The sixth section resolves difficulties: it provides an explanation as an aid. The thesis (宗) constitutes the meaning. Meaning arises from the causal factor of understanding (了因). Furthermore, through the support of cause and example, the thesis is clarified — this also counts as correct reasoning. Moreover, the thesis is described as the cause which generates the opponent’s understanding. It reveals and illuminates the established thesis.
There are explanations. Establishing (a valid inference) has four categories: 1) True valid establishment, 2) True-like valid establishment, 3) Seeming valid establishment, 4) Seeming-seeming valid establishment. Some consider a contradictory determination to be true-like valid establishment, and the four indefinite logical reasons to be seeming-seeming valid establishment. But I say this is not so. Why? For a "true-like valid establishment" is simply a seeming establishment—why call it "true-like valid establishment"? Such an interpretation leads to the fault of self-contradiction. Moreover, if within semblances there can be seeming-seeming, then within truth there should also be true-true. Since this is not the case, how can that be accepted? Therefore, simply saying "true-like valid establishment" covers the meaning completely. Adding "true-like valid establishment" and "seeming-seeming valid establishment" is utterly unnecessary.
Question: "You say there are two aspects of what is established. Are they established together, or is only one established?"
Answer: "They are established according to the specific dispute."
Question: "Then why do you say two aspects are established?"
Answer: "Because the issues in a debate never go beyond these two."
Question: "If the dispute is about a distinction (e.g., an attribute), we can say the property and the subject combine to form the thesis. If the dispute is about the essence itself—like debating whether the self exists or not—what subject and property combine?"
Answer: "Even if the dispute is only about the essence, when you first raise 'self' it becomes a subject (e.g., the bearer of properties), and then you propose whether it 'exists' or 'does not exist,' which functions as a property. Thus, it is still a combination."
Question: "If you argue 'the self exists,' existence and the self combine—both are present. But if you argue 'the self does not exist,' what two things combine?"
Answer: "Non-existence combines with non-existence. That does not violate the principles of logic."
Question: "If so, the dispute is still about a property. Why call it a dispute about the subject?"
Answer: "When presenting a thesis, you must use language to state the property. But before adding that language, what you originally intended to argue about is the subject itself."
Question: "Then why do all the treatises say this is done to avoid the errors of ancient masters, who sometimes only argued about the subject, sometimes only about the property, sometimes both, but never saw them as a combination?"
Answer: "Although they say 'ancient masters,' this does not refer solely to Vasubandhu and his school. It refers to other ancient scholars who did not understand logic. Some argued against the ancient masters, claiming that 'a thesis cannot be a means of proof because it does not express a logical reason.' But that is wrong—a thesis does not need to express a reason to serve as a means of proof. Direct perception and inference are also means of valid cognition, yet they do not express reasons. If you claim that perception and inference are not valid means of cognition, what category do they belong to?
"If you say that Dignāga did not accept perception and inference as part of the 'logical reason' category—that is an uncertain objection—it ultimately contradicts scripture and commits the error of a faulty thesis. Dignāga and his successors wrote to clarify the Yogacāra tradition. How could their work lead to contradictory conclusions? If they intended to refute other ancient masters, even then the objection is not necessarily valid."