Twelve Gates Treatise (十二門論)

Contemplating the Presence or Absence of Results, Chapter 2

Furthermore, all phenomena are unborn. Why is that?

If the effect already existed in the cause, it would not need to arise. If it did not exist, it also could not arise. If it both existed and did not exist, it equally could not arise.

Why? If an effect existed within its cause beforehand and then came to be, the process would go on endlessly. If something that had not yet arisen were to arise, then once it has arisen, it should arise again. Why? Because the cause perpetually contains it. Thus, from that existing state it would have to arise repeatedly, leading to an infinite regress.

If it is said that what is born no longer comes to be, and what has not yet been born now comes to be—there is no principle of arising in either case. Therefore, the idea that something that already exists comes into being is not correct.

Furthermore, if one claims that the effect already exists within the cause, and thus speaks of "not yet arisen yet arising" or "already arisen yet not arising," this would mean both exist simultaneously—one arising and one not—which is impossible.

Furthermore, if what has not yet arisen were to truly exist, then once it arose it would cease to exist. Why? Because arising and not-yet-arisen are fundamentally opposed to each other; since they are opposites, their functions and characteristics are also contradictory.

Furthermore, existence and non-existence are opposites. If something that has already arisen could also be said to exist before it arose, then there would be no difference between having arisen and not yet having arisen. Why? Because if arising can apply equally to what has arisen and what has not, then what distinction remains between the two? Since no distinction can be made between arising and not arising, this view is invalid. Therefore, existence does not truly arise.

Furthermore, if something already exists, why should it be born again? Just as what is already done should not be done again, and what is already achieved should not be achieved again, therefore, a thing that already exists should not be born.

Furthermore, if something were truly born from a cause, then before it was born, its effect should already be visible within that cause. But in reality, it is not. For example, a jar should be visible in clay, or a mat should be visible in reeds, yet they are not. Therefore, there is no true arising.

Question: "Although the fruit exists beforehand, it is not seen because it has not yet transformed."

Answer: "If a clay pot is invisible before it is made because its form has not yet changed, then by what sign do you claim the pot already exists in the clay? Is it because the pot's form exists there? Or because the cow's form or horse's form is in the clay? If the pot's form is not in the clay, neither are the cow's or horse's forms — wouldn't that simply mean the clay contains none of these things? So your claim that the effect already exists in the cause before it appears is not valid.

Furthermore, if change itself is the effect, then change should already exist in the cause beforehand. Why? Because in your view, the effect pre-exists in the cause. If the pot and other things already exist, change should also already exist and be observable — yet it is not actually found. So your argument that it is invisible because it has not yet changed does not hold.

If you say that what has not yet changed should not be called an effect, then the effect can never be obtained at all. Why? Because if this change did not exist before, it should not exist afterward either — so the pot and other effects could never truly be obtained. If you say that something becomes an effect only after it has changed, then it did not exist beforehand in the cause — this makes your position inconsistent: sometimes you say the effect pre-exists in the cause, sometimes that it does not."

Question: “A transformation may exist yet remain unseen. All things can exist yet be inaccessible—some are near yet unknowable, some are distant and unknowable, some are unknowable because the senses are impaired, some because the mind is unsteady, some because of obstruction, some because of similarity, some because of superiority, some because of subtlety.

Near yet unknowable: like medicine applied to the eye. Distant yet unknowable: like a bird soaring high into the vast sky, vanishing far away. Unknowable due to impaired senses: like the blind who cannot see forms, the deaf who cannot hear sounds, the congested nose that cannot smell scents, the dulled tongue that cannot taste flavors, the numb body that cannot feel touch, or the disturbed mind that cannot perceive reality. Unknowable because the mind is unsteady: like when the mind is fixed on forms, it does not hear sounds. Unknowable due to obstruction: like the earth blocking a great body of water, or a wall blocking external objects. Unknowable because of similarity: like black ink spots on a black surface. Unknowable because of superiority: like when the sound of bells and drums prevails, the sound of a gentle tap goes unheard. Unknowable because of subtlety: like fine dust particles that are invisible.

Thus, although these phenomena exist, they remain unknowable due to these eight causes. Your claim that transformation cannot be found in the cause, and that the pot and so forth cannot be found, is not valid. Why? Because although these things exist, they are inaccessible due to these eight causes.”

Answer: "Transformation and the vessel and other effects cannot be obtained through these eight causes. Why? If transformation and the vessel are too close to be obtained, they should be obtainable at a slight distance; if too far to be obtained, they should be obtainable at a slight proximity; if unattainable due to impaired faculties, they should be attainable when faculties are sound; if unattainable due to a distracted mind, they should be attainable when the mind is focused; if unattainable due to obstruction, transformation and the vessel should be unobstructed and attainable; if unattainable due to sameness, they should be attainable at a different time; if unattainable due to superiority, they should be attainable when superiority ceases; if unattainable due to subtlety, then the coarse effects like the vessel should be attainable. If the vessel is too subtle to be obtained, then even after it arises, it should also be unobtainable. Why? Because the subtle nature of the arisen and not-yet-arisen is the same—both the arisen and not-yet-arisen states definitely exist."

Question: "Before it arises, it is subtle; after it arises, it becomes coarse. Therefore, once it has arisen, it can be perceived, but before arising, it cannot be grasped."

Answer: "If that were so, then there would be no result within the cause. Why? Because within the cause, there is no coarse form. Moreover, if the coarse form were already present in the cause, then it could not be called fine, and thus it would not be obtainable. But the actual result is coarse; you say it is unobtainable because it is fine—then this coarse thing would not be the result. Since the actual result truly cannot be unobtainable, and yet it is indeed obtained, it is not the case that it is unobtainable due to being fine. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the result exists in the cause beforehand but is simply unobtainable due to the eight conditions."

Furthermore, if the effect already existed within the cause beforehand, then the nature of the cause and the nature of the effect would both be undermined. Why? For example, when a cloth is in threads, or a fruit is in a container—these are just locations, not causes. Why? Because the threads and the container are not the cloth or the fruit themselves; they are not their causes. If the cause is invalid, the effect is also invalid. Therefore, threads and the like are not the causes of cloth and the like. When there is no cause, there is no effect. Why? It is due to the cause that the effect comes into being; if the cause does not establish the effect, how can the effect be established?

Furthermore, if something is not brought into being, it cannot be called an effect. Thread and other causes cannot produce cloth and other effects. Why? Because thread does not depend on cloth for its existence in order to produce cloth as an effect. In the same way, there would be no cause and no effect. If both cause and effect are absent, then one should not seek to determine whether the effect already existed in the cause or did not exist in the cause beforehand.

Furthermore, if the effect were already present in the cause but could not be perceived, there should be some sign of it—just as the scent of fragrance tells you there are flowers, the sound of a voice tells you there are birds, the sound of laughter tells you there are people, seeing smoke tells you there is fire, and seeing cranes tells you there is a pond. In the same way, if the effect already existed in the cause, there should be a sign of it. Yet here, neither the effect itself can be found, nor any sign of it can be found. From this, you should know: the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.

Furthermore, if the effect already existed within the cause, then we could not say that cloth comes from threads or that a mat comes from reeds. If the cause does not produce it, could something else? For instance, if cloth is not made from threads, could it be made from reeds? If neither threads nor reeds produce it, could we say it comes from nothing at all? If it comes from nothing, then it cannot be called an effect. If there is no effect, there is no cause either, as explained earlier. Therefore, the idea that the effect pre-exists in the cause is not valid.

Furthermore, if an effect did not arise from any cause, it would be permanent, like the nature of Nirvana. If the effect were permanent, then all conditioned phenomena would also be permanent. Why? Because all conditioned things are effects. If all things were permanent, there would be no impermanence. If there were no impermanence, there would also be no permanence. Why? Because permanence is defined in relation to impermanence, and impermanence in relation to permanence. Thus, if both permanence and impermanence were absent, that would be impossible. Therefore, one cannot claim that an effect exists within its cause beforehand.

Furthermore, if the effect already existed within the cause, then that effect would itself become the cause of yet another effect—just as cloth serves as the cause of clothing, or a mat as the cause of protection, or a cart as the cause of carrying. But in reality, these do not serve as causes for further effects. Therefore, it cannot be said that the effect pre-exists within the cause.

If one argues: "Just as the earth holds fragrance, which only emerges when water is sprinkled upon it, similarly an effect cannot act as a cause until it encounters the right conditions"—this reasoning is flawed. Why? Because in your view, only that which is actualized can be called an effect, while objects like pots are not effects. The reason is that actualization is an active process, whereas pots and similar things already exist and are not the result of that process. Thus, you would be defining the effect solely in terms of its actualization.

Therefore, the claim that the effect exists beforehand within the cause is incorrect.

Furthermore, the illuminating cause only reveals what is already there; it does not create things. For example, when we light a lamp to see a vase in the dark, the same light also reveals other objects like bedding. However, when we combine various conditions to make a vase, those conditions cannot produce bedding or other objects. From this, we should understand that the effect does not exist within the cause beforehand, waiting to be born.

Furthermore, if the effect already existed within the cause, there would be no difference between what is being made now and what will be made later. But you acknowledge this distinction between present and future making—therefore, the effect does not pre-exist in the cause.

"If it is said that an effect arises even though it did not exist in its cause, this is also incorrect. Why? If something could come into being from nothing, then a second head or a third arm should also arise. Why? Because they too would be arising from nothing."

Question: "Objects like a vase have causes and conditions, so why do a second head or a third arm, which lack such causes, come into being? Therefore, your assertion does not hold."

Answer: "The second head, the third hand, and the jar—these effects do not exist in their causes. For example, a jar is not present in a lump of clay, nor is it present in a stone. So why is the clay called the cause of the jar, but not the stone? And why is milk called the cause of cheese, or threads the cause of cloth, but not reeds?"

Furthermore, if an effect could arise from a cause that did not already contain it, then any one thing could give rise to all things—for instance, the tip of a finger could produce a cart, a horse, food, and so on. In the same way, threads should not only produce cloth but also carts, horses, food, and other things. Why? If something can arise from nothing, then why do threads only produce cloth and not carts, horses, or food? Because they are equally lacking in all of them.

If an effect could arise from a cause that did not already contain it, then no cause would have its own specific power to produce its own result. For example, someone needing oil would get it from sesame seeds, not from pressing sand. But if both were equally lacking in oil, why seek it from sesame rather than press sand? One might say, "We have seen oil come from sesame and not from sand, so we seek it from sesame and not from sand." But this reasoning does not hold. Why? If the nature of arising were established, one could say, "At other times we have seen oil come from sesame and not from sand, so we seek it from sesame and not from sand." However, since the nature of arising is not established for any phenomenon, one cannot claim, "At other times we have seen oil come from sesame, so we seek it from sesame and not from sand."

"Moreover, if the effect arises without being present in its cause, then the defining characteristics of a cause would not hold. Why? If there is no cause, how could anything be produced or accomplished? Without production or accomplishment, how could it be called a cause? In this way, the agent cannot have anything it acts upon, and the instrument of action cannot have anything it accomplishes either."

If it is said that the effect already exists within the cause, then there should be no distinction between the action, the agent, and the act itself. Why? If the effect already exists, what need is there to act again? Therefore, you claim that the causes—action, agent, and act—are all unobtainable.

But to say the effect does not exist in the cause and then arises is also not correct. Why? If a person accepts that the agent and action are distinctly subject to cause and effect, they might raise this objection; however, I say that agent, action, and cause-and-effect are all empty. If you refute agent, action, and cause-and-effect, you actually affirm my teaching—it is not a valid objection. Therefore, the idea that an effect arises from a cause where it did not previously exist is not valid either.

Furthermore, whether the effect already exists within the cause or does not exist within it—this has already been refuted in the discussion of existence and non-existence above. Therefore, the effect is not produced from a cause in which it already exists, nor from a cause in which it does not exist, nor from a cause in which it both exists and does not exist. The reasoning reaches its limit here. Since the effect cannot be found anywhere upon thorough investigation, it ultimately does not arise. Because the effect ultimately does not arise, all conditioned phenomena are empty. Why? Because all conditioned phenomena are effects arising from causes.