大乘成業論一卷
Mahayana Doctrine of Karma, One Volume
世親菩薩造
Composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu
大唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯
Translated by the Tang Dynasty Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by Imperial Decree
如處處經中世尊說三業,謂身業、語業、意業。此中有說身所造業故名身業,語即是業故名語業,此二皆用表與無表為其自性。意相應業故名意業,此業但以思為自性。今於此中何法名表?且身表業形色為性,緣此為境心等所生。誰之形色謂身形色?若身形色,何故前言身所造業故名身業?謂總名身一分攝故,名身形色。依身大種而發生故,名身所造。以總身言於別亦轉,如世間說居邑住林。何緣復說緣此為境心等所生?為欲簡彼脣等形色,彼非緣彼心等所生,以緣言音心等生故。又為簡彼宿願心等所引形色,彼非緣彼心等所生,餘異熟因心等生故。何故名表?此能表示自發業心令他知故。為顯此義,故說頌言:
As the Sutra on Every Occasion states, the World-Honored One spoke of three kinds of karma: bodily karma, verbal karma, and mental karma. Here, it is said that what is done through the body is called bodily karma; speech itself is called verbal karma. Both of these have manifestation and non-manifestation as their intrinsic nature. Karma associated with the mind is called mental karma, and this karma has intention as its intrinsic nature. Now, what is meant by "manifestation"? Bodily manifest karma takes form and color as its nature; it is generated by the mind and so forth based on this as an object. Whose form and color? The form and color of the body. If it is the form and color of the body, why was it earlier said that what is done through the body is called bodily karma? Because it is included as a part of the whole body, it is called the body's form and color. It arises dependent on the primary elements of the body, hence it is called something done through the body. The term "body" is also applied to its parts, just as in worldly speech one speaks of "living in a village" or "dwelling in a forest." Why is it further stated that it is "generated by the mind and so forth based on this as an object"? This is to distinguish it from the form and color of the lips and so forth, which are not generated by the mind based on this as an object, since they are generated by the mind based on speech sounds. It is also to distinguish form and color arising from prior vows and the mind, which are not generated by the mind based on this as an object; they are produced by other karmic retribution causes and the mind. Why is it called "manifestation"? Because it can indicate the mind that initiated the action, making it known to others. To clarify this meaning, the verse states:
由外發身語, 表內心所思,
譬彼潛淵魚, 鼓波而自表。
From what's within, words and actions flow, Revealing the thoughts that one comes to know— Like a fish lurking in deep water's bed, Who stirs up ripples to show where it's led.
形色者何?謂長等性。何者長等?謂於彼生長等名想。此攝在何處?謂色處所攝。今應思擇:長等為是極微差別猶如顯色?為是極微差別積聚?為別一物遍色等聚?設爾何失?長等若是極微差別,應如顯色,諸色聚中一一細分,長等可取。若是極微差別積聚,此與顯色極微積聚有何差別?即諸顯色積聚差別應成長等。若別一物遍色等聚,一故遍故,一一分中應全可取,於一切分皆具有故;或應非一,於諸分中各別住故。又壞自宗十處皆是極微積聚。又應朋助食米齊宗執實有分遍諸分故。即於和合諸聚色中,見一面多便起長覺、見一面少便起短覺、見四面等便起方覺、見諸面滿便起圓覺、見中凸出便起高覺、見中坳凹便起下覺、見面齊平起於正覺、見面參差起不正覺,如旋轉輪觀錦繡時便生種種異形類覺,不應實有異類形色同在一處如諸顯色。若許爾者,應於一一處起一切形覺。然無是事,是故形色無別有體,即諸顯色於諸方面安布不同起長等覺,如樹蟻等行列無過。若爾云何?於遠闇處不了顯色,了形色耶?如何不了樹等形色,而能了彼行列形耶?然離樹等無別行列,或於遠闇諸聚色中若顯若形俱不能了,雖復能取而不分明,疑是何物、此何所見?由是應知但取顯色,由遠闇故見不分明,故表是形理不成立。
What is shape or form? It refers to characteristics like length and so forth. What are length and the like? They are names and concepts that arise based on growth and extension. Where are these included? They belong to the category of visible objects. Now we must carefully consider: Are length and the like subtle differentiations of particles, similar to color? Or are they accumulations of subtle differentiations of particles? Or are they separate entities that pervade clusters of color and so on?
If this is the case, what would be the flaw? If length and the like were subtle differentiations of particles, then just like color, within every cluster of matter, each minute part should individually give rise to perceptions of length. If they were accumulations of subtle differentiations of particles, what difference would there be between this and accumulations of color particles? The very differences in the accumulation of colors should then constitute length and the like. If there were a separate entity that pervades clusters of color and so on, then because it is one and pervasive, it should be fully perceivable in every single part, since it exists in all parts; or perhaps it should not be one, because it dwells separately in each part. Moreover, this would contradict one's own school's tenet that all twelve sense bases are accumulations of subtle particles. It would also support the school of the "rice-porridge-eaters," who hold that parts truly exist and pervade all parts.
Therefore, within the combined aggregate of matter, when we see one side as abundant, we develop the perception of length; when we see one side as scarce, we develop the perception of shortness; when we see four sides as equal, we develop the perception of squareness; when we see all sides as full, we develop the perception of roundness; when we see a protrusion in the middle, we develop the perception of height; when we see a depression in the middle, we develop the perception of lowness; when we see the surface as smooth, we develop the perception of evenness; when we see the surface as uneven, we develop the perception of unevenness. Just as when we observe brocade while turning a wheel, various perceptions of different shapes arise. It is not reasonable that truly existing different forms could all dwell in the same place, as colors do. If we allowed that, then we should perceive all shapes in every single place. Yet this is not the case. Therefore, shape and form have no separate substance; they are simply the different arrangements of colors in various directions that give rise to perceptions like length, just as there is nothing wrong with the rows of trees or ants.
If that is so, then how is it that in a distant or dark place, we're unable to perceive color but can perceive shape? For example, how can we not perceive the shape of a tree but still perceive the shape of its row? However, there is no row apart from the trees. Or perhaps, in a distant or dark place, within the clusters of matter, both color and shape cannot be perceived clearly. Even if we can detect something, it is not distinct—we wonder what it is. What is it we are seeing? Therefore, we should understand that we are merely perceiving color, but due to distance or darkness, the perception is not clear. Hence, the argument that shape is indicated separately from color is not logically established.
有說:身表行動為性,緣此為境,心等所生。何緣復說緣此為境心等所生?為欲簡彼脣等搖動,彼非緣彼心等所生,以緣言音心等生故。云何名行動?謂轉至餘方。此攝在何處?謂色處所攝。何緣知此轉至餘方?謂差別相不可知故。此理不然,如熟變物,雖纔觸火,光雪酢等諸熟變緣即有差別,而不可知彼差別相。然彼前後非無有異,此亦應然。如長薪草眾分相似,各別生焰雖有差別,而不可知彼差別相。然彼眾分非無有異,此亦應然。若熟變物纔觸緣時諸熟變相不即生者,彼於後時亦應不生,緣無異故。若長薪草眾分相似非分分中別生焰者,彼焰應無,由彼別故形量照明焰熱差別。是故不應以差別相不可知故,便謂即此轉至餘方,應審了知彼差別相。若謂滅因不可得故,知即此法轉至餘方。此亦非理,如心心所聲燈焰等,有何滅因而念念滅?餘亦應爾,滅不待因。若言心等亦有滅因,謂唯各別自無常相。若爾,何故餘不許然?餘既不然,此云何爾?故知心等滅不待因。心等既然,餘亦應爾。若餘法滅不待因者,薪等未與火等合前,彼色等性應不可取。如合後位,後亦應如前位可取。如何風手未觸未執燈鈴已前,燈焰鈴聲分明可取非於後位?然焰聲滅不待風手,薪等亦然不應為難。又若薪等由火等滅,彼色等性不可取者,纔觸無間應不可取,彼纔觸時有差別故,又彼外緣無差別故。諸熟變物下中上品,諸熟變相差別生時,由彼為因,後後生起、前前滅壞。誰復為因?不應此法由彼故生,即此復由彼法故滅,二相違法非共一因,世極成立。故有為法不待滅因,任運自滅。如前可取、不可取者,應知相續隨轉滅壞差別之相有微增故。又若滅法亦有因者,是則應無無因滅法。心心所等如待因生,滅亦應爾,非離心等別有無常世共成立。又因異故滅應差別,如火光雪酢等異故熟變差別。又已滅法應更可滅,許有因故,猶如色等。是故滅法決定無因。滅無因故纔生即滅,故知無有轉至餘方。若謂生因不可得故,知即此法轉至餘方。此亦非理,有生因故,謂前與後而作生因,如前念心與後念心、前念熟變與後熟變、乳與其酪、葡萄汁與酒、酒復與酢等,故無少法轉至餘方。轉相既無,何有行動?又若有住則無行動,既無行動彼應常住。法若無住亦無行動,纔生即滅,無動義故。若爾,現見行動者何?餘方所見,非即本物。何緣知彼非本物耶?由彼彼方新新生故。如草火焰及如影行,非此方影餘方可見形質不動,日等光明遠近迴轉,便見彼影或長或短或移轉故。又障光明少分生故。有反詰言:何緣徵難至餘方義?且如何知餘方所見非即本物?此亦應引前理為證,謂若有住則無動等。又外火等緣無差別,而於後時差別可取,由此證知念念各別。又若以證異因無故,謂餘所見還是本物。既無有因,證即本物,何緣不謂非本物耶?由此二義應俱不定,故至餘方義不成立。
Some say: "An action of the body is in the nature of movement, and it arises from the mind and other conditions conditioned on that." Why is it said again, "conditioned on that, the mind and others arise"? In order to exclude the mere shaking of the lips, etc., which does not arise from the mind and others conditioned on that; for it arises from the mind conditioned on speech. What is called "movement"? It means reaching another place. Where is this included? It is included in the category of visible form. How is it known that this reaches another place? Because the characteristic of the difference cannot be known. This reasoning is not correct. For example, in the case of a transformed thing, although when it first touches fire, light, snow, vinegar, and other transformative conditions, there is immediately a difference, yet the characteristic of that difference cannot be known. Nevertheless, its before and after are not without difference. This should also be the same. For example, in a long firewood or grass, the parts are similar; individually produced flames, though having differences, yet the characteristic of those differences cannot be known. Nevertheless, those parts are not without difference. This should also be the same. If, when a transformed thing first touches the conditions, the characteristics of transformation do not arise immediately, then it would not arise later either, because the conditions are not different. If, in a long firewood or grass where the parts are similar, a flame is not separately born in each part, then that flame would be non-existent; for because of those differences, there are differences in shape, size, illumination, and heat of the flame. Therefore, one should not, because the characteristic of the difference cannot be known, assert that this very thing reaches another place. One should carefully discern that characteristic of the difference.
If someone says: "Because a cause of the cessation cannot be obtained, we know that this very dharma reaches another place," this is also not reasonable. For example, in the case of mind, mental factors, sound, lamp-flame, etc., what cause of cessation exists for their moment-by-moment cessation? Others should also be the same; cessation does not depend on a cause. If one says that mind, etc., also have a cause of cessation, namely, their own respective nature of impermanence, then why do others not allow this? Since others do not allow it, why should this be the case? Therefore, it is known that the cessation of mind, etc., does not depend on a cause. Since mind, etc., are thus, others should also be the same. If the cessation of other dharmas did not depend on a cause, then before firewood, etc., are combined with fire, etc., their nature of form, etc., should be imperceptible. Just as in the state after combination, so too afterwards, they should be perceptible as in the state before. How is it that before the wind or hand has not touched or taken hold of a lamp or bell, the lamp-flame and bell-sound are clearly perceptible, and not in the later state? Yet the cessation of flame and sound does not depend on wind or hand. Firewood, etc., being similar, should not create a difficulty.
Furthermore, if firewood, etc., were destroyed by fire, etc., and their nature of form, etc., became imperceptible, then as soon as they touch, they should become imperceptible; for at the moment of touching, there is a difference, and also those external conditions are without difference. In the case of the various transformed things, when characteristics of transformation of lower, middle, and higher grades arise, with that as the cause, later ones arise successively, and earlier ones are destroyed. What again is the cause? It is not proper that this dharma, because it arises from that, should also be destroyed by that dharma. Two contradictory dharmas do not share one single cause; this is firmly established in the world. Therefore, conditioned dharmas, without depending on a cause of cessation, cease by themselves spontaneously. Regarding the previous perception and the later non-perception, it should be known that there is a slight increase in the characteristic of difference when the continuum is transmitted and destroyed.
Furthermore, if a ceasing dharma also has a cause, then there would be no ceasing dharma without a cause. Mind, mental factors, etc., depending on a cause, arise; cessation should also be the same. There is no impermanence established in the world separately from mind, etc. Moreover, because the cause is different, the cessation should be different, just as the differences in transformation arise from the differences between fire, light, snow, vinegar, etc. Moreover, a dharma that has already ceased should be c e able again, because a cause is admitted, just like form, etc. Therefore, a ceasing dharma is definitely without a cause. Because cessation is without cause, it ceases as soon as it arises. Hence, it is known that there is no reaching of another place.
If someone says: "Because a cause of arising cannot be obtained, we know that this very dharma reaches another place," this is also unreasonable. For there is a cause of arising, namely, the former acts as the cause of arising for the latter. For example, the former moment of mind acts for the latter moment of mind, the former transformation acts for the latter transformation, milk for curd, grape juice for wine, wine for vinegar, etc. Therefore, there is not even a single dharma that reaches another place. Since a reaching action does not exist, how can there be movement? Furthermore, if there is abiding, then there is no movement. Since there is no movement, it (the dharma) should be permanent. If a dharma has no abiding, neither is there movement. As soon as it arises, it ceases; there is no meaning of motion. If so, what is it that is seen in the present world as movement? That which is seen in another place is not the original thing itself. How is it known that it is not the original thing? Because in each and every place, new ones arise and arise. For example, the flame of grass and the movement of a shadow: it is not that the shadow of this place is seen in another place while the substance remains motionless; but because the light of the sun, etc., revolves far and near, that shadow is seen as either long or short, or as moving. Furthermore, a small portion of the obstruction of light is produced.
There is a counter-question: "Why do you press this difficulty regarding the meaning 'reaching another place'? Moreover, how does one know that what is seen in another place is not the original thing?" This should also be proven by the previous reasoning, namely, if there is abiding, then there is no motion, etc. Furthermore, when the external conditions like fire, etc., are not different, yet a difference is perceived later, this proves that each moment is distinct. Moreover, if one argues that because there is no evidence of a different cause, what is seen elsewhere is still the original thing—since there is no cause proving it is the original thing, why not say it is not the original thing? Thus, both these positions are uncertain. Therefore, the meaning of 'reaching another place' is not established.
日出論者作如是言:諸行實無至餘方義,有為法性念念滅故。然別有法心差別為因,依手足等起,此法能作手足等物。異方生因是名行動,亦名身表。此攝在何處?謂色處所攝。若爾,何緣不許眼見如諸顯色?既非所見、不表示他,如何名表?復云何知此法實有?云何此法能令自身轉趣餘方別異而起?若言由心差別,所生風界即應如是。風界其性是動,足能為彼異方生因。何乃離風執有動法?又草葉等離外風界無別動法,云何移轉?然諸風界搖觸等生,其性能動,即應許彼能令手等轉餘方生,何勞別執?若體若用俱不極成能動法生。
The proponents of arising-from-sunrise claim: All conditioned things truly have no meaning that extends to other places, because the nature of conditioned phenomena is to cease in each moment. However, there exists a phenomenon distinguished by mental distinction as cause, arising based on hands, feet, etc. This phenomenon can create things such as hands and feet. That which generates arising in a different place is called "action" and also "bodily expression." In which category is this included? It is included in the domain of visible form. If so, why is it not accepted as visible to the eye like other manifest colors? Since it is not seen and does not indicate others, how can it be called "expression"? And how do we know this phenomenon truly exists? How does this phenomenon cause one's own body to turn toward another place, arising distinctly? If it is said to arise from mental distinctions, then the wind element generated should be exactly like this. The wind element has movement as its nature; it alone can serve as the cause of arising in a different place for the feet. Why cling to a movement phenomenon apart from wind? Furthermore, for grass, leaves, etc., apart from the external wind element, there is no separate movement phenomenon—how do they shift? Yet, the wind element produces sensations like shaking, and its nature is movement; it should be accepted as able to cause hands, etc., to transition and arise in other places. Why bother with a separate grasping? Whether in substance or function, the view that a movement phenomenon arises is not universally established.
若不爾者,即心差別所生風界,能為手等異方生因,應是身表。如是風界無所表示,云何名表?又許觸處是善不善,便非釋子。
If it were otherwise, the element of wind (air) produced by the mind’s distinctions would serve as the cause for movements of the hand and other limbs in various directions, and this would be considered bodily expression. But since the wind element itself has no designated meaning, how can it be called an expression? Furthermore, asserting that tangible objects can be classified as wholesome or unwholesome contradicts the teachings of the Buddha’s disciples.
若不爾者,即心差別能令自身餘方生起,即身生起,應是身表。是則身表應假非實,自身多法合為體故。又無表示,云何名表?香等不能表示他故。又許香等是善不善,便非釋子。若不爾者,即心差別所生顯色應是身表,顯色非心差別所起,自種子風差別生故。又許顯色是善不善,便非釋子。若此顯色體非身表,此餘方生應是身表。天愛任汝於此表業盡力所能勤加轉計,然此非用功力能成,何乃於中徒生勞倦?誰能成立生別有體?此所執生,非如色等是所現見、非如眼等是能現見,何緣知有?又不可見,云何名表?前說不能表示他故。又若顯色是善不善,可說此生為身表業。然諸顯色非善不善,前已說故。生亦應然,是故定無身實表業。若爾,身業應唯無表。此無表名為目何法?謂法處攝律儀色等。云何欲界有善無表離表而發?若欲界中有此無表,復有何過?應隨心轉,如在色界。是則餘心及無心位,應無律儀不律儀等。若謂受時要期發語所引發故無斯過者,說戒經時默無所說亦無要期,如何獲得虛誑語罪。又應無有無記身業,以無表業唯二種故。又亦應無一剎那頃善惡身業,以諸無表定相續故。謂若輕心不發無表,重心所發決定相續,雖彼隨情計度,實有身語業色,而不應成善不善性。所以者何?彼說色業於命終位必皆捨故,如何由此能得當來愛非愛果?有作是言:此何非理。謂過去業其體實有,能得當來所感果故。此於癰上更復生癰,謂執過去業體實有,先有後無名為過去,如何可執其體實有?若爾,世尊何故自說:
If it is not so, then mental distinctions cause the body to arise elsewhere in other forms. Yet if it is the body itself that arises, that should be "bodily expression." In that case, bodily expression would be nominal, not real, because one's own body is a composite of many factors. Moreover, if there is no communication, why call it "expression"? Fragrance, for instance, cannot convey a message to another. Furthermore, if you assert that fragrance can be virtuous or non-virtuous, then you are not a disciple of the Buddha. If it is not so, then the visible forms born from mental distinctions should be considered bodily expression. But visible forms are not produced merely by mental distinctions; they arise from their own seeds, which are influenced by the wind element. Also, if you claim that visible forms are virtuous or non-virtuous, you are not a follower of the Buddha. If these visible forms are not inherently bodily expression, then what arises elsewhere in other forms should still be bodily expression. Dear one, you may exhaust your efforts in endlessly redefining and reinterpreting this concept of action, but this is not something that can be accomplished through force of effort. Why do you trouble yourself with wearisome labor? Who can establish that "life" has a separate essence? This "life" you cling to is not like form, which is directly visible; nor is it like the eye, the organ that sees. How, then, can we know it exists? Moreover, if it is invisible, how can it be called "expression"? As stated earlier, it cannot convey meaning to another. Also, if visible forms could be virtuous or non-virtuous, you might claim that this life is the bodily expression of action. However, as already explained, visible forms are neither virtuous nor non-virtuous. The same applies to life. Therefore, there is definitely no real, substantial bodily action.
If that is the case, then bodily deeds should be only non-expressive. What does the term "non-expressive" refer to? It refers to the precepts, which are mental factors—forms of discipline and so forth. Why would the desire realm have virtuous non-expressive actions that arise independently of express actions? If the desire realm does have such non-expressive actions, what fault would there be? They should follow the mind, as in the form realm. In that case, during other mental states or states without mind, there should be no discipline or indiscipline. Suppose one argues that when receiving the precepts, it is a verbal commitment that initiates it, so there is no such flaw. But when reciting the precepts in a ceremony, without speaking or making such a commitment, how does one acquire the offense of false speech? Furthermore, there would be no neutral bodily deeds, because non-expressive actions are only of two kinds [virtuous and non-virtuous]. Moreover, there would be no moment of virtuous or non-virtuous bodily action, because non-expressive actions are necessarily continuous. To explain: if the mind is weak, no non-expressive action arises; if the mind is strong, what arises is definitely continuous. Although one may interpret things arbitrarily, claiming that there is truly physical and verbal "action-form," this cannot be established as virtuous or non-virtuous. Why? Because they claim that such form-action ceases entirely at the moment of death. How, then, could one thereby obtain a pleasant or unpleasant result in the future?
Some say: Why is this invalid? Because past actions truly exist in substance and can bring about future results. This is like a pustule growing upon another pustule—they cling to the notion that past actions have real substance. What is named "past" is that which first existed and later does not exist. How can one insist that its substance is truly existent? If this were so, why did the World-Honored One Himself say:
「業雖經百劫, 而終無失壞,
遇眾緣合時, 要當酬彼果。」
“Though karma lasts a hundred eons, it never fades or ceases. When the right conditions come together, its results must be fully repaid.”
無失壞言,為顯何義?顯所作業非無果義,由後半頌證此義成。誰不信受善不善業,雖經久遠而能得果?但應思擇如何得果。為由相續轉變差別,如稻種等而得果耶?為由自相經久遠時安住不壞而得果耶?若由相續轉變差別而得果者,義且可然。若由自相經久遠時安住不壞而得果者,應言此業經久遠時體不謝滅而能得果。若謂此業非自相無名為謝滅,然由此業無復作用名謝滅者,如何此業無復作用?由更不能引當果故。何緣不能更引當果?此於彼果已曾引故。不可於果引而復引,如法已生不重生故。何緣不引餘等流果?以等流果無分限故,豈不此果亦現在時?已曾引故不須重引,業體不滅常應現在,何不常引所得果耶?豈不前言不可於果引而復引,如法已生不重生故,如何復難?前雖有言,而未釋難。業體恒有,應如中際,常名現在;常能引果,應如初際,恒復可生。若謂過去業體雖有而無作用故非現在,非現在故不能引果。此亦不然,既恒有體,應如現在恒有作用。又汝所宗過去諸法有與果用,何非現在?若謂現在唯依諸法取果用說,理亦不然,用義同故,應俱現在。過去諸法無取果用名過去者,有與果用應名現在,此用盡時應名謝滅,是則諸法滅而復滅,如是亦應生而復生,故彼宗義理不成立。又法如何名能引果?謂安立彼令當生故。諸漏盡者,最後剎那應不引果,後不生故。是則此念應非現在,不應更滅入於過去。初現在時已無作用,如何後時說名謝滅?若雖無用而更滅者,是則過去復應須滅。若滅已復滅,應生已更生,便有自違前所說過。若謂此念雖有能生後果作用,而緣闕故後果不生。此亦非理,果必不生,如何知有能生作用?應言此念違順二緣有非有故,雖從因生而無作用能生後果。是故彼宗如是種類能引果義,理必不成。由此但應於果種子能長養故,名能引果。又彼宗說過去未來體皆實有,未來何故非如現在能引果耶?若一切時一切物有,何時何物體非有故。而經言:遇眾緣合時當酬彼果。又彼應說誰於何位、於誰有能,言安立彼令當生故名能引果。以一切時一切有故,是故所言謂過去業其體實有能得當來所感果者,理定不成。
The phrase "never lost or decayed" indicates what meaning? It reveals that the actions one performs do not go without their effects. The latter half of the verse confirms this principle. Who does not accept that good and bad actions, even after a long time, can still bring their results? We should simply examine how these results come about.
Do they arise through the gradual transformation of a continuity, like rice seeds producing new grains? Or do they arise through the action itself, remaining unchanged and undecayed over time? If results arise through the transformation of a continuity, that is plausible. But if they arise because the action itself remains intact for a long time, then we would have to say that the action never perishes and can produce its result even after ages.
If one claims that the action does not perish in its own nature but simply ceases to function, how does it lose its function? Because it can no longer bring about future results. Why can it not bring future results? Because it has already produced its own result. A result cannot be produced again once it has already been produced, just as a phenomenon that has already arisen cannot arise again. Then why does it not produce other effects of the same kind? Because there is no limit to the scope of such effects. Is it not true that this result already exists in the present moment? Since it has been produced, there is no need to produce it again. If the action itself never perishes, it should always be present and constantly produce its results. Why doesn't it keep producing results?
But wasn’t it already stated that a result cannot be produced again once it has been produced, like a phenomenon that has arisen cannot arise again? Then why raise this objection? Although this was said earlier, it does not resolve the difficulty. If the action always exists, it should be like the middle state (the present), constantly described as "present" and constantly capable of producing results. It should be like the beginning state, always able to arise again.
If one says that past actions still have existence but lack function and therefore are not present, and being not present they cannot produce results, this is also untenable. Since they always exist, they should, like present things, always have function. Moreover, in your own doctrine, past dharmas can still give results. Why are they not considered present?
If you say that "present" is only defined by the function of receiving results, this is also incorrect because the meaning of "function" is the same. Both should be present. In your system, past dharmas lack the function of receiving results and are called past. But as long as they have the function of giving results, they should be called present. When that function ends, they should be said to have perished. This would mean that dharmas perish multiple times, and by the same logic, they would also arise multiple times. Therefore, this doctrine is not established logically.
Furthermore, how is a dharma said to "produce a result"? It means it establishes that result so that it will arise in the future. For those who have eliminated all defilements (the arhats), the last moment of consciousness should not produce a result, because no further birth follows. Thus, that last moment should not be considered present, and there would be no need for it to pass into the past. If it had no function from the very beginning of the present moment, how can we later say it has "perished"? If it perishes even after having no function, then the past would need to perish again.
If the past perishes again, then what has already arisen would have to arise again. This contradicts the earlier reasoning.
If one argues that this moment has the potential to produce a future result, but due to the absence of supporting conditions, the result does not arise—this also is illogical. Since the result certainly does not arise, how can we know that it had the potential to do so? Rather, we should say that because favorable and unfavorable conditions may or may not be present, although the moment arises from causes, it lacks the power to produce future results.
Therefore, the idea in your system that an action inherently possesses the ability to bring about its result is logically untenable. For this reason, it is through the nurturing of the seed of the effect that we can speak of producing a result.
Furthermore, your system claims that both past and future states truly exist. If so, why is the future not able to produce results like the present does? If all things exist at all times, when and what thing does not exist? Yet the scriptures say: "When many causes and conditions come together, then the result of that action will come due."
You would also need to explain: who, at what point, is capable of what? You describe "establishing something so that it will arise in the future" as producing a result. But since everything exists at all times, the assertion that past actions truly exist and can bring about future results is logically untenable.
若爾,應許由善不善身語二業蘊相續中引別法起,其體實有,心不相應行蘊所攝。有說此法名為增長。有說此法名不失壞,由此法故能得當來愛非愛果。意業亦應許有此法,若不爾者,餘心起時此便斷滅。心相續中若不引起如是別法,云何能得當來世果?是故定應許有此法。若於先時誦習文義,後經久遠復生憶念;又於先時於諸境界數見聞等,後經久遠於彼境中還生憶念,於何剎那引起何法,由此後時還生憶念?
If this is the case, then we must accept that from the continuous flow of good and bad physical and verbal karma, a distinct element arises. This element is substantially real and belongs to the category of formations not associated with mind. Some say this element is called "accumulation." Others say it is called "indestructibility." Because of this element, future pleasant or unpleasant results are obtained.
We must also accept that mental karma possesses such an element. Otherwise, when another mind arises, this element would be cut off and cease. If, within the continuity of the mind, no such distinct element is produced, how could future-life results be obtained? Therefore, we must certainly accept the existence of this element.
Consider this: In the past, one recites and studies the meaning of texts. Later, after a long time, memory of them arises again. Likewise, in the past, through repeated seeing and hearing of various objects, one later—after a long time—experiences memory arising again toward those same objects. In which moment, then, does this cause what element to arise, so that at a later time memory arises again?
又先趣入滅定等心引起何法,由此後時還從定起生出定心?又紫礦汁染拘櫞花,彼二俱滅引起何法,後結果時瓤生赤色?故離彼計身語二業所引別法,但應由思差別作用熏心相續令起功能,由此功能轉變差別,當來世果差別而生。如紫礦汁染拘櫞花相續轉變,至結果時其瓤色赤,內法熏習應知亦爾。又何不許身語二業熏心相續?以身語業由心引成善不善故。不應由心成善不善,於異相續能與當來愛非愛果,非餘造業餘受果故。若所作業體雖謝滅,由所熏心相續功能轉變差別,能得當來愛等果者,處無心定及無想天心相續斷,如何先業能得當來愛非愛果?有作是說:於此生中先所熏心必還相續,故得當來愛非愛果。既已間斷,何因能續?入定心作等無間緣故能令續。彼久謝滅,云何能作等無間緣?如破過去業能得果,此亦同彼,應如理破,故出定心不應續起。
Then, regarding the mind that first enters the cessation attainment and so on—what phenomenon does it bring forth, such that later, when emerging from that state, the mind of arising from concentration occurs?
Furthermore, consider the juice of the purple mineral dye coloring a citron flower: both the dye and the flower cease, but what phenomenon is caused, such that later, when the fruit forms, its pulp is red?
Thus, setting aside the concept of a separate entity produced by bodily and verbal actions, it is simply the distinct functioning of volitional intention that perfumes the mental continuum, giving rise to a latent potential. Through the transformation of this potential, different future results arise accordingly. Just as the juice of the purple mineral dye, through the successive transformation of the citron flower, causes the fruit’s pulp to become red, the same principle applies to internal mental perfuming.
Why not accept that bodily and verbal actions also perfume the mental continuum? Because bodily and verbal actions are themselves conditioned by the mind, becoming either wholesome or unwholesome.
It should not be said that the mind makes them wholesome or unwholesome, yet actions from a different continuum can produce pleasant or unpleasant results in the future—otherwise, the one who performs the action would not be the one who experiences its result.
If it is argued that, although the action itself has ceased, the perfumed mental continuum, through its transformations, can still bring about pleasant or unpleasant results in the future, then what about the state of non-perception (the attainment of cessation) and the heaven of no thought? In those states, the mental continuum is interrupted—how then can past actions produce future pleasant or unpleasant results?
Some explain: In this life, the mind previously perfumed will necessarily continue, and thus future pleasant or unpleasant results arise. But if the mind is interrupted, what cause can bring about its continuation?
The mind that enters concentration serves as an equanimous immediate condition, enabling the mind to continue. However, if that condition has long ceased, how can it still function as an equanimous immediate condition?
This is similar to the argument against past actions producing results—the same reasoning applies, and therefore, the mind of emerging from concentration should not arise.
有作是說:依附色根種子力故後心還起,以能生心心所種子依二相續,謂心相續、色根相續,隨其所應。豈不經說:意法為緣生於意識。云何離意而意識生?應知意種或時名意,以於因中立果名故,如於所觸立飢渴名。如何一一心心所法,從二種子相續而生?不見芽等從種生法有如是事,可藉多緣生於一果。無從二種有一果生。若爾,還應不免前過。謂無心定及無想天心相續斷,如何先業能得當來愛非愛果?是彼宗過。何謂彼宗?謂執此位全無心者。若說此位是有心者,即無斯過。如尊者世友所造問論中言:若執滅定全無有心,可有此過;我說滅定猶有細心,故無此失。彼復引經證成此義,如契經言:處滅定者身行皆滅,廣說乃至根無變壞。識不離身,今此位中許有何識?
Some assert: “It is due to the power of the seeds that depend on the physical sense faculties that mental activity arises again later. Because the seeds that generate mental events depend on two lines of continuity: the continuity of the mind, and the continuity of the physical sense faculties, according to the specific case.” But hasn’t the scripture explained: “Consciousness arises conditioned by the mind and mental objects.” How then could consciousness arise without the mind? Understand that the mind-seed is sometimes called “mind,” because the name of the result is given based on its cause—just as we use the terms “hunger” or “thirst” based on the experience of touch.
Now, how could each individual mental event arise sequentially from two different kinds of seeds? We don’t see such a situation in physical seeds giving rise to sprouts. One result can be produced by relying on many conditions, but no single result arises from two seeds. If that were the case, then we would again be stuck with the previous problem: in the state of non-conscious meditation and the heaven of no-thought, the continuity of the mind is broken—so how could past actions yield future desirable or undesirable results? This is the flaw in their position.
What is “their position”? It is the claim that in these states there is absolutely no mind. If one maintains that mental activity still exists in these states, then this problem does not arise. As the Venerable Vasumitra states in his *Questions and Discussions*: “If you insist that in the cessation meditation there is absolutely no mind, then you have this flaw; I say that even in cessation meditation, a subtle mind remains—so there is no such mistake.”
He further cites a scripture to support this meaning: As the scripture says: “One who enters cessation meditation has all physical activities cease” — and continues — “while the sense faculties remain unimpaired, and consciousness does not leave the body.” In this state, what kind of consciousness is admitted?
有說:此有第六意識。豈不經說:意法為緣生於意識,三和合觸,與觸俱起有受想思。云何此位得有意識而無三和、或有三和而無有觸、或復有觸而無受想?由是說名滅受想定。有作是釋:如何世尊說受緣愛,而一切受非皆愛緣?觸亦應爾,非一切觸皆受等緣。世尊餘經自簡此義,謂無明觸所生諸受為緣生愛。曾無有處簡觸生受,無簡別故,非為善釋。有別釋言:三和觸者,三事有力,合故觸生。於此位中,三事無力可能生觸及生受想,由入定心所厭壞故。正在定位尚無有觸,況有受想,故此位中唯餘意識,無諸心所。若爾,此位意識是何?為善、為染、為無記性?設爾何失?若善性者,如何善性非無貪等善根相應?設無貪等善根相應,如何無觸?若謂由善等無間緣所引發故此識善者,理不應然,善心無間生三心故。又善根力所引善心,無因能遮,無貪等故。又無善根,應不成善。然此滅定,如滅是善。若染性者,如何染性不與貪等煩惱相應?設與貪等煩惱相應,如何無觸?如佛於彼《十問經》中自作是說:所有受蘊、想蘊、行蘊皆觸為緣。又無想定尚不許染,況滅盡定!若是無覆無記性者,為異熟生、為威儀路、為工巧處、為能變化?設爾何失?若異熟生,如何有頂定心無間,此下八地中間懸隔,而起欲界異熟生心?如何復從此心無間,而得現起不動等心?如摩訶俱瑟祉羅契經中作如是問:「出滅定時當觸幾觸?」答言:「具壽!當觸三觸,謂不動觸、無所有觸及無相觸。」又異熟心宿業所引,有何道理?由滅定前要期勢力,令彼出定時限不過。復有何緣?要於有頂緣滅為境定心邊際,欲界宿業習氣所引,異熟果心方得現起,非於前位。又以何緣?於此所起異熟生色斷已不續,異熟生心斷而更續。若威儀路或工巧處、或能變化,如何此心緣威儀等,無觸而能有所造作?又許所修九次第定及八解脫體皆是善,不應此位現起染污或無記心。又用有頂緣滅為境,寂靜思惟定為依止,方能現入滅受想定。如摩訶俱瑟祉羅契經中依滅盡定作如是問:「幾因幾緣為依能入無相界定?」答言:「具壽!二因二緣為依能入無相界定,謂不思惟一切相及正思惟無相界。」若滅定中有意識者,此緣何境?作何行相?若緣滅境作靜行相,如何非善?設是善者,如何不許與無貪等善根相應?設許相應,如何不許觸為緣起?若緣餘境作餘行相,如何入滅定心無間起散亂心而不違理?設自計度有餘無記,由此二因亦不應理。是故汝等不如實知阿笈摩義,縱情妄計第六意識滅定等有,由是而執此位有心。
Some say: There is a sixth consciousness in this state. But does the scripture not say: Mind and mental objects serve as conditions for the arising of mind-consciousness; the union of the three brings about contact; and wherever there is contact, there arise feeling, perception, and volition. How then could there be mind-consciousness in this state without the union of the three, or the union of the three without contact, or contact without feeling and perception? For this reason it is called the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception.
Some explain it this way: How is it that the World-Honored One says feeling is the condition for craving, yet not all feelings are conditions for craving? Contact should be the same—not all contact is the condition for feeling and so on. The World-Honored One himself clarified this point in another scripture, saying that it is the feelings born of ignorant contact that serve as the condition for the arising of craving. Nowhere does he make such a distinction regarding contact giving rise to feeling. Since there is no such distinction, this is not a good explanation.
Others explain differently: The union of the three brings about contact—meaning when the three factors have power, their coming together produces contact. But in this state, the three factors lack the power to produce contact or to produce feeling and perception, because the mind that entered this attainment is averse to and has destroyed them. While actually dwelling in this attainment, there is not even contact—how much less feeling and perception! Therefore, in this state only mind-consciousness remains, without any mental factors.
If that is so, what is this mind-consciousness in this state? Is it wholesome, defiled, or neutral? What fault would there be either way?
If it is wholesome, how could something wholesome not be associated with wholesome roots such as non-greed? And if it is associated with wholesome roots such as non-greed, how could there be no contact?
If one claims that this consciousness is wholesome because it is produced by the immediately preceding condition of a wholesome mind—that does not hold, because a wholesome mind can be immediately followed by three types of mind. Moreover, a wholesome mind produced by the power of wholesome roots has no cause that could prevent it, since it lacks non-greed and so on. And without wholesome roots, it should not qualify as wholesome. Yet this attainment of cessation, like cessation itself, is wholesome.
If it is defiled, how could something defiled not be associated with afflictions such as greed? And if it is associated with afflictions such as greed, how could there be no contact? As the Buddha himself says in the Scripture of Ten Questions: All feeling, perception, and volition are conditioned by contact. Moreover, even the attainment of no-perception is not permitted to be defiled—how much less the attainment of complete cessation!
If it is neutral, being neither obscured nor unobscured—is it karmic result, gestural, artistic, or transformative? What fault would there be either way?
If it is karmic result: How could a mind of the peak of existence in meditative attainment be immediately followed, across the gap of eight intermediate levels, by a karmic-result mind of the desire realm arising? And how could that mind in turn be immediately followed by the arising of the mind of the immovable stage? As the Mahākauṣṭhila Sutra asks: "When emerging from the attainment of cessation, how many contacts does one touch?" The answer: "Venerable sir, one touches three contacts—the contact of immovability, the contact of nothingness, and the contact of signlessness."
Moreover, a karmic-result mind is drawn forth by past karma—by what principle? It is by the force of the resolve made before entering the attainment of cessation that the time of emergence is not exceeded. And for what reason is it only at the final moment of the meditative mind that takes cessation as its object at the peak of existence that a karmic-result mind drawn by the habitual tendencies of past karma of the desire realm can arise, and not at an earlier point?
And for what reason, when this karmic-result form that has arisen is cut off, does it not continue, while the karmic-result mind, though cut off, arises again?
If it is gestural, artistic, or transformative—how could this mind, taking gesture and so on as its object, without contact, perform any activity?
Furthermore, it is accepted that the nine progressive attainments and the eight liberations are all wholesome in nature. Therefore, a defiled or neutral mind should not arise in this state.
Also, it is only by relying on the peak of existence, taking cessation as object, and the calm contemplation of cessation as support, that one can enter the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception. As the Mahākauṣṭhila Sutra asks regarding the attainment of cessation: "By how many causes and how many conditions does one rely to enter the signless meditative attainment?" The answer: "Venerable sir, by two causes and two conditions one relies to enter the signless meditative attainment: by not thinking of any signs, and by rightly contemplating the signless realm."
If there is mind-consciousness in the attainment of cessation, what object does it take? What aspect does it have? If it takes cessation as its object and has a calm aspect, how is it not wholesome? And if it is wholesome, how can it not be admitted to be associated with wholesome roots such as non-greed? And if such association is admitted, how can contact not be admitted as a condition for its arising? If it takes another object and has another aspect, how is it not contradictory that a scattered mind arises immediately after the mind that entered the attainment of cessation?
If you suppose there is some other neutral state, these two causes would still not make sense. Therefore, you do not truly understand the meaning of the Āgamas. You indulge in arbitrary speculation that a sixth mind-consciousness exists in the attainment of cessation and the like, and on that basis you insist that there is a mind in this state.
若爾,云何許滅定等諸無心位亦有心耶?應如一類經為量者所許細心彼位猶有,謂異熟果識具一切種子,從初結生乃至終沒,展轉相續曾無間斷,彼彼生處由異熟因品類差別相續流轉,乃至涅槃方畢竟滅。即由此識無間斷故,於無心位亦說有心,餘六識身於此諸位皆不轉故說為無心。由滅定等加行入心增上力故,令六識種暫時損伏不得現起故名無心,非無一切。心有二種:一集起心,無量種子集起處故;二種種心,所緣行相差別轉故。滅定等位第二心闕故名無心,如一足床闕餘足故亦名無足。彼諸識種被損伏位,異熟果識剎那剎那轉變差別,能損伏力漸劣漸微乃至都盡,如水熱箭引燒發力,漸劣漸微至都盡位。識種爾時得生果便,初從識種意識還生,後位隨緣餘識漸起,即前所說異熟果識攝藏種種諸法種子。彼彼餘識及俱有法善不善性數熏發時,隨其所應種力增盛,由此相續轉變差別。隨種力熟隨遇助緣,便感當來愛非愛果。依如是義,有說頌言:
If that is so, how can it be accepted that there is still a mind in states without mind, such as the attainment of cessation? It should be as accepted by those who follow a certain sutra as authoritative: a subtle mind still exists in those states. That is, the ripened-result consciousness, which holds all seeds, continues without interruption from the first moment of rebirth until death, flowing on through various rebirths according to the different categories of ripened causes, and is only finally extinguished at Nirvana. Because this consciousness is uninterrupted, it is said that there is mind even in states without mind. The other six consciousnesses do not operate in these states, and so they are called states without mind. Through the power of the preparatory effort that enters the attainment of cessation, the seeds of the six consciousnesses are temporarily suppressed and cannot arise, and so it is called without mind—but not without all mind. Mind is of two kinds: first, the collecting mind, because it is the place where countless seeds are collected; second, the manifesting mind, because it turns toward objects with different characteristics. In the attainment of cessation and similar states, the second kind of mind is absent, and so it is called without mind—just as a one-legged bed is also called legless because it lacks the other legs. When those consciousness-seeds are in a suppressed state, the ripened-result consciousness undergoes momentary transformation and difference, and the power of suppression gradually weakens and becomes subtler until it is entirely exhausted—like the force of a heated arrow that burns and gradually weakens until it is completely gone. At that time, the consciousness-seeds regain the ability to produce results. First, consciousness arises again from the consciousness-seeds, and later, the other consciousnesses gradually arise according to conditions. This is what was previously described as the ripened-result consciousness, which contains the seeds of all dharmas. When those other consciousnesses and their associated dharmas of wholesome and unwholesome nature are repeatedly perfumed and activated, the power of the seeds increases accordingly, and through this the continuity transforms and differs. As the power of the seeds matures and meets supporting conditions, it brings about desirable and undesirable results in the future. Based on this meaning, a verse says:
心與無邊種, 俱相續恒流,
遇各別熏緣, 心種便增盛。
種力漸次熟, 緣合時與果,
如染拘櫞花, 果時瓤色赤。
The mind, together with its boundless seeds, flows on continuously in an unbroken stream. When it meets various conditioning influences, the mind's seeds grow and flourish. The power of these seeds gradually ripens; when conditions align, they bear fruit— just as a citron flower, when dyed, produces fruit whose flesh turns red.
世尊依此,於解深密大乘經中說如是頌:
The World-Honored One, based on this, spoke these verses in the Great Vehicle Sutra of the Explanation of the Profound Secret:
「阿陀那識甚深細, 一切種子如暴流,
我於凡愚不開演, 恐彼分別執為我。」
The ādāna consciousness is profound and subtle; It flows like a raging torrent, carrying all seeds. I do not reveal it to ordinary, foolish beings, For fear they would discriminate and cling to it as a self.
能續後有、能執持身,故說此名阿陀那識。攝藏一切諸法種子,故復說名阿賴耶識。前生所引業異熟故,即此亦名異熟果識。若不許有此異熟識,復有何識能執持身?非有餘識能遍持身,乃至命終恒不捨故。又何處蘊煩惱隨眠對治生時可名能斷。若言蘊在能對治心,此不應理,如何隨眠煩惱隨逐可為能治?又諸有情生無色界,染善無漏心正起時,有何趣攝異熟法在?或應許趣通非異熟及不繫法,便與理違。又不還果生有頂處,為盡餘漏修對治道。無所有處無漏起時,於有頂處有何別物自體猶存,而不名死、非眾同分?或復命根離色心等別有實物。此二唯於異熟諸蘊相似勢分而假建立。相似勢分無別實體,如稻稗等相似勢分,故定應許異六識身有如上說持種識體。
即依此識,赤銅鍱部經中建立有分識名、大眾部經名根本識、化地部說窮生死蘊。云何此識緣境行相?此境行相不可了知。云何名識而得如是?如執滅定等位有餘,識者境界行相難知,此亦應爾。此識攝在何取蘊中?理實應言識取蘊攝。若爾,經句當云何通?如說:云何名識取蘊?謂六識身。又說:云何識緣名色?識謂六識。應知此經別有密意,如契經說:云何行蘊?謂六思身。非行蘊中更無餘法,此亦應爾。說六非餘有何密意?且如世尊《解深密》說,「我於凡愚不開演」者,「恐彼分別執為我」故。何緣愚夫執此為我?此無始來窮生死際行相微細無改變故。又以六識所依所緣行相品類麁易了故,與諸煩惱及對治道有相應故,建立雜染清淨品故。體是果識,由此比知有種識故。諸契經中隨所宜說,不說因識,與上所說皆相違故,是名說六非餘密意。由此已釋餘部經中唯說六識身為有分識等,隨其所應皆無違害。又於今時一一部內無量契經皆已隱沒,如《釋軌論》廣辯應知,故不應計阿賴耶識定非經說,理必有故。若爾,一身應有二識俱時而轉,謂異熟識及餘轉識。如是何過?若一身中二識俱轉,應俱時立二有情身,如餘身中二識俱轉。此無有失,因果二識展轉為依,不相離故。又異熟識是餘轉識所熏習故,非異身中二識俱轉有如是事,故無此失。頗有現見種與種果相續異耶?現見世間青蓮花等,根與莖等相續各異而為種果,此亦應然。又縱世間見與不見,若不許有阿賴耶識,便有如前所說過難,故應定許阿賴耶識離六識身其體實有。
何緣不許我體實有,與六識身為所依止?汝所執我其相云何,而說能為六識依止?若許我如阿賴耶識生滅相續隨緣轉變,與識何殊而執為我?若執我體是一是常畢竟無變,如何可說受識等熏為所依止?夫熏習者,令彼所熏相續變成功能差別,如紫礦汁熏拘櫞花,令彼相續功能轉變。若無熏習,則無轉變差別功能。如何先時領智貪等?數習異故,後經久時念智貪等生起差別。又無心位與彼後時我體無別,今既無識,後意識等從何而生?又於識等我有何能,而執我為識等依止?若言識等因我故生,我體恒時既無差別,如何識等漸次而生,非於一時一切頓起?若謂更待餘因緣助方能生者,離餘因緣如何知有我能生用?若言識等依我而轉,諸法纔生無間即滅,既無住義何容有轉?故不應執我體實有,與六識身為所依止。又執有我,違阿笈摩說一切法皆無有我,故汝所執一常實我,都無正理,但率妄情。
由此證成,但思差別熏習同時,阿賴耶識令其相續轉變差別,能引當來愛非愛果,非如彼說身語業相。
若不許有身語二業,豈能遺謗三業契經?不能遺謗,然能如理解釋此經令無過失。如何無失解釋此經?應除執毒,當為廣說。何為契經說有三業?何者是身?何者是業?何義名身?何義名業?復以何義名為身業語業意業?問亦如是。復以何緣,契經唯說身等三業,非眼等耶?何為契經說三業者,為顯三業攝十業道,勸勵怖多所作者故,如略說三學授佛栗氏子。有執諸業唯身所造非語非意,為顯彼二亦有所造,故說三業。身謂諸根大造和合,差別為體。業即是思,差別為性。積集所成是為身義,大造極微積集成故。有說種種穢惡集成是為身義,身是種種諸不淨物所依處故。若爾,天趣應無有身。隨作者意有所造作,是為業義。能動身思,說名身業。思有三種:一審慮思、二決定思、三動發思。若思能動身,即說為身業。此思能引令身相續異方生因,風界起故。具足應言動身之業,除動之言,但名身業,如益力之油但名力油,如動塵之風但名塵風,此亦如是。十業道中,初三業道許身業攝,謂殺生、不與取、欲邪行。如何思業而得彼名?由此思業能動其身,令行殺、盜及邪行故。思力動身令有所作,即名思作,如世間說狂賊燒村薪草熟飯。思復云何得名業道?思有造作故名為業,復與善趣惡趣為道,通生彼故得業道名。或所動身是思業道,三種思業依彼轉故。又殺盜婬由思業起、依身而生,隨世俗故亦名身業。然此實非善不善性,亦隨世俗假立其名,為令世間依此門故,於善惡思勤修止作,是故假說善不善名。若唯思業是善不善,何故業道契經中言:由身三種故思造業,作及增長是不善故,能生苦果及苦異熟。此經意說,能動於身、以身為門、身為依處,緣殺盜婬為境,思業為因,能感苦果異熟名身三種,故思造業。除此,餘思名為意業,意相應故、不能動發身及語故。若爾,何緣經說:二業,所謂思業及思已業。即前所說三種思中,初二種思名為思業,第三一思名思已業,無違經過。語謂語言,音聲為性,此能表了所欲說義,故名為語。能發語思,說名語業。或復語者,字等所依,由帶字等能詮表義,故名為語。具足應言發語之業,除發之言,但名語業,喻說如前。意者謂識,能思量故。趣向餘生及境界故,說名為意。作動意思,說名意業,令意造作善不善等種種事故。具足應言作意之業,除作之言,但名意業。或意相應業名意業,除相應言,但名意業,喻說如前。若三種業但思為體,於散亂心及無心位爾時無思,如何得有名具律儀不律儀者?由思差別所熏成種不損壞故,名具律儀不律儀者,故無有過。思差別者,簡取勝思能發律儀不律儀表。由此思故,熏成二種殊勝種子,依二種子未損壞位,假立善惡律儀無表。齊何當言損壞如是由思差別所熏成種?謂從此後不作因生遮不遮思。如先所受,誰能損壞如是種子?謂若有思能發於表,因此棄捨善惡律儀,及餘捨因亦能損壞。所以不說眼等業者,由此經中但說有情加行之業,不說諸法作用之業。何謂有情加行之業?謂隨作者意所造作。何謂諸法作用之業?謂眼耳等各別功能。
佛說三業義深細, 我依理教妙辯成,
願乘此福濟群生, 咸使速證清淨覺。
大乘成業論一卷