觀所緣論釋
Examination of the Object of Consciousness Commentary
護法菩薩造
Protector Bodhisattva Composed
大唐三藏法師義淨奉 制譯
若言能令毒智人， 為令其慧極明了，
及為消除於罪惡， 稽首敬已觀其義。
論曰：諸許眼等識者，於所棄事及所收事，或捨或取，是觀察果故。所捨事體及顛倒因，是所顯示。此中等言，謂攝他許依其色根五種之識，由他於彼一向執為緣實事故。意識不然，非一向故；許世俗有，緣車等故。縱許意識緣實事境有其片分，亦能將識相似之相，離無其境。於眼等識，境不相離，得成就已，方為成立，是故於此不致慇懃。又復於串修果、智所了色，誠非呾迦所行境故，及如所見而安立故。今此但觀聞思生得智之境也，如斯意識所緣之境全成非有，此於自聚不能緣故；復緣過未非實事故，猶若無為。為此等言攝五識身。若爾，根識引生所有意識，斯乃如何？非此共其根識同時或復無間，皆滅色等為所緣故；或緣現在，此非根識曾所領故。斯乃意識自能親緣外境體性，此則遂成無聾盲等，復違比量。知有別根，此遮增色，是所欲故，然於意識不復存懷。眼等諸識，色為依緣而方有故。無表但是不作性故，自許是無，本意如此。此於所緣將為現量，是所取性故，深履邪途故。為此正意遮所緣性，因便方遮斯所依性；同時之根、功能之色，將設許之。言外境者，彼執離斯而有別境。此顯其倒，顯彼執有異事可取，故言境也。如何當說或緣總聚？由非總聚，實事應理。誠如來難，彼自前後道理相違，余復何失。緣其實事及緣總聚是所許故。將欲敘其別過，為此且放斯愆。或許極微，雖復極微唯共聚已而見生滅，然而實體一一皆緣、不緣總聚，猶如色等。設自諸根悉皆現前、境不雜亂，彼根功能各決定故，而於實事斷割有能，一一極微成所緣境，彼因性故。彼眼等識之因性故，是彼生起親支分義。然而有說：其所緣境是識生因，在諸緣故，或復於彼為總聚者。彼諸論者執眾極微所有合聚，為此所緣相識生故。由於總聚而生其智，是故定知彼為所緣。如有說云：若識有彼相，彼是此之境。此二論者咸言彼相，應斯理故。若不言因，此因無喻，猶如因等成因等性極微總相是所緣性而成立之。又若自許不於識外緣其實事，應有有法自相違過。然法稱不許，斯乃於他亦皆共許，即以為喻。若但如所說，應於所立義而屬當之。前量意云：論本二因但是明因，所以不即是因，以無共成之喻，為此須出彼相應因。何以如此。
The Treatise states: For those who assert the existence of visual consciousness and other forms of consciousness, regarding matters to be discarded or matters to be retained, one either abandons or adopts them, as these are the observed results. The essence of what is discarded and the causes of delusion are what is revealed here. The term "and others" in this context refers to the inclusion of the five types of consciousness that others assert rely on the material sense faculties, because others consistently hold that they depend on real objects. Mental consciousness is not like this, as it is not consistently so; it is conventionally accepted to exist, as it apprehends objects like chariots and so forth. Even if mental consciousness is allowed to apprehend real objects to some extent, it can still present appearances similar to consciousness, even in the absence of such objects. For visual consciousness and the others, the inseparability of the object is established only after it has been confirmed; therefore, no special effort is made here. Furthermore, regarding the objects of perception for those with the fruits of habitual cultivation and the wisdom that discerns forms, these are indeed not the domains of conceptual thought, and they are established just as they are perceived. Here, we only examine the objects of wisdom born from hearing and reflection. For such mental consciousness, the objects it apprehends are entirely non-existent, as it cannot apprehend objects within its own aggregate; moreover, it apprehends past and future objects, which are not real, similar to unconditioned phenomena. For these reasons, the term "and others" includes the five sense consciousnesses.
If so, how does the mental consciousness that arises from the sense consciousnesses function? It is not that this mental consciousness shares the same time or is uninterrupted with the sense consciousnesses, as it apprehends objects like forms that have already ceased; or it apprehends the present, which the sense consciousnesses have never experienced. This means that mental consciousness is capable of directly apprehending the nature of external objects, which would then imply the absence of conditions like blindness or deafness, and would contradict inferential reasoning. Knowing that there are distinct sense faculties, this refutes the proliferation of forms, which is the intended meaning; however, no further consideration is given to mental consciousness. Visual consciousness and the other forms of consciousness arise only when supported by forms as their conditions. Unmanifest forms are merely non-active in nature; they are asserted as non-existent, as this is the original intent. To regard these as valid perception in terms of their objects, as objects of apprehension, is to deeply tread a mistaken path. Therefore, the true intent is to refute the nature of the object, and by extension, to refute the nature of its support; the simultaneous sense faculties and the functional forms are provisionally accepted. When speaking of "external objects," it refers to the mistaken belief that there are separate objects apart from these. This reveals the error, showing that they mistakenly believe there are distinct things to be apprehended, hence the term "object."
How can it be said that one apprehends a collection? Because it is not the collection but the real things that are reasonable. Indeed, as the objection states, their own reasoning is inconsistent from beginning to end; what other fault remains? Apprehending real things and apprehending collections are both accepted. To point out their specific faults, we temporarily set aside this error. Alternatively, if atoms are accepted, even though atoms are only perceived as arising and ceasing when gathered together, their individual substantial entities are each apprehended, not the collection as a whole, just like forms and so forth. Even if all one's sense faculties are present and the objects are not confused, because the functions of those sense faculties are each determined, they are capable of distinguishing real things, and each atom becomes an object of apprehension, as they are the causes. They are the causes of visual consciousness and the others, meaning they are the direct contributing factors for their arising. However, some say: The object of apprehension is the cause of consciousness, as it is among the conditions, or it is the collection for them. Those theorists hold that the aggregation of many atoms is the object of apprehension, as the appearance of consciousness arises from it. Since wisdom arises from the collection, it is certain that it is the object. As it is said: If consciousness has that appearance, that is its object. Both groups of theorists say that appearance accords with this principle. If the cause is not stated, this cause lacks an example, just as the nature of causes and so forth is established by the nature of causes and so forth, and the collective appearance of atoms is established as the nature of the object. Moreover, if one asserts that one does not apprehend real things outside of consciousness, there would be the fault of contradicting the nature of the subject. However, Dharmakīrti does not accept this; this is something universally accepted by others as well, and thus it serves as the example. If it is only as stated, it should be applied to the thesis being established. The meaning of the previous reasoning is: The two causes in the root text are merely explanatory causes, so they are not themselves the causes, as there is no universally accepted example; therefore, it is necessary to present the corresponding cause. Why is this so?
次復顯己所論之理是無謬妄，明他共許置第五聲。設許為因，猶如共許諸非有事非有性故，非因極微。而且縱許諸極微體是其因性，但說不合是所緣性，由非彼相極微相故，此云根識極塵非境。如根者言，猶如於根縱實是識，親依之因無根相故非彼之境，極微亦爾。諸無其相彼非斯境者，何謂也？為此說其名境者等。言自性者，謂自共相了者。定也如何？此復名為了耶？如彼相生故。此言意者，同彼相貌而識生起，由隨彼體故。此則說名了彼境也，而實離識無別所了，可與其識為因性耶？然而但有前境相狀，於其自己猶如鏡像而安布之，共許名斯為了其境。然非極微一一自體，識隨彼狀。由此極微而為境體，縱有因性，由非因義，所緣如根，雖是因性，不為所緣。若由因性許作所緣，根亦同斯，應成彼也。斯言前說彼相應理，故因有不成過。然而意顯非唯因性即是其根所緣之相。若如所說因將為能立者，則彼因性故為所緣性耶？於根亦有成不定過。若如是者，由非彼相，其義何也？為明成立自己之宗，由非但述他宗過故己義便成。此言為彰非即能生自識相故。境非極微，猶如眼等。若其是彼因性之言，將為論主前立他宗、明他共許。此時意在遮他顯己，能破義成，置斯言矣。宗許定彼，不定他宗，恐其不許。向者與他出不定成，即是能破，何假自宗更由比量？凡言不定，未必決定不成，恐致疑惑，是故更須立量。或可由斯非彼相者，於諸極微非定了性，如相識生是謂決了。既彼非故，明知決了此亦無由，應可說非決了性故。惟出此因不是所緣，如根極微。有餘復作諸識差別，顯其成立眼識不能了極微色，無彼相故，如餘根識。如是餘識，翻此應言如根之言，誠為乘也。其喻別須，義准而出。
又復縱是因性之言，為無用矣。彼雖因用，非所緣性。此亦如是，實為有用，然非聲等所有極微可是餘根之識生因。有說於識自體無聚現故，非是所緣，如根眾微。由境相狀安布於識，是彼相性，此非有故。理即說其無有聚現。如是且述，鉢囉摩怒不是所緣，彼之能立不相應故，及非境性量善成故。若爾，總聚是境。然由所說諸有能立，若望謨阿宗，皆有不成性。理實如此，然而總聚實有彼相，可是所緣。無因性故，由彼相識不能生其總聚相識，總聚不生。彼既不生，此識如何令此緣彼？所緣之相不相應故，非所緣義。由此前云：彼相應理斯乃不成。若爾，何謂所緣之相？凡是境者，理須生其似自相識。隨境之識，彼是能生，彼是所緣。有說凡為境者，理必須是心及心生起之因也。此既生已，隨境領受而與言論，于時名此為所緣境。若義具斯二種相者，此乃方合名為所緣，是能生性所緣之境。引阿笈摩，此即便是說生緣性。由是生因，彼識生緣共許是其所緣之境。自體相現，此中無益，故不言之。能非總聚是能生者，非實事故。由其總聚不是實事，此於有聚，一異二性不可說故。又復無有不實之事，能有生起果用功能，猶如二月。如第二月，不能生識第二月相。若爾，何因有斯相現？根損害故。若時眼根由瞖等害損其明德，遂即從斯損害根處，見二月生，非實境故。由此二月縱有彼相，然非斯境。如第二月，縱令此識有彼相狀，由不生故不名斯境。此由非實事有性等總聚不是識之生因，非實性故，如第二月。由斯方立非因性故不是所緣，還如二月。又復將此第二月喻，於彼相因，應知說其不定之過。復由識義理成就故，過是相違。
復緣眼識不緣青等聚集極微，為由彼體非生性故，如餘根識。此喻共許，故不別言。第二月喻非實事故，應知此是於非因性而成立之。如所說之，縱有相性然非彼境，斯言復是非彼因義。若言無有第二月者，如何現見有二相生？謂從內布功能差別均其次已，似相之識而便轉生，猶如夢時見有境起，由此令似妄作斯解，於其月處乘更覩餘。諸有說云：而於眼識雙現之時，此二次第難印定故，將作同時，於斯二種相貌之後，意識便云我見月之第二月也。或復有云：於共許曰數有錯亂，由根損故。若望不許外境之宗，如斯眾見但是妄執，由非眼識所緣無間引生意識能於一時雙緣兩相，作如斯解見二月耶？又於聲等，緣彼之識不知其次，應有二聲等見同時起耶？好眼之人意識次第尚多難解，何況依於色根之識測其差別，便成多有二相等見。一旃達羅，若時離識許實有者，斯乃何勞妄增二月，而言於數有其錯亂？離識之外執有二種極微總聚，此皆闕其一分義故。又如所說能立能斥道理力故以之為境，成不相應，闕一分故。自體相現及能生性，具斯二分方是所緣。於極微處即闕初支，於第二邊便亡第二。若如是者，如向所論二種過失，重更收攝令使無差。有說集相者，於諸極微處各有集相，即此集塵而有相現。隨其所有多少極微，此皆實有。在極微處有總聚相生自相識，實有性故，應是所緣。斯乃雙支，皆是有故。此即於前所有成立，求進無由。為聚集相即是極微、為不爾耶？由諸境義有眾多相，即此諸微許有微狀亦有集相。如何得令兩相共居一事為應理乎？有眾多相，凡諸有色合聚之物，皆以地等四大為性，彼皆自性有勝功能，青黃等相隨事隨根而為了別。即此於其眾多相處，極微之處有總集相。即將此相為眼等識所行境故，是現量性。若如是者，於諸微處，識有聚相何不言之？塵有聚相，何不言識有聚相耶？所以復云然於微處有總聚相，即以此言為其方便，亦顯識有極微總相。若爾，一一極微有此相者，何故復云總集相也？色聚眾多，極微分別，是論所許，此即是其總聚性故。不是實有，如前已陳，何勞重述？有別意趣。縱令實事別別體殊，然此相狀但於集處更相藉故而可了知，說觀集相更無餘矣。又復設使諸有極微合聚為性，然而一事有其勝劣，隨事觀之，且如蒼色是其地界。如是等說，誠為應理。縱許如是，如極赤物初生起時多事皆強，遂無容矣；依容有處作此譸議。若爾，如何說諸極微非根所見，又復如何唯有如知能見極微？由其塵相非是識義，非是依根識之境界，故曰非根非根之義，獨是如知之所觀察。復如何理現見極微，塵形不覩，如堅性等、如堅潤等。於彼青等縱有其事，非是眼等識之境界，根之功能各決定故。塵亦如是，無違共許，豈非顯微無其堅性，由別體故。此對宗法，許其十處但是大種，斯言無過。然此已陳，汝瓨甌等覺者、汝如是證者，於瓨及甌便成根覺。相似而觀，於其自境識不差故，復由根覺隨現有境而相生故，識境不別。如何得知？由匪於其瓨甌等處眾微有別而此言說。然諸極微以總聚相而為其境，固非於彼瓨等自體了別之時，於眾多聚體有片別，彼之實事相貌之外無別積聚體可得故，緣彼根識便成相狀無有差殊，由此方成於塵自體是所緣性。復非於彼無別相處覆審之緣，異解性故，如緣青等。若相殊故。所言殊者，相謂形狀布置有殊，於其瓨甌咽腹底等殊異狀故。由境有別，覺乃遂殊，誠為應理。無如是事，非於根識所觀境處極微有殊。然此總聚是三佛栗底，而此總聚非根識境，此已㡰破。復非非境有別而令識相有殊，可為應理。復如何知諸極微處別狀非有？極微形相無別異故。凡諸事物有支分者，必有別狀於方處轉。然諸極微體無方分，至窮極處，斯即何曾得有形別，於瓨甌等縱令事別？而極圓性曾無有殊，斯乃一體無增減故。是故定知，於總聚處非實物有。凡有方隅布列形狀，皆非根識所行之境。上來如此眾多詰責，意欲顯其有別相故。瓨甌等覺，非以別事為所緣境，猶若蘇佉毒佉情矣。然而極微是不別境，即是彰其非彼境性。若相殊故方言殊者，此言意顯向云非以不別之事而為境者，是立已成。彼意說言，極微為境，其實無殊，然為形相別故別也。極微無殊，我亦共許。是立已成，由諸極微量無別故。此顯殊事是其別境，答非已成。或可此明諸根之識，於瓨甌等無有極微相狀性故非是所緣，猶如餘識。餘識謂意或餘根識，但緣青時，無黃相故。於諸極微雖體眾多，無差別故，而諸根識差別相故，斯乃共成。非塵狀性頌於極微，差別之言同前問答。若其總聚許覆相已，形非實境理方可成。如斯勝理，是應成立。若言離極微如是等如離彼者，彼覺便無故，猶如軍等。此言瓨等是非實義，由非實事。此顯餘宗諸非不實，皆非捨彼相違事也，如於聲等。青覺非有，此形相別，是覆相有，以其瓨等為境性故。雖引眾多異見道理，而竟不能顯其極微實事之體有其差別，據內境體，謂立自宗所緣之事。若也總撥無所緣境，便有違世、自許宗過，四種緣性於經說故。此中內聲，為顯不離於識而有所緣。言境體者，是所取分，是識變為境相之義。然在識外別分而住，將以為境。違世之過如前尚在。由諸世俗共許於境在外而住，應云如外。此不離識，其所取分如外而現，云我見境，生其慢想，寔此為因。如於眼識現其髮等，外境雖無，謂實無其在外之境，非了性故。以理究尋，不可了其自體定在於外，縱令許彼實有外相，然非識緣，非彼相性故。非極微相現如似外相顯現之時此即是其所緣緣也，彼相相應故。由若與相理相應故者，此即是此，如因性等。由與自相理相應故，復顯所緣差別體相，如云識有彼相故等，明不假藉外事為境，如情所計，境相隨生。又情所計，若離於識，非外有故，此之境相元不離識，由此名為內境相也。此中內聲言不離識，本無其外，望誰為內？及從此生，有此方生。或可從此由第七五，義有別故，由非離境得有其識，是故有此方乃識生。不言第五，二法合故。明其所緣，道理合故，顯能立也，此即但以共相之境為其能立。若差別者，其仳若南不緣外事，於其夢位以為顯示。如說二種為一能立，識有彼相復是識生，緣此二用方成一量。且復縱許有其內相，但觀外境妄有相故，言無地相。如情計境生其領受，境之相狀列在於內，將為應理，如何是彼一分得作同生之緣？其所取分離識無故，斯之一分復還生識，便成自體相違之過。復還是彼一分性故，如能取分，斯乃便成匪能生性，但由外相染識而生。此即相分與識同起，非二同時有因果性，如牛兩角。又匪於其不異之事同在一時，以同伴聲而合說之。亦非於識別說有境，斯乃如何名同伴性？理實如是，然由相狀差別力故，猜卜為異而表宣之。由有見分、相分之殊，遂將此識而有差別。若如是者，緣性亦應但是所執，非分別事有自性體，斯乃應成非真緣性，此因相違，由其緣義於餘所執差別之境亦共許之，如等無間滅，同分之識為斷割時，此識亦以四種多緣而為緣也。
觀所緣論釋一卷