觀所緣緣論
Discourse on the Object-Condition
陳那菩薩造
三藏法師玄奘奉 詔譯
Tripitaka Master Xuanzang's Imperial Translation
諸有欲令眼等五識以外色作所緣緣者，或執極微許有實體，能生識故；或執和合，以識生時帶彼相故。二俱非理。所以者何？
Those who claim that the five senses—such as sight—take external objects as their conditions, either argue that atoms truly exist and can give rise to perception, or claim that it is the combination of atoms that does so, because perception arises with their appearance. Both views are mistaken. Why is that?
極微於五識， 設緣非所緣，
彼相識無故， 猶如眼根等。
The atom is not an object of perception for the five senses, For it lacks the form that can be grasped by consciousness— Just as the eye itself cannot see its own form.
所緣緣者，謂能緣識帶彼相起，及有實體令能緣識託彼而生。色等極微，設有實體能生五識，容有緣義，然非所緣，如眼根等於眼等識無彼相故。如是極微於眼等識無所緣義。
The condition of the object means that the perceiving consciousness takes on the appearance of that object and arises, and that there is a real entity which enables the perceiving consciousness to rely on it and come into being. Even if the fundamental particles of form and so forth have a real existence and can generate the five sense consciousnesses, they might be considered as having the meaning of a condition. However, they are not the object itself, just as the eye faculty and so forth do not have the appearance of those objects for the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses. In this way, the fundamental particles have no meaning as the object for the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses.
和合於五識， 設所緣非緣，
彼體實無故， 猶如第二月。
When the five senses come together, Even if there is an object, it is not truly real. Its substance is ultimately nonexistent, Just like the second moon in the sky.
色等和合於眼識等有彼相故，設作所緣，然無緣義。如眼錯亂見第二月，彼無實體不能生故，如是和合於眼等識無有緣義。故外二事於所緣緣互闕一支，俱不應理。
When colors and other objects come together, they may appear as forms in the eye-consciousness and so on, and thus seem to serve as objects of perception. Yet, they lack the true meaning of being a condition for perception. It is like when the eye is confused and sees a second moon—that moon has no real substance and cannot produce genuine perception. Similarly, when things come together in the eye-consciousness and other forms of consciousness, they do not truly serve as conditions for perception. Therefore, external phenomena, when considered as conditions for perception, lack an essential aspect and cannot be logically justified.
有執色等各有多相，於中一分是現量境，故諸極微相資各有一和集相。此相實有，各能發生似己相識，故與五識作所緣緣。此亦非理。所以者何？
If one holds that various forms, such as color and so forth, each possess multiple aspects, and among these, a portion serves as the object of direct perception, then it follows that each fundamental particle, through mutual support, possesses a unified, aggregated form. This form is considered real, and each is capable of generating a cognition that resembles itself, thereby serving as the objective condition for the five sense consciousnesses. This reasoning is also flawed. Why is that?
和集如堅等， 設於眼等識，
是緣非所緣， 許極微相故。
When aggregates gather firm as stone, If eye and other senses are the cause, They are conditions, not the object known— For subtle particles have no true form.
如堅等相雖是實有，於眼等識容有緣義，而非所緣，眼等識上無彼相故。色等極微諸和集相理亦應爾，彼俱執為極微相故。執眼等識能緣極微諸和集相，復有別失。
Although qualities like hardness are indeed real and can be perceived by the eye-consciousness and other senses, they are not the actual objects of perception. This is because the eye-consciousness and other senses do not contain the form of those qualities. The same logic applies to the aggregated forms of subtle particles like color and others, as both are considered to have the nature of subtle particles. To claim that the eye-consciousness and other senses can perceive the aggregated forms of subtle particles leads to further errors.
瓶甌等覺相， 彼執應無別，
非形別故別， 形別非實故。
The perception of a jar and a bowl — if grasped as distinct, that would be untenable.
They are not distinct because of their different shapes, for the distinction in shape is not ultimately real.
瓶甌等物大小等者，能成極微多少同故，緣彼覺相應無差別。若謂彼物形相別故覺相別者，理亦不然。頂等別形唯在瓶等假法上有，非極微故。彼不應執極微亦有差別形相。所以者何？
If the size of objects like jars and bowls is the same, it is because they are composed of an equal number of ultimate particles, and thus the perception arising from them is correspondingly indistinguishable. If one argues that the perception differs because the forms of those objects are distinct, this reasoning is also incorrect. Distinct shapes, such as a top or a base, exist only in composite objects like jars—which are conceptual constructs—and not in the ultimate particles themselves. One should not insist that ultimate particles possess distinct shapes. Why is that?
極微量等故， 形別惟在假，
析彼至極微， 彼覺定捨故。
Since the smallest particles are equal, The distinction of form exists only conventionally. When one analyzes them down to the smallest particle, The perception of them is certainly abandoned.
非瓶甌等能成極微有形量別捨微圓相，故知別形在假非實。又形別物析至極微，彼覺定捨。非青等物析至極微，彼覺可捨。由此形別唯世俗有，非如青等亦在實物，是故五識所緣緣體非外色等，其理極成。彼所緣緣豈全不有？非全不有。若爾，云何？
Vases and bowls and such things are not composed of ultimate particles with distinct shapes and sizes, for when you let go of the concept of a round particle, you realize that specific shapes are merely conventional, not ultimately real. Moreover, when you analyze a thing with a distinct shape down to its ultimate particles, your perception of that shape will certainly be abandoned. But when you analyze something like the color blue down to its ultimate particles, your perception of blue may not be abandoned. Therefore, distinct shapes exist only conventionally, not like colors such as blue, which also exist in real things. Hence, it is well established that the objects perceived by the five senses are not external colors and so forth. Does that mean the objects of perception do not exist at all? No, they are not entirely nonexistent. Then how should we understand this?
內色如外現， 為識所緣緣，
許彼相在識， 及能生識故。
Internal forms appear as external objects, Because consciousness takes them as its objects of perception. We acknowledge that their characteristics exist within consciousness, And that they are capable of generating consciousness.
外境雖無，而有內色似外境現為所緣緣。許眼等識帶彼相起及從彼生，具二義故。此內境相既不離識，如何俱起能作識緣？
Although external objects do not truly exist, there appears within the mind an internal image that resembles an external object, and this serves as the object condition for perception. It is accepted that visual consciousness and other forms of consciousness carry the appearance of that image and arise from it, fulfilling both conditions. Since this internal image does not exist apart from consciousness, how can it arise simultaneously with consciousness and still act as its condition?
決定相隨故， 俱時亦作緣；
或前為後緣， 引彼功能故。
Since they are mutually determined, they also serve as conditions for each other simultaneously; Or the preceding one becomes the condition for the following, because it activates its potential.
境相與識定相隨故，雖俱時起亦作識緣。因明者說：若此與彼有無相隨，雖俱時生，而亦得有因果相故。或前識相為後識緣，引本識中生似自果功能令起，不違理故。若五識生唯緣內色，如何亦說眼等為緣？
Since the objects of perception and the perceiving consciousness are inseparably linked, even though they arise simultaneously, they still serve as conditions for consciousness. As logicians explain: If the presence or absence of one thing consistently accompanies another, even if they arise at the same time, they can still have a cause-and-effect relationship. Alternatively, the perception of a preceding moment can serve as a condition for the perception of a later moment, drawing out from the foundational consciousness the latent potential to produce its corresponding result—this does not contradict reason. If the five sense consciousnesses arise solely by relying on internal mental representations, why is it also said that the eye and other sense faculties serve as conditions?
識上色功能， 名五根應理，
功能與境色， 無始互為因。
The functions of consciousness upon form are appropriately called the five sense faculties. These faculties and their objects have been mutually dependent as cause and effect since beginningless time.
以能發識比知有根，此但功能，非外所造，故本識上五色功能名眼等根亦不違理，功能發識理無別故。在識在餘雖不可說，而外諸法理非有故，定應許此在識非餘。此根功能與前境色，從無始際展轉為因。謂此功能至成熟位，生現識上五內境色，此內境色復能引起異熟識上五根功能。根境二色與識一異、或非一異？隨樂應說如是諸識惟內境相為所緣緣，理善成立。
The ability to perceive indicates the existence of sensory faculties. This is merely a function, not something externally created. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to say that the five sensory functions within the foundational consciousness are what we call the eye and other faculties, as there is no logical distinction between the function and its capacity to generate perception. Whether these functions reside in consciousness or elsewhere is difficult to articulate, but since external objects are logically untenable, we must affirm that they reside within consciousness, not elsewhere.
These sensory functions and the external objects they perceive have been mutually interdependent since beginningless time. When these functions reach maturity, they give rise to the five internal sensory objects within the present consciousness. These internal objects, in turn, stimulate the five sensory functions within the karmic consciousness. As for whether these sensory faculties, objects, and consciousness are identical, distinct, or neither identical nor distinct—one may explain according to preference.
Thus, it is well established in principle that all forms of consciousness take only internal objects as their conditioning support.
觀所緣緣論
Discourse on the Object-Condition