Discourse on the Object-Condition
Tripitaka Master Xuanzang's Imperial Translation
Those who claim that the five senses—such as sight—take external objects as their conditions, either argue that atoms truly exist and can give rise to perception, or claim that it is the combination of atoms that does so, because perception arises with their appearance. Both views are mistaken. Why is that?
The atom is not an object of perception for the five senses, For it lacks the form that can be grasped by consciousness— Just as the eye itself cannot see its own form.
The condition of the object means that the perceiving consciousness takes on the appearance of that object and arises, and that there is a real entity which enables the perceiving consciousness to rely on it and come into being. Even if the fundamental particles of form and so forth have a real existence and can generate the five sense consciousnesses, they might be considered as having the meaning of a condition. However, they are not the object itself, just as the eye faculty and so forth do not have the appearance of those objects for the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses. In this way, the fundamental particles have no meaning as the object for the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses.
When the five senses come together, Even if there is an object, it is not truly real. Its substance is ultimately nonexistent, Just like the second moon in the sky.
When colors and other objects come together, they may appear as forms in the eye-consciousness and so on, and thus seem to serve as objects of perception. Yet, they lack the true meaning of being a condition for perception. It is like when the eye is confused and sees a second moon—that moon has no real substance and cannot produce genuine perception. Similarly, when things come together in the eye-consciousness and other forms of consciousness, they do not truly serve as conditions for perception. Therefore, external phenomena, when considered as conditions for perception, lack an essential aspect and cannot be logically justified.
If one holds that various forms, such as color and so forth, each possess multiple aspects, and among these, a portion serves as the object of direct perception, then it follows that each fundamental particle, through mutual support, possesses a unified, aggregated form. This form is considered real, and each is capable of generating a cognition that resembles itself, thereby serving as the objective condition for the five sense consciousnesses. This reasoning is also flawed. Why is that?
When aggregates gather firm as stone, If eye and other senses are the cause, They are conditions, not the object known— For subtle particles have no true form.
Although qualities like hardness are indeed real and can be perceived by the eye-consciousness and other senses, they are not the actual objects of perception. This is because the eye-consciousness and other senses do not contain the form of those qualities. The same logic applies to the aggregated forms of subtle particles like color and others, as both are considered to have the nature of subtle particles. To claim that the eye-consciousness and other senses can perceive the aggregated forms of subtle particles leads to further errors.
The perception of a jar and a bowl — if grasped as distinct, that would be untenable.
They are not distinct because of their different shapes, for the distinction in shape is not ultimately real.
If the size of objects like jars and bowls is the same, it is because they are composed of an equal number of ultimate particles, and thus the perception arising from them is correspondingly indistinguishable. If one argues that the perception differs because the forms of those objects are distinct, this reasoning is also incorrect. Distinct shapes, such as a top or a base, exist only in composite objects like jars—which are conceptual constructs—and not in the ultimate particles themselves. One should not insist that ultimate particles possess distinct shapes. Why is that?
Since the smallest particles are equal, The distinction of form exists only conventionally. When one analyzes them down to the smallest particle, The perception of them is certainly abandoned.
Vases and bowls and such things are not composed of ultimate particles with distinct shapes and sizes, for when you let go of the concept of a round particle, you realize that specific shapes are merely conventional, not ultimately real. Moreover, when you analyze a thing with a distinct shape down to its ultimate particles, your perception of that shape will certainly be abandoned. But when you analyze something like the color blue down to its ultimate particles, your perception of blue may not be abandoned. Therefore, distinct shapes exist only conventionally, not like colors such as blue, which also exist in real things. Hence, it is well established that the objects perceived by the five senses are not external colors and so forth. Does that mean the objects of perception do not exist at all? No, they are not entirely nonexistent. Then how should we understand this?
Internal forms appear as external objects, Because consciousness takes them as its objects of perception. We acknowledge that their characteristics exist within consciousness, And that they are capable of generating consciousness.
Although external objects do not truly exist, there appears within the mind an internal image that resembles an external object, and this serves as the object condition for perception. It is accepted that visual consciousness and other forms of consciousness carry the appearance of that image and arise from it, fulfilling both conditions. Since this internal image does not exist apart from consciousness, how can it arise simultaneously with consciousness and still act as its condition?
Since they are mutually determined, they also serve as conditions for each other simultaneously; Or the preceding one becomes the condition for the following, because it activates its potential.
Since the objects of perception and the perceiving consciousness are inseparably linked, even though they arise simultaneously, they still serve as conditions for consciousness. As logicians explain: If the presence or absence of one thing consistently accompanies another, even if they arise at the same time, they can still have a cause-and-effect relationship. Alternatively, the perception of a preceding moment can serve as a condition for the perception of a later moment, drawing out from the foundational consciousness the latent potential to produce its corresponding result—this does not contradict reason. If the five sense consciousnesses arise solely by relying on internal mental representations, why is it also said that the eye and other sense faculties serve as conditions?
The functions of consciousness upon form are appropriately called the five sense faculties. These faculties and their objects have been mutually dependent as cause and effect since beginningless time.
The ability to perceive indicates the existence of sensory faculties. This is merely a function, not something externally created. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to say that the five sensory functions within the foundational consciousness are what we call the eye and other faculties, as there is no logical distinction between the function and its capacity to generate perception. Whether these functions reside in consciousness or elsewhere is difficult to articulate, but since external objects are logically untenable, we must affirm that they reside within consciousness, not elsewhere.
These sensory functions and the external objects they perceive have been mutually interdependent since beginningless time. When these functions reach maturity, they give rise to the five internal sensory objects within the present consciousness. These internal objects, in turn, stimulate the five sensory functions within the karmic consciousness. As for whether these sensory faculties, objects, and consciousness are identical, distinct, or neither identical nor distinct—one may explain according to preference.
Thus, it is well established in principle that all forms of consciousness take only internal objects as their conditioning support.
Discourse on the Object-Condition