---
title: "楞嚴經摸象記 · 第三卷"
description: "明代高僧莲池大师袾宏所著的《楞嚴經摸象記》是对《大佛顶首楞严经》的权威注疏。该书以盲人摸象为喻，强调对佛法真谛的体认需超越片面认知，系统阐释了首楞严定的修持法门、心性本体论及禅观实践。其内容涵盖显密教理、禅净融合思想，为汉传佛教尤其是禅宗与净土宗提供了重要理论依据。该注疏被誉为解读《楞严经》的里程碑之作，对明清佛教义学发展影响深远，至今仍是研究楞严思想的核心文献。"
url: "https://rushiwowen.co/en/r/cmcyde3x40j88l204a57exdhz"
---

### ○第三卷

> Volume 3

前矚塵象，歸當見根。

> Focusing on external appearances, one should eventually recognize their true source.

此破見不從空生也。若從空生，則空必前矚塵象，乃名為見。蓋空為能見，塵象為所見。今此眼根，實在我面，則我乃塵象矣，空應反歸而見我之眼根。如其不能見眼，則前矚塵象之義不成矣，安得見從空生？

> This view does not arise from the emptiness. If it arose from the emptiness, then in order to see something, the emptiness would first have to perceive an object. For emptiness is the ability to see, and objects are what is seen. Now, the eye itself is firmly attached to my face—so I am the object, and emptiness should be able to turn back and see my own eyes. If it cannot see the eyes, then the idea of emptiness first perceiving objects does not hold. How could it be said that sight arises from emptiness?

見聞逆流，流不及地。

> Seeing and hearing flow backward, they cannot reach the ground.

依孤山，解穩當。見聞逆流者，五根順流，惟意能旋。其見聞逆流而緣五塵，以其逆流，故攬塵而為憶也。流不及地者，如是逆流所不及之分際，則閴然懵然而無所緣，以流不及，故失憶而為忘也。

> Rely on Lone Mountain, the understanding is steady. When seeing and hearing go against the current, the five senses flow with it, only the mind can turn back. When seeing and hearing go against the current and engage with the five sense objects, because they go against the current, they grasp the objects and become memory. What the current cannot reach— that boundary beyond the reach of this opposing flow— is still, dim, and has nothing to engage with. Because the current does not reach it, memory is lost and becomes forgetting.

聲來耳邊。

> The sound comes to the ear.

耳之有聽，經明言非聲來耳邊矣。今以事證之，有可疑者。假如鐘鼓樓介乎城南北之中央，南風作則北城聞之而南不聞，北風作則南城聞之而北不聞，風送聲而人得聞，如何道不是聲來耳邊？人多於此草草看過，無發難者。愚意佛言：寧有錯乎？聲定不來耳邊，心定徧周法界。但諸眾生粘湛發聽，失本妙圓，局而礙之，束而小之，是以風順則聞，風逆則否，反為境使而不得自在。耳之過也，非聲之故也。以是推之，隔垣聽音響，遐邇皆可聞，亦復可難。既垣不礙音，何為城內一人面城而語，城外一人附城而聽，乃杳爾無聞乎？此亦同前。蓋耳之過也，非垣與城之故也。是以耳通者徹聽，或聽一世界乃至恒沙世界而無盡也。

> The ear's hearing: the scriptures clearly state that sound does not come to the ear. Now let us prove this with a real example, which may raise doubts. Suppose a bell-and-drum tower stands in the center between the south and north of a city. When the south wind blows, the northern part of the city hears it while the southern part does not; when the north wind blows, the southern part hears it while the northern part does not. The wind carries the sound and people hear it—how can we say the sound does not come to the ear? Most people gloss over this without raising questions. In my view, could the Buddha's words be wrong? Sound definitely does not come to the ear; the mind certainly pervades the entire universe. But sentient beings, clinging to stillness and developing hearing, lose the wondrous perfection of their original nature. They become confined and obstructed, bound and diminished. Thus, with the wind, they hear; against the wind, they do not. They are driven by circumstances and lose their freedom. This is the fault of the ear, not of sound. Extending this reasoning: hearing sounds through walls, near or far, all can be heard—one might also question this. If walls do not block sound, why is it that when one person inside a city speaks facing the wall, and another person outside presses their ear to the wall, they hear nothing at all? This too is the same as before. It is the fault of the ear, not of walls or the city. Thus, one whose ear is unobstructed can hear completely, hearing one world or even worlds as numerous as the sands of the Ganges without end.

此摩所知，誰為能觸？

> What is known by the mind, and who is it that perceives?

凡物須一能一所，彼此相感，然後成觸。則一有知，一無知也。今以手摩頭，手與頭各各有知，將以誰為能觸乎？若手為能觸，頭則木石也。今頭亦有知，何得名觸？若頭為能觸，手則木石也。今手亦有知，何得名觸？此明身之覺觸，皆虗妄也。問：手摩頭，固不成觸矣。若手摩外物，豈不成觸？答：是亦妄分能所也。然此意人所難明，故借頭手引起。畢竟身觸虗妄，皆如頭手耳。

> Everything requires a perceiver and a perceived, mutually responding, before contact arises. Thus, one is conscious and the other is not. Now, when the hand rubs the head, both the hand and the head are each conscious—so which one is the perceiver that makes contact? If the hand is the perceiver, then the head is like wood or stone. Yet the head is also conscious, so how can this be called contact? If the head is the perceiver, then the hand is like wood or stone. Yet the hand is also conscious, so how can this be called contact? This shows that the body's sensation of contact is all illusory. Question: When the hand rubs the head, contact indeed does not occur. But when the hand rubs an external object, doesn't contact occur? Answer: That too is a false division of perceiver and perceived. However, this point is hard for people to grasp, so the head and hand are used as an illustration. Ultimately, bodily contact is illusory, just like the head and hand.

從變則變，界相自無；不變則恒，既從色生，應不識知虗空所在。

> From change comes change, and the nature of realms naturally vanishes; If unchanging, it remains eternal, but since it arises from form, It should not recognize where empty space resides.

上文言此識若從色生，色滅應與俱滅，識既俱滅，則空獨存，誰識空者？若色滅時，識不俱滅，則識獨存，無色為侶，誰界空者？今又重申上意，言不但識存無界，假使隨色變滅，則識已變滅，亦誰與空為界者？不但識滅不應識空，假使識不變滅，則恒常與色一體，與空無干，誰識空者？反覆較量，眼識不生於色明矣。

> The text above asks: if this consciousness arises from form, then when form ceases, consciousness should cease along with it. If consciousness ceases along with form, then only emptiness remains—but who is there to perceive that emptiness? If, when form ceases, consciousness does not cease, then consciousness exists alone, having no form as its companion—so what defines it as emptiness? Now, to restate the earlier point: not only does consciousness have no realm when it exists alone, but even if it were to change and cease along with form, then consciousness would already have ceased—so who would still relate to emptiness as a realm? Not only would it be inappropriate for consciousness to perceive emptiness after ceasing, but even if consciousness did not change or cease, it would forever remain one with form and have nothing to do with emptiness—so who would perceive emptiness? After repeated deliberation, it becomes clear that the eye-consciousness does not arise from form.

合則中離，離則兩合。

> When they come together, they part; when they part, they come together again.

承上文，眼識不從眼生，不從色生矣。既不分二處而各生，得無兼二處而合生乎？然汝欲合之，彼則中離矣。蓋眼自屬有知，色自屬無知，有知無知，兩相敵對，如之何其可合也？若汝欲離之，彼則兩合矣。蓋眼根必合色，色塵必合眼，而後識生其中，兩相和會，如之何其可離也？合之則離，離之則合，此之體性，渾然雜亂，將於何處立共生之界乎？前明眼色虗妄，今言識亦虗妄，故曰三處俱無。

又汝識心與諸思量兼了別性，為同為異？

舊解初句識心是意，次二句是識，但初句明標識心，何得作意？今謂仍以初句為識，下二句為意，以意屬思量，亦能了別也。蓋云今此識心，與彼意之思量義，乃了別義，同乎？異乎？若識同意，則識即意，何得云意之所生？若識異意，則識乃無知，與意判隔，何得云意之所生？若識異意，而又能思量了別，則意無知而識有知，應當反識乎意而為識意，又何得云意之所生？同之不可，異之不可，識非意生，何疑焉？而謂以意為界者，非也。一說識心與思量之意，俱能了別，既俱能了別，則同矣，何得又問為同為異？既俱能了別，則有識矣，何得又問無識有識？或謂意思量，識了別，今說意兼了別，何也？蓋心意識三古稱，義可通用，如金光明言意根分別一切諸法，則意兼了別，有何不可？

了然自知，獲本妙心，常住不滅。此節當在空則同無後。

如上微妙開示，自決擇心見，以至發明五陰、六根、六塵、六識、七大，皆即如來藏心，因此了知自心常住不滅，此是一經大旨趣、大眼目。誠得此心，則我常為主，萬法為客，長安雖閙，我國晏然。彼摩登伽猶如妖狐，忽遇明鏡，竄伏無地，尚安所施其魔力耶？

自汝整衣，云何倒拂？

此文因自汝整衣四字，故解者不一。今只依文順釋，其意自顯。蓋此是明風不生彼面也。言風若生於彼面，則當從彼至此拂汝阿難。然今此風自汝整衣現拂於彼，既風生彼面，何為不順拂汝而倒拂彼耶？故知風決不生彼面也。若以倒拂屬阿難，則非明風不生於彼面，乃明風不生於阿難袈裟矣。

見覺無知，因色空有。

或謂此言見覺無知，下文舉見覺空頑作對，則覺乃有知，上下矛盾。宜以上覺字屬身根，下覺字屬知覺，雖似有理，然不應一覺兩解。今謂無知者，非實無知也，以此引起因色空有一句。蓋色空不現時，見覺寂然，宛似無知；因色空現，而後見覺有知也。孔子曰：吾有知乎哉？無知也。有問我者，我叩其兩端而竭焉。孔子實無知，誰答問者？兩無知相比，意極痛快。

性見覺明，覺精明見。

時解七大，作一例看。初地大云：性色真空，性空真色。言真妄本同一性，全性之色即空，全性之空即色，猶言全濕之波即水，全濕之水即波也。今此見大云：性見覺明，覺精明見。照上一例，文小異而意實同也。言全性之見即明，全性之明即見也。乃至識大云：性識明知，覺明真識。亦言全性之識即知，全性之知即識也。真俗交互，七大一例。溫陵後二大與前五不同，時解為是。又地等四大用空字，麤細之謂也。空大用覺字，無情有情之謂也。見大用明字，見乃妄明，明者真明也。識大用知字，識乃妄知，知者真知也。

空則同無，有非同物，縱發汝識，欲何分別？

此明識必不生於空也。若生於空，則非相非見。夫識應在相見之中，今乃處此相見兩非之地，將頑然一空歟？空則畢竟同無，既無矣，識何由發？將實然有是識歟？有則同於何物，既非物矣，識何由發？縱許發識，而空本自無分別，則其所發之識，應與空同，豈有分別乎？識不生於空，審矣。

不歷僧祇獲法身。

獲法身，吳興謂是實證，其說甚詳。長水、溫陵、孤山諸師，皆同此說。蓋是分證法身，不言五分究竟也。即不通指大眾言，阿難證亦復何礙。其以阿難後卷文中僅證二果為礙，而曰是解非證，又是佛神力故，暫俾得見。今皆不必作如是解，只依前來諸師言證法身，後卷僅證二果，至文自有詳辨。

舜若多性可銷亡，爍迦羅心無動轉。

舜若多空也，此有二義：其一，空決不可銷亡。今欲極言心無動轉，取以相形言，空尚可銷，心必不動。如虗空可量，風可繫，無能盡說佛功德之類也。其二，一人發真歸元，虗空消殞。則實說空可消殞，心不可消殞。如海水可竭，須彌可傾之類也。劫壞之時，海涸山崩，非喻說也。