Chapter 2: Examining Coming and Going(25 verses)

Question: In our everyday experience, we see actions happening in three times: past, future, and present. Since actions exist, it follows that all things must exist.

He replied:

What has already gone does not go, because it has already gone. If one claims there is an act of going apart from what has already gone, this is not so. What has not yet gone also does not go, because there is no going yet. The moment of going is called half gone and half not gone, but it does not exist apart from what has already gone and what has not yet gone.

Question:

Wherever there is movement, there must be a "going." When the eye sees something moving, there is activity in the process of going. In what has already gone, the activity has ceased. In what has not yet gone, there is no activity. Therefore, it should be understood that in the moment of going, there is indeed a going.

He replied:

When you say there is a time of going, that is not correct. Why? Because apart from the act of going, there is no such thing as a "time of going." If there were a time of going separate from the act of going, then going should be found within that time—like fruit inside a bowl. Furthermore:

If someone claims that movement does not exist in the past or the future, but that movement truly exists in the present moment, then that person is mistaken. If the present moment of movement exists independently of movement itself, then the two are not interdependent. Why? If one says that movement exists in the present moment, then movement and the present moment become two separate things—but in reality, this is not so. Therefore, it cannot be said that the present moment of movement exists apart from movement itself. Furthermore:

If we say that the act of going exists within the time of going, then a problem arises: there would be two acts of going—one because the act of going defines the time of going, and the other because the time of going contains the act of going.

Question: If there are two kinds of movement, what is the problem with that?

He replied:

If there were two acts of going, then there would be two goers. Why? Because the goer exists in dependence on the act of going. But it is not possible for one person to have two acts of going and two goers. Therefore, even in the moment of going, there is no going.

Question: It is acceptable to say that without a departure, there is no act of departing. But in the three times, there must certainly be someone who departs.

He replied:

If there is no one who goes, then the act of going cannot be established. So how can you claim that there is definitely a "goer" in the past, present, and future when the act of going itself does not exist?

There is no one who goes. Why? If there were someone who goes, there would be two kinds: one who goes, and one who does not go. Apart from these two, there is no third one who goes.

Question: If the one who goes is going, what is the fault in that?

He replied:

If you claim that there must be a mover who uses the act of moving, this is not correct. Why? Because apart from the act of moving, a mover cannot be found. If apart from the mover there definitely existed an act of moving, then the mover could use the act of moving—but in reality, that is not the case. Furthermore:

If we say that the one who goes uses the act of going, then there are two faults: within a single goer, there are two acts of going—one where the act of going establishes the goer, and another where the goer establishes the act of going. It is unreasonable to say that the goer is established first and then uses the act of going. Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that in the three times—past, present, and future—there is a fixed goer who uses the act of going. Furthermore:

If someone says that the one who goes can use the act of going, that person is mistaken, for the one who goes is separate from the act of going. Why? To say that the one who goes uses the act of going implies that the one who goes exists first, and the act of going comes afterward. This is not the case. Therefore, in the three times, there is no one who goes.

Moreover, if it were certain that there is an act of going and one who goes, there should be an initial movement. Yet, in the three times, seeking such a beginning cannot be found. Why?

Why is there no arising in the three times?

If a person has not yet set out, there is no "time of going" nor any "having gone." If there is a setting out, it should be in one of two states: either in the "time of going" or in "having gone." But neither is the case, because before going, there is no setting out. How could there be a setting out in the "not yet gone"? Since there is no setting out, there is no going; and since there is no going, there is no one who goes. How, then, can there be "having gone," "not yet gone," or "time of going"?

Question: If there is no going and no one who goes, then there should be staying and someone who stays.

If there is a state of rest, and there is something that is at rest, then either that which is moving should be at rest, or that which is not moving should be at rest. If we set aside these two, there should be a third kind of rest. But this is not the case.

That which is moving is not at rest, because its motion has not ceased; rest is defined as being contrary to motion. That which is not moving is also not at rest. Why? Because rest arises from the cessation of motion; without motion, there is no rest.

Apart from that which is moving and that which is not moving, there is no third thing that is at rest. If there were a third thing at rest, it would be included in either that which is moving or that which is not moving.

Therefore, we cannot say that that which is moving is at rest. Furthermore:

You say the one who goes is the one who stays. This is not correct. Why? Apart from the act of going, the one who goes cannot be found. If the one who goes is in the act of going, how could there be staying? Going and staying are contradictory. Furthermore:

If one claims that movement involves rest, then that person should be able to rest in the three states of movement: while moving, after having moved, or before moving. Yet rest is found in none of these three states. Therefore, your claim that movement involves rest is incorrect.

Just as movement and rest are refuted in this way, so too are arising and ceasing. Arising refers to the continuous process from seed to sprout, stem, and leaves. Ceasing refers to the end of the seed, followed by the end of the sprout, stem, and leaves. Continuity is called arising; interruption is called ceasing.

Similarly, from ignorance arise all conditioned formations, up to aging and death—this is called arising. When ignorance ceases, all conditioned formations and so on cease—this is called ceasing.

Question: Even though you refute the idea of movement and stillness from various angles, we still see with our own eyes that things move and remain still.

The answer was: The eyes cannot be trusted. If movement truly exists, is it achieved through a single principle, or through two? Both views are flawed. Why is that?

If the act of going and the one who goes were one and the same, that would not be correct. If they were different, that would also not be correct.

Question: What are the problems with considering things as either identical or separate?

He replied:

If these two are considered identical, it is flawed. Why? If the act of going itself is the goer, then there is confusion, disrupting the principle of dependent arising. Because there is the act of going, there is a goer; because there is a goer, there is the act of going. Moreover, going is a phenomenon, while the goer is a person. A person is considered permanent, whereas a phenomenon is impermanent. If they were one and the same, then both should be permanent or both impermanent. This leads to contradictions.

If they are considered separate, then they are incompatible. Without the act of going, there should still be a goer; without a goer, there should still be the act of going. They would not depend on each other, and if one ceases, the other would still exist. This also leads to contradictions.

If there is a goer and a going, whether they are the same thing or different things— both are impossible. It has already been explained that there is no third possibility.

If you claim they exist, you should explain the cause.

There is no going, no goer. Now let me explain further.

How can we know the one who goes by means of the act of going? That one who goes cannot use that act of going. Why? Because when that act of going does not yet exist, there is no one who goes, nor is there a time of going, a past going, or a future going. It is like first having a person and a town, and then something can arise. But the act of going and the one who goes are not like that—the one who goes is formed by the act of going, and the act of going is formed by the one who goes. Furthermore:

How can we know the one who goes by the means of going? The one who goes cannot be known through a separate act of going. Why? Because within a single goer, two acts of going cannot be found.

What is determined to exist is called inherently real, not arising from the act of going. The act of going refers to bodily movement. There are three aspects: not yet gone, already gone, and in the process of going. If there is a determined goer, then apart from the act of going, there should be a goer, and there should be no staying. Therefore, it is said that a determined goer cannot use the three aspects of going.

If the goer is not determined—not determined meaning inherently unreal—then the goer is named because of the act of going. Without the act of going, the goer cannot use the three aspects of going. Because of the act of going, there is a goer. If there is no act of going beforehand, then there is no goer. How can one say that an undetermined goer uses the three aspects of going?

The same applies to the act of going. If, apart from the goer, there is a determined act of going, then the act of going does not depend on the goer. Therefore, the goer cannot use the three aspects of the act of going. If there is definitely no act of going, what use is the goer?

Thus, upon reflection and examination, the act of going, the goer, and the destination—all these phenomena are mutually dependent. Because of the act of going, there is a goer; because of the goer, there is an act of going; and because of these two, there is a destination. One cannot say they definitely exist, nor can one say they definitely do not exist. Therefore, it is decisively understood that these three phenomena are illusory, empty, and without inherent existence. They are merely conventional names, like a dream or a magical illusion.