---
title: "阿毘達磨順正理論 · 6 六"
description: "阿毘達磨順正理論是印度佛教论师众贤尊者所造的重要论典，由唐代高僧玄奘大师译成中文。该论属于说一切有部阿毘达磨论典体系，成书于公元5世纪左右，主要针对经量部观点进行辩驳，系统阐述有部教义。内容涵盖诸法实有、三世实有等核心理论，详细分析心法、色法等法相，论证有部主张的合理性。作为说一切有部晚期代表作，该论在部派佛教发展中具有承前启后的地位，是研究部派佛教思想的重要文献，也是理解大乘佛教兴起背景的关键著作之一。"
url: "https://rushiwowen.co/en/r/cmcx3tv9m053hkz04fdsie0mv"
---

## 阿毘達磨順正理論卷第二十六

尊者眾賢造

三藏法師玄奘奉　詔譯

### 辯緣起品第三之六

> Chapter 3: On Dependent Origination, Part 6

結生識後、六處生前，中間諸位總稱名色。豈不已生身意二處，應言此在四處生前？大德邏摩率自意釋，度名色已方立處名。意體雖恒，有非意處，要是觸處方得處名。滅盡定中意處不壞，由斯亦許有意識生，然闕餘緣故無有觸，是故非識。名色位中，身意二根可得名處，故說名色在六處前。名色為緣生於六處，此唯率意妄設虛言，都無正理及正教故。謂無理教可以證成意法為緣生於意識。於中亦有不名三和，或有三和而無有觸。若謂此位有劣三和，觸亦應然，寧全非有？彼宗許觸即三和故。又彼亦許有處無觸，由彼自說滅盡定中意處不壞而無有觸。既爾，於識名色位中，何法壞心令非意處？又彼執離根境識三，有何別緣親能生觸，而言闕故識有觸無？非佛世尊曾有此說，但如童竪自室戲言。又說名色為觸緣故，如告慶喜：若有問言觸有緣耶？應答言有。彼若復問此觸何緣？應正答言所謂名色。既爾，豈不六處生前有名色故必應有觸，是則無時意非意處。若謂如是，生觸名色非六處前名色支位，如世尊告阿難陀言：識在嬰孩及童子位便斷壞者，名色必無增長廣大。如是名色豈六處前？故今觸緣即彼名色。此救亦非理，說識為緣故。謂能為緣生觸名色，世尊即說彼結生識為緣，如契經言：識若不入母胎中者，此名色成羯剌藍不？不也？世尊！乃至廣說。次說名色與觸為緣，非此位中可得即說為嬰孩等，故不成救。今此位中已有何色為緣生觸，而言此位名色為緣生於觸耶？有說此位唯名生觸，約位總說名色為緣。有言此約名色滿位，身觸為緣能生身識，故說名色與觸為緣。今謂此中名色緣觸，就位總說言具二緣，若別說緣或名或二。或即六處為緣生觸，故說名色與觸為緣。然名色位非無有觸，以許此中有意識故。曾無處說離根境等別有觸緣，而說此中有識無觸，有言無理。又彼所說，意體雖恒，有非意處。此何所表？若是處體而不施設，此何所以竟不說因？又言觸處方立處名，許是處體，此言便壞。若非處體，便違契經。一切法者謂十二處，然佛世尊處處顯示，離十二處無別有法。亦不可說於諸法中，有非處體而處所攝。雖一極微不能生觸，而無現在唯一極微。非五識身所依緣者亦是處體，得彼相故。是故所說，意體雖恒有非意處，非應理說。若爾，何故不作是言：四處生前說為名色，識名色位用減劣故。謂二位中諸內處體，用猶減劣，不立處名。若此位中處用圓勝，即於此位可立處名。或位不同，體有異故。謂六處位所得意身，用勝體圓，非前所得。如是六處，名色為緣，故說名色緣生六處。或此位方得全分現行故，謂要支開位方得男女根，爾時諸識身乃容皆現起。故身意處六處位中，體用現行方得全分。由斯故說六處生前是名色位。此說為善。餘廣分別此名色支，於此後文當更顯示。即此名色為緣所生，具眼等根未三和合，中間諸蘊說名六處。謂名色後六處已生，乃至根境識未具和合位，下中上品次第漸增，於此位中總名六處。豈於此位諸識不生，而得說三未具和合？且無一位意識不生，名色位中身識亦起，況六處位言無三和？所餘識身亦容得起，然非恒勝，故未立三和名。於此位中唯六處勝，故約六處以標位別。既許六處緣名色生，一念名色後即應立六處，如一念識後即立名色支。此責不然，六處要待名色成熟方得生故。何法說為名色成熟？無別有法，然名色位下中品時，未能為緣引生六處，要增上位方能為緣引生六處，即名成熟。要待名色熟六處方生，如因種轉變芽方得起或非離名色六處可得生，如要依雲方得降雨。若爾，六處非名色生，如何可說言名色緣六處？諸為緣者，謂有助能，未必親生方成緣義。如果雖為引業所牽，滿業若無，果終不起。如是六處雖業所招，無名色緣必無起義。即先行業所招六處，要由名色緣助乃生，同一相續勢力引故。雖名色為緣亦生色等，而即初念識滋潤所生，故不說彼緣名色起。又彼色等通情非情，今此唯明有情緣起，故唯說名色為緣生六處。或先已辯，識緣名色即已總說緣生色等。今名色後，色等與前更有何殊？義用可得，而須說彼從名色生，故如本文所說無失。此中上座欲令眼等唯有世俗和合用故，作如是說：眼等五根唯世俗有，乃至廣說。如是所欲，於理匪宜。救療彼方，如初品說，有少差別，今應更辯。謂上座言：五根所發識，唯緣世俗有，無分別故，猶如明鏡照眾色像。即由此理，識不任依。如佛世尊言：依智不依識。意識通緣世俗勝義，故體兼有依及非依。此亦不然，智應同故。若眼等識緣世俗故、無分別故不任依者，智亦應然，豈唯依性？謂彼說智是思差別，依五根門亦有智起。彼緣世俗、無分別故，亦應同識不任為依。若謂智生有緣勝義及有分別，識亦應然。謂有意識能緣勝義，有分別故，亦任為依。若智唯由意所引起，亦不應說唯智是依，以許意識通緣二故，及許體兼依非依故。由此如意識，智亦通非依，意識應如智，亦有任依者。又無漏智亦應非依，以於多法一行轉故、無分別故。上座意許如是法智不緣勝義，故即於此說如是言：多分有情所起諸智，於多法上一相智生，謂於多法取一合相，此智難成緣勝義起。若謂此智雖緣多法生，而不於諸法取一合相，眼等諸識應亦許然，謂彼雖緣多法為境起，無分別故，不取一合相。如是應許五識唯依意識，貫通依非依性，有取一合相，有緣勝義故。曾無處說意識是依，上座或時說為依性，是則上座於經義中進退躊躇，不能定顯；設復定顯，便違理教，故上座意不任為依。餘處別當辯此經義，恐文煩重故應且止，但應思擇此正所明。上座此中廣為方便立無境識，此於第五隨眠品中當廣遮遣。應知如是辯六處中，亦可遍摧彼諸妄計。薄伽梵說：根境識三具和合時說名為觸。謂未能了三受因異，但具三和，彼位名觸。觸差別義後當廣辯。已了三受因差別相，未起婬貪，此位名受。謂已能了苦樂等緣，婬愛未行，說名受位。受差別義後當廣辯。貪妙資具，婬愛現行，未廣追求，此位名愛。妙資具者，謂妙資財，貪此及婬總名為愛。廣辯愛義，如隨眠品。上座於此復作是說：受望於愛，非作生因。若爾，如何說受緣愛？受為境故，說為愛緣。謂諸愛生，緣受為境。故契經說：若有於受，不如實知是集沒味過患出離，彼於受喜，即名為取。云何知此？契經中說愛緣受生。豈不所言彼於受憙，即是緣受生憙愛義？此非誠證，於因義中亦可得說第七聲故。謂因於受，憙愛得生，是依受因生憙愛義，由此故說受為愛緣。若不爾者，要愛生已方有所緣，非愛未生可能緣受，未有體故。既餘緣力愛體已生，如何復言受緣生愛？若餘緣力愛體已生，受為所緣亦名緣者，如是便有太過之失。謂受有時緣愛為境，亦應說受以愛為緣。又愛有時緣觸為境，亦應說觸為緣生愛。又無漏智亦緣愛為境，亦應說此愛為緣故生。設許此經約緣受境說於受憙，何緣知說受緣愛者非謂生因？上座所宗亦許一切所說緣起皆據生因，如何此中撥生因義？故彼論說：緣起為繩，繫縛有情令住生死。若能遍知受，名為斷繩。若緣受生，即名為縛。說所緣受為令遍知，為愛即能遍知於受，而言說受為令遍知？不爾。云何？謂遍知智知受集等智所知受，即愛所緣，無有定因。證能治境，即是所治愛等所緣，故不應言愛緣受起。說所緣受為令遍知，設為令遍知說愛所緣受，許所緣受為愛生因，於理何違？因為誹撥，誹許意識，以意為所緣便撥意根為因生識義。又彼上座於自論中數處有言因受生愛，謂有無明受能為愛緣，無明觸生受，為緣生愛。又說愛是果，必以受為因，由說果名知有因故。又說無明助受，能為愛生因故。如是所說，存前違後、存後違前，前後二言互相違害。不觀理趣率爾發言，故彼所言不可依信。尊者世親作如是釋：彼於愛憙即名取者，愛攝在取中，故經不別說。上座於此妄撥言非，因果二門理應別故。謂愛與取因果性殊，以愛為因生取果故。如彼尊者說愛為因還能生愛，有何別失？理必不然，說異相故。謂於緣起中說異相因果，為辯生死相續次第，不可言愛攝在取中。若也愛生還因於愛，如是展轉便致無窮，何所遍知令愛止息？即應生死無斷絕期。如是所言，皆不應理。自宗許觸即是觸因，和合性故，非彼許觸與觸所因有別異相，或應許觸離因而有。若彼意許觸與觸因，雖無異相而有因果，愛取亦然，何容非斥？若言假實相有異者，理亦不然，非如受等類有別故。謂彼宗觸離觸所因，非如受等體類有別，如何可言其相有異？非諸假法離假所依別有相體，依何辯異？或如六處與觸為緣，非許為緣唯望自類，望自他類皆許為緣，然於此中非無因果。如是說愛與取為緣，亦應許非唯望自類，望自他類皆得為緣，而於此中非無因果。又如六處名色為緣，雖無相別而有因果。亦如名色用識為緣，識體即在名中所攝，前識後識雖無相異，而識名色非無因果。從愛生取類亦應然，故緣起中相雖無別亦有因果，由此說取即攝於愛亦無有失。所言因果其相定異，如是言義無理證成。為辯生死相續次第，必說因果其相有殊，非相無別。有何因證？若謂因果相若無別，則所化生難知故者，亦不成證。所以者何？愛取義名有差別故。如識等名義與名色等別，既不說愛即為愛因。如何可言二愛因果別難知故，生死相續次第難知。分明說愛能生取果，如是因果別豈難知？如彼所宗說名色因識、六處因名色、觸因六處，非難了知。又佛世尊親演說故，謂契經說：若於受喜即名為取，取為有緣，乃至廣說。故取攝愛，其理極成。上座復言：此經非了義，或誦者失，別說對治故。彼謂此經非了義攝，世尊為令速斷滅故，於取因上假說取聲。或應誦言，若於受憙，便能生取。所以者何？餘處別說彼對治故。以契經言：若能滅此，於諸受憙以憙滅故，取亦隨滅。悲哉東土聖教無依，如是不知了不了義，仍隨自樂決判眾經，為立己宗緣受生愛，及破他立取攝愛言，真了義經判為不了，實可依者執作非依。非了義經可名不了，勿不了義名了義經。若爾，總無可依聖教，唯有無義、不可依言，是則便成壞聖法者。若取因愛攝在取中，如取蘊因攝在取蘊，如是取體及與取因，二種皆以取聲而說，於令速斷彌是勝緣，何所乖違判非了義？又彼不可改本誦言，於教義中無勝用故，非本所誦於聖教中義有所闕，何煩輒改？又彼所引，證此契經非了義言，亦非誠證，謂因愛滅，果愛及餘亦隨滅故。薄伽梵說：若能滅此，於諸愛憙以憙滅故，取亦隨滅。為顯一因有多果故。又何不信如是契經？由此經說憙即名取，故餘經言：以憙滅故取亦隨滅。世尊為顯取所攝憙即是取因，故作是說。若作是說，彌令速斷，以於取中攝多過故。又若餘處分明顯說，愛之與取條然異類，可判此經憙即名取為不了義。然無是說，仍有餘經判愛即取，謂世尊說：我當為汝說順取法及諸取體，廣說乃至云何為取體？謂此中欲貪。上座自言：若薄伽梵自標自釋是了義經。不可判斯為不了義。又薄伽梵告諸苾芻：取非即五蘊，亦非離五蘊。然取即是此中欲貪，是故此經言憙即取，無容判是不了義經。又取攝愛，理定應爾，以諸煩惱皆業因故，如前際惑皆謂無明。故契經言：取緣有者，是因煩惱發諸業義。愛於發業是最勝因，攝在取中為緣發有，於理何失而不信依？如前際緣起，說無明緣行，一切煩惱皆能發業，是業因故皆謂無明，故後際中能發業惑皆取所攝，其理極成。又彼所言：愛還因愛，如是展轉便致無窮。理實無窮，於宗何失？謂許後愛因前愛生，前愛復因前前愛起，因無始故，理實無窮，此於我宗是德非失。又彼所說何所遍知令愛息者，遍知自性故及遍知因故，能令愛息。如是愛因略有二種：一異類謂受、二同類謂愛。有何因證令愛止息，唯由遍知異類因受，非由遍知同類因愛？縱許愛息唯由遍知，異類因受豈能違愛攝在取中？故說愛因亦取中攝，理無傾動。為得種種可意境界周遍馳求，此位名取。取有四種，謂欲及見、戒禁、我語取差別故。以能取故，說名為取，即諸煩惱作相想業。謂欲界繫煩惱隨煩惱，除見，名欲取，如馬等車。三界四見，名為見取。彼戒禁取，名戒禁取。色無色界繫，煩惱隨煩惱，唯除五見，名我語取。如是語取，隨眠品中當廣分別。唯與上座決擇相應，此中略辯不立無明為別取者，自力無明，不猛利故、非解性故；相應無明，他煩惱力令能取故。由斯義故，不別立取。離餘見立戒禁取者，於能集業力最勝故。由斯故說一戒禁取，於集業門力齊四見，由此一見令業熾然，乖違聖道、遠離解脫，故戒禁取別立取名。以諸取名表依執義，雖煩惱類皆為依執，而此二取依執義勝，故唯此二俱得取名，以二於他最堅執故。然於此二，戒禁取強，如所蔽執熾然行故，由是離餘別立為取。四見皆以慧為性故，對餘煩惱依執義強，攝四簡餘立為見取。諸餘煩惱，定不定地有差別故、不善無記因差別故，立餘二取。我語之取名我語取，是於我語能執取義。此有我語說為我語，是於此中有我語義。此體是何？謂有情數諸法聚集，於此我語有能執著，名我語取。若爾，一切煩惱皆應名我語取。我宗許爾，為難唐捐。何故少分說我語取？為欲成立一切煩惱皆我語取，故說別名。謂以別名說餘三取，顯我語取是立總名，如色處界及如行蘊、法念住等，於聖教中多見此例。為總攝餘所應說義，故於少分安立總名，如初力無畏及法處界等。復有異門釋我語取，謂依此故能引我言，此即我見，名為我語。色無色纏、貪慢疑等，能令我見增長堅多，朋我語故，名我語取，是令我語能堅執義。或取能令我語盛義，非欲貪等亦得此名，唯定地惑，能於我語，極增盛中為近因故，非散地惑朋助我見令其增盛如定地惑。欲界有情多遊外境令心散動，故此地惑非令內緣我執增盛，是故不說為我語取。於此對法所立理中，寡學上座謬興彈斥，如是所說理不相應，聖教曾無如是說故。謂曾無有少聖教中以我語聲說上二界惑彼所繫我見煩惱，及以取聲說彼餘惑。又前後說自相違故，謂對法中自作是說：出家外道於長夜中執我有情命者生者及養育者。補特伽羅彼尚不能記別無我，況能施設斷我語取？上座於此畢竟無能顯對法宗違於法性，但如歌末無義餘聲。言聖教曾無如是說故者，且問上座聖教是何？於三藏中曾未聞有佛以法印決定印言：齊爾所來名為聖教。若謂聖教是佛所言，寧知此言非佛所說？未見有一於佛所言能決定知量邊際故。謂曾未見有於佛語能達其邊，如何定言對法宗義非聖教說？上座於此乍可斥言，此所釋理違於法性，不應總撥聖教中無。世尊每言諸有所說順法性理堪為定量，如契經說：隨順契經、顯毘柰耶、不違法性，如是所說方可為依。阿毘達磨既名總攝，不違一切聖教理言，故所釋理無違法性。然佛世尊亦嘗稱讚非契佛意符正理言，如契經言：汝等所說雖非我本意，而所說皆善符正理，故皆可受持。若聖教中現無說處言非量者，有太過失，謂聖教中何處顯了定說樹等皆無有命、定說諸行皆剎那滅、定說瓶等非別實有、定說過去非未來為因、定說有情非本無今有？又佛世尊曾於何處定釋密說殺父等言，謂有漏業名為父等？又自所執舊隨界等，佛於何處曾說此言？設為證成，引相似教，非正顯故，可作餘釋。由是所言，無經說故便非有者，非決定因。又阿難陀尚不應說如是釋理全無說處，況彼上座於聖教中少分受持便應定判？故嗢怛羅契經中說，天帝釋白嗢怛羅言：我今遍觀贍部洲內諸佛弟子，無能受持如是法門，唯除大德，是故大德應自正勤持此法門無令忘失，世尊自說此法門故。由是比知，今亦無有於佛聖教能具受持。佛初涅槃及正住世，阿難陀等聞持海人尚不遍知佛語邊際，況今得有能遍知人？故上座說謂曾無有少聖教中以我語聲說上界等，此欲顯己知聖教邊，於自所知增益之甚。然契經說：取為有緣。一切煩惱皆能發業，故取應攝一切煩惱，應具攝理已如前說。此與理教無片相違，故知經中定有說處。是故憎背他宗善說，苟欲成立自所宗承，如是未為順聖教理，毀他成己豈曰仁師？有智學徒皆依對法，採正理食以增慧命，飲濯如是善說清流，諸所願求無不成辦。自無淨信又闕多聞，越路而行誹毀正法，顯己有濫外道異生，豈謂自障稟賢聖法？豈不此釋違於聖教？如世尊告諸苾芻言：汝等昔時執我語取為常恒住不變易法，謂正住耶？實爾。世尊！乃至廣說。此中意說，於內法中執取為我名我語取，故對法釋違此契經。此亦不然，迷經義故。且應審察，為依我見問諸苾芻：汝等昔時執我語取，為常恒等、為依所取我語事耶？我見且無常恒等相，亦無有執謂常恒等。如何世尊問苾芻眾：汝等昔時執我語取為常恒等，謂正住耶？苾芻云何答言實爾？故應但約所執取事為常等問。此意假說所取我語名我語取。或應誦言：汝等昔時由我語取，執常恒等謂正住耶？或復應言：汝等昔時執我語體為常恒住，乃至廣說。雖為此釋，非意所存，理實但應所取名取。若謂此釋理不應然，於能作用中多置屢吒故；如是所引理不定然，於業差別中亦有屢吒故。如是經義，證對法宗釋我語取義更明了。謂我語者是說我言，世共於中說此為我，此有我語得我語名。我語能為取依著處，故亦得說為我語取。此體是何？謂五取蘊。世於取蘊起我有情命者等想，故契經說：諸有沙門或婆羅門，乃至廣說。此意則說，汝等昔時執五取蘊為常恒住，乃至廣說。故所引經所說取義，不能決定證彼所執，亦不能遮諸對法者如前所辯我語取相。然彼具壽引此契經，但能顯己誦文迷義。言前後說自相違者，此宗前後都不相違，於對法文不了義意，隨己謬解謂有相違。由彼出家諸外道類，不了取義，唯聞取名，但隨取名自稱我等說斷三取，唯除第四。所以者何？彼諸外道謂我語取即所取我，然彼計我是常恒住不變易法，體不可斷。又於我斷，彼生大怖，故不施設斷我語取。此意說言，彼若真實善解取義，於我語取亦應施設能斷少分；以於取義不善了知，唯聞取名妄推實義，故除第四，言唯斷三。亦如今時一譬喻者，不應立義而強立之、應立義中而倒不立。又彼依自所執取門，施設斷三非我語取。然彼所執，取體不同。且欲取中，有言體是諸妙欲境，有謂婬貪。他宗戒禁名戒禁取，他宗諸見名為見取，於我見中執為正智，故不建立我語取名，故說斷三非我語取。故諸外道有作是言：如彼大師可敬可愛，我師亦爾。如彼大師於法究竟，我師亦爾。如彼法侶互相敬愛，我等亦爾。如彼於戒圓滿護持，我等亦爾。如彼施設能斷諸取，我等亦爾。彼與我等有何差別？故我宗義前後無違，上座如何安立諸取？彼言欲取，於契經中世尊分明親自開示，如有請問：欲者謂何？世尊答言：謂五妙欲。然非妙欲即是欲體，此中欲貪說名為欲。又世尊勸依了義經，此了義經不應異釋。我今於此見如是意，謂由愛力，五妙欲中欲貪生故而有所取，是名欲取。經與彼義都不相應，謂此經中都不依彼所執欲取而興問答。又經所說，亦不乖違我對法宗所說欲義，我等亦說五妙欲中所有欲貪是真欲故。又彼引此，竟何所成？世尊於此中，非辯欲取故。又此所引非了義經，復應觀察別意趣故，謂經後句世尊自遮言非妙欲即是欲體，有何密意於前句中正答問言謂五妙欲。若更有別意而名了義經，更無別意者應名不了義，則了不了義應無定建立。又何意說，五妙欲中欲貪生故而有所取是名欲取？為執欲貪、為執妙欲名為欲取？除此二種更作餘執，則無所依。且彼所宗取不攝愛，不應欲取體是欲貪，或彼前後自相違害。若執妙欲名欲取者，豈非煩惱能為業因？又取不應緣愛而起，唯應許愛緣取而生。彼上座言：取非二種，但於妙欲欲貪生故，執而不捨，說名欲取。巧為如是響像言詞，惑亂東方愚信族類。何名為執？何名不捨？豈不於彼五妙欲中有欲貪生即名為執，耽著不棄即名不捨。故先說彼不應立義而強立之，應立義中而倒不立，言成無謬。或彼應辯執不捨相，非即前二而名欲取。彼言見取即是五見，謂愛力故執而不捨。故契經說：由有彼故，應知是諸沙門梵志成不聰叡，墮無明趣，愛廣滋長。彼謂諸見由愛勢力種種熾盛名廣滋長，如是所說前後相違不了經義，引之無益。如何彼說前後相違？謂能執故說名為執，如是執體即是五見，彼即不棄故名不捨，是謂後言違於前說。謂彼前說，於內法中執取為我名我語取，或我語取，見取所收，無別性故，應唯三取。理不應許取體相雜，如何說彼不了經義？謂經但言愛廣滋長，如何知說是由愛力種種熾盛名廣滋長，非由見力愛滋長耶？我於此中見如是義，謂由見力愛廣滋長。由彼經言：沙門梵志依前際執說常住論，言我世間皆悉是常，於四事中而興諍論。由有彼故，應知是諸沙門梵志成不聰叡，墮無明趣，愛廣滋長。此中意說，愛由見力而廣滋長，非見由愛。此分明說愛廣滋長，如何翻謂見滋長耶？如何此經引之無益？謂縱如彼釋，引之何所成？非由此能成彼見取，豈由此故便能證成？離彼諸見外，有執而不捨，然執不捨即是諸見，故所引經於彼無益。彼言此中戒禁取者，非五見中戒禁取攝。然即戒禁其體是何？謂有外道，由愛力故，受持牛鹿猪狗戒禁，願我由斯持戒禁力，當受快樂、或當永斷。觀察為先所起執見，是五見中戒禁取攝。希欲為先所受戒禁，是四取中戒禁取攝。故此與彼取體不同。如是立中有二種失，取體支體俱雜亂故。且無有一但希求果受持戒禁，非見為先；要見為先，方希求故。設許彼說希欲為先，所受戒禁非五見中戒禁取攝，則定應許觀察為先所受戒禁是五見中戒禁取攝。此戒禁取於四取中，為是見取、為戒禁取？隨許是一，取應雜亂，或違先許。彼先許言：希欲為先，所受戒禁，是四取中戒禁取攝，非五見中戒禁取攝，無如是失，以能執見是四取中見取所攝，所執戒禁是四取中戒禁取攝。此救非理，四見亦應如戒禁取而建立故。謂餘四見亦應能執，是四取中見取所攝，所執境界別立餘取。又應欲貪立為欲取，所貪境界別立餘取，此彼差別無定因故，是則諸取數應不定。如對法宗，於五見內獨立一見，名戒禁取；我宗亦然，強者別立。若爾，應唯四見立一，如戒禁取；欲貪與境應立別取，何理能遮？故彼所宗非善立取。又諸有支體應雜亂，謂取支中有有支故，以契經說，告阿難陀：能感當來後有諸業，應知即是此中有支。又業為生因，餘契經說故。所受戒禁是有是業，後有即生應如前際，則當生有應取為緣。上座救言：此後所起方名為有，用取為緣。此救不然，有業非有，即此種類有業是有，此必應遭外道所魅。又應說愛與有為緣，彼許有戒禁從希望生故。由此定知越對法理，必無於取無過安立。今應思擇：應諸煩惱皆是取緣，展轉相因諸惑生故，何故但說愛為取緣？不可取緣說餘煩惱，夫取緣者謂能為緣，令取體生、不捨所取。愛望於取具有二能，餘惑但能令取體起，故唯說愛能為取緣。上座釋言：所以不說餘煩惱者，理無有故。謂若離愛，現在前行我語等取終不行故。未了彼言何意故說，若遮諸惑展轉力生，是則應違聖教正理。故契經說，佛告苾芻：愛由愛生，愛復生恚；恚由恚起，恚復生愛。如是亦說，取為愛緣。又契經說：愛用無明為集為因為生為類。前已成立無明是取故亦應說愛用取為緣。但由前說因，是故不說，理亦應爾。慢起無間遇恚生緣，然恚不生反生於愛，斯有何理？愛恚生緣定有差別，由是證知愛亦緣餘惑生。故非取生但緣於愛，而偏說者由具二能。上座此中妄釋經義，謂非離愛恚得現行。未審此言欲詮何義？豈不愛恚不俱起故，必應離愛恚得現行。若謂恚行必由前愛是經義者，此但虛言，以契經言：恚由恚起，恚復生愛。故但虛言。由是所言理無有故，愛必非賴餘煩惱生，取但因愛理不成立。是故對法所說取支，總攝諸惑，其理為善。

> After the consciousness of conception and before the six sense bases arise, the intermediate stages are collectively called name-and-form. Haven't the body and mind faculties already arisen? Shouldn't this be said to occur before the four faculties? The Venerable Rāma, according to his own interpretation, held that after name-and-form is established, the term "sense base" is applied. Although the mind is constant, there are times when it is not considered a sense base. Only when it becomes an object of contact is it called a sense base. In the cessation attainment, the mind base is not impaired, and thus it is also acknowledged that mind consciousness arises. However, due to the lack of other conditions, there is no contact, and therefore it is not considered consciousness. In the stage of name-and-form, the body and mind faculties can be called sense bases, which is why it is said that name-and-form precedes the six sense bases. To say that name-and-form is the condition for the arising of the six sense bases is merely arbitrary and baseless, as there is neither proper reasoning nor scriptural authority to support it. There is no reasoning or scripture that can prove that mind and mental objects are conditions for the arising of mind consciousness. Among these, there are instances where the threefold combination is not present, or where the threefold combination exists but contact is absent. If it is argued that in this stage there is a subtle threefold combination, then contact should also be present. Why is it entirely absent? Their school holds that contact is precisely the threefold combination. Moreover, they also acknowledge that there can be sense bases without contact, as they themselves state that in the cessation attainment, the mind base is not impaired but there is no contact. If so, in the stage of consciousness and name-and-form, what factor impairs the mind such that it is not considered a sense base? Furthermore, if they assert that apart from the faculty, object, and consciousness, there is some other condition that directly gives rise to contact, then why do they say that due to its absence, consciousness exists but contact does not? The Buddha never taught such a thing. This is like the playful talk of children in their own homes. Moreover, it is said that name-and-form is the condition for contact, as the Buddha told Ānanda: "If someone asks whether contact has a condition, you should answer yes. If they further ask what the condition for contact is, you should correctly answer that it is name-and-form." If so, doesn't this mean that before the six sense bases arise, since name-and-form exists, contact must also exist? Thus, there is no time when the mind is not a sense base. If this is the case, then the name-and-form that gives rise to contact is not the name-and-form of the stage before the six sense bases. As the World-Honored One told Ānanda: "If consciousness were to cease in the stage of an infant or child, name-and-form would not grow and expand." How could such name-and-form be before the six sense bases? Therefore, the condition for contact is precisely that name-and-form. This defense is also unreasonable, as it is said that consciousness is the condition. That is, the consciousness that serves as the condition for the arising of contact and name-and-form is precisely the conception consciousness, as the sutra states: "If consciousness does not enter the mother's womb, would this name-and-form develop into a kalala? No, World-Honored One!" and so on. Next, it is said that name-and-form is the condition for contact. It is not that in this stage one can immediately speak of it as an infant or child, so this defense does not hold. In this stage, what form exists as a condition for the arising of contact, such that it is said that name-and-form is the condition for contact? Some say that in this stage, only name gives rise to contact, but it is generally said that name-and-form is the condition. Others say that this refers to the stage when name-and-form is fully developed, where bodily contact serves as the condition for the arising of bodily consciousness, and thus it is said that name-and-form is the condition for contact. Here, it is understood that when name-and-form is said to be the condition for contact, it is a general statement referring to the two conditions together. If specified separately, it may be name alone or both. Alternatively, it is the six sense bases that serve as the condition for contact, and thus it is said that name-and-form is the condition for contact. However, in the stage of name-and-form, contact is not absent, as it is acknowledged that mind consciousness exists in this stage. There is no scripture that says there is a condition for contact apart from the faculty, object, etc., while also saying that in this stage there is consciousness but no contact. Such a claim is unreasonable. Moreover, what they say—"although the mind is constant, there are times when it is not considered a sense base"—what does this signify? If it is the nature of a sense base but not designated as such, what is the reason? Why is no cause given? If it is said that only when there is contact is it called a sense base, and it is acknowledged to be the nature of a sense base, then this statement is contradictory. If it is not the nature of a sense base, it contradicts the sutras. All phenomena are the twelve sense bases, and the Buddha repeatedly shows that apart from the twelve sense bases, there is nothing else. It cannot be said that among phenomena, there are things that are not the nature of sense bases yet are included among them. Although a single atom cannot give rise to contact, there is no present moment with only a single atom. Even what is not the support or object of the five consciousnesses is still the nature of a sense base, as it possesses that characteristic. Therefore, the statement "although the mind is constant, there are times when it is not considered a sense base" is not reasonable. If so, why not say: "Before the four sense bases arise, it is called name-and-form, because in the stages of consciousness and name-and-form, their functions are diminished"? That is, in these two stages, the internal sense bases have diminished functions and are not designated as sense bases. If in this stage the functions of the sense bases are complete and superior, then in this stage they can be designated as sense bases. Alternatively, because the stages are different, their natures differ. That is, the mind and body faculties attained in the stage of the six sense bases have superior functions and complete natures, unlike what was attained before. Thus, the six sense bases arise conditioned by name-and-form, which is why it is said that name-and-form conditions the six sense bases. Or, it is in this stage that they become fully manifest. That is, only when the faculties develop do the male and female faculties arise, and at that time, all consciousnesses can manifest. Therefore, the body and mind faculties, in the stage of the six sense bases, attain their full nature and function when they become manifest. For this reason, it is said that before the six sense bases arise is the stage of name-and-form. This explanation is good. Further detailed analysis of this name-and-form limb will be presented later. The aggregates that arise conditioned by this name-and-form, possessing faculties such as the eye but not yet in threefold combination, are called the six sense bases in the intermediate stages. That is, after name-and-form, the six sense bases have arisen, up to the stage when the faculty, object, and consciousness are not yet fully combined. In this stage, they gradually increase from lower to middle to higher levels, and are collectively called the six sense bases. In this stage, do consciousnesses not arise, such that it can be said that the three are not yet fully combined? Certainly, there is no stage where mind consciousness does not arise. In the stage of name-and-form, bodily consciousness also arises, let alone in the stage of the six sense bases. How can it be said that there is no threefold combination? The other consciousnesses may also arise, but they are not consistently dominant, so the term "threefold combination" is not applied. In this stage, only the six sense bases are dominant, so the stage is labeled by the six sense bases. Since it is acknowledged that the six sense bases arise conditioned by name-and-form, immediately after a single moment of name-and-form, the six sense bases should be established, just as after a single moment of consciousness, the name-and-form limb is established. This objection is not valid, because the six sense bases must await the maturation of name-and-form to arise. What is meant by the maturation of name-and-form? There is no separate phenomenon, but in the lower and middle levels of the name-and-form stage, it is not yet able to condition the arising of the six sense bases. Only when it reaches a higher level can it condition the arising of the six sense bases, and this is called maturation. The six sense bases arise only when name-and-form matures, just as a sprout arises only when the seed transforms, or as rain falls only when there are clouds. If so, the six sense bases are not produced by name-and-form. How can it be said that name-and-form conditions the six sense bases? Conditioning means having a supportive capacity; it does not necessarily mean direct production to constitute a condition. Just as a fruit, though drawn by a motivating karma, will not arise without the completing karma, so too the six sense bases, though brought about by karma, will not arise without the condition of name-and-form. The six sense bases brought about by prior karma arise only with the supportive condition of name-and-form, because they are drawn by the same continuum of force. Although name-and-form also conditions the arising of form, etc., these are produced by the nourishing of the initial moment of consciousness, so it is not said that they arise conditioned by name-and-form. Moreover, those forms, etc., include both sentient and non-sentient things. Here, only the dependent origination of sentient beings is explained, so it is said that name-and-form conditions the six sense bases. Alternatively, it has already been explained that consciousness conditions name-and-form, which already includes the conditioning of form, etc. After name-and-form, how do form, etc., differ from before? If there is a distinct function, then it should be said that they arise from name-and-form, so there is no error in the original text. Here, the elder, wishing to assert that the eye, etc., have only conventional combined functions, says: "The five faculties such as the eye exist only conventionally," and so on. Such a view is not reasonable. Refuting it is as explained in the first chapter, with some differences, which should now be further clarified. The elder says: "The consciousness arising from the five faculties perceives only conventional existence, because it is non-conceptual, like a mirror reflecting images." For this reason, consciousness cannot serve as a reliance. As the Buddha said: "Rely on wisdom, not on consciousness." Mind consciousness perceives both conventional and ultimate truths, so its nature includes both reliance and non-reliance. This is not correct, because the same should apply to wisdom. If visual consciousness, etc., perceive conventional existence and are non-conceptual, and thus cannot serve as reliance, the same should apply to wisdom. How can wisdom alone be of a relying nature? They say that wisdom is a differentiation of thought, and wisdom also arises based on the five faculties. Since it perceives conventional existence and is non-conceptual, it should be like consciousness and unable to serve as reliance. If it is said that wisdom arises perceiving ultimate truth and is conceptual, the same should apply to consciousness. That is, mind consciousness can perceive ultimate truth and is conceptual, so it can serve as reliance. If wisdom is solely induced by the mind, it should not be said that only wisdom is reliance, since mind consciousness perceives both and its nature includes both reliance and non-reliance. Thus, like mind consciousness, wisdom also includes non-reliance, and mind consciousness, like wisdom, can also serve as reliance. Moreover, unconditioned wisdom should also not be reliance, because it operates on many phenomena with a single mode and is non-conceptual. The elder implicitly acknowledges that such wisdom does not perceive ultimate truth, so he says: "The wisdom arising in most sentient beings perceives many phenomena with a single perception, taking them as a unified whole. Such wisdom hardly arises perceiving ultimate truth." If it is said that this wisdom, though arising from perceiving many phenomena, does not take them as a unified whole, the same should be acknowledged for visual consciousness, etc. That is, though they arise perceiving many phenomena as objects, they are non-conceptual and do not take them as a unified whole. Thus, it should be acknowledged that the five consciousnesses rely solely on mind consciousness, which encompasses both reliance and non-reliance, as it can take a unified whole and perceive ultimate truth. There is no scripture that says mind consciousness is reliance. The elder sometimes says it is of a relying nature, which shows that he hesitates in interpreting the sutras and cannot definitively explain them. Even if he did, it would contradict reasoning and scripture, so the elder's view cannot serve as reliance. The meaning of this sutra will be explained elsewhere, but to avoid excessive length, it should be set aside for now. Only the present topic should be examined. Here, the elder extensively establishes consciousness without an object, which will be refuted in detail in the fifth chapter on latent tendencies. It should be understood that in discussing the six sense bases, his erroneous views can also be thoroughly refuted. The Bhagavān said: "When the three—faculty, object, and consciousness—are combined, it is called contact." That is, when the causes of the three feelings are not yet distinguished, but the three are combined, that stage is called contact. The detailed meaning of contact will be explained later. When the distinguishing characteristics of the causes of the three feelings are understood, but sensual desire has not yet arisen, this stage is called feeling. That is, when one can distinguish the conditions of pleasure and pain, but sensual craving has not yet operated, it is called the feeling stage. The detailed meaning of feeling will be explained later. Craving for excellent possessions, with sensual desire operating but not yet extensively pursued, this stage is called craving. "Excellent possessions" refers to excellent wealth. Craving for this and sensual desire are collectively called craving. The detailed meaning of craving is explained in the chapter on latent tendencies. Here, the elder further says: "Feeling is not the producing cause of craving. If so, how can it be said that feeling conditions craving? Feeling is the object, so it is said to condition craving." That is, craving arises with feeling as its object. Thus, the sutra says: "If one does not truly understand feeling as arising, ceasing, delightful, faulty, and leading to escape, one delights in feeling, and this is called grasping." How is this known? The sutra says craving arises conditioned by feeling. Isn't it said that delighting in feeling means craving arises conditioned by feeling? This is not conclusive proof, because the locative case can also indicate cause. That is, craving arises due to feeling, meaning craving arises depending on feeling as its cause. Thus, it is said that feeling conditions craving. If not, craving must already exist to have an object. Before craving arises, it cannot have feeling as its object, as it does not yet exist. If craving has already arisen due to other conditions, how can it be said that feeling conditions craving? If craving has already arisen due to other conditions, and feeling is its object, then feeling is also called a condition. This leads to the fault of overextension. For example, when feeling has craving as its object, it should also be said that craving conditions feeling. Also, when craving has contact as its object, it should also be said that contact conditions craving. Moreover, unconditioned wisdom also has craving as its object, so it should be said that craving conditions it. Even if this sutra is interpreted as delighting in feeling as an object, how does one know that "feeling conditions craving" does not mean a producing cause? The elder's own school also acknowledges that all dependent origination is based on producing causes. How can he deny the meaning of producing cause here? Thus, his treatise says: "Dependent origination is a rope that binds sentient beings to samsara. If one fully understands feeling, it is called cutting the rope." If craving arises conditioned by feeling, it is called bondage. Is the object feeling said to be fully understood? Or is craving able to fully understand feeling? No. How then? The wisdom that fully understands feeling—the wisdom that knows the arising, etc., of feeling—is the object of craving. There is no fixed reason to prove that the object of the antidote is precisely the object of the afflictions such as craving. Thus, it should not be said that craving arises conditioned by feeling. If the object feeling is said to be fully understood, and if the object feeling is acknowledged as the producing cause of craving, what contradiction is there with reason? To deny this is to deny mind consciousness, for if the mind is taken as an object, one denies that the mind faculty is the cause producing consciousness. Moreover, the elder in his own treatise repeatedly says that craving arises from feeling as its cause. For example, he says: "Feeling with ignorance can condition craving," "Feeling arising from ignorant contact conditions craving," and "Craving is an effect, so it must have feeling as its cause, because the name 'effect' implies a cause." He also says: "Ignorance assists feeling to become the producing cause of craving." Such statements contradict each other—affirming the former contradicts the latter, affirming the latter contradicts the former. The two statements are mutually contradictory. He speaks rashly without considering reason, so his words cannot be relied upon. The Venerable Vasubandhu explains: "Delighting in craving is called grasping because craving is included in grasping, so the sutra does not mention it separately." The elder wrongly denies this, saying that cause and effect should be distinguished. That is, craving and grasping have different natures, as craving is the cause producing grasping as its effect. If, as the Venerable says, craving as a cause can also produce craving, what error is there? This is certainly not reasonable, because different characteristics are spoken of. That is, in dependent origination, cause and effect with different characteristics are explained to show the sequence of samsaric continuity. It cannot be said that craving is included in grasping. If craving arises again conditioned by craving, this would lead to an infinite regress. What is fully understood to cease craving? Then samsara would have no end. Such statements are unreasonable. Our school acknowledges that contact is the cause of contact because it is of a combining nature. They do not acknowledge that contact and its cause have different characteristics, or they would have to acknowledge contact existing apart from its cause. If they implicitly acknowledge that contact and its cause, though not different in characteristic, still have a cause-effect relationship, then the same should apply to craving and grasping. How can this be denied? If it is said that the conventional and the real are different, this is also unreasonable, because they are not like feeling, etc., which have distinct categories. That is, in their school, contact apart from its cause is not like feeling, etc., which have distinct natures. How can it be said that their characteristics differ? Conventional phenomena do not have distinct characteristics apart from their conventional basis. On what basis can difference be argued? Alternatively, just as the six sense bases condition contact, it is not acknowledged that conditioning applies only to the same category. It applies to both same and different categories, yet cause and effect are not absent here. Similarly, craving conditioning grasping should also be acknowledged as applying not only to the same category but to both same and different categories, yet cause and effect are not absent here. Also, just as the six sense bases are conditioned by name-and-form, though not different in characteristic, cause and effect exist. Similarly, name-and-form is conditioned by consciousness, and consciousness is included in name. Though earlier and later consciousness are not different in characteristic, consciousness and name-and-form still have a cause-effect relationship. The same should apply to grasping arising from craving. Thus, in dependent origination, though characteristics are not different, cause and effect still exist. Therefore, saying that grasping includes craving is not erroneous. The claim that cause and effect must have distinct characteristics is not supported by reason. To explain the sequence of samsaric continuity, cause and effect must be said to have distinct characteristics, not to be undifferentiated. What proof is there for this? If it is said that if cause and effect are undifferentiated, it would be difficult for trainees to understand, this is also not proof. Why? Because the meanings and names of craving

## 說一切有部順正理論卷第二十六

> Shravasti Abhidharma Treatise, Volume 26