觀一異門第六
Chapter 6: The Gate of Oneness and Difference
復次，一切法空。何以故？
Furthermore, all phenomena are empty. Why is this so?
相及與可相， 一、異不可得；
若無有一、異， 是二云何成？
The sign and what can be signified Cannot be found as one or different. If there is neither oneness nor difference, How can these two be established?
是相、可相，若一不可得，異亦不可得；若一、異不可得，是二則不成，是故相、可相皆空。相、可相空故，一切法皆空。
The nature of a sign and that which is signified cannot be grasped as one and the same, nor as separate and different. Since neither oneness nor difference can be established, these two concepts cannot stand. Therefore, both signs and the things they signify are empty. Because signs and what they signify are empty, all phenomena are empty.
問曰：「相、可相常成，何故不成？汝說相、可相，一、異不可得，今當說：凡物，或相即是可相，或相異可相，或少分是相餘是可相。如識相是識，離所用識更無識；如受相是受，離所用受更無受，如是等相即是可相。如佛說滅愛名涅槃，愛是有為有漏法，滅是無為無漏法；如信者有三相，樂親近善人、樂欲聽法、樂行布施，是三事身、口業故色陰所攝，信是心數法故行陰所攝，是名相與可相異。如正見是道相，於道是少分；又生、住、滅是有為相，於有為法是少分，如是於可相中少分名相。是故，或相即可相，或相異可相，或可相少分為相；汝言一、異不成，故相、可相不成者，是事不然。」
Question: "Is the relationship between a characteristic and what it characterizes always fixed? Why is it that sometimes a defining mark and the thing it defines cannot be established as either the same or different? Let me explain. There are three possible relationships:
First, sometimes the characteristic **is** the thing it characterizes. For example, the nature of consciousness *is* consciousness itself—apart from its function of knowing, there is no separate 'consciousness.' Likewise, the nature of sensation *is* sensation. In these cases, the characteristic and the thing are identical.
Second, sometimes the characteristic and the thing are **different**. For example, the Buddha said that extinguishing craving is nirvana. Craving is a conditioned phenomenon with defilements, while extinguishing is unconditioned and free of defilements. Similarly, a faithful person has three marks: they enjoy亲近 good people, delight in hearing the Dharma, and love to practice generosity. These three are physical and verbal actions (form aggregate), while faith itself is a mental factor (formation aggregate). Here, the marks and the thing are distinct.
Third, sometimes the characteristic is only a **part** of the thing it characterizes. For example, right view is a part of the path. Or, arising, dwelling, and ceasing are characteristics of conditioned phenomena, but they are only partial aspects of those phenomena.
Therefore, the relationship varies: sometimes it's identity, sometimes difference, and sometimes a part. Your claim that because neither identity nor difference can be established, the idea of characteristic and thing-characterized is invalid—that is incorrect."
答曰：「汝說或相是可相，如識等。是事不然。何以故？以相故可知，名可相，所用者名為相。凡物不能自知，如指不能自觸，如眼不能自見，是故汝說識即是相、可相，是事不然。
Reply: "You argue that the characteristic and the characterized are identical, as with consciousness and its objects. This is not the case. Why? Because a characteristic is that which allows something to be known; what is known is called 'the characterized,' and that which is used to know it is called 'the characteristic.' A thing cannot know itself—just as a finger cannot touch itself, and the eye cannot see itself. Therefore, what you say—that consciousness is both the characteristic and the characterized—is incorrect."
「復次，若相即是可相者，不應分別是相、是可相；若分別是相、是可相者，不應言相即是可相。
"Further, if the characteristic were identical to what it characterizes, there would be no distinction between the two. If we could distinguish them, it wouldn't be accurate to say the characteristic and the characterized are the same."
「復次，若相即是可相者，因果則一。何以故？相是因，可相是果，是二則一；而實不一，是故相即是可相，是事不然。
「汝說相異可相者，是亦不然。汝說滅愛是涅槃相，不說愛是涅槃相；若說愛是涅槃相，應言相、可相異；若言滅愛是涅槃相者，則不得言相可相異。
「又汝說信者有三相，俱不異，信若無信則無此三事，是故不得相、可相異。又相、可相異者，相更復應有相，則為無窮。是事不然，是故相、可相不得異。」
問曰：「如燈能自照亦能照彼，如是相能自相亦能相彼。」
答曰：「汝說燈喻，三有為相中已破。又自違先說，汝上言相、可相異，而今言相自能相亦能相彼。是事不然。又汝說可相中少分是相者。是事不然。何以故？此義或在一中、或在異中，一異義先已破故，當知少分相亦破。如是種種因緣相、可相，一不可得、異不可得，更無第三法成相可相，是故相、可相俱空。是二空故，一切法皆空。」
Reply: "You used the analogy of a lamp, but the concept of 'three conditioned characteristics' has already been refuted. Moreover, you contradict your own earlier statement—you previously said that the characteristic and the thing characterized are different, yet now you claim that a characteristic can characterize itself and also characterize others. This is not correct. Furthermore, your assertion that 'a partial characteristic exists within the thing characterized' is also incorrect. Why? Because this idea either falls under the category of 'identity' or 'difference.' Since the concepts of identity and difference have already been refuted, you should understand that the notion of a partial characteristic is likewise refuted. Thus, through various reasons, the characteristic and the thing characterized—whether as one or as different—cannot be established. There is no third way to establish them. Therefore, both the characteristic and the thing characterized are empty. Because these two are empty, all phenomena are empty as well."