不真空論第二
Chapter 2: On the Emptiness of the Unreal
夫至虛無生者，蓋是般若玄鑑之妙趣，有物之宗極者也。自非聖明特達，何能契神於有無之間哉？是以至人通神心於無窮，窮所不能滯；極耳目於視聽，聲色所不能制者，豈不以其即萬物之自虛，故物不能累其神明者也。是以聖人乘真心而理順，則無滯而不通；審一氣以觀化，故所遇而順適。無滯而不通，故能混雜致湻；所遇而順適，故則觸物而一。如此，則萬象雖殊而不能自異。不能自異，故知象非真象。象非真象故，則雖象而非象。然則物我同根、是非一氣，潛微幽隱，殆非群情之所盡，故頃爾談論，至於虛宗，每有不同。夫以不同而適同，有何物而可同哉？故眾論競作而性莫同焉。何則？心無者，無心於萬物，萬物未嘗無。此得在於神靜，失在於物虛。即色者，明色不自色，故雖色而非色也。夫言色者，但當色即色，豈待色色而後為色哉？此直語色不自色，未領色之非色也。本無者，情尚於無，多觸言以賓無。故非有，有即無；非無，無亦無。尋夫立文之本旨者，直以非有非真有，非無非真無耳。何必非有無此有，非無無彼無？此直好無之談，豈謂順通事實，即物之情哉！夫以物物於物，則所物而可物；以物物非物，故雖物而非物。是以物不即名而就實，名不即物而履真。然則真諦獨靜於名教之外，豈曰文言之能辨哉？然不能杜默，聊復厝言以擬之。試論之曰：
The profound state of emptiness and non-arising is the wondrous essence of Prajñā’s deep insight—the ultimate root of all phenomena. Unless one possesses extraordinary wisdom, how can one truly grasp the reality between existence and non-existence? Thus, the sage connects the mind to the infinite, unhindered by any limitation; engages fully with sight and sound, yet is not bound by sensory experience. Is this not because they recognize that all things are inherently empty, and thus nothing can burden their enlightened awareness?
Therefore, when a sage acts with genuine mind and follows the natural order, no obstruction remains unpenetrated. By observing the transformations of a single vital energy, they adapt harmoniously to whatever arises. With no obstruction left unpenetrated, they blend all distinctions into pure simplicity. Adapting harmoniously to whatever arises, they encounter all things as one. In this way, though the myriad phenomena appear different, they cannot truly be separate. Since they cannot be separate, we know appearances are not real appearances. And because appearances are not real, even what seems to exist is not truly existent.
Thus, self and others share one root; right and wrong stem from one breath. This subtle, hidden truth is hardly grasped by ordinary understanding. That is why, in recent discussions on emptiness, views often differ. If we try to unify what is inherently different, what can truly be unified? Hence, many theories contend, yet their essence never aligns.
Why? The “mind-only” view holds that mind is empty of things, yet things themselves are not nonexistent. Its strength lies in mental stillness; its flaw is in overlooking the emptiness of things. The “form-is-emptiness” view clarifies that form does not exist independently, so even form is not form. But to speak of form merely as form—must we wait for form to be labeled as form before it is form? This only says form is not self-existent, without realizing form’s true nature is emptiness.
The “original non-existence” view favors non-being, often speaking in support of nothingness. Thus, it denies existence—saying existence is nothing—and denies non-existence—saying non-existence is also nothing. But if we seek the original intent behind these words, it is simply that what is called “existence” is not truly existent, and what is called “non-existence” is not truly nonexistent. Why must one deny existence to erase this “existence,” or deny non-existence to erase that “non-existence”? This is merely a fondness for nothingness—how can it accord with reality and the true nature of things?
If we treat a thing as a thing, then what is treated as a thing can be called a thing. But if we treat a thing as not a thing, then even a thing is not truly a thing. Thus, a thing does not conform to its name to match reality; a name does not correspond to a thing to capture truth. Therefore, ultimate truth dwells in silence beyond words and teachings—how can it be fully expressed through language? Yet since I cannot remain silent, I shall attempt to approximate it with words.
Let us consider this:
《摩訶衍論》云：「諸法亦非有相，亦非無相。」《中論》云：「諸法不有不無者，第一真諦也。」尋夫不有不無者，豈謂滌除萬物、杜塞視聽，寂寥虛豁，然後為真諦者乎？誠以即物順通，故物莫之逆；即偽即真，故性莫之易。性莫之易，故雖無而有；物莫之逆，故雖有而無。雖有而無，所謂非有；雖無而有，所謂非無。如此，則非無物也，物非真物。物非真物，故於何而可物？故經云：「色之性空，非色敗空。」以明夫聖人之於物也，即萬物之自虛，豈待宰割以求通哉！是以寢疾有不真之談，超日有即虛之稱；然則三藏殊文，統之者一也。故《放光》云：「第一真諦，無成無得；世俗諦故，便有成有得。」夫有得即是無得之偽號，無得即是有得之真名。真名故，雖真而非有；偽號故，雖偽而非無。是以言真未嘗有，言偽未嘗無。二言未始一，二理未始殊。故經云：「真諦、俗諦謂有異耶？答曰：無異也。」此經直辯真諦以明非有，俗諦以明非無；豈以諦二而二於物哉？然則萬物果有其所以不有，有其所以不無。有其所以不有，故雖有而非有；有其所以不無，故雖無而非無。雖無而非無，無者不絕虛；雖有而非有，有者非真有。若有不即真，無不夷跡，然則有無稱異，其致一也。故童子歎曰：「說法不有亦不無，以因緣故諸法生。」《瓔珞經》云：「轉法輪者，亦非有轉，亦非無轉，是謂轉無所轉。」此乃眾經之微言也。何者？謂物無耶，則邪見非惑；謂物有耶，則常見為得。以物非無，故邪見為惑；以物非有，故常見不得。然則非有非無者，信真諦之談也。故《道行》云：「心亦不有亦不無。」《中觀》云：「物從因緣故不有，緣起故不無。」尋理，即其然矣。所以然者，夫有若真有，有自常有，豈待緣而後有哉？譬彼真無，無自常無，豈待緣而後無也！若有不自有，待緣而後有者，故知有非真有。有非真有，雖有，不可謂之有矣。不無者，夫無則湛然不動，可謂之無。萬物若無，則不應起；起則非無。以明緣起故不無也。故《摩訶衍論》云：「一切諸法，一切因緣故應有；一切諸法，一切因緣故不應有。一切無法，一切因緣故應有；一切有法，一切因緣故不應有。」尋此有無之言，豈直反論而已哉！若應有，即是有，不應言無；若應無，即是無，不應言有。言有，是為假有，以明非無。借無，以辨非有。此事一稱二，其文有似不同。苟領其所同，則無異而不同。然則萬法，果有其所以不有不可得而有；有其所以不無不可得而無。何則？欲言其有，有非真生；欲言其無；事象既形。象形，不即無；非真，非實有。然則不真空義，顯於茲矣！故《放光》云：「諸法假號不真，譬如幻化人。非無幻化人，幻化人非真人也。」夫以名求物，物無當名之實；以物求名，名無得物之功。物無當名之實，非物也；名無得物之功，非名也。是以名不當實，實不當名。名實無當，萬物安在？故《中觀》云：「物無彼此。」而人以此為此，以彼為彼。彼亦以此為彼，以彼為此。此、彼莫定乎一名，而惑者懷必然之志。然則彼此初非有，惑者初非無，既悟彼此之非有，有何物而可有哉？故知萬物非真，假號久矣！是以《成具》立強名之文，園林託指馬之況。如此，則深遠之言，於何而不在！是以聖人乘千化而不變，履萬惑而常通者，以其即萬物之自虛，不假虛而虛物也。故經云：「甚奇，世尊！不動真際為諸法立處。」非離真而立處，立處即真也。然則道遠乎哉？觸事而真！聖遠乎哉？體之即神！
The *Mahāyāna Treatise* states: "All phenomena are neither with characteristics nor without characteristics." The *Middle Treatise* says: "That all phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent is the supreme truth."
Now, when we speak of "neither existent nor non-existent," does it mean we must wash away all things, block our sight and hearing, and enter a state of barren emptiness before we can grasp the truth? Truly, it is by following along with things and penetrating them that nothing obstructs us; it is by recognizing the false as the true that their nature is not altered. Since their nature is not altered, though they are non-existent, they are; since nothing obstructs us, though they are existent, they are not. "Though existent, they are not" is what is meant by "non-existent"; "though non-existent, they are" is what is meant by "non-absent." Thus, it is not that there are no things, but that things are not real things. Since things are not real things, how can we truly speak of "things"? Therefore, the sutra says: "The nature of form is emptiness; it is not that form is destroyed to become empty." This clarifies that the sage, in relation to things, sees the self-emptiness of all things—how could he need to dissect them to seek understanding?
Thus, in illness there is talk of the "unreal"; in transcending the sun there is the term "emptiness." Yet, though the three baskets of scripture differ in wording, what they unify is one. Therefore, the *Fangguang* says: "In the supreme truth, there is neither accomplishment nor attainment; in the conventional truth, there is accomplishment and attainment." "Attainment" is but a provisional name for "non-attainment"; "non-attainment" is the true name for "attainment." Because it is the true name, though true, it is not existent; because it is a provisional name, though provisional, it is not non-existent. Thus, speaking of the true does not imply existence; speaking of the provisional does not imply non-existence. The two statements are not one, yet the two principles are not separate. Therefore, the sutra says: "Are the supreme truth and the conventional truth different? The answer: They are not different." This sutra directly distinguishes the supreme truth to clarify non-existence, and the conventional truth to clarify non-absence. How could the duality of truths imply a duality in things?
Thus, all things indeed have that by which they are not existent, and that by which they are not non-existent. Having that by which they are not existent, though they exist, they are not truly existent; having that by which they are not non-existent, though they are non-existent, they are not utterly void. "Though non-existent, they are not utterly void" means the non-existent is not cut off from emptiness; "though existent, they are not truly existent" means the existent is not truly real. If the existent does not equate to the real, and the non-existent does not obliterate traces, then though existence and non-existence are spoken of as different, their ultimate meaning is one. Therefore, the youth exclaimed: "Teaching the Dharma as neither existent nor non-existent, because of causes and conditions, all phenomena arise." The *Yingluo Sutra* says: "Turning the Dharma wheel—it is neither with turning nor without turning; this is called turning without anything turned." This is the subtle message of the many sutras.
Why? If we say things are non-existent, then the view of annihilation is not deluded; if we say things are existent, then the view of permanence is correct. Because things are not non-existent, the view of annihilation is deluded; because things are not existent, the view of permanence is incorrect. Thus, "neither existent nor non-existent" is indeed the discourse of the supreme truth. Therefore, the *Daoxing* says: "The mind is neither existent nor non-existent." The *Zhongguan* says: "Because things arise from conditions, they are not existent; because they arise from conditions, they are not non-existent." Investigating the principle, this is indeed so.
The reason is this: If existence were truly existent, it would exist eternally on its own—how could it depend on conditions to exist? Just as true non-existence would be eternally non-existent on its own—how could it depend on conditions to be non-existent? If existence does not exist on its own but depends on conditions to exist, then we know existence is not true existence. Since existence is not true existence, though it appears, it cannot be called existent. As for "not non-existent": Non-existence would be a still, unmoving void—that could be called non-existence. If all things were non-existent, they should not arise; since they arise, they are not non-existent. This clarifies that because of conditioned arising, they are not non-existent. Therefore, the *Mahāyāna Treatise* states: "All phenomena, because of all conditions, should exist; all phenomena, because of all conditions, should not exist. All non-existents, because of all conditions, should exist; all existents, because of all conditions, should not exist." Examining these statements on existence and non-existence, are they merely paradoxical? If they should exist, then they exist—one should not say they are non-existent; if they should not exist, then they are non-existent—one should not say they exist. Speaking of "existence" is to speak of provisional existence, to clarify it is not non-existent; borrowing "non-existence" is to distinguish it from true existence. This one matter is expressed in two ways; the wording may seem different. But if one grasps what is the same, there is no difference in their unity.
Thus, all things indeed have that by which they are not existent—they cannot be grasped as existent; they have that by which they are not non-existent—they cannot be grasped as non-existent. Why? If we wish to say they exist, their existence is not truly produced; if we wish to say they do not exist, their appearances and forms are already manifest. Since appearances and forms are manifest, they are not simply non-existent; since they are not truly produced, they are not truly existent. Thus, the meaning of "not truly empty" is revealed here! Therefore, the *Fangguang* says: "All phenomena are provisional names, not real—like an illusory person. It is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not a real person." If we seek things by their names, things lack the reality that matches the name; if we seek names by the things, names lack the power to capture the thing. Since things lack reality matching the name, they are not real things; since names lack power to capture the thing, they are not real names. Thus, names do not match reality, and reality does not match names. When names and reality do not correspond, where do the myriad things reside? Therefore, the *Zhongguan* says: "Things have no 'this' or 'that.'" Yet people take this as "this" and that as "that." Others take this as "that" and that as "this." "This" and "that" are not fixed by a single name, yet the confused hold to definite judgments. Thus, "this" and "that" originally are not existent, and the confusion originally is not non-existent. Once one awakens to the non-existence of "this" and "that," what thing could there be to be grasped? Therefore, know that all things are not real—they have long been provisional names! Thus, the *Chengju* establishes the text on "forced naming," and the garden parable offers the illustration of pointing to a horse. In this way, where is the profound teaching not present?
Therefore, the sage rides a thousand transformations without changing, treads through ten thousand delusions yet is always free—because he sees the self-emptiness of all things, without needing to impose emptiness to empty them. Thus, the sutra says: "How wonderful, World-Honored One! Without moving from the true reality, you establish a place for all phenomena." It is not apart from the true that a place is established; the established place is itself the true. So, is the Way far away? Touch any matter, and it is true! Is the sage far away? Realize it, and it is divine!
不真空論(終)
On the Unreality of Emptiness(End)