---
title: "成唯識論證義 · 第一"
description: "明王肯堂所著成唯識論證義是對世親菩薩成唯識論的權威注疏。該書創作於明代唯識學復興背景下，以唯識古學為基礎，系統闡釋阿賴耶識、三性三無相等核心教義，並對唯識思想進行科判與證義。此作被譽為漢傳唯識學重要文獻，融合了唐代唯識傳承與明代學術特質，為研究唯識學說提供了關鍵注釋依據，在佛教義理史與唯識宗發展脈絡中具有承先啟後的學術地位。"
url: "https://rushiwowen.co/en/r/cmczkts7j0p7fjj0452mfc6ik"
---

## 成唯識論卷第一

> Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 1

金壇居士　王肯堂　證義

> King Tang Layman Wang Kentang's Commentary

成唯識論者。此論成立唯識。故名成唯識論。梵云毗若底。識也。麼怛喇多。唯也。悉底。成也。奢薩怛羅。論也。應云識唯成論。而譯為成唯識論者。彼方先所後能。此方先能後所。是以唐梵次序不同。今順梵文。先明唯識。後明成字。唯識二字之中。又先明識。識之名義。約有幾何。若約同門自相。不可分別。若約異門共相。隨義似分。名約性相有九。義包內外具五。名有九者。一眼識。二耳識。三鼻識。四舌識。五身識。六意識。七末那識。八阿賴耶識。九淨識。義具五者。一識自相。謂識自證分。二識所變故。一切境界從心現起。三識相應故。同時受想等心法。四識分位故。識上四相等。五識實相故。謂二空真如。是識實性。自上諸法。皆不離識。總名唯識。故知若相若住。若境若心。乃至差別分位。皆是唯識。卷舒匪離。總別同時。猶雲霧之依空。若波瀾之湧海。又古德廣釋唯識。義有十門。明此唯識二字。先離解。次合解。先且離解。初唯。後識。初唯字者。有三義。一者揀持之義。揀謂揀去。揀去我法所執。持謂持取。持取依圓二性。論云。唯言為遣離識我法。非無不離識心所無為等。二者決定義。決無離心之境。定有內識之心。謂小乘離心有境。清辯撥無內心。三者顯勝義。謂心王勝。心所等劣。今但顯勝。不彰於劣。瞿波論師二十唯識云。此說唯識但舉王勝。理兼心所。如言王來。非無臣佐。次解識字者。即了別義。謂八種心王。是識自性等。五位百法。理之與事。皆不離識。不爾。真如應非唯識。攝餘歸識總立識名。經云。三界唯心。次合釋唯識者。唯。謂揀去。遮無外境。境無非有。識。能了別。詮有內心。心有非無。合名唯識。唯謂遮無是用。識表詮有是體。攝用歸體。唯即識。持業釋也。問。此言唯遮外境不有。為遮離心之境。為遮不離心之境。答。設爾何失。難。二俱有過。若遮離心之境是無。餘有不離心相分在。何以但言唯識。不言唯境識。若遮不離心境是無。應但有能變三分。闕所變相分過。如何通釋。答。所言唯識者。遮心外境無。不遮內境不離識相分是無。問。內境與識。既並非無。如何但言唯識。不言唯境識耶。答。以護法菩薩云。境名通於內外。謂有離心境。不離心境。恐濫外境。但言唯識。所以論云。謂諸愚夫。迷執外境。起煩惱業。生死輪迴。不解觀心。非謂內境相分如。外都無。又云。唯言識者。是了別義。意云。五位一百法。理之與事。不離識。今攝歸識。總言識名。以萬法由心起故。然即非唯一人之識。亦非唯一識。更無餘識等。出唯識體者。一所觀出體者。即取五位一百法為體。以通觀有為無為法故。即以識相識性合為唯識體。皆不離識故。二能觀出體者。即唯取心心所為體。心所與識常相應故。即唯能非所。若約唯識觀。即取別境中慧為體。於所觀境。觀察勝故。又明唯識差別。總攝諸緣及理。有其十種。一遣虗存實義者。遣為除遣。虗為虗妄。觀徧計所執。唯虗妄起。都無體用。應正除遣。為情有理無故。存者留義。實謂實有。即觀依圓法體。是實有。是本後二智境。應正存留。為理有情無故。良由一切異生小乘無始時來妄執我法為有。清辯菩薩等妄撥理事為空。今於唯識觀中。遣虗者。空觀對遣有執。存實者。有觀對遣空執。非有非空。法無分別。離言詮故。二者捨濫留純義。捨為捨離。濫即相濫。留謂存留。純為無雜。雖觀事理。有境有心。為心不孤起。仗境方生。境不自生。識變方起。由境有濫。捨之不稱。唯心體既純。留說唯識。故論云。識唯內有。境亦通外。恐濫外境。但言唯識。非為內境如外都無。華嚴經云三界唯心故。三攝末歸本義。攝謂綰攝。末即見相二分。歸即向本。謂識自證分是所依體故。今攝末見相分。歸本自證分體。故言唯識。故解深密云。諸識所緣。唯識所現。四隱劣顯勝義。謂王所俱能示現。心所即劣。依他起故。隱劣不取。心王即勝。所依體故。故言唯識。即名顯勝。故莊嚴論云。許心似二現。如是似貪等。五遣相證性義。識言所表。具有事理。事謂相用。遣而不取。理為體性。應求作證。故攝論偈云。依繩起蛇解。見蛇知是無。證見彼分明。方知明性亂。六境義。境謂所觀境。識即能觀心。此所觀境。由識變現。境不離識。立境唯識。故阿毗達磨經云。鬼人天等。所見各異。七教義。即能詮教。說有唯識義。故楞伽經偈云。由自心執著。心似外境轉。彼所見非有。是故說唯心。八理義。道理唯識。唯識頌云。是諸識轉變。分別所分別。由此彼皆無。故一切唯識。九行義。行謂觀行。即菩薩在定位作四尋伺觀等。即觀行及定。俱不離識。故瑜伽論偈云。菩薩於定位。觀境唯是心等。十果義。謂佛果四智菩薩。所有功德。皆不離識。故莊嚴論云。真如無境識。是淨無漏界等。如上十義。性。相。境。智。教。理。行。果等。皆唯是識。無有一法。而非所標。故稱羣經了義中王。諸聖所依之父。若有遇者。頓息希望。無一法而可求。無一事而不足。全獲如來無上之珍寶。寧同荊岫璞中。已探教海秘密之靈珠。豈比驪龍頷下。遂得盡眾生之苦際。斷煩惱之病原。一念功全。千途自正。已釋唯識竟。今當釋成字。成者。安立之義。故樞要云。安教立理。名之為成。問。成立唯識。有何義利。答。我佛法中。以心為宗。凡夫外道。背覺合塵。馳流生死。菩薩憫之。故造此論。成立唯識。令歸本源。解脫生死。所以成立。問。以何方便。得歸本源。答。有五觀門。令自觀心。得本源故。五觀門者。即前十義中遣虗存實為初觀。捨濫留純為二觀。攝末歸本為三觀。隱劣顯勝為四觀。遣相證性為五觀也。問。論者何義。答。教誡學徒。決擇性相。激揚宗極。藻義攸歸。垂範後昆。名之為論。問。論題四字。何字能所。答。論字為能成。唯識為所成。成字通能所。問。當作何釋。答。若成目能成。成屬論字。唯識之成。或成唯識之論。依主釋也。或論體之上。有能成之用。以用隨體。成即是論。持業釋也。若成目所成。成屬唯識。唯識即成。或所成即唯識。亦持業釋也。問。論字唯能。唯識唯所。論有本末。何論能成。答。本末皆能。若本論為能成。佛經唯識為所成。若末論為能成。本論唯識為所成。問。能成所成。皆有教理。此當何句。答。當以教成理之句。何以故。論是其教。唯識是理故。問。此論以何為宗。答。唯識為宗。何以故。識有非空。境無非有。以為宗故。問。以何為體。答。護法正義。實能所詮文義為體。問。憑何教理。答。二十論云。展轉增上力。二識成決定。問。論有宗論釋論。此論是何。答。此宗論也。正憑六經。橫該大藏。明唯識理。故為宗論。不單解釋別一本經。故非釋論。問。教有三藏。一素怛囕經藏。二毗柰耶律藏。三阿毗達摩論藏。此於何攝。答。此當第三對法藏攝。問。教說一乘或三乘。謂菩薩緣覺聲聞。或說五乘。加人與天。此何乘收。答。正是一乘。三中菩薩。五內第一。

> \*\*The Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only\*\* This treatise establishes the principle of Consciousness-Only. Therefore, it is called the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only. In Sanskrit, "Vijñāna" means consciousness, "Mātra" means only, "Siddhi" means establishment, and "Śāstra" means treatise. So it should be called "Consciousness-Only Establishment Treatise." However, in translation, we say "Establishment of Consciousness-Only Treatise" because the order of subject and object differs between languages: Sanskrit places the object first, while Chinese places the action first. To follow the Sanskrit, we first explain "Consciousness-Only" and then "Establishment." Within "Consciousness-Only," we first clarify "Consciousness." What is the meaning and scope of the term "consciousness"? If considered within its own category, it cannot be divided. But when examined through different categories and shared characteristics, it can be classified according to meaning. There are nine types based on nature and characteristics, and five aspects based on meaning. \*\*The nine types are:\*\* 1. Eye-consciousness 2. Ear-consciousness 3. Nose-consciousness 4. Tongue-consciousness 5. Body-consciousness 6. Mind-consciousness 7. Manas-consciousness 8. Store-consciousness (Ālaya) 9. Pure consciousness \*\*The five aspects are:\*\* 1. The self-nature of consciousness: its own self-verifying awareness. 2. What consciousness transforms: all experiences arise from the mind. 3. What accompanies consciousness: mental factors like feeling and perception that arise simultaneously. 4. The divisions of consciousness: its four aspects (like arising, abiding, changing, ceasing). 5. The ultimate reality of consciousness: true suchness (empty of self and phenomena), which is the true nature of consciousness. All these phenomena do not depart from consciousness. Together, they are called Consciousness-Only. Therefore, whether we speak of characteristics, abiding, objects, or mind—even their differences and divisions—all are Consciousness-Only. Like clouds depend on the sky or waves surge from the ocean, they are inseparable, both whole and part simultaneously. Ancient masters broadly explained Consciousness-Only through ten gates. To understand these two words, we first analyze them separately, then together. \*\*Analysis of "Only":\*\* The word "Only" has three meanings: 1. \*\*Exclusion and Inclusion\*\*: It excludes the false attachments to self and phenomena, and includes the perfectly real and dependent natures. As the treatise says, "The word 'only' is used to eliminate the idea of self and phenomena apart from consciousness, not to deny that consciousness-dependent mental factors and unconditioned realities exist." 2. \*\*Certainty\*\*: It definitively negates any object apart from mind and affirms the existence of inner consciousness. This counters the small vehicle's belief in objects outside the mind and the nihilism of Bhāviveka. 3. \*\*Emphasizing Superiority\*\*: The mind-king is superior, while mental factors are inferior. "Only" highlights the superior. As \*Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only\* says, "This teaching of Consciousness-Only mentions the mind-king as the chief; in principle, it includes mental factors as well, just as saying 'the king is coming' does not deny his retinue." \*\*Explanation of "Consciousness":\*\* "Consciousness" means "to discern." The eight kinds of mind-kings are the self-nature of consciousness. The five categories and one hundred dharmas—whether principle or phenomena—do not depart from consciousness. If they did, true suchness would not be Consciousness-Only. By including all within consciousness, we use the single name "consciousness." As the sutra says, "The three realms are only mind." \*\*Combined Explanation of "Consciousness-Only":\*\* "Only" excludes and negates external objects (which do not exist). "Consciousness" discerns and affirms inner mind (which does exist). Together, they form "Consciousness-Only." The word "only" negates what does not exist, while "consciousness" affirms what does. Thus, essence (consciousness) encompasses function (only) by a possessive compound. \*\*Question:\*\* Does "only" negate external objects separate from mind, or objects inseparable from mind? \*\*Answer:\*\* If it negates objects separate from mind, then what about the mental images (nimitta) that remain inseparable? Why not say "Only Object-Consciousness"? If it negates inseparable objects, then we would lack the transformed object-aspect, leaving only the transforming mind, which is flawed. \*\*Response:\*\* "Consciousness-Only" negates objects external to mind, not the inner mental images (nimitta) that are inseparable from consciousness. \*\*Question:\*\* If both inner objects and consciousness exist, why not say "Only Object-Consciousness"? \*\*Answer:\*\* Master Dharmapāla explains: The term "object" can refer to both external objects (separate from mind) and internal objects (inseparable from mind). To avoid confusion with external objects, we say only "Consciousness-Only." The treatise states: "Ignorant beings are confused by grasping external objects, giving rise to afflictions and karma, leading to the cycle of birth and death. They do not understand how to observe the mind." This does not mean that inner mental images are non-existent like external objects. Furthermore, "consciousness" means discernment. All dharmas—whether principle or phenomena—do not depart from consciousness. We include them under the single name "consciousness" because all phenomena arise from the mind. However, this is not just one person's consciousness, nor a single consciousness without others. \*\*The Essence of Consciousness-Only:\*\* 1. \*\*Object of Observation\*\*: The five categories and one hundred dharmas, encompassing both conditioned and unconditioned realities. Together, the characteristics and nature of consciousness form the unified essence of Consciousness-Only, as nothing departs from it. 2. \*\*Subject of Observation\*\*: Only the mind and mental factors serve as the observing subject, since mental factors always accompany consciousness. If focusing on the meditation on Consciousness-Only, the wisdom mental factor (in the category of "specific determining factors") is taken as the essence, as it excels in examining the observed object. \*\*The Ten Meanings of Consciousness-Only:\*\* 1. \*\*Eliminating the False, Preserving the Real\*\*: "Eliminating" removes the false imagination that grasps at objects without substance (the imagined nature). "Preserving" keeps the real nature (the dependent and perfected natures), which truly exist. This counteracts both the attachment to existence (by common beings) and the denial of emptiness (by Bhāviveka), leading to non-dual, transcendent understanding. 2. \*\*Abandoning Confusion, Preserving Purity\*\*: Objects are mixed (including external perceptions), so they are abandoned. Mind is pure (inner and real), so it is preserved, thus we say "Consciousness-Only." 3. \*\*Gathering the Branches, Returning to the Root\*\*: The branches (phenomena and characteristics) are gathered back to the root (self-verifying awareness). \*The Unraveling of the Profound Sutra\* says: "The objects of all consciousnesses are only manifestations of consciousness." 4. \*\*Concealing the Inferior, Manifesting the Superior\*\*: Mental factors are inferior; the mind-king is superior. So we speak only of consciousness. \*Ornament to the Sutras\* says: "The mind appears as two aspects \[subject and object\], and likewise as greed, etc." 5. \*\*Setting Aside Characteristics, Witnessing Nature\*\*: "Consciousness" includes both phenomena (characteristics) and reality (nature). We set aside the former and seek realization of the latter. As the verse says: "Seeing a snake in a rope, one realizes there is no snake; seeing its true nature, one knows illusions." 6. \*\*In Terms of Objects\*\*: The observed objects, though seeming external, are transformations of consciousness, so the object-aspect is Consciousness-Only. 7. \*\*In Terms of Teachings\*\*: The scriptures teach Consciousness-Only. \*Lankavatara Sutra\* says: "Due to mind's attachment, it appears as external objects; those appearances are not real, hence the teaching of Mind-Only." 8. \*\*In Terms of Principle\*\*: The logical principle is that all is Consciousness-Only. \*Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only\* says: "All these transformations of consciousness—the discriminator and the discriminated—are ultimately unreal; therefore, all is Consciousness-Only." 9. \*\*In Terms of Practice\*\*: Meditative observation, such as the fourfold observation in \*Yogacara-bhumi\*, does not depart from consciousness. 10. \*\*In Terms of Result\*\*: Even the Buddha's four wisdoms and all merits do not depart from consciousness. Thus, all beings, characteristics, objects, wisdom, teachings, principles, practices, and results are only consciousness. No phenomenon falls outside this designation. Therefore, Consciousness-Only is called the King of Ultimate Meaning among scriptures and the Father relied upon by all sages. Whoever encounters it instantly abandons hope, finding nothing to seek yet everything sufficient. They obtain the supreme treasure of the Tathāgata and explore the ocean of teachings. They end the suffering of beings and cut the root of afflictions. In a single moment, all paths become correct. Having explained "Consciousness-Only," we now explain "Establishment." \*\*"Establishment"\*\* means to establish the teaching and principle. As the \*Essentials\* says: "To establish the teaching and set forth the principle is called ‘establishment’." \*\*Question:\*\* What benefit comes from establishing Consciousness-Only? \*\*Answer:\*\* In our Buddha's Dharma, the mind is the core. Ordinary beings and non-Buddhists turn away from enlightenment and cling to defilements, flowing in the cycle of birth and death. Bodhisattvas, in compassion, composed this treatise to establish Consciousness-Only, guiding beings back to the origin and liberating them from suffering. \*\*Question:\*\* By what method can one return to the origin? \*\*Answer:\*\* There are five gates of meditation to observe one's own mind. These are: (1) Eliminating the false, preserving the real; (2) Abandoning confusion, preserving purity; (3) Gathering branches, returning to the root; (4) Concealing the inferior, manifesting the superior; (5) Setting aside characteristics, witnessing nature. \*\*"Treatise" (Śāstra)\*\* means a composition that instructs students, discerns natures and characteristics, excites the ultimate principles, refines meaningful expressions, and establishes standards for later generations. \*\*Question:\*\* Among the four words of the title ("Establishment of Consciousness-Only Treatise"), which are active and which is passive? \*\*Answer:\*\* "Treatise" is the active establisher; "Consciousness-Only" is what is established. "Establishment" encompasses both active and passive roles. \*\*Question:\*\* How should we interpret this grammatically? \*\*Answer:\*\* If "establishment" refers to the act of establishing, then it belongs to "treatise" — "the establishment of Consciousness-Only," or "the treatise that establishes Consciousness-Only" (possessive compound). If the treatise itself has the function of establishing, then "establishment" is the treatise itself (same-characteristic compound). If "establishment" refers to what is established, then "Consciousness-Only is the establishment" (same-characteristic compound). \*\*Question:\*\* "Treatise" is only active, "Consciousness-Only" is only passive. Both root and branch treatises—which treatise is the establisher? \*\*Answer:\*\* Both are active. If the root treatise (the primary text) establishes, then the Buddha’s teachings on Consciousness-Only are what is established. If the branch treatise (commentaries) establishes, then the root treatise on Consciousness-Only is what is established. \*\*Question:\*\* What is the proper phrase structure? \*\*Answer:\*\* It should be "establishing principle through teaching." Why? Because the treatise is the teaching, and Consciousness-Only is the principle. \*\*Question:\*\* What is the main doctrine of this treatise? \*\*Answer:\*\* Consciousness-Only is the main doctrine. Because it affirms consciousness as existent (not empty) and objects as non-existent (not truly existent). \*\*Question:\*\* What is its essence? \*\*Answer:\*\* According to Dharmapāla’s correct view, the actual essence is the teaching and its meaning expressed in the text. \*\*Question:\*\* On what teaching and reasoning does it rely? \*\*Answer:\*\* \*Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only\* says: "Through mutual conditioning forces, two consciousnesses become determined." \*\*Question:\*\* Many treatises are either root or commentarial. Which is this? \*\*Answer:\*\* It is a root treatise. It directly relies on the six main sutras and broadly encompasses the entire canon, illuminating the principle of Consciousness-Only. Therefore, it is a root treatise, not a commentary on a single specific sutra. \*\*Question:\*\* The three collections (tripiṭaka) are: sutra (teachings), vinaya (discipline), and abhidharma (treatises). Which does this belong to? \*\*Answer:\*\* It belongs to the third, the abhidharma collection. \*\*Question:\*\* The Dharma speaks of one vehicle or three vehicles (bodhisattva, pratyekabuddha, śrāvaka), or even five vehicles (plus humans and gods). Which does this belong to? \*\*Answer:\*\* It belongs to the one vehicle, the bodhisattva vehicle among the three, and the highest among the five.

天親菩薩造頌

> Verses Composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu

按婆藪槃豆傳云。北天竺富樓沙富羅。此云丈夫國。此土有國師婆羅門。姓嬌尸迦。有三子。同名婆藪槃豆。此云天親。原為帝釋遣弟生閻浮提。名毗搜扭天王。降阿脩羅故。有此苗裔。故名天親。雖同一名。復立別名顯之。第三子於薩婆多部出家。得阿羅漢果。別云比隣持䟦婆。此云母兒。長子是菩薩根性。亦於薩婆多部出家。於後修定。即得離欲。思惟空義。不能得入。欲自殺身。賓頭盧阿羅漢在東毗提訶。觀見此事。從彼方來。為說小乘空觀。如教觀之。即便得入。意猶未安。謂理不應止爾。因乘神通往兜率陀天。諮問彌勒菩薩。為說大乘空觀。還閻浮提。如說思惟。即便得悟。於思惟時。地六種動。既得大乘空觀。因此別名阿僧伽。譯為無著。爾後數上兜率陀天。諮問彌勒大乘經義。隨有所得。還閻浮提。為餘人說。聞者多不生信。無著法師即自發願。我今欲令眾生信解大乘。惟願大師。下閻浮提。解說大乘。令諸眾生皆得信解。彌勒即如其願。於夜時。下閻浮提。放大光明。廣集有緣眾。於說法堂。誦出十七地經。隨所誦出。無著法師隨解其義。經四月夜。解十七地經方竟。雖同一堂聽法。唯無著法師得近彌勒菩薩。餘人但得遙聞。因此眾人皆信大乘。第二子婆藪槃豆。亦於薩婆多部出家。博學多聞。徧通墳籍。神才俊朗無可為儔。戒行清高。難以相匹。兄弟皆兼別名。法師但名婆藪槃豆。後住阿踰闍國。徧通十八部義。妙解小乘。執小乘為是。不信大乘。無著法師既見此弟聰明過人。識解深廣。該通內外。恐彼造論破壞大乘。遣使報天親云。我今疾篤。汝可急來。天親即隨使還丈夫國。與兄相見。諮問疾源。兄云。我今心病由汝而生。汝不信大乘。恒生毀謗。以此惡業。必永沉淪。我今愁苦。命將不全。天親聞此驚懼。即請兄解說大乘。法師聰明。殊有深識。即得解悟。知大乘理。應過小乘。於是就兄廣學大乘。悉得通達。憶昔毀謗。深自咎責。往至兄所。陳其愚迷。我昔由舌。故生毀謗。今當割舌以謝其罪。兄云。汝舌善巧毀謗大乘。欲滅此罪。亦當善巧解說大乘。因此遂製十地論。攝大乘論。故此二論。菩薩創歸大乘之作。既而久蘊玄宗。情󳭪奧旨。更為宏論。用暢深極。採撮幽機。提控精邃。著唯識三十頌。以暢大乘之妙趣也。

> According to the \*Biography of Vasubandhu\*: In the country of Puruṣapura in northern India—which means "Land of Men"—there lived a national teacher, a brahmin of the Kauśika clan. He had three sons, all named Vasubandhu, meaning "Kinsman of the Gods." They were originally descended from a younger brother sent by Śakra to be born in Jambudvīpa, named Viṣṇu, the king who subdued the asuras. Hence they were all called "Kinsman of the Gods." To distinguish them despite the shared name, separate titles were used. The third son became a monastic in the Sarvāstivāda school and attained arhatship. He was also called "Vṛndāvāsika" (sometimes "Balinḍa Bhadra"), meaning "Son of the Mother." The eldest son was of bodhisattva disposition and also entered the Sarvāstivāda order. Later, while cultivating meditative concentration, he attained detachment from desire. But when he contemplated the meaning of emptiness, he could not penetrate it. Despairing, he thought of killing himself. The arhat Piṇḍola, who was in the eastern continent Pūrvavideha, saw this from afar and came to him. He taught the śrāvaka view of emptiness, and following that instruction, the elder brother entered into it. Yet he still felt unsatisfied, sensing that the truth could not stop there. So he traveled by supernatural power to Tuṣita Heaven to consult Maitreya Bodhisattva, who taught him the Mahāyāna view of emptiness. He returned to Jambudvīpa and, as instructed, contemplated it. Then he attained awakening. At the moment he was contemplating the Mahāyāna emptiness, the earth shook in six ways. From then on, he was given the separate name "Asaṅga," translated as "Not Clinging." After that, he frequently ascended to Tuṣita Heaven to ask Maitreya about the meaning of Mahāyāna scriptures, and as he learned, he returned to Jambudvīpa to teach others. But many listeners lacked faith. Asaṅga made a vow: "I now wish to make beings understand and believe the Great Vehicle. May the great teacher descend to Jambudvīpa and expound the Mahāyāna so that all beings may gain faith and understanding." Maitreya granted his wish. One night, he descended to Jambudvīpa, emitted great light, and gathered a vast assembly of those with karmic affinity. In the lecture hall, he recited the \*Scripture of the Seventeen Stages\*. As he recited, Asaṅga explained the meaning. After four months of nights, the exposition of the \*Seventeen Stages\* was complete. Though all in the hall heard the teaching, only Asaṅga was near Maitreya; the rest heard from afar. Thus, everyone came to believe in the Mahāyāna. The second son, Vasubandhu, also became a monastic in the Sarvāstivāda school. He was broadly learned and well-read, with unparalleled brilliance and pure conduct that none could match. Though his brothers had separate titles, he alone was known simply as Vasubandhu. He later lived in Ayodhyā and mastered the doctrines of all eighteen schools, deeply understanding the Lesser Vehicle. He firmly held the Lesser Vehicle as correct and did not believe in the Mahāyāna. When Asaṅga saw that his younger brother was extraordinarily intelligent, knowledgeable, and well-versed in both worldly and spiritual matters, he feared that Vasubandhu would compose treatises to refute the Mahāyāna. So he sent a messenger saying, "I am gravely ill; come quickly." Vasubandhu returned with the messenger to the Land of Men and asked his brother about the cause of his illness. The elder brother replied, "My heart's illness arises from you. Since you do not believe in the Mahāyāna and constantly slander it, the evil karma will cause you to sink forever. I grieve, and my life is at risk." Alarmed, Vasubandhu asked his brother to explain the Mahāyāna. Being extraordinarily intelligent, he realized that the Mahāyāna principle surpassed the Lesser Vehicle. He then studied under his elder brother, thoroughly mastering the Mahāyāna. Remembering his past slander, he deeply reproached himself and went to his brother, confessing: "In the past, I used my tongue to slander; now I should cut it out to atone." His brother said, "Your tongue skillfully slandered the Mahāyāna. To eliminate this karma, you should skillfully teach the Mahāyāna." Thus, Vasubandhu composed the \*Commentary on the Ten Stages\* and the \*Compilation of the Great Vehicle\*. These two works were the first he wrote after turning to the Mahāyāna. Having long treasured the profound teachings and deeply grasped the subtle meaning, he later wrote more extensive treatises to fully express the depth of the Great Vehicle. He extracted the essential points and offered penetrating insight, composing the \*Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only\* to illuminate the exquisite meaning of the Mahāyāna.

護法等菩薩造論

梵言達磨波羅。唐言護法。本達羅毗茶國大臣之子。少而爽慧。弱冠之後。王愛其才。欲妻以公主。菩薩久修離欲。無心愛染。將成之夕。特起憂煩。乃於佛像前。請祈加護。願脫茲難。志誠所感。有大神王。𢹂負而出。送離此城數百里。置一山寺佛堂中。僧徒來見。謂之為盜。菩薩自陳由委。聞者驚嗟。無不重其高志。因即出家。爾後專精正法。遂能究通諸部。閑於著述。等者。該親勝。火辯。德慧。安慧。難陀。淨月。勝友。陳那。智月。九大論師也。佛圓寂後。九百年中。天親造頌。親勝火辯同時造釋。千一百年後。餘八論師相次造釋。各成十卷。故卷有百。三藏翻後。糅成十卷。故掌中樞要云。雖分峰崐岫。竦幹瓊枝。而獨擅光輝。穎標芬馥者。其唯護法一人乎。菩薩果成先劫。位克今賢。撫物潛資。隨機利見。春秋二十有九。知息化之有期。厭無常以禪習。誓不離於菩提樹。以終三載。禪禮之暇。注裁斯釋。文邁旨遠。智贍名高。執破畢於一言。紛解窮於半頌。文殊水火則會符膠漆。義等江湖。乃疎成清濁。平郊弭弭。聳層峰而接漢。堆阜峨峨。夷穹窿以坦蕩。俯鑽䆳而無底。仰尋高而靡際。疎文淺義。派演不窮。浩句宏宗。陶甄有極。功逾千聖。道合百王。時有玄鑒居士。識鳳鵷之斂羽。委麟龍之潛跡。每罄所資。恒為供養。深誠固志。物竭積年。菩薩誘接多端。答遺茲釋。而誡之曰。我滅之後。凡有來觀。即取金一兩。脫逢神頴。當可傳通。終期既漸。奄絕玄遵。菩薩名振此州。論釋聲超彼土。有靈之類。誰不懷歡。朝聞夕殞。豈吝金璧。若市趨賢。如丘疊貨。五天鶴望。未輙流行。

> In Sanskrit, Dharma-pāla; in Chinese, Hufa (Protector of Dharma). He was originally the son of a minister in the country of Dravida. Brilliant and sharp from a young age, by the time he came of age, the king admired his talent and wished to marry him to a princess. The Bodhisattva had long cultivated detachment from desires and had no inclination toward worldly affection. As the wedding night approached, he felt deep distress. So before a Buddha statue, he prayed for protection, wishing to escape this calamity. His sincere devotion moved a great divine king, who lifted him and carried him away, transporting him hundreds of miles from the city and placing him in a mountain monastery's shrine. When the monks saw him, they thought he was a thief. The Bodhisattva explained his story, and all who heard it were astonished and deeply respected his noble ambition. He then became a monk. From then on, he devoted himself exclusively to the true Dharma, eventually mastering all the scriptures and becoming skilled in writing. The term "et cetera" includes the nine great commentators: Jina, Huobian (Fire Debate), Gunamati, Sthiramati, Nanda, Suddhamat (Pure Moon), Mitra (Good Friend), Dignāga, and Jñāna-mitra (Wise Moon). In the nine hundred years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa, Vasubandhu composed the verses, and Jina and Huobian simultaneously wrote their commentaries. Over a thousand one hundred years later, the other eight commentators successively wrote their own explanations, each producing ten volumes. Hence, there were one hundred volumes in total. After the Tripiṭaka Master (Xuanzang) translated them, he combined and condensed them into ten volumes. Thus, the Essential Point in the Palm says: "Though there are many peaks and ranges, towering branches and jade-like boughs, the one who alone shines brilliantly and stands out fragrantly is none other than Hufa (Dharmapāla)." The Bodhisattva attained his reward in a past acon, and his virtue matched that of today's sages. He comforted beings and secretly aided them, adapting to their capacities and bringing benefits as appropriate. At the age of twenty-nine, he realized that his time for withdrawal from teaching was near. Weary of impermanence, he devoted himself to meditation and practice, vowing not to leave the Bodhi tree for three years. In the intervals between meditation and worship, he composed and revised this commentary. His writing was profound and his meaning far-reaching; his wisdom was vast and his reputation lofty. He resolved disputes in a single phrase and unraveled complexities within half a verse. Differences like water and fire he reconciled as harmoniously as glue and lacquer; principles like rivers and lakes he clarified, distinguishing pure from turbid. The plain stretched gently, but he raised towering peaks reaching the heavens; the mounds were high, but he leveled them into a vast, open expanse. One could look down into bottomless deeps or look up to immeasurable heights. The simple writings and shallow meanings branched and spread endlessly; the profound phrases and grand doctrines shaped and limited all. His merit surpassed that of a thousand sages, and his path harmonized with a hundred kings. At that time, there was a layperson named Xuanjian (Profound Mirror), who recognized the hidden grace of the phoenix's feathers and the concealed traces of the dragon and qilin. He exhausted his resources to constantly provide offerings. With deep sincerity and steadfast resolve, he gave all he had for many years. The Bodhisattva guided him in many ways and, in return, gave him this commentary, instructing him: "After I pass away, whenever someone comes to see it, take one tael of gold. If you encounter one with divine insight, you may transmit it to them." As the end of his life gradually approached, his serene observance of the noble path ceased. The Bodhisattva's fame resounded in this land, and his commentary's renown surpassed that of other regions. Among all sentient beings, who did not rejoice? To hear the Dharma in the morning and die in the evening—how could one begrudge gold and jade? People flocked to him like a market to a sage, and his treasures piled up like hills. Though the five regions of India looked up to him with hope, the work was not widely circulated.

唐三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

> Translation of the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang, by imperial decree.

唐者李氏有天下之號。以其奮迹晉陽。為陶唐氏故都。故國號唐焉。三藏者。一素怛囕經藏。二毗柰耶律藏。三阿毗達摩論藏。前已具列。法師玄奘。生洛州偃師陳氏。隋季出家。受具戒。廣學經論。愽參耆宿。鈎深致遠。開微發伏。眾所不至。獨悟於奧者。固非一義矣。既遍謁眾師。備餐其說。詳考其義。各擅宗途。驗之聖典。亦隱顯有異。莫知適從。乃誓從西方。以問所惑。并取十七地論以釋眾疑。即今之瑜伽師地論也。結侶陳表。有詔不許。諸人咸退。唯法師不屈。孑身獨邁。徧歷艱辛。具載慈恩傳中。故掌中樞要云。大師睿發天資。識假循謁。無神迹而不瞻禮。何聖教而不披諷。聞斯妙理。殷俯諦求。居士記先聖之遺言必今賢之是囑。乃奉茲草本。并五蘊論釋。大師賞翫。猶覩聖容。每置掌中。不殊真說。自西霏玉牒。東馳素象。雖復廣演微詮。賞之以為秘訣。及乎神栖別舘。景阻炎輝。清耳目以徵思。蕩心靈而繹妙。乃曰。今者方怡我心耳。宣尼云。我有美玉。韞匱藏諸。誰為善價。我今沽諸。基夙運單舛。九歲丁艱。自爾志託煙霞。加每庶幾緇服。浮俗塵賞。幼絕情分。至年十七。遂預緇林。別奉明詔得為門侍。自參預三千。即欣規七十。必諧善願福果。函丈不以散材之質。遂得隨伍譯僚。即事操觚。餐受此論。初功之際。十釋別翻。昉。尚。光。基。四人同受。潤飾執筆。檢文纂義。既為令範。務各有司。數朝之後。基求退迹。大師固問。基殷勤請曰。自夕夢金容。晨趨白馬。英髦間出。靈智肩隨。聞五分以心祈。攬八藏而遐望。雖得法門之槽粕。然失玄源之淳粹。今東土榮賚。並目擊玄宗。幸復擢秀萬方。穎超千古。不立功於參糅。可謂失時者也。況羣聖制作各馳譽於五天。雖文具傳於貝葉。而義不備於一本。情見各異。稟者無依。況時漸人澆。命促慧舛。討支離而頗究。攬殊指而難悟。請錯綜羣言。以為一本。楷定真謬。權衡盛則。久而遂許。故得此論行焉。大師理遣三賢。獨授庸拙。此論也。括眾經之秘。包群聖之旨。何滯不融。無幽不燭。仰之不極。俯之不測。遠之無智。近之有識。其有隱括五明。搜揚八藏。幽關每壅。玄路未通。囑猶毫毳丘盈。投之以炎爍。霜氷㵎積。沃之以畏景。信巨夜之銀輝。昏旦之金鏡矣。雖復本出五天。然彼無茲糅釋。直爾十師之別作。鳩集猶難。況更摭此幽文。誠為未有。斯乃此論之因起也。

> The Tang dynasty was the ruling dynasty of the world under Emperor Li. It was named "Tang" because its founder rose to power in Jinyang, which was the ancient capital of the Tao Tang clan. The Three Collections (Tripitaka) are: 1) the Sutra Pitaka (scriptures), 2) the Vinaya Pitaka (monastic rules), and 3) the Abhidharma Pitaka (philosophical treatises), as previously detailed. The Dharma Master Xuanzang was born in Luozhou, in the Chen family of Yanshi. He left home to become a monk during the late Sui dynasty, received full ordination, and extensively studied scriptures and treatises. He consulted widely with elder masters, delving deep and uncovering subtle meanings, reaching places others could not. He alone understood the profound truths—this was no single instance. After visiting many teachers and absorbing their teachings, he examined them in detail but found each school had its own path. Testing them against the sacred scriptures, he saw both hidden and apparent differences, leaving him unsure of which to follow. He then vowed to go to the Western Regions to resolve his doubts and retrieve the "Seventeen Grounds Treatise" (the \*Yogacara-bhumi-shastra\*) to clear up confusion. He gathered companions and petitioned the emperor, but the decree refused permission. All others withdrew, but the Master alone did not give up. He set out alone, enduring countless hardships, all recorded in the \*Biography of the Great Master Ci'en\*. Thus, the \*Essentials of the Palm\* says: "The Great Master's wisdom was heaven-gifted, his knowledge born from inquiry. He never failed to pay homage to any sacred site or to recite any holy teaching. Hearing these marvelous truths, he earnestly sought them out. A lay disciple entrusted him with the sacred words of the ancients, saying they must be passed to the present wise ones. He then offered this original text along with the \*Explanation of the Five Aggregates\*. The Master treasured it as if beholding the holy countenance, always keeping it in his hand as if hearing the true teaching itself." From the west, jade scriptures came; to the east, white elephants arrived. Though the subtle teachings were widely proclaimed, he valued them as secret formulas. Later, dwelling in a separate abode, facing the summer heat, he cleared his senses and focused his mind to reflect and elaborate. He said, "Now my heart is truly at peace." Confucius once said, "I have a beautiful gem—should I hide it in a box? Who will offer a good price? I will sell it." Ji (Kui Ji, the disciple) was born with a difficult destiny. At nine, he lost his father. From then on, his aspirations turned to mist and clouds, longing for monastic robes. He scorned worldly honors, cutting off ordinary affections as a child. At seventeen, he entered the monastic community. Through a special imperial decree, he became a gate attendant. Joining the three thousand disciples, he delighted in the seventy great teachings, vowing to fulfill good karma. Though of humble talent, he was allowed to assist in translation. Taking up the brush, he received this treatise. At the beginning of the work, ten commentaries were translated separately. Master Fang, Shang, Guang, and Kui Ji received the teachings together. They polished, wrote, and edited the text, each assigned their task. After a few days, Kui Ji sought to withdraw. The Great Master pressed him for the reason. Kui Ji earnestly said: "Since dreaming of the golden countenance and hurrying to the White Horse Temple, I have seen brilliant figures arise and wise men keep pace. I sought the Five Divisions with heartfelt prayer, gazed at the Eight Collections from afar. Though I gained chaff from the Dharma gate, I lost the pure essence of the profound source. Now the eastern lands are blessed—we see the mystic teachings firsthand. To fail in composing or refining would be a missed opportunity. Moreover, the great sages' works each shine in the Five Indias. Though the texts are recorded on palm leaves, their meaning is not complete in one version. Each person's insight differs; followers have no sure guide. As times grow corrupt, life is short and wisdom skewed. Scattered fragments are hard to study; diverging points are difficult to grasp. Please combine the various commentaries into one definitive text. Distinguish true from false; weigh the excellent teachings." After long persuasion, the Master finally agreed. Thus this treatise came to be. The Great Master set aside the Three Worthies and entrusted this humble work to me alone. This treatise encompasses the secrets of all scriptures and the essence of all sages. What obstruction does it not clear? What darkness does it not illuminate? Looking up, one cannot reach its height; looking down, one cannot fathom its depth. Far off, it seems beyond wisdom; close at hand, it lies within knowledge. It compresses the Five Sciences, sweeps through the Eight Collections. When the hidden gate is blocked and the mystic path unclear, this text is like a match set to tinder, or sun rays on ice and frost in a ravine. Truly it is the silver light of the great night, the golden mirror of dawn and dusk. Though the treatise originated in the Five Indias, no such compilation exists there. Just collecting the separate works of the ten masters is difficult; gathering such profound writings as this is unprecedented. Such is the origin of this treatise.

此論十卷。總三十二頌。依頌分科。約為三分。前後各一頌。乃護法等菩薩所造。故以前一頌。名宗前敬敘分。即同常經序分也。後一頌。名釋結施願分。即流通分也。中三十頌。乃天親菩薩所造。故名依教廣成分。即正宗分也。以依瑜伽五分論中。略集要義。成三十頌。施諸學者。名集施頌。初宗前敬敘分分二。一頌。二釋頌意。

> This treatise consists of ten chapters and a total of thirty-two verses. According to the verses, the structure is divided into three parts, with one verse at the beginning and one at the end. The first verse was composed by the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla and others, so it is called the section of reverent introduction before the main teaching, similar to the introductory section found in common scriptures. The last verse is called the section of conclusion and dedication, equivalent to the transmission section. The middle thirty verses were composed by the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu, so they are called the section of teaching according to tradition, which is the main teaching. Based on the Yoga Five Treatises, essential meanings were condensed to form these thirty verses for the benefit of scholars, and thus they are called the Verses of Condensed Teachings. The initial reverent introduction is divided into two parts: the first is the verse itself, and the second is the explanation of the verse's meaning.

稽首唯識性滿分清淨者我今釋彼說利樂諸有情。

> I bow to the nature of Consciousness-Only—the perfectly pure and complete one. Now I shall explain that teaching for the benefit and happiness of all living beings.

一頌。前二句。敬禮三寶。後二句。言所以造論之意。稽者。至也。以頭至地。故云稽首。問。禮者三業皆敬。以首至地。此唯身業。何得盡敬。答。既舉動身。必有語意。何以故。若無心口。何得動身。故動身時。必有語意故。唯識性。法也。滿清淨。佛也。分清淨。僧也。三寶有同體別體。同體者。法界為體。一真體上。有覺照為佛。有軌持為法。有和合為僧。別體者。法。報。化。三身名佛。三乘教。理。行。果。名法。五果。四向。十地。三賢。名僧。問。唯識者。性與相通。何偏敬性。答。唯無漏故。唯真諦故。聖所證故。迷悟依故。所以偏敬。問。常言三寶。佛在法先。今敘何以法在佛先。答。顯說相因。佛先法後。師資相因。法先佛後。問。何故以法得為佛師。答。諸佛所師。所謂法也。般若云。一切諸佛皆從此經出。所以法為佛師也。問。何故論。初須歸敬三寶。答。最吉祥故。真福田故。有大力故。起希求故。故須敬之。問。何故但敬三寶。不敬餘天等。答。性調善故。具方便故。有大悲故。不喜財利故。所以偏敬。利。對害言。樂。對苦言。有情二障。起惑造業。流浪生死。受無量苦。今因此論。生解斷障。得二聖果。利益安樂諸有情故。故曰利益也。

> First verse: The first two lines pay homage to the Three Jewels; the last two lines explain the reason for composing this treatise. "Homage" means to bow down, pressing the head to the ground—thus it is called "prostration." Question: In paying respect, all three actions—body, speech, and mind—should be reverent. Pressing the head to the ground involves only physical action—how can this be complete respect? Answer: Once the body moves, speech and mind must necessarily be involved. Why? If there were no mind or speech, how could the body move? Therefore, whenever the body moves, speech and mind are present. "Consciousness-Only Nature" refers to Dharma. "Perfectly Pure" refers to the Buddha. "Partially Pure" refers to the Sangha. The Three Jewels have two aspects: the same essence and the separate essence. "Same essence" means their foundation is Dharma-realm itself—on this single true essence, there is awareness and illumination (Buddha), there is holding and transmitting (Dharma), and there is harmony and unity (Sangha). "Separate essence" means: the three bodies—Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya—are the Buddha; the teachings, principles, practices, and results of the Three Vehicles are the Dharma; the five fruits, four stages of enlightenment, ten stages of Bodhisattva development, and the three levels of worthy practitioners are the Sangha. Question: Between nature and characteristics, why pay special homage to nature? Answer: Because nature is unconditioned, belongs to ultimate truth, is realized by the sages, and serves as the basis for confusion and awakening—hence the special reverence. Question: It is often said that among the Three Jewels, the Buddha comes before the Dharma. Why does this text place the Dharma before the Buddha? Answer: To show the causal sequence in teachings. In terms of manifestation, the Buddha appears first, then the Dharma; in terms of teacher-student relationship, the Dharma comes first, then the Buddha. Question: How can the Dharma be the teacher of the Buddha? Answer: All Buddhas take the Dharma as their teacher. As the \*Prajna Paramita Sutra\* says, "All Buddhas arise from this sutra." Thus, the Dharma is indeed the teacher of Buddhas. Question: Why must a treatise begin by paying homage to the Three Jewels? Answer: Because they are supremely auspicious, the true field of merit, possess great power, and inspire aspiration—so we must pay homage. Question: Why pay homage only to the Three Jewels and not to other gods or celestial beings? Answer: Because the Three Jewels possess inherently good nature, complete skillful means, great compassion, and no attachment to material gain—thus they alone are worthy of special reverence. "Benefit" refers to what counters harm, and "happiness" refers to what opposes suffering. Sentient beings, hindered by two types of obstacles, give rise to afflictions, create karma, drift in samsara, and experience endless suffering. Now, through this treatise, they can generate understanding, eliminate obstacles, attain the two holy fruits, and thus bring benefit and happiness to all sentient beings. Therefore, this is called "bringing benefit."

今造此論為於二空至所知障故得大菩提。

> This treatise is composed to fully realize the emptiness of both self and phenomena, and thereby attain supreme enlightenment by clearing away the obstacles to omniscience.<note>end</note>

自此至故作斯論。明頌中利樂有情之意。先總後別。今初。二空者。我空法空也。外道不解名迷。小乘邪解名謬。迷者昧於二空。謬者執於我法。外道我有三種。法有十三種。小乘我亦三種。法有七十五種。我法之義。下文詳之。執者。封著之義。謂同時一聚心心所法。封閉人法。堅著不捨。名之為執。障者覆礙之義。謂覆蔽真心。礙智不起。名之為障。以執我故。生煩惱障。障大涅槃。令諸有情流轉生死。以執法故。生所知障。障大菩提。令諸有情不得滿覺。今以生解而得斷障。以斷障而得解脫菩提二聖果。豈非利樂乎。煩惱者。擾也。亂也。謂見思惑見思惑者。即見愛煩惱。見煩惱者。邪心觀理。名之曰見。若於假實之理情迷。而倒想邪求。隨見偏理。妄執為實。通名為見。即五利使。見諦所斷。八十八使。及六十二見也愛煩惱者。貪染之心。名之為愛。若於假實二事情迷。隨心所對一切事境。染著纏綿。通名為愛。即五鈍使。思惟所斷十使。及所斷結流愛扼纏盖纏等也。擾亂有情。故名煩惱。煩惱即障。持業釋也。所知者。智所知境。名為所知。被此染法。障所知境。令智不知。名所知障。所知之障。依主釋也。所知不是障。被障障所知。故非持業。問。二障頭數。是同是別。答。同是根隨二十六惑。問。既同根隨。何稱二障。答。由貪上有擾惱用。名煩惱障。有覆蓋用。名所知障。問。執之與障。是同是別。答。根梢有異。何以故。我法二執為障根本。生餘障類。問。執生障時。為通為別。答。別。謂我執為根。生諸煩惱。法執為根。餘障得生。問。此二障。染有殊否。答。有分別者。名之為麤。有俱生者。名之為細。問。何名分別。答。強思計度。而生起故。何名俱生。答。與身俱生。任運起故。問。分別俱生。孰為先斷。答。分別之障先斷。於見道一時頓斷。俱生之障。修道位中分分漸斷。至金剛心時。方能斷盡。問。斷此二障。於大小乘差別如何。答。二乘唯斷煩惱障。大乘雙斷。問。此二障染。以何方便能斷。答。見前先伏。入見方斷。其斷伏道。三乘有異。如後三乘五位中辨。總明竟。

> From this point onward, this treatise explains the meaning of benefiting and bringing joy to sentient beings as stated in the verse. It first gives a general explanation, followed by specific details. Now, the general explanation. The "two emptinesses" are the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena. Those outside the path do not understand this, which is called "confusion." Those of the Lesser Vehicle have mistaken views, which is called "error." The confused are ignorant of the two emptinesses; those in error cling to self and phenomena. Outsiders have three types of self and thirteen types of phenomena. The Lesser Vehicle also has three types of self and seventy-five types of phenomena. The meaning of self and phenomena will be explained in detail later. "Attachment" means to cling firmly. Specifically, as the mind and mental factors arise together in a single moment, they seal off both the person and phenomena, holding on tightly and never letting go—this is called attachment. "Obstruction" means to cover and hinder. It covers and obscures the true mind, hindering wisdom from arising—this is called obstruction. Because of attachment to self, afflictive obstructions arise, which obstruct great nirvana, causing sentient beings to cycle through birth and death. Because of attachment to phenomena, cognitive obstructions arise, which obstruct great awakening, preventing sentient beings from attaining perfect enlightenment. Now, by generating understanding, one can cut off the obstructions. By cutting off the obstructions, one attains the two noble fruits of liberation and enlightenment. How could this not be benefiting and bringing joy? "Afflictions" means disturbance and disorder, referring to views and attachments<note>Views and attachments refer to afflictions of views and desire. The affliction of views means contemplating principles with a deviant mind, called "views." When one's mind is confused about the principles of conventional and ultimate reality, and inverted thoughts seek wrongly, following biased views and mistaking them for truth, all this is called "views." These are the five sharp faculties, the eighty-eight views abandoned upon seeing the truth, and the sixty-two views. The affliction of desire means a mind of greed and attachment, called "desire." When one's mind is confused about the conventional and ultimate nature of things, and clings to all objects of experience with attachment and entanglement, all this is called "desire." These are the five dull faculties, the ten afflictions abandoned through cultivation, and the various bonds, currents, attachments, entanglements, and coverings.</note> that disturb and confuse sentient beings, hence called afflictions. Afflictions themselves are obstructions—this is a case of "holding the functions together" (持業釋). "Cognitive" refers to the objects of wisdom, called the knowable. This defiled state obscures the knowable objects, preventing wisdom from knowing them—this is called cognitive obstruction. This is an obstruction of the knowable—a case of "dependent on the subject" (依主釋). The knowable is not itself an obstruction; it is the obstruction that obscures it. Therefore, it is not a case of "holding the functions together." Question: Are the categories of these two obstructions the same or different? Answer: They share the same root disturbances—the twenty-six fundamental and secondary afflictions. Question: If they share the same root disturbances, why are they called two obstructions? Answer: Because greed has a disturbing function, it is called an afflictive obstruction; it also has a covering function, called a cognitive obstruction. Question: Are attachment and obstruction the same or different? Answer: Their roots and branches differ. Why? Because the two attachments—to self and to phenomena—are the root of obstructions, giving rise to all other types of obstructions. Question: When attachment gives rise to obstruction, does it do so universally or specifically? Answer: Specifically. Self-attachment serves as the root for generating all afflictions, while attachment to phenomena serves as the root for generating other obstructions. Question: Are these two obstructions different in terms of defilement? Answer: Those that arise through discrimination are called "coarse." Those that arise innately are called "subtle." Question: What is meant by "discriminative"? Answer: It arises through forceful thinking and conceptual calculation. What is meant by "innate"? It arises naturally, together with one's very existence, without deliberate effort. Question: Between discriminative and innate obstructions, which is cut off first? Answer: Discriminative obstructions are cut off first—they are completely cut off in a single moment upon seeing the truth. Innate obstructions are gradually cut off, moment by moment, during the path of cultivation. They are only fully eliminated at the stage of the diamond-like concentration. Question: What is the difference between the Greater and Lesser Vehicles in cutting off these two obstructions? Answer: Those of the Lesser Vehicle only cut off the afflictive obstructions. The Greater Vehicle cuts off both. Question: By what method can these two obstructive defilements be cut off? Answer: They are first subdued before the path of seeing, and then cut off upon entering the path of seeing. The paths of subduing and cutting off differ among the three vehicles, as will be explained in the discussion of the five stages of the three vehicles. This concludes the general explanation.

又為開示謬執我法至於唯識理如實知故。

> He further taught that attachment to false views of self and dharmas <note>ultimately</note> leads to true understanding of Consciousness-Only.

此約二執。別顯世間迷也。開發我法本空。去其謬執。指示唯識實理。出之迷途。

> This addresses the two forms of attachment and specifically reveals how ordinary people are lost in confusion. It opens up the understanding that self and phenomena are fundamentally empty, removing mistaken attachments. It points to the true principle of Consciousness-Only, guiding beings out of their deluded path.

復有迷謬唯識理者至得如實解故作斯論。

> There are also those who are confused and mistaken about the nature of Consciousness-Only. To help them attain correct understanding, I have composed this treatise.

此約四執。別顯聖教迷也。或執外境如識非無者。此即有宗。依十二處教。執心境俱有。或執內識如境非有者。此破清辯。依密意空教。撥識亦無。或執諸識用別體同者。即大乘一類菩薩。言八識用雖不同。體唯是一。如一水鏡。多波像生。或執離心無別心所者。此即經部覺天所計。但有心王。都無心所。以經言士夫六界。染淨由心。無心所故。雖於蘊中亦有心所。但於識上分位假立。無別實有。然清辯計雖撥皆空。強違中道。而立唯境。順世亦立唯四大種成有情故。若依此義。應有四句。一清辯順世。有境無心。二中道大乘。有心無境。三小乘多部。有境有心。四邪見一說都無心境士夫即作者。以心能造物。故名作者。六界。謂地。水。火。風。空。識。六法各別。故名為界。此皆迷實有之唯識。謬執假設之我法。為遮此等。令得悟入唯識深妙理。深妙理。即唯識性也。如則非穿鑿之見。實則非影響之知。能證唯識。方為能解唯識。如是而解。可以言正解矣。

> This passage concerns four kinds of attachment, which respectively reveal how people become confused by the sacred teachings. Some cling to the idea that external objects exist, just as consciousness is not nonexistent. This is the position of the "Existence School," which, based on the teaching of the twelve sense bases, insists that both mind and its objects are real. Some cling to the idea that inner consciousness is nonexistent, just like external objects. This refutes the views of the philosopher Bhaviveka, who, following the Buddha's hidden-meaning teaching of emptiness, denied consciousness as well. Some cling to the idea that all forms of consciousness have different functions but share the same essence. This is the view of a certain type of Mahayana bodhisattva, who says that although the eight consciousnesses have different functions, their essence is one—like a single body of water or a single mirror that gives rise to many waves or reflections. Some cling to the idea that apart from the mind, there are no separate mental factors. This is what the Sautrāntika school and the teacher Vasumitra believed. They held that only the mind (the primary consciousness) exists, and there are no separate mental factors. They cited the scripture that says "a person consists of six elements" and that purity and defilement depend on the mind alone, with no separate mental factors. Although the aggregates include mental factors, they argue that these are only provisional designations based on the mind's functions and have no independent reality. However, Bhaviveka, in asserting that everything is empty, forcibly opposes the Middle Way and instead establishes only the existence of external objects. The Lokāyata school also holds that sentient beings are composed solely of the four great elements. According to this meaning, there are four positions: 1. Bhaviveka and the Lokāyata: only external objects exist, mind does not. 2. The Mahayana Middle Way: only mind exists, external objects do not. 3. The many schools of Hinayana: both mind and external objects exist. 4. Wrong views, such as the Ekavyāvahārika school: neither mind nor external objects exist. <note>"士夫" means "agent." Because the mind creates things, it is called the agent. "六界" refers to earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness—six distinct elements. </note> All these views confuse the true reality of "consciousness-only" and mistakenly cling to the provisional concepts of self and phenomena. In order to refute these views and help others awaken, the teaching is given so that one may realize the profound truth of consciousness-only. That profound truth is the very nature of consciousness-only. True understanding does not come from forced interpretations; reality is not found in mere conceptual knowledge. Only by realizing consciousness-only can one truly understand it. Understanding in this way can be called correct understanding.

已上宗前敬敘分竟。下依教廣成分。分三種三科。

> Above, the section of reverent opening and narration is completed. Now, following the teachings, we enter the extensive explanation section. This section is divided into three categories or three topics.

一略廣位三科。初一頌半。略答外難。略標識相。次二十三頌半。廣明識相。顯前頌意。後五頌。明修行之位。

> Outline of the Three Sections: First, one and a half verses briefly answer external objections and state the characteristics of consciousness. Next, twenty-three and a half verses elaborate on the nature of consciousness, explaining the meaning of the previous verses. Finally, five verses describe the stages of spiritual practice.

二境行果三科。前二十五頌。明唯識境。次四頌。明唯識行。後一頌。明唯識果三性相位三科。前二十四頌。明唯識相。第二十五頌。明唯識性。後五頌。明唯識位。今依性相位分科。初明唯識相。次明唯識性。初又分二。初一頌半。略辯唯識。次二十二頌半。廣辯唯識。

> The text is organized into three sections: the Two Realms, the Path, and the Result. The first twenty-five verses explain the realm of Consciousness-Only. The next four verses explain the path of Consciousness-Only. The final verse explains the result of Consciousness-Only. Alternatively, it is arranged into another three sections: Nature, Characteristics, and Stage. The first twenty-four verses explain the characteristics of Consciousness-Only. The twenty-fifth verse explains the nature of Consciousness-Only. The last five verses explain the stages of Consciousness-Only. Following the division by nature, characteristics, and stage: First, I explain the characteristics of Consciousness-Only. Next, I explain the nature of Consciousness-Only. The first part is further divided into two: The first verse and a half offer a brief explanation of Consciousness-Only. The remaining twenty-two and a half verses provide a detailed explanation of Consciousness-Only.

若唯有識云何世間及諸聖教說有我法。

> If only consciousness exists, why do worldly beings and the sacred teachings speak of a self and phenomena?

第一頌半。破我法。此天親假設問詞。謂若唯有識。一切法皆無。則云何世間與聖教中。皆說有我及有法耶。世間或是妄執。聖教豈是謬談。

> \[First half of the stanza: Refuting the self and phenomena\] This is where Vasubandhu proposes a hypothetical question: If consciousness is all that exists, and all phenomena are without inherent reality, then why do both worldly conventions and sacred teachings speak of a "self" or "phenomena"? The world may cling to false concepts, but how could the sacred teachings be mistaken?

頌曰由假說我法至謂異熟思量及了別境識。

> The verse says: The concepts of self and phenomena exist only as conventional designations. What we call consciousness—retributive, reflecting, and sense-discriminating— is nothing more than these constructed names.

頌意謂聖教雖有我法之名。對機假設。非同情執。假有二種。一者無體隨情假。即世間外道所執。雖無如彼所執我法。隨執心緣。亦名我法。故說為假。二者有體施設假。聖教所說。雖有法體。而非我法。本體無名。強名我法。不稱法體。隨緣施設。故說為假。此假說我法一句。古疏有二解。初解言說由。後解我法由。言說由者。言說與我法為由。由言說故。有假我法。我法由者。我法與言說為由。由有我法。方起言說。問。言說由者。因何便能起得言說。說彼我法。答。由妄情故。執著我法。依此便起假我法言方有所詮假我假法。此名說擔情我法也。何以故先有執情。次起言說。後有我法。言說在中。名說擔情我法也。此世間者。若聖教我法。即云說擔證得及我法也。問。我法由者。因何便有我法依之起說。答。由證得故。強名施設假我假法。後起言說。此是假我假法。此名我法擔證說也。先有證得。施設為我法。後起言說。此是聖教。若世間者。應云我法擔情說也。長行問在有字上。頌家答在說字上。名言說由。長行問在說字上。頌家答在假字上。名我法由。既無實我法。則假依何而立。故云彼依識所變。謂依識所變相見分立也。首二句。總答問意。中二句。釋上我法為所變。顯識為能變。後二句。釋能變三名。

> Verses explain that the holy teachings, though using terms like "self" and "phenomena," are merely provisional designations for sentient beings and not attachments to reality. Provisional designations have two types: 1. \*\*Substanceless, circumstantially assumed\*\*: Referring to common worldly and non-Buddhist beliefs—though objects like a "self" do not exist as they imagine, due to the mind's clinging, these are still called "self" and "phenomena," hence considered provisional. 2. \*\*Substantial, skillfully established\*\*: What the holy teachings describe, though having a fundamental nature, are not actually "self" or "phenomena." The essence has no name; we forcibly call it "self" or "phenomena"—which doesn't match the true nature but is a skillful adaptation to circumstances, hence also deemed provisional. Regarding this line—"these provisional self and phenomena"—ancient commentaries offer two interpretations: 1. \*\*Explanation via speech as the cause\*\*: Speech serves as the cause for the concepts of "self" and "phenomena." Because of speech, there arise provisional selves and phenomena. 2. \*\*Explanation via self and phenomena as the cause\*\*: The concepts of "self" and "phenomena" serve as the cause for speech. Because there are such concepts, speech arises. \*\*Question (First Interpretation):\*\* How does speech arise in the first place? And why does it refer to these "self" and "phenomena"? \*\*Answer:\*\* Due to deluded emotions, beings cling to a "self" and "phenomena." Based on this clinging, provisional words arise, pointing to these provisional selves and phenomena. This is called \*\*"speech carrying emotional-self and phenomena."\*\* Because first there is clinging, then speech, and then the concepts of self and phenomena—with speech in the middle—it's thus named. In worldly contexts, this applies. But in the holy teachings, speech carries the realization and the resulting self-phenomena concepts. \*\*Question (Second Interpretation):\*\* How do "self" and "phenomena" come to exist, such that speech arises based on them? \*\*Answer:\*\* Because of realization, one forcibly designates provisional selves and phenomena, then speech arises. These are merely provisional constructs. This is called \*\*"self and phenomena carrying the realization and speech."\*\* First there is realization, which is provisionally set up as "self" and "phenomena," then speech follows—this is the holy teaching. In worldly contexts, it would be "self and phenomena carrying emotions and speech." The prose question lies under the word "has" (in existence), while the verse answer lies under the word "says" (in speech). For the "speech-as-cause" interpretation, the prose question relates to "says," and the verse answer lies under "provisional." For the "self-phenomena-as-cause" interpretation, the verse answer also lies under "provisional." Since there is no actual self or phenomena, what do these provisional concepts rely on? They rely on \*\*what consciousness transforms\*\*—specifically, the division into perceiving and perceived aspects (subject and object), based on the transformations of consciousness. Thus: - First two lines: Answer the overall question. - Middle two lines: Explain that the above "self and phenomena" are the \*\*transformed objects\*\*, revealing consciousness as the \*\*transforming subject\*\*. - Final two lines: Explain the three types of transforming consciousness.

論曰世間聖教說有我法至我謂主宰法謂執持。

> Treatises state: The world and the sacred teachings speak of a self and of dharmas. "Self" refers to a dominant controller, and "dharmas" refer to that which holds and grasps.

從此直至第二卷非謂一切止。並護法等解釋頌意。分二。一釋我法。即前三句頌。二釋三能變。即後三句頌。一又分三。一釋由假說我法我。謂主宰。主有自在力。宰有割斷力。義同我故。主是我體。宰是我用。或是我所主是俱生我。無分別故。屬第七識我。宰是分別我。有斷割故。屬第六識我。法謂軌持。軌者軌範。可生物解。持者任持。不捨自相。

> From this point until the second volume, it is not that all forms of mental stillness are being discussed. Along with masters like Sthiramati, we will explain the meaning of the verses in two sections. The first explains "self and phenomena"—this covers the first three lines of the verse. The second explains "the three transformations of consciousness"—this covers the last three lines. The first is further divided into three parts. The first explains the concept of "self" in the phrase "the self and phenomena spoken of by convention." "Self" means a sovereign ruler: "sovereign" implies the power of autonomy, and "ruler" implies the power of judgment. Their meaning is similar to "self," so the sovereign is the essence of self, and the ruler is its function. Alternatively, they may be seen as belonging to the self. <note>The "sovereign" refers to the innate self, which is without discrimination and belongs to the seventh consciousness (manas). The "ruler" refers to the conceptual self, which involves discrimination and judgment and belongs to the sixth consciousness (mental consciousness).</note> "Phenomena" means things that maintain their own characteristics: "tracking" provides a pattern that allows things to be understood, and "holding" means maintaining and not letting go of one's own defining nature.

彼二俱有種種相轉至轉謂隨緣施設有異。

> For both, various appearances arise and change— "arise and change" means that they adapt and manifest differently according to conditions.

二釋有種種相轉。世間我種種相。謂我有情。異生。摩納縛迦。養育者。數取趣。命者。生者。知者。見者。外道別執作者。受者。神我等也。聖教我種種相。謂預流等人。三賢。十地。三乘。五性。二十五有。是也。世間法種種相。謂勝論六句。數論二十五諦。及順世外道。七種外道。執梵王。執時。執方。執本際。執自然。執虗空。執我等。是也。聖教法種種相。謂蘊處界等。緣起根諦善巧等法。是也。問。世間我法。率己妄情。聖教我法。有何益用。答。有四緣故。一言說易故。二順世間故。三能除無我怖故。四有自他染淨信解事業等故。有此益用。聖說我法耳。隨緣施設有異。即解轉字。施設即假立義。隨主宰緣。假立為我。隨執持緣。假立為法。

> Second, there are various types of mental constructs ("marks") at work. In the worldly view, there are many kinds of constructs of a "self," such as: a sentient being, a soul, a living entity, a person, a nourished one, a subject of experience, a possessor of life, a birth recipient, a knower, a seer. Outsiders hold mistaken views of a creator, an experiencer, a divine self, and so on. In the sacred teaching, there are also many kinds of constructs of a "self," such as: those who have entered the stream (stream-enterers) and so on, the three stages of worthies, the ten grounds, the three vehicles, the five spiritual capacities, and the twenty-five forms of existence. Furthermore, there are many kinds of constructs of "phenomena" within the worldly view, such as: the six categories of the Vaisheshika school, the twenty-five truths of the Samkhya school, along with the Charvaka (materialist) school. There are also the seven kinds of non-Buddhist schools that cling to the Creator, Time, Space, a First Cause, Nature, Emptiness, or a Self. In the sacred teaching, there are also many kinds of constructs of "phenomena," such as: the aggregates (skandhas), sense bases (ayatanas), and elements (dhatus); and skillful methods involving dependent origination, the faculties, truths, and such. \*\*Question:\*\* The worldly views of self and phenomena arise from deluded personal imagination. What benefit is there in the sacred teaching's own use of the terms "self" and "phenomena"? \*\*Answer:\*\* There are four reasons: (1) to make communication easier; (2) to accord with worldly conventions; (3) to remove fear of selflessness; and (4) to establish a basis for concepts like self and other, purity and impurity, faith, understanding, and actions. For these benefits, the sacred teaching uses the designations "self" and "phenomena." The designations are established according to circumstances—this is what "turning" or "function" means. "Designation" means provisional establishment. Based on the condition of "mastery," we tentatively posit a "self." Based on the condition of "supporting," we tentatively posit "phenomena."

如是諸相若由假說至緣此執為實有外境。

> All these appearances, spoken of as mere designations, arise based on conditions. Thus, we cling to them as truly existing external objects.

三釋彼依識所變。設問云。是種種相。既由假說。則此假依何而得成立。故答云。彼相皆依識所轉變而假施設。轉變與變現不同。變現者。唯現心等。能起見相。名之為變。不通於種相分色等。轉變者。通於種現。現能熏種。種能生種。種生現行。名轉變也。識謂了別。別釋頌中識字義。顯了分明辨別境相。故名為識。凡所言識。必攝心所。以心所與心王同一所依根。同一所緣境。同一時。同一事。同一行相。具足五義。故曰定相應也。變謂識體轉似二分。識體即自證分。二分即相分見分。論明諸識體即自證分轉似相見二分而生。此說識體是依他性。轉似相見二分非無。亦依他起。依此二分。執實二取。聖說為無。非謂依他中無此二分。論說唯二依他性故。此除真智。緣於真如。無相分故。餘皆有相。不爾。如何名他心智。後得智等。不外取故。許有相見二體性故。說相見種或同或異。若同種者。即一識體轉似二分相用而生。如一蝸牛變生二角。此說影像相見離體更無別性是識用故。若言相見各別種者。見是自體。義用分之。故離識更無別種。即一識體轉似見分別用而生。識為所依。轉相分種。似相而起。以作用別。性各不同故。相別種生。於理為勝。故言識體轉似二分。此依他起。非有似有。實非二分。似計所執二分相見。故立似名。問。相別有種。何名識變。答。不離識故。內識變時。相方生故。問。此顯能變相見二分用體別有。何故又說識似二分生。答。論說相見俱依自證起故。若無自證。二定不生。如無頭時。角定非有。及無鏡時。面影不起。皆於識上現相貌故。故說二分依實體生。世間聖教。依此見分施設言我。依此相分施設言法。何以故。我法若離相見二分。無由起故。我法為能依。相見為所依故。或復者。更端之詞。前言轉似二分。後言轉似外境。故言或復。以第八識頓變根身器界種子。轉生七識。各能變現自分所緣。故曰變似外境。問。如何變耶。曰。我法分別熏習力故。諸識生時。變似我法。此我法相。雖在內識。而以分別故。似外境現耳。此二種轉似。俱依他起性。俱屬聖教。諸有情下。方是徧計所執相。方屬世間。諸有情類六七二識。無明覆故。緣此執為實我實法。如患夢者患夢力故。心似種種外境相現。夢時執為實有外物。寤來方知唯夢所變。我此身相。及外世界。亦復如是。唯識所變。迷故執有我及諸境。患。即病也。但云似者。即屬聖教。但云實者。即是世間。或為內識二字所障。以轉似二分為世間。轉似外境為聖教。非是。

> Third: Explanation of Transformation Based on Consciousness. If asked: "Since all these various appearances are established through conventional designations, what is the basis for such designations?" The answer: Those appearances are all provisionally posited based on the transformation of consciousness. "Transformation" is different from "appearance." "Appearance" means only manifesting mind and so forth, capable of producing seeing and seen aspects—this is called manifestation. It does not apply to the seeds, sense-objects, and forms. "Transformation," however, applies to both seeds and manifestations: manifestations can condition seeds, seeds can produce other seeds, and seeds can generate manifestations. This is transformation. "Consciousness" means discernment. This explains the meaning of the word "consciousness" in the verse: it clearly distinguishes and discerns the characteristics of objects, hence the term. Whenever consciousness is mentioned, it includes mental factors (\*caitasika\*), because mental factors share the same root as the mind-king, the same objective support, the same time, the same event, and the same mode of operation—possessing these five characteristics, they are said to be necessarily associated. "Transformation" means the consciousness-essence evolves into two aspects. The consciousness-essence is the self-verification part; the two aspects are the perceived aspect and the perceiving aspect. The treatise explains that the essence of all consciousnesses is the self-verification part, which evolves into the perceiving and perceived aspects and arises. This says that the consciousness-essence is of the nature of dependent origination (\*paratantra-svabhava\*). The evolution into the two aspects is not non-existent; they too arise out of dependent origination. Based on these two aspects, one clings to two entities as real. The sages say this is nonexistent, which does not mean that there are no two aspects in dependent origination. The treatise states that only the two aspects are of the nature of dependent origination. This excludes true wisdom (\*jñana\*) directed toward ultimate reality (\*tathata\*), because the latter has no perceived aspect. All other states have perceived aspects; otherwise, how could one speak of "knowledge of others' minds"? The subsequent wisdom, etc., does not grasp externally; it is accepted as having the nature of both perceiving and perceived aspects. The seeds of the perceiving and perceived aspects are said to be either identical or different. If the seeds are identical, then a single consciousness-essence evolves and functions as two aspects, like a snail growing two horns. This says that the imaged perceiving and perceived aspects have no separate nature apart from the essence; they are functions of consciousness. If one says that the perceptual and perceived aspects have separate seeds, then the perceiving aspect is the self-essence, and its functions are distinguished. Thus, apart from consciousness, there is no separate seed. The single consciousness-essence evolves and functions as the perceiving aspect—the function arises. Consciousness is the basis, while the perceived aspect's seed evolves and appears as the perceived object. Since their functions are distinct and their natures differ from each other, it is more reasonable to say that the perceived and perceiving aspects arise from different seeds. Hence, the consciousness-essence is said to evolve into two aspects. This is dependent origination: what is not real appears as if real. They are not actually two aspects; they merely resemble the imagined two aspects of perceiving and perceived. Therefore, the label 'similar' is applied. Question: If the perceived aspect has a separate seed, why is it called a transformation of consciousness? Answer: Because it is not separate from consciousness. It arises only when internal consciousness transforms. Question: This shows that the two aspects have distinct functions and essences. Why does it also say that consciousness evolves as if producing two aspects? Answer: The treatise says both aspects depend on the self-verification part to arise. Without the self-verification part, the two aspects would not arise. For example, without a head, horns cannot exist; without a mirror, no reflection appears. They all manifest within consciousness, so the two aspects are said to arise from a real essence. Based on this perceiving aspect, worldly and scriptural traditions postulate a self; based on this perceived aspect, they postulate dharmas. Why? Because self and dharmas cannot arise without the two aspects. Self and dharmas are the reliant; the two aspects are the foundation. "Moreover" (or "alternatively") indicates a shift in topic. Earlier, we discussed the evolution into two aspects; later, we discuss the evolution into external objects. Hence, "or else." Because the eighth consciousness instantaneously transforms the body, environment, and seeds, leading to the arising of the seven succeeding consciousnesses, each manifesting its own object, it is said to "transform, appearing as external objects." Question: How does this transformation occur? Answer: By the force of habitual conditioning from distinctions of self and dharmas, when consciousness arises, it transforms to resemble self and dharmas. These appearances of self and dharmas, though within internal consciousness, appear as external objects due to conceptual discrimination. Both of these two types of 'transformation as resembling' belong to dependent origination and pertain to scriptural traditions. Below, speaking of sentient beings, this refers to imputed nature, belonging to the worldly realm. Sentient beings, through the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, veiled by ignorance, grasp these as real self and real dharmas. It is like someone in a dream or a sick person who, due to their condition, sees various external objects. In the dream, they cling to these as real external objects; upon waking, they realize it was only what the dream had transformed. Our bodies and the external world are also like this: they are transformations of consciousness. Due to confusion, we cling to a self and external objects. "Illness" refers to affliction. When something is called "like" or "apparently," it is within the domain of scriptural tradition; when something is called "real," it is within the worldly realm. Someone might mistakenly think that the notion of "internal consciousness" obstructs this understanding—taking the evolution into two aspects as worldly, and the evolution into external objects as scriptural. This is incorrect.

愚夫所計實我實法至所依事故亦勝義有。

> What ordinary people perceive as a truly existing self or truly existing phenomena—even the support for those perceptions—is also considered real from an ultimate perspective.

此結前義。總釋前三句意。愚夫所計實我實法。是徧計所執。體實都無。猶如龜毛。非與依他內識相似。但隨妄情強施設耳。故說為假。內識所變似我似法。即依他性。必依種子因緣所生。非體全無。如徧計境。彼實我法。然非我法。即我法名。亦是聖教強施設故。名不稱法。故說為假。然則外境定無。而非能如識之有也。內識定有。而不至如境之無也。便遮外計離心之境實有增益執。及遮邪見惡取空者撥識亦無減損執。即離空有。設唯識教。境唯世俗之有。識通勝義之門。由此二諦之名立焉。釋頌意略辯我法竟。

> This concludes the explanation of the preceding meaning, summarizing the intent of the first three lines. The real self and real objects imagined by the ignorant are fabrications of clinging to conceptual constructs. Their essence is, in fact, utterly non-existent, like a rabbit’s horns—not in the same way as the inner consciousness that arises from causes and conditions. They are merely imposed by false mental fabrications and are therefore said to be illusory. The inner consciousness gives rise to representations that appear as self and objects; these are dependent on causes and conditions and arise from seeds. They are not entirely non-existent like the objects of fabricated thought. The real self and real objects that people imagine do not correspond to actual self or objects. Even the terms “self” and “objects” are provisional designations made by sacred teachings, as the names do not fully capture the reality, and are thus said to be illusory. Hence, external objects are definitely non-existent, not in the way that consciousness exists. Inner consciousness is definitely existent, not in the way that external objects are non-existent. This refutes the mistaken view that there are objects outside the mind, which is the error of clinging to existence. It also refutes the nihilistic view that denies consciousness altogether, which is the error of denial. Thus, we transcend both existence and non-existence and establish the doctrine of consciousness-only. External objects exist only as worldly conventions, while consciousness pertains to the gateway of ultimate truth. Hence, the two truths are distinguished. This completes the explanation of the meaning of the verses, briefly clarifying the nature of self and objects.

云何應知實無外境至境生問也實我實法不可得故。

> How should one understand that external objects truly do not exist? \*\[Question\]\* Because it is impossible to find a real self or real phenomena.

二設問答廣辯我法分二。一總問總答。

> Second, through questions and answers, we broadly clarify the two aspects of self and phenomena. This is divided into two parts: first, general questions and general answers.

如何實我不可得耶問也至潛轉身中作事業故。

> How can a self truly be said to exist? \*\[Asking\]\* \*\[Arriving at the point\]\* Because it hides and moves within the body, carrying out actions.

二別問別答分四。一別破我執分五。一破外道三種我。諸所執我以下。皆是答詞。現見世人知覺運動。作業受果。明有主人公潛施默運。如何實我不可得耶。曰。世間所執我雖多。總而言之略有三種。一同太虗立我。即勝論所計作者我。數論所計受者我。二卷舒不定我。即無慚外道。尼虔子。計隨身大小有卷舒故。三量小極微我。即獸主。徧出。二宗所計潛轉身中有自在用。此名六師三計。餘九十種所計我等。不出此三。故曰略有三種。

> Second Section: Separate Questions and Answers in Four Parts. Part One: Breaking Attachment to Self in Five Sub-parts. Sub-part One: Refuting the Three Views of Self Held by Non-Buddhists. What follows, from “All that you deem as the self” onward, is the reply. Now we see that ordinary people possess awareness, movement, action, and the experience of results. Clearly, there is a master who operates subtly and silently. So how can it be that a truly existent self cannot be found? The answer is: Although the “self” that the world clings to takes many forms, it can be summarized into three types: 1. \*\*The self as vast as empty space.\*\* This is the “agent-self” taught by the Vaiśeṣika school, and the “experiencer-self” taught by the Sāṃkhya school. 2. \*\*The self that can expand and contract.\*\* This is the view of the Ājīvika (non-ashamed) and Nirgrantha (Jain) schools. They believe the self expands or shrinks according to the size of the body. 3. \*\*The self as small as an atom.\*\* This is the idea of the Paśupata (Lord of Beasts) and the Sarvāstivāda schools. They hold that the self, subtle yet active, dwells within the body, possessing autonomy. These are known as the three theories of the six heretical teachers. The remaining ninety or so views of self fall within these three categories. That is why it is said, “broadly speaking, there are three types.”

初且非理所以者何至所修證法一切我合故。

> Initially it is not reasonable, why is that? Because all the dharma that one cultivates and realizes are unified with the self. (Note: "to")

先破同太虗空我。應出外量云。我是有法。體常周徧是宗。因云。隨處造業受苦樂故。同喻如虗空。此因唯於異品中有。同品定無。又宗犯能別不極成過。因犯法自相相違過。喻犯能立法不成過。立量破云。我是有法。非常非徧為宗。因云。隨處造業受苦樂故。同喻如心所。異喻如虗空。又諸有情。同一我耶。各一我耶。若同一我者。則一作業時一切應作。一受果時一切應受。一解脫時一切應解脫。如今現見四生六道三賢十聖各各不同。而立此論。便成大過。若各一我者。我既常徧。則一切我更相涉入。各一我中。具有一切我。亦當一作業時一切應作。一受業時一切應受。若言彼作彼受。此作此受。作業受果。於諸我中不相紊亂。無他作我受之過者。理亦不然。常徧之我。不分彼此。既分彼此。不為常徧。今既執常徧。則業果及身。一即一切。而云屬此非彼。有是理乎。故一解脫時。一切應解脫。何以故。一修即一切修。一證即一切證故。

> First, we dismantle the idea of a self that is the same as infinite space. I will state a logical argument: The subject is "I." The proposition: "The substance of the self is eternal and omnipresent." The reason: "Because it creates karma and experiences suffering and happiness in various places." The analogy is space. This reason exists only in dissimilar examples, not in similar ones. This argument has three faults: 1. The term "eternal and omnipresent" is unacceptable as a quality of the subject. 2. The reason contradicts its own definition. 3. The analogy fails to demonstrate the reason. To refute it, I present another argument: The subject is "I." The proposition: "The self is neither eternal nor omnipresent." The reason: "Because it creates karma and experiences suffering and happiness in various places." Similar example: mental factors. Dissimilar example: space. Furthermore, do all beings have a single shared self? Or does each being have its own self? If there is one self for all, then when one being acts, all beings would act. When one experiences a result, all would experience it. When one is liberated, all would be liberated. Yet we see in reality that beings appear in four modes of birth, six realms of rebirth, three stages of ordinary beings, and ten levels of saints—all distinct from one another. This proposition leads to grave absurdity. If each being has its own self, then since each self is eternal and omnipresent, they would all interpenetrate. Within each individual self, all other selves would exist. Then, when one acts, all would act; when one experiences a result, all would experience it. If someone argues: "This one acts and experiences; that one acts and experiences. Actions and results are not confused among different selves. There is no fault of one's karma being experienced by another." This reasoning is invalid. A self that is eternal and omnipresent cannot have distinctions between "this" and "that." If such distinctions exist, it is not eternal or omnipresent. Since you insist it is eternal and omnipresent, then karma, results, and the body would be unified—all is one. How can you claim something belongs to "this" but not "that"? Therefore, when one is liberated, all should be liberated. Why? Because one's practice is everyone's practice, and one's realization is everyone's realization.

中亦非理所以者何至故彼所言如童豎戲。

> That, too, is not reasonable. Why is that? <note>To</note> Therefore, what they say is like the play of a child.

次破卷舒不定我。我體常住。應不卷舒。既有卷舒。應如橐籥。橐籥中豈有常住之風耶。立量破云。我體非常住宗。因云。有卷舒故。喻如橐籥風。又我既隨身。則身有多物。應可分析。何者為我。色是我耶。受等是我耶。分析之後。便成多體。而猶執我體是一是常。真兒戲之談矣。

> Next, we refute the idea that the self (ātman) is subject to contraction and expansion. The self is inherently permanent and should not undergo contraction or expansion. If it does, then it would be like a bellows, and is there truly a permanent wind within a bellows? We construct a logical syllogism to refute this: - The self is not permanent (thesis). - Because it undergoes contraction and expansion (reason). - Like wind in a bellows (example). Furthermore, since the self is said to accompany the body, and the body consists of many components, should it not be analyzable? What exactly is the self? Is it the form (rūpa)? Is it feeling (vedanā), and so forth? Upon analysis, it would become multiple entities. Yet one still insists that the self is a singular, permanent entity—this is truly a childish notion.

後亦非理所以者何至諸有往來非常一故。

> Moreover, this is not reasonable. Why? Because all phenomena that come and go are not permanent or singular.

三破量小極微我。廣百論云。是故我體住於身內。形量極細。如一極微。不可分析。體常無變。動慮動身。能作能受。此亦不然。以違理故。眾微聚積。成極大身。我住其中。形量甚小。云何小我能轉大身。舉體同時皆見動作。若汝意謂我量雖小。而於身中往來擊發。漸次周匝。如旋火輪。以速疾故。謂言俱動。若爾。我體巡歷身中。應有生滅。及成眾分。但是遷流至餘處者。定歸生滅必有眾分。既言我轉。所至非恒。如彼燈光。豈有常一。常必非動。動即非常。我動而常。深違正理。又所執我有住有行。何得說為是常是一。若行時我。不捨住性。應如住位。則無所行。若行時我捨其住性。別體即生。常一何在。

> \*\*Three Arguments Refuting the Notion of a Minute Self Within the Body\*\* The \*Extensive Hundred Treatise\* states: "Thus, the self abides within the body, its form extremely subtle, like a single atom, indivisible. Its essence is eternal and unchanging, yet it moves thoughts and moves the body, capable of acting and experiencing." But this is incorrect, because it violates reason. If countless atoms gather to form a vast body, and the self dwells within it with a minute form, how could something so tiny move something so large? How could the entire body move simultaneously, as if all actions happen at once? You might say: "Though the self is small, it moves back and forth within the body, striking and activating gradually, akin to a spinning fire-wheel. Because of its speed, it appears as if everything moves at once." If that were the case, as the self travels through the body, it would have to be subject to birth and death, and would consist of multiple parts. Anything that moves from one place to another must inevitably arise and cease, and must have parts. Since you say the self moves, where it goes is not constant. Like a lamp's flame—how could it be both permanent and singular? What is permanent can never move; what moves is never permanent. To claim the self both moves and is eternal deeply contradicts true logic. Moreover, if you assert that the self both abides and moves, how can it be described as eternal and singular? If the moving self does not abandon its abiding nature, then it should remain as if stationary, and there would be no actual movement. If the moving self abandons its abiding nature, then a different entity is born. Where, then, is eternity and singularity?

又所執我復有三種至三者與蘊非即非離。

> But the grasped self is of three kinds. Three: neither identical with nor separate from the aggregates.

二破小乘三種我。即離二我。正量經部二宗所計。非即離我。犢子部計。正量部等亦作此計。蘊是聚義。聚為身故。亦是覆義。覆真如故。即色受想行識五法合聚為身。即蘊我者。謂色是我色等。即身為我。離身之外。無我義故。離蘊我者。彼執我體離蘊別有。非即離我者。彼執我體即蘊非即。離蘊非離。則知蘊有生滅。我體常一。

> Now, refute the three kinds of self proposed by the Small Vehicle schools: that is, the self that is identical to the aggregates, the self that is separate from the aggregates, and the self that is neither identical nor separate. These are the views held by the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika schools, among others. The "aggregates" (skandha) refer to accumulation—they are what come together to form the body. They also mean "covering," as they conceal true reality. The body is composed of the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness—these five together constitute the body. The view that the self is identical to the aggregates holds that "form is the self," and so on—the body itself is the self, and there is no self apart from the body. The view that the self is separate from the aggregates holds that the self exists independently, apart from the aggregates. The view that the self is neither identical nor separate holds that the self is neither the aggregates nor apart from them. Yet, one can see that the aggregates arise and cease, while the self is said to be permanent and singular.

初即蘊我理且不然至故彼所執實我不成。

> First, the theory that an inherent self dwells within the aggregates does not hold true. <note>Therefore</note>, the eternal self that is asserted by others cannot be established.

凡執我者。皆以常一為宗。若言即蘊我者。蘊取聚義。則非常矣。五法合成。則非一矣。量云。我若即蘊。非常一故。喻如五蘊。次約五位破。五根六塵。皆屬色蘊。此云內色。即五根也。此云外色。即六塵也。餘行。即得等二十四法。與五十一心所。除受想二。俱屬行蘊。故曰餘行。餘色。即長短方圓麤細高下正不正等色。色有質礙。我無質礙。故我非即色。量云。內諸色定非實我。有質礙故。如外諸色。心待眾緣。不恒相續。我恒相續。應不待緣。故我非即受想行。量云。心心所法亦非實我。不恒相續。待眾緣故。喻如聲等。餘行餘色無有覺性。我有覺性。故我非即餘蘊。量云。餘行餘色。亦非實我。非覺性故如虗空等。若言離蘊我者。我既離蘊。非色非心。則應如虗空。既不作業。亦不受果。而今現見有作有受。離身心外。復是何物。量云。我若離蘊。無作受故。喻如虗空。若言俱非我者。依蘊立我。故云非離。我非是蘊。故云非即。正知作瓶。團泥成瓶。非離團泥。瓶非團泥。非即團泥。故知泥可言實。瓶決定假。則汝蘊可言實。我決定無矣。有為無為等者。謂犢子部等。彼立三聚。一有為聚。二無為聚。三非二聚。非二即我。又立五法藏。謂三世為三。無為為四。第五不可說藏。我在其中。以不可說為有為無為故。經部亦執有勝義我。非即非離。即計菩薩出離生死。故名勝義。即借彼說例破之云。若汝既知不可說為有為無為。亦應當知不可說為是我非我。故彼所執實我不成。破小乘三種我竟。

> All who cling to a self regard it as permanent and singular. If one claims that the self \*is\* the aggregates, since "aggregates" means "collection," they are impermanent. Since they are composed of five factors, they are not singular. The logical argument is: If the self were the aggregates, it would not be permanent or singular, just like the five aggregates themselves. Next, we refute this through the five categories. The five sense organs and the six sense objects belong to the Form Aggregate. "Inner form" refers to the five sense organs; "outer form" refers to the six sense objects. "Other mental formations" refers to the twenty-four derivative factors and the fifty-one mental states, excluding feeling and perception, all belong to the Formation Aggregate. Hence, they are called "other formations." "Other forms" refer to forms with attributes like long, short, square, round, coarse, fine, high, low, proper, improper, etc. Form is obstructive, but the self is not obstructive. Therefore, the self is not form. The logical argument is: All internal forms are definitely not the real self, because they are obstructive, just like external forms. The mind depends on various conditions; it does not persist continuously. The self, however, does persist continuously and should not depend on conditions. Therefore, the self is not feeling, perception, or mental formations. The logical argument is: Mental factors and mind are also not the real self, because they are not continuous and depend on conditions, just like sounds. "Other formations" and "other forms" lack sentience. The self possesses sentience. Therefore, the self is not the other aggregates. The logical argument is: Other formations and other forms are also not the real self, because they lack sentience, just like space. If one claims the self is separate from the aggregates, then since the self is not form or mind, it should be like space—neither performing actions nor experiencing results. Yet we clearly see that actions and results exist. Apart from body and mind, what other thing could this be? The logical argument is: If the self were separate from the aggregates, it would have no actions or experiences, just like space. If one claims the self is neither identical with nor separate from the aggregates, we respond that the self is posited in dependence upon the aggregates, so it is not separate. Yet it is not the aggregates themselves, so it is not identical. This is like a pot made from clay: the pot is not separate from the clay, yet it is not the clay itself. The clay can be considered real, but the pot is definitely conventional. Therefore, the aggregates can be considered real, but the self is definitely non-existent. Regarding "conditioned and unconditioned," the Vātsīputrīya school posits three categories: conditioned phenomena, unconditioned phenomena, and a third category that is neither—this third is the self. They also posit five "dharma-stores": past, present, and future as three, the unconditioned as the fourth, and a fifth, the "inexpressible store," in which the self resides. This self cannot be described as conditioned or unconditioned. The Sautrāntika school also holds to a "supreme self" that is neither identical with nor separate from the aggregates. They conceive that a bodhisattva transcends birth and death, hence the term "supreme." We use their own reasoning to refute them, saying: If you already know it cannot be described as conditioned or unconditioned, you should also know it cannot be described as self or not-self. Therefore, your notion of a real self is invalid. This concludes the refutation of the three kinds of self posited by the Lesser Vehicle schools.

又諸所執實有我體至故所執我理俱不成。

> Furthermore, among all the views that cling to the existence of a real self, the reasoning behind such a self is ultimately unsupported, and in the end it cannot be logically established.

三總約根境識三種破。謂汝所執之我。是根耶。境耶。識耶。先約識彼。故曰思慮。念過去現在為思。念未來為慮。立量云。我若是識。應是無常。有思慮故。如諸心所。我若非識應是無情。無思慮故。如虗空等。

> The analysis focuses on three aspects: the faculties, the objects, and consciousness, in order to refute the existence of a self. The question is: does the self you hold to exist pertain to the faculties, objects, or consciousness? First, we examine it in terms of consciousness, which is characterized by thought and reflection. Thinking of the past or present is called "thought," and thinking of the future is called "reflection." A logical argument can be made: if the self were consciousness, it would be impermanent, because it involves thought and reflection—just like mental factors (cittas). On the other hand, if the self were not consciousness, it would be devoid of life and feeling, because it would lack thought and reflection—just like empty space or other inanimate things.

又諸所執實有我體至故所執我二俱不成。

> Furthermore, all those conceptualizations that cling to the existence of a solid, permanent self<note>are</note> fundamentally flawed—thus, neither concept of a self holds true.

次約根破。根是有作用法。故以作用徵詰。立量云。我若是根。應是無常。有作用故。如手足等。我若非根。應非實我。無作用故。如兔角等。

> Thus, we examine the breakdown of the sense faculties. A faculty is something that functions. Therefore, we test it through its function. We can reason as follows: If the self were a sense faculty, it would be impermanent, because it functions. For example, hands and feet are impermanent. If the self were not a sense faculty, it would not be a real self, because it lacks function. For example, a rabbit's horn has no function.

又諸所執實有我體至正見翻令沈淪生死。

> Furthermore, the mistaken belief in a truly existing self-nature leads even correct views to sink into the cycle of birth and death.

此約境破。言汝所執我。是我見分所緣境否耶。若非我見所緣境者。汝等云何知實有我。若是我見所緣境者。即是真相分。現量所得。如實知故。非顛倒攝。當迷之而沉生死。悟之而證涅槃矣。云何汝等所信聖教。皆毀我見沉淪生死。稱讚無我能證涅槃耶。邪見能證涅槃。正見反淪生死。有是理乎。此不立量者。下文當出故。廣百論云。外道經中。咸作是說。著我生死。離我涅槃。既讚捨我。令欣解脫。如何固執有實我耶。為顯此義。故復頌曰。我若實有性。不應讚離我。謂我若實有。緣生我見。即是真實。不應勸捨。為證實我。應更殷勤勸修我見。令其堅固。云何勸捨真實我見。令修虗妄無我見耶。若無我見。不稱實我。汝不應說能證涅槃。不稱實見證涅槃者。知真趣脫。此說應虗。為顯斯義。故次頌曰。定知真實者。趣解脫應虗。有我若實。無我我所解脫方便見應成虗。有我我所違逆涅槃隨順生死見應是實。若顛倒見隨順涅槃。無顛倒見隨順生死。云何汝論作如是言。定知實者能趣解脫。以此定知空無我見。得涅槃故。所證非虗。我我所見涅槃時捨。應知餘見是其顛倒。

> This section addresses the nature of the self through inquiry. It asks: Is the "self" you cling to an object perceived by the view of self-identity? If it is not, how can you claim to know a real self exists? If it is, then it must be a real characteristic, directly known through perception. Being accurately known, it would not be deluded. Delusion about it would lead to sinking in the cycle of birth and death, while awakening to it would lead to enlightenment. Why, then, do the sacred teachings you trust all condemn the view of self-identity as causing suffering and praise the view of no-self as realizing enlightenment? Would it make sense for a wrong view to lead to enlightenment while a correct view leads to suffering? This argument is not fully laid out here, as it will be developed below. The \*Extensive Commentary on the Hundred Treatise\* states: "In non-Buddhist scriptures, it is said: Clinging to self leads to birth and death; abandoning self leads to enlightenment." Since they praise abandoning the self to encourage liberation, how can they stubbornly cling to a real self? To illustrate this point, the next verse declares: "If the self truly exists, abandoning it should not be praised." This means that if the self truly existed, the view of self arising from causes and conditions would be true and should not be abandoned. On the contrary, to realize the true self, one should actively cultivate and strengthen the view of self. Why would they encourage abandoning the true view of self and cultivating a false view of no-self? If the view of no-self does not correspond to a real self, then you cannot claim it leads to enlightenment. If an inaccurate view can achieve enlightenment, then the saying "true knowledge leads to liberation" would be false. To clarify this meaning, the next verse says: "If it is certain that the real leads to liberation, this statement would be false." If the self truly exists, then the view of self and possessions, which opposes enlightenment and aligns with suffering, should be real. If a deluded view aligns with enlightenment, and an undeluded view aligns with suffering, how can your texts say that "those who truly know reality can attain liberation"? It is precisely through the certain knowledge of the empty, selfless view that enlightenment is realized. This realization is not false. The view of self and possessions is abandoned at enlightenment. Know that other views are therefore deluded.

又諸我見不緣實我至隨自妄情種種計度。

> Furthermore, the various views of a self do not arise from an actual self, but arise according to one's own deluded emotions, and are measure and guessed at in various ways.

此破我執已竟。總申二比量。初約能緣。次約所緣。以將欲說出我見所緣是假相分。故先審定。我見不緣實我。以我見自有所緣故。喻如緣餘心。亦無實我為我見境。以是我見之所緣故。喻如所餘法也。我見亦是心所。以其餘心所為同喻。故曰如緣餘心。我見即是妄見。妄見所緣。即是妄境。與龜毛兔角等耳。故曰。是所緣故。如所餘法也。所餘法。即第六蘊第十三處第十九界等。是故下。說出我見所緣是假相分。我見既不緣實我。是緣何等。但緣內識變現五蘊似我之相。隨自妄情。周徧計度。以為實我。如病眼境。定非實有。故不可以我見所緣。證立此我實有常住。

> This completes the refutation of attachment to self. Two logical arguments are presented in general: first, concerning the perceiving subject; second, concerning the perceived object. Since we are about to explain that what the view of self perceives is a false mental image, we first confirm this: The view of self does not perceive a real self, because the view of self has its own object of perception. This is like other mental states that also lack a real self as their object—because what they perceive is merely their own object. Likewise, the view of self is a mental factor. Other mental factors serve as a similar example, so it is said: "like other mental states." The view of self is a distorted view; what a distorted view perceives is a distorted object, no different from a turtle's hair or a rabbit's horn. Thus it is said: "because it is an object of perception," like other conditioned phenomena. "Other conditioned phenomena" refers to the sixth aggregate, the thirteenth sense-base, the nineteenth element, and so forth. Therefore, the following explains that what the view of self perceives is a false mental image: Since the view of self does not perceive a real self, what does it perceive? It perceives only the appearance of the five aggregates, which resemble a self, manifested by internal consciousness. Based on one's own deluded tendencies, one extensively imagines and clings to this as a real self—like the vision of an eye disease, which is certainly not truly existent. Thus, one cannot use what the view of self perceives to prove that this self is truly real and permanent.

然諸我執略有二種一者俱生二者分別。

> However, the attachment to self exists in two forms: one is innate, the other is conceptual.

四總舉通執分二。一標數。總舉世間沙門婆羅門等所有我執。品數雖多。約而言之。不出二種。

> Four General Types of Attachment: Two Categories 1. \*\*Enumeration.\*\* Generally speaking, all worldly ascetics and brahmins, and indeed all beings, have various forms of attachment to a self. Though the types are many, to summarize, they fall into no more than two categories.

俱生我執無始時來至勝生空觀方能除滅。

> Since beginningless time, innate self-grasping can only be eliminated through the superior view of emptiness.

二正釋分三。一俱生。二分別。三總結。今初。由從無始來故。不待邪教。由內因力故。非邪分別。由恒與身俱。即任運而轉。具上諸義。故名俱生。此復二種。一者。第七執第八見分為內自我。而親緣第八見分不著。但託彼見分為本質。於自心上變起影相而緣。為帶質境。故曰起自心相執為實我。此則常常相續。無有間斷。二者。第六緣第八所變色心蘊法。或總執內蘊為我。外蘊為所。或別執一蘊為我。餘蘊為所。於自心上。變起影相而緣。為獨影境。故亦曰起自心相執為實我。此則有間斷時。不恒相續。此二我執。無始至今。任運而有。不假作意分別尋伺。細故難斷。直至修道位中。修習勝生空觀。地地漸斷。至金剛心。方能斷盡。言勝生空者。揀異見道生空。故名勝也生空。即眾生空。若觀生死苦果。但見名色陰界入實法。從因緣生。新新生滅。是實法中空無我人眾生壽者等十六知見。如龜毛兔角畢竟不可得。是名眾生空。

> Now we will explain the three parts of the second category: (1) Innate self-grasping, (2) Discursive self-grasping, and (3) Summary. We begin with the first. Because it has existed since beginningless time, it does not rely on false teachings. Because its cause is internal, it is not due to wrong discrimination. Because it is always present with the body, it functions naturally and effortlessly. Possessing all these qualities, it is called "innate." This has two kinds: First, the seventh consciousness grasps the eighth consciousness's seeing part as an internal self, but it does not directly perceive the eighth consciousness's seeing part. Instead, it relies on that seeing part as a foundation, and from its own mind, it projects an image to perceive. This is called "a perceived image bearing a nature" (i.e., an indirect perception). Thus, it says, "arising an image from one's own mind and grasping it as a real self." This kind is constant and uninterrupted. Second, the sixth consciousness grasps the aggregates of form and mind projected by the eighth consciousness. Sometimes it grasps the internal aggregates as "self" and the external aggregates as "belonging to self." Other times it grasps a single aggregate as "self" and the rest as "belonging to self." From its own mind, it projects an image to perceive. This is called "a purely projected image" (i.e., a subjective mental construct). Thus, it also says, "arising an image from one's own mind and grasping it as a real self." This kind is intermittent and not always continuous. These two kinds of self-grasping have been naturally present from beginningless time until now. They do not require deliberate thought, discrimination, or investigation. They are subtle and difficult to eliminate. They can only be cut off gradually through the cultivation of the superior insight into the emptiness of living beings, stage by stage within the cultivation path. It is only at the stage of the diamond-like mind that they can be completely exhausted. The term "superior emptiness of living beings" distinguishes it from the emptiness of living beings realized at the path of seeing, which is why it is called "superior." <note>"Emptiness of living beings" means the emptiness of sentient beings. If one contemplates the suffering of birth and death and merely sees the real dharmas of name, form, aggregates, sense bases, and elements arising from causes and conditions, perpetually arising and ceasing, then within these real dharmas, the sixteen views such as self, person, sentient being, and life span are empty, like a turtle's hair or a rabbit's horn, ultimately unobtainable. This is called the emptiness of living beings.</note>

分別我執亦由現在至生空真如即能除滅。

> The attachment to a self that arises from discrimination can also be eliminated by realizing the true nature of emptiness at the present moment.

執有內外。等從緣生。故曰亦由。現在。對無始時來。外緣。對內因。非與身俱。對恒與身俱。然後方起。對任運而轉。唯在第六意識中有。簡前第七無分別義。邪教所說蘊相。如從冥生覺。從覺生心。從心生五微塵。從五微塵生五大。從五大生十一根等。邪教所說我相。如我是思等。現分別起。對前俱生。故名為麤。初見道時。即能除滅。故名易斷。見道位中。初地初心生空徧行真如現在前時。一時頓斷。

> Hold on to the notion of an "inner" and "outer" self, each arising from conditions. Therefore, it is said "also from." The present moment, in contrast to the beginningless past. External conditions, in contrast to internal causes. Not inherent to the body, in contrast to always accompanying the body. Arising only afterward, in contrast to operating spontaneously. This exists only in the sixth consciousness (mental awareness), distinguishing it from the meaning of the seventh consciousness (self-centered awareness), which has no discrimination. The various aggregates (skandhas) taught by heterodox schools, such as: from the unmanifest (prakriti) arises intellect (buddhi), from intellect arises ego (ahamkara), from ego arises the five subtle elements (tanmatras), from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements (mahabhutas), and from the five gross elements arise the eleven sense organs, etc. The notion of a self (atman) taught by heterodox schools—such as "the self is thought"—arises through current discrimination. In contrast to the innate self, it is therefore called "coarse." At the moment of first seeing the truth (path of seeing), it can be immediately eliminated; therefore, it is called "easy to cut off." In the stage of seeing the truth—specifically at the first moment of the first stage (first bhumi), when the true suchness (tathata) that pervades all and arises with the emptiness of the self (pudgala-shunyata) manifests—it is cut off all at once.

如是所說一切我執至一切皆緣五取蘊起。

> All egotistical attachments arise entirely from the five aggregates of clinging.

三總結內外。自心內蘊。自心外蘊。據宗鏡錄有二種解。彼云。心外執我執法者有兩種。一者如外道等執離心等別有一物是常是一。名之為我。此乃妄計所執。其體都無。二者踈所緣緣本質之法。能緣之心親緣不著。亦名心外。此是依他。其體是有。又云。自心外蘊。第七計我心外唯有。第六計我心外之蘊或是於無。自心內蘊。一切皆有者。親所緣也。不問即離計為我者。影像必有故。云何必有。曰如能緣心將緣龜毛等無法之時。由無始來熏習力故。依種生時。從識自證分上變起龜毛等相分。及緣此龜毛相分。此相見分與識自證分同一種。生。既依種生。是依他性。非體全無。不同本來無體龜毛。故得成所緣緣。乃至如離蘊計有實我實法等亦復如是。離蘊性外。部無實我。亦無決定實法。但是有情虗妄執有。以理推徵。都無有體。故如本來無體龜毛。然我法執此時。亦由無始虗妄熏習力故。變起假我法相。此相與見等同種。亦依他起。成所緣緣。若言獨影境是偏計性者。其體即無。猶如龜毛等。即此一分相分無。何得論言自心內蘊一切皆有耶。是故我執皆緣無常五取蘊相妄執為我者。結成前義。影像相分。必是蘊故。緣此為我。義顯大乘親緣無法不能生識。不成所緣緣。成所緣緣。必有法故。然不可緣此遂執我法是有。如諸蘊相。是依他起性。決定似有。因云仗因託緣而得生故。喻如幻有。妄所執我。是徧計執性。決定非有。因云。橫計度故。喻如畢竟無。恐人不信。故以契經證結焉。集論云。何故名取蘊。以取合故。名為取蘊。何等為取。謂諸蘊中所有欲貪。何故欲貪說名為取。謂於未來現在諸蘊。能引不捨故。希求未來。染著現在。欲貪名取。俱舍云。或有唯蘊。而非取蘊。謂無漏行。煩惱名取。蘊從取生。故名取蘊。如草糠火。或蘊屬取。故名取蘊。如帝王臣。或蘊生取。故名取蘊。如華果樹。通上。四總舉通執竟。

> \*\*3. Summary of Internal and External\*\* Inner mental formations and outer physical formations. According to the \*Records of the Source-Mirror\*, there are two interpretations of what is mind. It says: When grasping to a self or phenomena outside the mind, there are two kinds. First, like non-Buddhists, who believe in something separate from the mind that is permanent and singular, calling it a self. This is false imagination; it has no true substance whatsoever. Second, there are objects that are remote conditions. The perceiving mind cannot directly touch them, so they are also considered external. These belong to the dependent nature; they do have existence. It also says: The outer forms that the seventh consciousness grasps as \*my\* self, existing only outside; the sixth consciousness grasps forms outside the self as either existing or not. The inner forms of the mind, all of which exist, are what the mind directly perceives. Whether we consider the self as identical to the body or separate, within these inner forms we find an image of the self. Why must it exist? Because when the perceiving mind turns to a non-existent thing like a turtle’s hair, due to the force of beginningless conditioning, when the seed arises, the mind’s fundamental ground projects an image of the turtle's hair. The seeing part and the image part arise from the same seed. Since they arise from a seed, they belong to dependent nature, not absolute non-existence. This is different from the originally non-existent turtle’s hair, which has no substance. Thus, they can still fulfill the role of perceived objects. The same applies to grasping to a real self or real phenomena apart from the five aggregates. Outside the nature of the aggregates, there is no real self, nor any fixed, real phenomena. Beings simply cling to them through delusion. When we analyze it logically, there is no substance. So it is like the originally non-existent turtle’s hair. However, even at the moment of clinging to self and phenomena, the force of beginningless deluded conditioning projects a false image of self and phenomena. This image shares the same seed with the seeing part. It also arises through dependent origination, and serves as a perceived object. If one says that the purely imaged object is merely conceptual projection, then its substance would be non-existent, like a turtle’s hair. If that one part of the image lacks existence, how can the text say that all inner forms of the mind exist? Therefore, the reason we say that clinging to a self always grasps at the impermanent five aggregates and falsely imagines them as a self is to confirm the previous point: The image of the self must be the aggregates themselves. By grasping this as self, the principle is clear. Mahayana states that directly perceiving a non-existent object cannot generate consciousness and thus cannot serve as a perceived object. For something to be a perceived object, it must exist. However, we must not, because we perceive these images, conclude that the self and phenomena truly exist. The aggregates, being dependently arisen, definitely appear to exist. They arise through causes and conditions; they are like magical illusions. The self, which is falsely imagined, is merely conceptual projection. It definitely does not exist. It is merely crosswise speculation; it is like absolute non-existence. To prevent disbelief, the scriptures confirm this. The \*Compendium of Abhidharma\* asks: Why are they called "clinging aggregates"? Because they are combined with clinging. What is clinging? It is the desire and attachment within the aggregates. Why is desire and attachment called clinging? Because it leads to grasping at future and present aggregates without letting go. Yearning for the future, attached to the present—this desire is called clinging. The \*Abhidharma-kośa\* says: Some things are aggregates but not clinging aggregates, like the unconditioned path. Defilements are called clinging. Aggregates arise from clinging, hence they’re called clinging aggregates, like a fire from grass and twigs. Or, aggregates belong to clinging, like a king’s minister. Or, aggregates produce clinging, like a fruit tree. Thus, we have concluded the general explanation of the various forms of grasping.

實我若無云何得有至於汝有失非於我宗。

> If the self does not truly exist, then how can there be <note>even</note> any fault on your part? The error lies with you, not with my school.

五外難內破有三章。初破我有三世難。難云。若無實我。則世人現能憶過去。識現在。誦習未來。益我損我。為恩為怨等事。念念生滅不停。誰為主宰而任持此耶。先約體破。言汝所執我。既是常住。應無轉變無轉變故。三世一如。則是過去應如現在。現在應如過去。若是現在如過去者。則我體常無。三世恩怨亦應常無。誰為憶識誦習。若是過去如現在者。則我體常有。三世恩怨亦應常有。何須憶識誦習。何以故。前之與後。同一我體。無分別故。次約用破。若謂我用自變。我體自常者。理亦不然。用即體之用。體即用之體。不可析而二也。用不離體。體常而用亦常。則我用不應有變。體不離用。用變而體亦應變。則我體不應言常。進退推求。不得言我能憶識誦習三世恩怨等事。次顯正義云。有情身中。一一各有阿賴耶識。一類相續。任持諸法種子不失。與一切法互為因果。熏習力故。得有如是憶識誦習恩怨等事。何嘗有實我為之主宰哉。汝無持種受熏之識。而設憶識誦習之難。祇彰汝失。成立我宗耳。乃我宗則何失焉。

> The external refutation of the self is divided into three sections. The first refutes the concept of a self across the three times. The objection states: If there is no real self, how can people in the world remember the past, recognize the present, and recite and learn the future? How can there be benefits and harms, kindness and enmity? Since all phenomena arise and cease in every moment without pause, who is the sovereign that upholds and maintains these experiences? First, we refute based on essence. It is said: The self you posit is eternal and unchanging. Since it has no change, the three times would be identical. Thus, the past should be like the present, and the present should be like the past. If the present were like the past, then the essence of the self would be permanently absent, and the enmity and kindness of the three times would also be permanently absent. Who then would remember, recognize, and recite? If the past were like the present, then the essence of the self would be permanently present, and the enmity and kindness of the three times would also be permanently present. Why would there be any need for memory, recognition, or recitation? Why is this? Because before and after, the self's essence is the same, without distinction. Next, we refute based on function. If you claim the self's function changes itself while its essence remains constant, this is also unreasonable. Function is the function of essence; essence is the essence of function. They cannot be separated into two. Function does not depart from essence; if essence is eternal, function must also be eternal—thus the function should not change. Essence does not depart from function; if function changes, essence must also change—thus you cannot claim the essence is eternal. Reasoning back and forth, you cannot assert that the self can remember, recognize, and recite the enmity and kindness of the three times, and so on. Then we reveal the correct meaning: Within sentient beings, each has the Alaya consciousness, which continues in a single stream, upholding and preserving the seeds of all dharmas without loss. It mutually serves as cause and effect with all phenomena. Through the power of conditioning and habituation, there arise such capacities as memory, recognition, recitation, and experiences of enmity and kindness. Where is there ever a real self acting as sovereign? You lack the consciousness that upholds seeds and receives conditioning, yet you raise the objection about memory, recognition, and recitation. This only reveals your error and establishes our doctrine. As for our doctrine, what error does it have?

若無實我誰能造業至造業受果於理無違。

> If there is no permanent self, who then creates karma and experiences its results? There is no contradiction in understanding that actions produce their consequences.

次破我能作受難。此即十六知見中起者受者。破詞雖以有變易無變易兩端徵詰。然外計定主無變易。以有變易違害常我故。立量云。汝所執我。應是不能造業受果。因云。無變易故。喻如虗空。若言有變易。已成自教相違。故不立量。次出正義云。然諸有情能造受者。皆是八種心王心所。發業潤生。內因外緣熏習之力。故有善惡苦樂業報等事。豈有實我能作受哉。華嚴會意問云。若準六根無我。誰造誰受耶。答。佛說作善生天為惡受苦者。此但因緣法爾。非是我能作受也。若言是我非因緣者。作惡何不生天。乃墮地獄耶。我豈愛彼地獄。故受苦耶。我既作惡而不受樂者。故知善惡感報。唯因緣。非是我也。如論云。因緣故生天。因緣故墮地獄。是此意也。問。既言無我。誰感因緣。若言無我。但是因緣自為者。草木亦稟因緣。何不生天與受苦耶。答。內外雖但稟因緣。因緣有二。一善惡增上業因緣。但感生天及地獄異熟等。二善惡等流業因緣。生天者感寶地金華。墮地獄者感刀林銅柱等。此是因緣業作。非我能為。豈謂受報不同而計有我也。故經云。無我無造無受者。善惡之業亦不亡。

> Next, refute the notion of a self that can act and experience. This pertains to the “agent” and “experiencer” among the sixteen views of self-identity. Although the refutation examines both the idea of a self that changes and one that does not, externalist schools typically insist on a self that is unchanging, because change would violate the constancy of the eternal self. The logical argument is stated as follows: The self you propose cannot be the creator of actions or the experiencer of results, because it is unchanging, like empty space. If you claim it changes, that contradicts your own teachings—so no further argument is needed. Now, let me clarify the correct view: All beings that create actions and experience results are simply the eight types of mind kings and mind companions (the primary and secondary consciousnesses). They generate karma and nurture rebirth through internal causes and external conditions, along with the power of conditioning. Thus, there are results such as good and bad karma, pleasure and pain, and so on. How could there be a real self that acts and experiences? The \*Huayan Jing Huiyi Wen\* asks: “If we accept that the six sense faculties are without a self, then who creates actions and who experiences results?” The answer: The Buddha said that doing good leads to rebirth in heaven, and doing evil leads to suffering—this is simply the natural law of causes and conditions, not the work of any self. If you claim it is because of a self rather than causes and conditions, then why don’t evil deeds result in heaven? Why would one fall into hell? Would the self choose to suffer in hell? Since the self, having done evil, cannot enjoy pleasure, we know that good and bad results come solely from causes and conditions, not from a self. As the treatise says, “One is reborn in heaven due to causes and conditions; one falls into hell due to causes and conditions.” This is the meaning. Question: If there is no self, then what connects to causes and conditions? If there is no self, and causes and conditions operate on their own, then plants and trees also depend on causes and conditions. Why do they not go to heaven or suffer? Answer: Although both internal and external phenomena depend on causes and conditions, there are two kinds: First, the potent karmic causes of good and evil that lead to rebirth in heaven or hell as their ripened results. Second, the karma of equal and similar results that brings about such things as jeweled grounds and golden flowers for those born in heaven, or forests of knives and copper pillars for those in hell. These are simply the workings of karmic causes and conditions, not the doings of any self. How could differences in experience prove the existence of a self? Therefore, the scripture says: “There is no self, no creator, no experiencer; yet the results of good and evil actions never disappear.”

我若實無誰於生死至愚者於中妄執為我。

> If I truly have no self, then who is it that passes through birth and death? <note>Extreme</note> The ignorant, in their confusion, mistakenly cling to the idea of a self within this process.

三破我有生死涅槃難。廣百論引其說云。若一切法空無我者。生死涅槃二事俱失。所以者何。由有我故。諸無智者樂著生死。先造能招善不善業。後受所感愛非愛果。諸有智者欣樂涅槃。先觀生死苦火煎逼。發心厭離。後方捨惡。勤脩諸善。得正解脫。如是一切。皆由我成。我為作者。我為受者。我為苦逼。發心厭離。捨惡修善。證得涅槃。此破之云。汝執我常無生滅。又謂我能生死輪迴。則害常無生滅義矣。我常如虗空。應非苦所惱。又謂我能捨苦求樂。則害常如虗空義矣。故觀厭苦求樂。捨此生彼。則可以驗知定無實我。何以故。若有實我。則不可移易。不能去來隨緣起滅故。但有諸識。無始時來。前滅後生。因果相續。虗妄熏習。似我相現。愚者遂執以為實我耳。此條為已出其自語相違之過。故不立量。大涅槃經云。師子吼菩薩言。世尊。眾生五陰。空無所有。誰有受教脩集道者。佛言。善男子。一切眾生。皆有念心。慧心。發心。勤精進心。信心。定心。如是等法。雖念念滅。猶故相似。相續不斷。故名修道。乃至如燈。雖念念滅。而有光明。除破闇冥。念等諸法。亦復如是。如眾生食。雖念念滅。亦能令饑者而得飽滿。譬如上藥。雖念念滅。亦能愈病。日月光明。雖念念滅。亦能增長草木樹林。善男子。汝言念念滅云何增長者。心不斷故。名為增長。如淨名經偈云。雖無我無造無受者。善惡之業亦不亡失。善惡之業因。苦樂之果報。非有人我能作能受。但是識持。因果不亡。如古師云。眾生為善惡而受其報者。皆由眾生心識。三世相續。念念相傳。如今世現行五蘊。由前世識種為因。起今世果。今世有作業熏種。又為來世現行因。展轉相續為因果故。又善惡之業。皆由心識而起。謂前念造得善惡業。然此一念識雖滅。而後念心識生。既心識相傳不斷。即能任持善惡之業而亦不亡。以由識持故。只為識心如幻無定。故乃有從凡入聖之理。厭妄求真之門。則不壞因緣。能含正理。通上別問別答下。第一別破我執竟。

> The third refutation addresses the view that without a self, both rebirth and nirvana become impossible. The \*Guang Bai Lun\* cites this argument: "If all things are empty and selfless, then both the cycle of rebirth and the state of nirvana are lost. Why? Because it is because of the self that the ignorant cling to rebirth, first creating karma—good or bad—and then experiencing its pleasant or painful results. The wise, on the other hand, delight in nirvana: first seeing how the fires of suffering torment them in rebirth, they become disillusioned, then abandon evil, diligently practice good, and attain true liberation. All of this is possible only because of the self: the self is the doer, the self is the experiencer, the self is tormented by suffering, develops aversion, abandons evil, practices good, and realizes nirvana." This is refuted as follows: "You claim that the self is eternal and unchanging, yet you also say that the self undergoes the cycle of rebirth. This contradicts the nature of an eternal, unchanging self. If the self were eternal like space, it would not be afflicted by suffering. Yet you also claim that the self can abandon suffering and seek happiness—this contradicts its being like space. Therefore, when we examine how beings grow weary of suffering, seek happiness, and move from one life to the next, we can know for certain that there is no real self. Why? Because if there were a real self, it would be fixed and unmoving, unable to come and go according to causes and conditions. What exists is only consciousness, which from beginningless time has been ceaselessly arising and passing away, cause and effect continuing in succession. Through the illusory conditioning of habit energies, a semblance of self appears, and the ignorant cling to it as a real self." This passage has already exposed the inherent contradiction in the opponent's own words, so no formal logical argument is set forth here. The \*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra\* says: "The Bodhisattva Lion's Roar said, 'World-Honored One, the five aggregates of sentient beings are empty and have nothing at all. Who then is there to receive teachings and cultivate the path?' The Buddha replied, 'Good man, all sentient beings have a mind of thought, a mind of wisdom, a mind of initiative, a mind of diligent effort, a mind of faith, and a mind of concentration. Although these states cease from moment to moment, they are still similar and continue in an unbroken stream. This is why we speak of cultivating the path. It is like a lamp: although its flame ceaselessly arises and extinguishes, it still produces light that dispels darkness. The same is true for thought and other mental states. It is like food: although it is consumed moment by moment, it still satisfies hunger. Like fine medicine: although it ceases moment by moment, it still cures illness. Like sunlight and moonlight: although they arise and cease moment by moment, they still nourish plants and forests. Good man, you ask how things can grow if they cease from moment to moment. They grow because the mind does not cease. It is this continuity that is called growth.'" As the \*Vimalakīrti Sūtra\* says: "Although there is no self, no doer, and no experiencer, good and bad karma are never lost." The causes of good and bad karma and the fruits of pleasure and pain—there is no person or self that creates or experiences them. It is only consciousness that holds them; cause and effect are not lost. As an ancient master said: "That sentient beings perform good and evil and experience their results is entirely due to their mind-consciousness, which continues through the three times, transmitting itself from moment to moment. For instance, the present five aggregates arise because seeds from previous lives' consciousness serve as the cause, producing the result of this life. In this life, actions create habitual seeds, which in turn become the cause for the next life's manifestation. Thus, cause and effect unfold in a continuous sequence. Moreover, good and evil actions arise entirely from mind-consciousness: when a previous moment of mind creates good or evil karma, that moment of consciousness ceases, but the next moment of mind-consciousness arises. Since the stream of mind-consciousness is unbroken, it sustains good and evil karma, preventing their loss—because consciousness holds them. It is precisely because consciousness and mind are illusory and impermanent that there exists the principle of progressing from ordinary to sage, the path of abandoning illusion and seeking truth. This does not violate the law of cause and effect and aligns with true reality." This concludes the first major section: "Specific Refutation of the Self."

如何識外實有諸法不可得耶問至理非有故答。

> How can the reality of "external, real dharmas being utterly unobtainable" be recognized? <note>The question extends to</note> Because their essential nature is not real. <note>Answer</note>

第二別問法執分二。一總問答。

> Section Two: Clinging to Dharma - Further Discussion, Part One: General Questions and Answers.

外道所執云何非有。

> What do the followers of other paths claim about what does not exist?

二別問答分四。一外道。二餘乘。三總破前執。四總舉通執。華嚴鈔云。至妙虗通。目之曰道。心遊道外。即稱外道。唯佛正道。餘悉名外道。約而言之。有一十三種。一有數論師。計二十五諦。二有勝論師。計六句義。三有計大自在天。是一。是實。是徧。是常。能生諸法。四至十。有七種外道。謂執梵王。執時。執方。執本際。執自然。執虗空。執我。如此七種計。執皆是常。能生諸法。十一。十二。有二聲論。一待緣生。一待緣顯。二宗計聲體皆是常。十三有順世外道。謂計四是常是實。能生有情。死歸四大。

> The explanation of the two categories consists of four parts: first, non-Buddhist paths; second, other Buddhist vehicles; third, general refutation of earlier attachments; fourth, general overview of common attachments. The \*Avatamsaka Sutra Commentary\* says: "That which is supremely subtle and universally unobstructed is called the Path. The mind roaming outside this path is called an 'external teaching.' Only the Buddha's right path is correct; all others are called external teachings." Broadly speaking, there are thirteen types: 1. \*\*Sāṃkhya philosophers\*\* who postulate twenty-five principles. 2. \*\*Vaiśeṣika philosophers\*\* who postulate six categories. 3. \*\*Those who postulate the Great Sovereign God (Maheśvara)\*\* as one, real, all-pervading, eternal, and capable of producing all phenomena. 4. Through 10. \*\*Seven types of external teachings\*\* who hold to: Brahmā, time, space, primordial origin, nature, emptiness, and self. These seven types of attachment all consider these as eternal and capable of producing all phenomena. 11. & 12. \*\*Two types of sound philosophers\*\* — one holding sound arises from conditions, the other holding sound is merely manifested by conditions. Both schools assert the essence of sound is eternal. 13. \*\*The Lokāyata (Materialist) external teaching\*\*, which asserts that the four great elements are eternal and real, capable of producing living beings, and that at death they return to these four great elements.

且數論者執我是思至是實非假現量所得。

> Furthermore, proponents of the Sāṃkhya school insist that the self is consciousness.<note>To</note> It is truly existent and not a mere illusion, perceivable directly through valid cognition.

外道中。一數論分四。一舉執。二總破。三別破。四結成。今初。梵音僧佉。此翻為數。數即慧數。數廣諸法根本立名。從數起論。名為數論。論能生數。亦名數論。其造數論。及學數論者。皆名數論師。本源即是迦毗羅所造。迦毗羅。此云黃赤色。髭髮面色並黃赤故。時世號為黃赤仙人。此人亦修禪定。有神通力。知八萬劫中事。八萬劫前。冥然不知。謂之冥諦。從冥初自性。生智大。乃至神我。開成二十五諦。合為九位。一冥初自性。謂此外道以八萬劫前之事冥然不知之處。昧為自性。古稱冥性。亦名勝性。未生大等。但住自分。名為自性。二智大。亦名覺大。大者。增長之義。謂冥初之際。覺知增長。故云從冥初生智大。三我心。亦名我執我慢。謂由覺知。生我慢心。故云從智大生我心。四五唯。亦名五微。即色聲香味觸也。以色等五種。由我執之心方現。故云從我心生五唯。五五大。即地水火風空也。此五種性。徧一切處。故名為大。由極微而生。故云從五唯生五大。六五知根。五即眼耳鼻舌身五根。謂之知者。以此五種皆有知覺故也。因五大而成。故云從五大生五知根。七五作業根。即口與手足小便大便。謂之作業者。以此五種能作業用故也。亦因五大而成。故云從五大生五作業根。八心平等根。心乃肉團心。即意根也。謂之平等者。以此根能徧一切根境而生分別故。此亦五大所成。故云從五大生平等根。并前五知。五作業。共為十一根也。九神我。即第八識。彼不知有第八識。故執神我能生諸法常住不壞。是二十五諦之主也。我思勝境。冥性即變。二十三諦。為我受用。我既受用。為境纏縛。不得解脫。我若不思。冥性不變。即得解脫。名為涅槃。問。自性云何能與諸法為生因。答。三德合故。其三德在冥性中。眠伏不起。在大等二十三位。便有覺悟。故二十三。一一皆以三德合成。言三德者。梵云薩埵。剌闍。答摩。薩埵。此云有情。亦云勇猛。今取勇義。剌闍。此為微。牛毛塵等皆名剌闍。亦名塵坌。今取塵義。答摩。此云闇。即闇鈍之闇。三德應名勇塵闇。若傍義翻。舊云染麤黑。新云黃赤黑。舊名喜憂闇。新云貪嗔癡。舊名樂苦癡。新云樂苦捨。敵體而言。即是二毒。能生三受。名樂苦捨。黃赤黑者。是其色德。貪多輕光。故色黃。嗔多動躁。故色赤。癡則重覆。故名黑。由此自性合三德故。能生諸法。故自性是作者。我是見者。而非作者。

> Among the non-Buddhist schools, the Sāṃkhya school is divided into four sections: first, stating their position; second, general refutation; third, specific refutation; fourth, conclusion. Now to the first. In Sanskrit, "Sāṃkhya" is rendered in Chinese as "number." "Number" refers to discriminative wisdom. This system enumerates all phenomena and establishes its fundamental principles based on this enumeration. Starting from enumeration, they established a doctrine, hence called the Sāṃkhya school. Since the doctrine gives rise to counting, it is also called the Enumeration Doctrine. Those who created this system and those who study it are all called Sāṃkhya masters. The original founder was Kapila. "Kapila" means "reddish-yellow" because his hair, beard, and complexion were all reddish-yellow. People of that time called him the "Reddish-Yellow Immortal." He also practiced meditation and possessed spiritual powers, knowing events within eighty thousand kalpas. However, what happened before eighty thousand kalpas was utterly dark and unknowable to him, so he called it the "Unmanifest Principle." From the primordial nature (prakṛti) at the beginning of the unmanifest, the Great Intellect (mahat) was produced, and eventually the Person (puruṣa), leading to twenty-five principles organized into nine categories. 1. \*\*Primordial Nature (Prakṛti)\*\* : This school considers the unknown realm before eighty thousand kalpas as the fundamental nature, calling it the dark nature, also known as the Supreme Nature. Before giving rise to the Great Intellect, it remains in its own state, hence called "Self-Nature." 2. \*\*Great Intellect (Mahat)\*\* : Also called Great Awareness. "Great" means "increasing." At the beginning of the unmanifest, awareness and knowledge increase, so it is said that from the Primordial Nature arises the Great Intellect. 3. \*\*Ego (Ahaṃkāra)\*\* : Also called self-clinging or self-conceit. From awareness arises the mind of self-importance, so it is said that from the Great Intellect arises the Ego. 4. \*\*Five Subtle Elements (Tanmātras)\*\* : Also called the Five Subtles: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch. These five arise because of the self-clinging mind, so from the Ego arise the Five Subtle Elements. 5. \*\*Five Gross Elements (Mahābhūtas)\*\* : Earth, water, fire, air, and space. These five elements pervade everywhere, hence called "great." They are produced from the extremely subtle, so from the Five Subtle Elements arise the Five Gross Elements. 6. \*\*Five Cognitive Organs (Buddhīndriyas)\*\* : The five faculties: eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and body. They are called "cognitive" because these five possess the ability to perceive. They are formed from the Five Gross Elements, so from the Five Gross Elements arise the Five Cognitive Organs. 7. \*\*Five Organs of Action (Karmendriyas)\*\* : The mouth, hands, feet, anus, and genitals. They are called "organs of action" because these five can perform actions. They too are formed from the Five Gross Elements, so from the Five Gross Elements arise the Five Organs of Action. 8. \*\*Mind (Manas)\*\* : The mind is a fleshy organ, that is, the faculty of thinking. It is called "equalizing" because this faculty can discriminate by pervading all organs and objects. It too is formed from the Five Gross Elements, so from the Five Gross Elements arises the Equalizing Mind. Together with the previous five cognitive and five action organs, there are eleven organs in total. 9. \*\*Person (Puruṣa)\*\* : This refers to the eighth consciousness. Not knowing of the eighth consciousness, they cling to a Self (Person) that can give rise to all phenomena and is eternal and indestructible—the lord of the twenty-five principles. When the Person contemplates the excellent objects, the Primordial Nature transforms into the twenty-three principles for the Person's enjoyment. Once the Person experiences enjoyment, it becomes entangled by objects and cannot attain liberation. If the Person does not contemplate, the Primordial Nature does not transform, and liberation is attained, which is called nirvāṇa. \*\*Question\*\*: How can the Primordial Nature be the cause of generating all phenomena? \*\*Answer\*\*: Because of the combination of the three qualities (guṇas). These three qualities lie dormant and inactive within the Primordial Nature. In the twenty-three principles such as the Great Intellect, they become awakened. Therefore, each of the twenty-three is composed of the three qualities in combination. What are the three qualities? In Sanskrit, they are sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva means "sentient" or "courageous"; here we adopt the sense of "courage." Rajas means "fine" as in dust, like the fine particles of cow hair or dirt; here we adopt the sense of "dust." Tamas means "darkness," i.e., the darkness of dullness and stupidity. The three qualities should be called "courage, dust, and darkness." In extended translations, they were formerly called "stain, roughness, black," and now "yellow, red, black." Formerly known as "joy, sorrow, darkness," now as "greed, anger, ignorance." Formerly "pleasure, pain, stupidity," now "pleasure, pain, indifference." In essence, they are three afflictions that give rise to three feelings: pleasure, pain, and indifference. As for the colors: yellow, red, and black are their color qualities. Greed is light and luminous, so its color is yellow. Anger is agitated and restless, so its color is red. Ignorance is heavy and obscuring, so its color is black. Because the Primordial Nature combines these three qualities, it can give rise to all phenomena. Thus, the Primordial Nature is the agent, while the Person is the witness and not the agent.

彼執非理所以者何至如何可說現量得耶。

> That view is unreasonable. Why? <note>Because</note> how can one say it is perceived through direct cognition?

二總破。言若使大等一一皆攬三成。即如軍如林。是假非實。如何可說現量得耶。二千五百人為軍。多樹為林。若分析至盡。即失軍林。故云是假。量云。大等是有法。應假非實非現量所得是宗。因云。多法成故。喻如軍林等。

> Second refutation: If we claim that each of these large entities—such as the "great elements"—is actually composed of smaller parts combined together—like an army or a forest—then they are merely conceptual constructs, not ultimately real. How can we say that direct perception obtains them? An army is formed by two thousand five hundred individuals; a forest is a collection of many trees. If you break them down completely, the "army" or "forest" disappears. Therefore, they are said to be "constructs" (false). The logical argument is: The great elements and so forth (the subject of debate) must be constructs, not ultimately real, and not something obtained through direct perception. This is our thesis (宗). The reason is: They are formed by the combination of many individual parts. This is illustrated by examples like an army or a forest.

又大等法若是實有至轉變非常為例亦爾。

> Furthermore, if large dharmas were truly real entities,<note>up to</note> the principle of transformation into impermanence would serve as another example.

三別破。分八。一因果相如破。本事。即自性三事。彼計大等二十三法皆是實有。又計自性三分合成。所謂薩埵。剌闍。答摩。剌闍性躁。警薩埵等。令起種種轉變功能。三法和同。隨於一分變成大等。轉名最勝。大等諸果。變故無常。一物自性。不變故常。故此破云。若大等法是實有者。則亦三事等耳。豈賴三事合成乎。量云。大等諸法。非三合成。是實有故。喻如本事。又薩埵等三。亦三合成。即大等故。喻如大等。本事既能轉變為大等。大等亦應能轉變為本事。何以故。是實有故。猶如本事。大等既是無常。本事亦應無常。何以故。即大等故。如大等法。廣百論云。大等皆用自性為體。大等變時。自性應變。由此自性應是無常。體無異故。猶如大等。又云。如是所執自性最勝。一分有用。變成大等。餘分無能無所轉變。是即自體應成種種。成種種故。定是非常。如大等果。相非常住。

> \*\*Third Refutation: Breaking Down the Three Components. Divided into eight parts. First: Refuting the Identity of Cause and Effect.\*\* \*\*Root Text:\*\* The fundamental nature consists of the three primary qualities. They believe that the twenty-three evolutes (such as the Great Principle, etc.) are all real. They also claim that the fundamental nature is composed of three components: Sattva (purity), Rajas (activity), and Tamas (inertia). Rajas, being agitated, stirs Sattva and the others, causing them to produce various transformations. When these three forces work together, one of them transforms into the Great Principle and the other evolutes. This transformed state is then called "the Excellent One." The evolutes like the Great Principle change, so they are impermanent. The single substance of the fundamental nature does not change, so it is eternal. Therefore, this refutation states: If the Great Principle and the other evolutes were truly real, then they too would be just the product of the three qualities. How could they be independently real without being synthesized by the three qualities? \*\*Logical argument:\*\* The various evolutes (Great Principle, etc.) are not formed by the synthesis of the three qualities, because they are claimed to be real entities. For example, the fundamental nature itself. Furthermore, the three qualities (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas) are themselves synthesized by the three qualities, because they are of the same nature as the evolutes (Great Principle, etc.). For example, the evolutes themselves. If the fundamental nature can transform into the Great Principle and the other evolutes, then the Great Principle and the other evolutes should also be able to transform back into the fundamental nature. Why? Because they are equally real entities, just like the fundamental nature. If the Great Principle and the other evolutes are impermanent, then the fundamental nature must also be impermanent. Why? Because it is of the same nature as the evolutes. For example, the evolutes themselves. The \*Extensive Hundred Treatise\* says: "The Great Principle and the others all have the fundamental nature as their essence. When the Great Principle changes, the fundamental nature should also change. Therefore, the fundamental nature should be impermanent, because its essence is not different from the evolutes, just like the Great Principle itself." It also says: "Thus, the fundamental nature they call 'the Excellent One' has one part that is functional and transforms into the Great Principle and the others, while the other part is inactive and does not transform. This means that the fundamental nature itself should become multiple. Since it becomes multiple, it must be impermanent, like the fruits of the Great Principle, whose nature is not permanent."

又三本事各多功能至餘亦應爾體無別故。

> Furthermore, each of the three fundamental natures \[the imagined, the dependent, and the perfected\] has multiple functions. <note>This extends to</note> the others as well, because their essence is not different.

三約體用相同破。彼計第一薩埵其性明白。第二剌闍其性躁動。第三答摩其性闇昧。此三一一相用眾多。能起種種轉變功能。故破之云。功能既多。則此三事體亦應多。何以故。功能與體。無差別故。體即自性也。廣百論云。又三自性。一一皆有明躁昧等眾多作用。自性作用。既許體同。以性隨用。應成多體。自性最勝。無差別故。是則最勝體亦應多。體既成多。應如大等。定是無常。又汝若謂三德之體。不分而徧。不成多者。一處起用轉變之時。餘一切處俱應轉變。何以故。能徧之體。無差別故。

> \*\*Breaking Down the Three Basic Qualities Based on Their Intrinsic Nature and Function\*\* If you claim that Ultimate Nature (Sāttvika) has a clear quality, Passion (Rajas) has an agitating quality, and Ignorance (Tamas) has an obscured quality—each one possessing many different aspects and functions that produce various transformations—then we can critique this. Since each quality has so many functions, their essential nature should also be multiple. Why? Because function and essence are identical; essence is intrinsic nature. As the \*Extensive Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas\* states: "Furthermore, each of these three natures has many active functions like clarity, agitation, and obscurity. Since both the essence and functions are admitted to be the same, and the essence follows the functions, the essence must also be many. The Ultimate Nature itself, being said to be supreme with no differences, would then also become multiple. If the essence is multiple, it must be like the Great Principle (Mahat)—definitely impermanent." Moreover, if you claim that the essence of the three qualities is undivided and all-pervading (and thus not multiple), then when a transformation occurs in one place, all other places would have to transform simultaneously. Why? Because a pervading essence has no distinction or difference.

許此三事體相分別至故不應言三合成一。

> Because the essential natures and characteristics of these three things are distinct from one another, it cannot be said that they merge into one.

四約體相異同破。汝既許此明躁昧等體相各別。如何和合共成一相。合時之體。與未合時。無差別故。不應未合時各別。而合時乃變為一相也。若謂三事其體雖異而相是同。故和合時成一相者。便有自教相違之過。汝執體相定是一故。體應如相同。相應如體異。如何可言三合成一耶。

> \*\*\[Fourfold Analysis of Whether Essence and Attributes Are the Same or Different\]\*\* Since you agree that brightness, stirring, darkness, and stillness each have distinct essences and attributes, how could they merge into a single form? The essence before merging and after merging cannot be different—thus, it is unreasonable to say that they are separate before merging yet transform into a single form upon merging. If you argue that the three elements, though different in essence, share the same attributes, and therefore become one form when combined, this contradicts your own teaching. Because you insist that essence and attributes are inherently unified, then essence should be like attributes, and attributes should be like essence. How can you claim that three elements merge into a single form?

又三是別大等是總至總亦應三如何見一。

> Third, the individual aspects are the specific, while their unity is the universal. The universal should also be understood as threefold. How can we see it as one?

五約總別相同破。三事是別相。大等是總相。以三事共生一法故。汝執總別既定是一。總應如別。是三非一。別應如總。是一非三。云何別三成於總一。若謂三德實不和合成一相者。三事轉變時既不和合。與未變時應無差別。不應現見是一色等。若謂三事和合而成一相。則三事別相即應亡失。而體亦應隨相而失。何以故。離相無體故。體相既失。又將何事而成一相。亦不可說三事各有總別二相。故雖成總相。亦不失別相。以大等總相。即是三事之別相故。若謂總相即別相者。則大等總相上。各各應有三事別相。如何但見大等一色總相。不見三德別相耶。廣百論云。不可說言樂等三德各有二相。一總。二別。所以者何。總相若一。不應即三。總相若三。不應見一。

> \*\*Refutation of the Sameness and Difference of the Universal and Particular\*\* The five elements are the universal aspect, while the three qualities are the particular aspects. The universal includes the particular, and the three qualities together give rise to one phenomenon. If you insist that the universal and the particular are definitely one and the same, then the universal should be like the particular — consisting of three, not one. Conversely, the particular should be like the universal — one, not three. How can three distinct particulars come together to form a single universal? If you claim that the three qualities, not actually harmonizing, produce a single appearance, then when the three qualities undergo change, since they don't harmonize, they should be no different from before the change. Therefore, it should not be possible to observe a single color or other property in the present moment. If you claim that the three qualities harmonize to produce a single appearance, then the particular characteristics of the three qualities should disappear, and their substance should also vanish along with their characteristics. Why is this? Because apart from characteristics, there is no substance. Since both substance and characteristics are lost, what is left to form a single appearance? Furthermore, it cannot be said that each of the three qualities possesses both a universal and a particular characteristic. For even if they form a universal, they would still retain their particular characteristics. This is because the universal characteristics of the five elements are precisely the particular characteristics of the three qualities. If you claim that the universal is identical to the particular, then the universal characteristics of the five elements should each contain the particular characteristics of the three qualities. But how is it that we only observe a single color as the universal characteristic of the five elements, and not the particular characteristics of the three qualities? As the \*Guang Bai Lun\* says: " It cannot be said that the three qualities, such as pleasure, each have two characteristics — one universal and one particular. Why? Because if the universal characteristic is single, it cannot be three. If the universal characteristic is three, it cannot be observed as one."

若謂三體各有三相至體亦應各三以體即相故。

> If each of the three bodies is said to have three characteristics, even the bodies themselves should be threefold, because the body and its characteristics are one.

六三相和合破。若謂三事一一皆有薩埵等二相共相和雜。難可了知。故見一者。此亦不然。各有三相。還應見三。如何見一。既見為一。則成一相。又如何知三事之有三相差別乎。若三事一一皆具三相。即應一一事能成色等根境差別。為我受用。何所闕少。必待三事和合而成耶。若謂必待三相和合而成。應一一事皆有三體。何以故。體即相故。廣百論云。又此三德。各有三相。互有差別。如何色等其相是一。三體各有三相者。謂貪中有瞋癡。瞋中有貪癡。癡中有貪瞋。三法和雜。故各見一。此遮三一不齊之難也。

> If the three qualities (triguṇa) each possess all three characteristics, then they must be mixed together. One might argue that because these two characteristics (such as sentience, etc.) intermingle within each quality, they are difficult to distinguish, and therefore we perceive them as one. However, this is not the case. Since each quality has three characteristics, we should still see three, not one. If we see them as one, then they become a single characteristic. How, then, can we know that three qualities have three distinct characteristics? If each quality itself possesses all three characteristics, then each quality alone should be capable of producing the distinct sense faculties and objects (such as form, etc.) for the self to experience. What would be lacking? Why must it depend on the combination of the three qualities to produce these? If it is said that the combination of the three characteristics is necessary, then each quality should have three distinct essences. Why? Because the essence is identical to its characteristics. As the \*Broad Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas\* says: "These three virtues each have three characteristics. They differ from each other. How can their characteristics—such as form—be singular? If each of the three essences has three characteristics, this means: within desire (rajas) there is also aversion (tamas) and ignorance (sattva); within aversion there is desire and ignorance; within ignorance there is desire and aversion. Because these three dharmas are intermingled, each is perceived as one." This refutes the inconsistency where three and one are not aligned.

又大等法皆三合成至皆應無異便為大失。

> Furthermore, all great teachings are formed by the combination of three factors.<note>zhi</note> If they all were no different, it would be a great mistake.

七果無差別破。因即能成之三事。果即所成大等二十三法。唯量即五唯量。諸大即五大。諸根即十一根。意謂能成三事既同。則所成大等悉一。是則一切差別之相。皆不得成。既無差別。則一根應得一切境。如眼根亦能聞聲齅香知味等。或應一境一切根所得。如一色唯。眼亦可見。耳亦可聞等。如是。則世間現見情與非情。淨穢等物。現比等覺。皆應無異。便成大失。豈特自教相違世間相違而已哉。唐三藏嘗折外道云。此大等俱各以三成。即一是一切。若一即一切。則應一一皆有一切作用。既不許然。何因執三為一切體性。又若一即一切。應口眼等根即大小便路。又一一根有一切作用。應口耳等根聞香見色。若不爾者。何得執三為一切法體。以此破詞。參看論義。更自了然。

> The Seven Effects Are Not Different \[from One Another\], This Refutes \[the Sāṃkhya View\]. The causes are the three qualities (sattva, rajas, tamas). The effects are the twenty-three principles they produce: the five subtle elements (tanmātras), the five gross elements (mahābhūtas), the eleven sense organs (indriyas), and the mind (manas). If the three qualities that form the causes are the same, then the effects—the gross elements and so on—must also be uniform. If so, all distinctions—such as the differences between various effects—cannot exist. Since there is no difference: • One sense organ should be able to perceive all objects. For example, the eye could also hear sounds, smell scents, taste flavors, and so on. • Or, one object should be perceivable by all sense organs. For example, a single visible form could be seen by the eye, heard by the ear, etc. If that were the case, then in the world as we directly perceive it: • Sentient beings and insentient things, • Purity and impurity, • Direct perception and inference— All these would be indistinguishable. This would be a huge mistake. It would not only contradict the Sāṃkhya school’s own teachings, but also contradict observable reality. The Tang Dharma Master \[Xuanzang\] once refuted the non-Buddhist \[Sāṃkhya\] view like this: “If the gross elements and so on are each composed of the three qualities, then one thing is everything. If one thing is everything, then each single thing should have the functions of all things. Since you do not accept that, on what basis do you insist that the three qualities are the essence of all things? “Furthermore, if one thing is everything, then the mouth and eye sense organs should be the same as the excretory organs. “And if each sense organ has all functions, then the mouth and ear should be able to smell and see colors. “If you do not accept that, how can you insist that the three qualities are the substance of all dharmas?” If you read this refutation alongside the doctrinal discussion, the point will become perfectly clear.

故彼所執實法不成但是妄情計度為有。

> Therefore, the ultimate reality they hold onto is false. It exists only as a product of deluded thinking and conceptual fabrication.

八結成前義。

> After eight gatherings, the meaning was established.

勝論所執實等句義多實有性現量所得。

> The doctrines upheld by the Vaiśeṣika school—such as categories like substance and quality—are mostly based on a theory of substantial existence that is perceived through direct sensory experience.

二勝論分四。一舉執。二總破。三別破。四結成。今初。此即衛世師計。新云吠世史迦薩多羅。此云勝論。立六句義。最為勝故。或勝人所造故。其能造人。即成劫之末。人壽無量。外道出世。名嗢露迦。此云鵂鶹。晝避聲色匿迹山藪。夜絕視聽。方行乞食。時人以為似鵂鶹鳥。故名鵂鶹仙人。即百論優樓佉也。或名羯挐僕。羯挐。此云米齋。僕。此云食。先為夜遊驚他稚婦。乃不夜乞。遂收場碾糠粃之中米齋而食。故時號為食米齋仙人。多年修道。遂獲五通。謂證菩提。便欣入滅。但嗟所悟未有傳人。愍世有情癡無慧目。乃觀七德。授法令傳。一生中國。二父母俱是婆羅門姓。三有般涅槃性。四身相具足。五聰明辯捷。六性行柔和。七有大悲心。經無量時。無具七德。後經多劫。婆羅痆斯國。有婆羅門。名摩納縛迦。此云儒童。有子名般遮尸棄。此云五頂。頂髮五旋。頭有五角。其人七德雖具。根熟稍遲。既染妻孥。卒難化導。經無量歲。伺其根熟。後三千歲。因入園遊。　其妻室競華相忿。鵂鶹因此乘神通化之。五頂不從。仙人且返。又三千歲。化又不得。更三千歲。兩競尤甚。相厭既切。仰念空仙。仙人應時神力化引。騰空迎往所住山中。與說所悟六句義法。一實。二德。三業。四大有。五同異。六和合。實者。說法體實。德業所依。名之為實。德業不依有性等故。德者道德。業者作用。動作義也。實有九種。一地。二水。三火四風。五空。六時。七方。八我。九意。德有二十四。一色。二香。三味。四觸。五數。六量。七別性。八合。九離。十彼性。十一此性。十二覺。十三樂。十四苦。十五欲。十六瞋。十七勤勇。十八重性。十九液性。二十潤。二十一行。二十二法。二十三非法。二十四聲。業有五種。一取。二捨。三屈。四申。五行。大有唯一。實德業三。同一有故。離實德業外。別有一法為體。由此大有。有實等故。同異亦一也。如地望地。有其同義。望於水等。即有異義。地之同異是地非水。水等亦然。亦離實等有別實體。和合句者。謂法和聚。由和合句。如鳥飛空。忽至樹枝。住而不去。由和合句故。令有住等。此六。是我所受具。未解脫已來。受用前六。若得解脫。與六相離。稱為涅槃。

> THE DOCTRINE OF THE VAISHESHIKA (VIŚEṢA) IS DISCUSSED IN FOUR PARTS: 1. \*\*Stating Their View\*\* 2. \*\*General Refutation\*\* 3. \*\*Specific Refutation\*\* 4. \*\*Conclusion\*\* \*\*1. Stating Their View\*\* This school is attributed to the sage Kanada, known in new translations as "Vaisheshika Sastra," or "The Treatise of Distinctions." It is called "Superior" because it establishes six categories (\*padārthas\*) as supreme, or because it was created by a superior being. The founder of this system lived at the end of the previous cosmic age (kalpa), when human lifespans were immeasurable. A non-Buddhist sage appeared, named \*Ulūka\* (the Owl), because he avoided seeing or hearing worldly distractions in the daytime, hiding in forests, and only came out at night to beg for food blind and deaf to the world. People called him the "Owl Sage" (the same figure as the \*Ulūka\* of the \*Hundred Treatise\*). Alternatively, he was known as \*Kadru-pah\* ("Millet-eater," 羯拏僕): Kadru meaning a meal of rice husks, and pah meaning to eat. This name came from his having frightened a young wife while begging at night in the past. He then changed his practice, picking out a small portion of rice from the chaff and winnowings at the threshing floor and eating only that. So people called him the "Millet-eating Sage." After many years of practice, he attained the five supernormal powers (\*pañcābhijñā\*). Thinking he had achieved enlightenment, he longed to enter nirvana. But he felt sorrow that his realization had no one to pass it on to. Compassionate for sentient beings, who are blind with ignorance, he looked for someone with seven special qualities to whom he could transmit his teaching: 1. Born in the central region (of Jambudvipa). 2. Both parents were of the Brahmin caste. 3. Possessing the nature of nirvana (final liberation). 4. Perfect physical characteristics. 5. Intellectually sharp and eloquent. 6. Gentle and harmonious character. 7. Having great compassion. For a long time, no one with all seven qualities appeared. After many eons, in the city of Vārāṇasī (Benares), a Brahmin named \*Mānavaka\* (the Young Scholar) had a son named \*Pañcaśikha\* (the Five-ridges), because the hair on his head was arranged in five spirals shaped like five peaks. This person had all seven qualities but his spiritual maturity was slow. Tied down by a wife and children, he was difficult to guide. The Owl-sage waited for countless years for his mind to ripen. After three thousand years, \*Pañcaśikha\* went to a garden. His wives there fought over flowers and became angry at each other. The Owl-sage, seeing this, used his supernormal powers to convert \*Pañcaśikha\*, but \*Pañcaśikha\* did not follow him, so the sage returned. After another three thousand years, the sage tried again but failed to convert him. Another three thousand years passed, and the quarrel between \*Pañcaśikha\*'s two wives grew worse. They grew so disgusted with each other that they looked up to the sky, thinking of the sage. The sage, using his spiritual powers, then took \*Pañcaśikha\* flying through the sky to the mountain where he dwelled. There, he taught him the six categories (\*padārthas\*) of his doctrine: 1. \*\*Substance\*\* (Dravya) 2. \*\*Quality\*\* (Guṇa) 3. \*\*Action\*\* (Karma) 4. \*\*Universality\*\* (Sāmānya) 5. \*\*Particularity / Distinctness\*\* (Viśeṣa) 6. \*\*Inherence\*\* (Samavāya) \*\*Substance\*\* (Dravya) refers to the fundamental realities that are the basis for qualities and actions. Secondary things (non-substances) like Universality, etc., do not serve as their foundation. There are nine substances: Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Space (Ether), Time, Direction, Self (Soul), and Mind. \*\*Quality\*\* (Guṇa) has twenty-four types: Color, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Magnitude/Size, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority (nearness), Posteriority (remoteness), Cognition/Intelligence, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort/Exertion, Gravity, Fluidity, Moisture, Tendency/Action (like \*Dharma\* and \*Adharma\*? actually 21, 22, 23 are \*Dharma\* / Virtue, \*Adharma\* / Demerit, and \*Sanskara\* / Subconscious Potencies?), Sound. \*\*Action\*\* (Karma) has five types: Upward/Throwing (Utkṣepaṇa), Downward/Throwing (Avakṣepaṇa), Contraction (Ākuñcana), Expansion (Prasāraṇa), Going/Motion (Gamana). \*\*Universality\*\* (Sāmānya) is one. It is the common essence (Beingness, "Concreteness") that makes substances, qualities, and actions all capable of being said to "exist." It is a separate principle that, by itself, confers existence on these three categories. \*\*Particularity\*\* (Viśeṣa) is also one. For example, earth is similar to other earth, but different from water. This "likeness" among earth and "distinctness" between earth and water are caused by this principle of \*Viśeṣa\* (which ground the distinctions between ultimate, eternal substances). It exists as a real entity separate from Substance, etc. \*\*Inherence\*\* (Samavāya) is the relation of things being inherently "together." It is the cause that makes composites (like a pot from clay). It is like a bird flying through the air and landing on a tree branch, staying there, not leaving. This relation of staying-together is the principle of \*Inherence\*, which acts to hold things combined such that they do not separate. These six categories are what I (the soul) experience, understand, and use. Before achieving liberation, I experience these six. If one attains liberation (Mokṣa), one becomes completely separate from them—this is called \*\*Nirvāṇa\*\*.

彼執非理所以者何至應非離此有實自性。

> That position is unreasonable. Why? <note>To the end,</note> there should not be a truly existing nature separate from this.

二總約常無常破。言汝所執六句義中。若常住者。為能生果。為不生果。若能生果。應是無常。若不生果。應非實有。量云。諸常住者。應是無常。有作用故。如所生果。諸常住者。應非離識實有自性。無作用故。如兔角等。若無常者。為有質礙。為無質礙。若有質礙。應可分析。若無質礙。應非實有。量云。諸無常法。應可分析。有質礙故。如軍林等。諸無常法。應非離識有實自性。無質礙故。如心心所。如上兩宗。各有二量。皆初一量。約所執破。第二一量。約唯識破。

> Second, we generally examine through the lens of "permanent" and "impermanent" to refute. You claim that within the six categories of principles, if something is permanent: does it produce a result, or does it not produce a result? If it can produce a result, it should be impermanent. If it does not produce a result, it should not truly exist. The logical proof is: All permanent things should be impermanent, because they have a function, like a produced result. All permanent things should not have a true nature separate from consciousness, because they lack function, like a rabbit’s horn. If something is impermanent: does it have physical obstruction, or does it lack physical obstruction? If it has physical obstruction, it should be analyzable. If it lacks physical obstruction, it should not truly exist. The logical proof is: All impermanent phenomena should be analyzable, because they have physical obstruction, like an army or a forest. All impermanent phenomena should not have a true nature separate from consciousness, because they lack physical obstruction, like the mind and mental factors. As with the two views above, each has two logical proofs. The first proof in each refutes based on attachment to a \[false\] view. The second proof refutes based on the principle of "consciousness-only."

又彼所執地水火風至許色根取故如地水火風。

> What they hold as 'earth, water, fire, and wind' is accepted because the material sense faculties perceive them, just as we perceive earth, water, fire, and wind.

三別破分四。一破實等三句。二破第四大有句。三破第五同異句。四破第六和合句。今初。彼計瓶衣諸物。因實德業同異合故。為眼所見。反身所觸。故是根境。現量所知。故此立量破云。地水火風是有法。應非有礙是宗。因云。實句義攝。身根所觸故。喻如堅濕暖動。即彼所執堅濕暖等是有法。應非無礙是宗。因云。德句義攝。身根所觸故。喻如地水火風。又地水火應非有礙。實句義攝。眼所見故。如青色等。青色等應非無礙。德句義攝。眼所見故。如地水火。故曰准此應責。觸言四大。而色止三大者。風但有觸。非眼所見故也。此身根所觸。及眼所見。因既向有礙地等實句上轉。又向無礙堅等德句上轉。同異俱有。犯不定過。身觸眼見因既犯過。則謂是根境現量所知者。不攻而自破。此論主量意也。地等且非根境。況瓶衣假物乎。實句地水火三。皆有質礙。餘六及德等二十四。皆無質礙。實句義中有礙常者。即是地水火三。諸句即餘六及德等諸句。色根即眼根。色根所取無質礙法。即青黃長短等實假色上言有礙無礙。止借以出因寬不定過。此但破歸有礙。有礙則可分析。常義不成。則所謂實有性。現量所得。其謬顯然矣。應是無常。應皆有礙。皆宗。皆有礙故。許色根取故。皆因。如麤地等。如地水火風。皆喻。

> Section Three: A Specific Critique in Four Parts Now we will break down the critique into four sections. The first refutes the three statements about “real” and the like. The second refutes the fourth category, “substance.” The third refutes the fifth category, “similarity and difference.” The fourth refutes the sixth category, “combination.” Let us begin with the first. Their position is that objects like pots and clothes are perceived by the eyes and touched by the body because they combine real substances, qualities, actions, similarity, and difference. Therefore, they are sense objects known through direct perception. To refute this, we present a logical argument: Earth, water, fire, and wind are the subject of the argument. They should not be considered as having physical obstruction. The reason is that they belong to the category of “substance” and are objects of bodily touch. The analogy is like the qualities of solidity, moisture, and warmth (which they claim are real). Furthermore, solidity, moisture, and warmth are the subject of the argument. They should not be considered as having no physical obstruction. The reason is that they belong to the category of “quality” and are objects of bodily touch. The analogy is like earth, water, fire, and wind. And again: Earth, water, and fire should not have physical obstruction. They belong to the category of “substance” and are seen by the eyes. The analogy is like the color blue. The color blue and such should not be without physical obstruction. They belong to the category of “quality” and are seen by the eyes. The analogy is like earth, water, and fire. Hence it is said: This argument should be applied accordingly. The reasoning only touches on the “four great elements,” but the example of “color” only covers three of them, because wind can only be touched and is not visible to the eyes. Now, the reason “objects of bodily touch” and “visible to the eyes” applies both to earth and other “substances” (which have obstruction) and to solidity and other “qualities” (which have no obstruction). Since the reason is common to both categories, it commits the fallacy of an “unsettled” reason. If the reasons of being “touched by the body” and “seen by the eyes” are flawed, then claiming they are sense objects known through direct perception collapses without further effort. This is the intention of the author (the logician). If earth and the like are not even sense objects, then how much less so are artificial objects like pots and clothes? Among the “substance” category, earth, water, and fire all have physical obstruction. The remaining six substance categories and the twenty-four qualities have no obstruction. Within the “substance” category, the permanent things with obstruction are just earth, water, and fire. The other categories include the remaining six substances and the qualities. “Sense organ” means the eye. What the eye perceives without obstruction refers to the apparent substances of blue, yellow, long, short, etc. The discussion of obstruction and non-obstruction is used solely to point out the fallacy of a reason being too broad and indeterminate. This refutation aims to show that everything has obstruction. If something has obstruction, it can be analyzed and broken down. Therefore, it cannot be permanent. So the claim that things are “real by nature” and “known through direct perception” is clearly false. Everything should be impermanent. Everything should have obstruction. These are the conclusions. Because everything has obstruction, and because everything is perceived by the sense organs. These are the reasons. The analogy is like coarse earth, etc., and like earth, water, fire, and wind.

又彼所執非實德等至故彼有性唯妄計度。

> Furthermore, what they uphold is not true virtue or other realities. Thus, their concept of "existence" is merely a product of false conceptualization.

二破第四大有句。非實德等。即大有句。彼計大有是離實德業外別有一法為體故。非有實等。即實德業三句。彼計離實等大有是有。則實等是非有故。此中先約唯識破。謂此大有性。既離實德業外。決在識內。以非是實等所攝故。若離實德業之大有性不離識。則離有情之實德業亦不離識。以非是有性所攝故。遂申量云。彼所執非實非德非業之大有性是有法。應非離識有別自性是宗。因云。非是實等所攝故。喻如石女兒。離大有之實德業是有法。亦非離識有別自性是宗。因云。以非有性所攝故。同喻如空華。二喻。一是畢竟無。一是幻有。以有住是徧計。實德業是依他故。次就彼宗自許破。又彼所執大有性。離實德業外無別自性。以彼自許大有性不離實德業故。立量云。大有性是有法。應離實等無別自性宗。因云。許非無故。喻如實德業等。次約有法差別相違破。因明云。有性是有法。非實非德非業宗。因云。有一實故。有德業故。如同異性。應申違量云。汝所執有性是無法。即實即德即業宗。因云。有一實故。有德業故。喻如畢竟無。此中量云。離實德業之大有性。應非有性宗。因云。汝許非實非德非業故。喻如畢竟無。雖小異而意則一也。如有非無下。即次大有例破實德業三非別有性。如大有性自許非無。離實德等無別有性。如何復說實等離大有外有別有性。若離實等有法。有別有性。應離非實等法。有別無性。既離無法無別無性。豈離有法有別有住哉。故曰。彼既不然此云何爾。故彼有性唯妄計度。結成前義。

> \*\*Second Refutation: The Fourth "Existence" Category\*\* \*\*\[Refutation of Existence as a Distinct Category\]\*\* "What is not real, \[not a\] quality, etc., is the category 'Existence.'" The opponent theorizes that "Existence" is a separate entity, distinct from the categories of Substance, Quality, and Action. But what is "non-real," "non-quality," etc., refers to those three categories themselves. The opponent argues that since Existence is separate from them, these categories are "non-existent." We first refute this from the idealist perspective (Vijñānavāda). This "Existence-nature," being beyond Substance, Quality, and Action, must necessarily be within consciousness, since it is not included in those categories. If this Existence-nature, separate from Substance, etc., is not separate from consciousness, then the Substance, Quality, and Action, which are separate from living beings, are also not separate from consciousness, since they are not included in the category "Existence." Thus we propose the logical argument (hetu-vidhi): The 'Existence-nature' which you claim is neither substance, quality, nor action, is \[your\] subject (dharmin). It should not have a separate self-nature, existing apart from consciousness — this is the proposition (pratijñā). Because it is not included in \[the categories of\] substance, quality, or action — this is the reason (hetu). For example, a barren woman's child (a complete non-entity). The Substance, Quality, and Action, which are separate from Existence, are \[also your\] subject. They too should not have a separate self-nature existing apart from consciousness — this is the proposition. Because they are not included in \[the category of\] Existence — this is the reason. For example, a flower in the sky (an illusory entity). These two analogies illustrate: one is an absolute non-entity, the other is an illusion. This is because Existence is a conceptual construct (parikalpita), while Substance, Quality, and Action are dependent-arising (paratantra). \*\*\[Refutation Based on the Opponent's Own System\]\*\* Next, we refute based on what the opponent himself accepts. He asserts that Existence-nature, apart from Substance, Quality, and Action, has no separate self-nature. This is because he himself concedes that Existence-nature is not separate from them. We therefore set forth the argument: Existence-nature is the subject. It should have no separate self-nature apart from \[Substance, etc.\] — the proposition. Because it is accepted that it is not non-existent — the reason. For example, Substance, Quality, and Action themselves. \*\*\[Refutation Regarding the Difference in the Property of the Subject\]\*\* Next, we refute based on the difference in the characteristic quality of the subject (dharma-viśeṣa). Buddhist logic says: 'Existence' is the subject. 'It is not substance, not quality, not action' is the predicate. Because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses \[qualities and actions\], like the category 'Similarity' (sāmānya-viśeṣa). But the opposing argument would be: The 'Existence' you posit is a non-entity; it is identical with substance, quality, and action — this is the proposition. Because it possesses one substance, and because it possesses qualities and actions, like a complete non-entity. Here, the argument is: Existence-nature, which is separate from Substance, Quality, and Action, should not be 'Existence' at all — the proposition. Because you yourselves say it is not substance, not quality, not action — the reason. For example, a complete non-entity. Though slightly different, the intention is the same. \*\*\[Application of the Same Logic to Substance, Quality, and Action\]\*\* The text continues: "If something is not non-existent..." This applies the same logic to argue that Substance, Quality, and Action are also not separate, distinct entities. Just as Existence-nature, which you yourself agree is not non-existent, has no separate nature apart from Substance, etc., how can you then claim that Substance, etc., have a separate nature apart from Existence? If, apart from an existent entity (dharma), 'Existence' has a separate nature, then, apart from a non-existent entity, 'Non-existence' should also have a separate nature. Since there is no separate 'Non-existence-nature' apart from a non-entity, how could there be a separate 'Existence-nature' apart from an existent entity? Therefore, the conclusion is: If that \[non-existence\] is not so, how can this \[existence\] be so? Hence, the opponent's concept of 'Existence' is merely a false conceptualization (vikalpa). This confirms our previous conclusion.

又彼所執實德業性至故同異性唯假施設。

> Moreover, the inherent nature they attribute to substance, quality, and action is merely a conceptual construct. Therefore, difference and sameness are only provisional designations.

三破第五同異句。彼計實等諸法相望。有同有異。法體局別。所以多異。有性該通。所以名同。通局既殊。故相有異。由相異故。異外有同。是則非離實德業外有同異性也。故言汝所執實德業之同異性。離實德業有別自體。理定不然。若同異性異實德業而有。則應實德業亦離同異性而有。故立量互破云。若此同異性是有法。非實德業是宗。因云。異實德業故。喻如德業等。則應實德業是有法。非實德業攝是宗。因云。異實等性故。喻如德業實。既同異性非離實德業而有。則實德業亦非離同異性而有。地等下。次准破。次彼計地望地為同。地望水為異等故。若知離實等體無同異性。離同異性無實等體。則知離堅等性無地等體。離地等體無堅等性。立量云。堅等性是有法。非地等體是宗。因云。異地等故。喻如水火等。地等體是有法。非地等攝是宗。因云。異地等性故。喻如水火等。如實下。次例破。言實德業外無同異性。如地等之外無堅等性。則應同異外無實德業性。如堅等之外無別地等。若離實等有同異性。即應離非實等有非同異性。今離非實等無非同異性。則實等之外又安得有同異性哉。廣百論云。若見諸法同異相異。即於法外別立有同。既見諸法同異相殊。應於法外別立有異。同異二相。俱徧諸法。異應如同。離法別有。設許法外有異有同。此復應有餘同異性。如是展轉。同異無窮。則不可知二相差別。二皆徧故。俱無窮故。異應如同。名同非異。同應如異。名異非同。是故法外無別同異。

> \*\*Third Refutation: The Doctrine of Sameness and Difference (Section Five)\*\* Those who hold this view believe that all things—like substances, qualities, and actions—share relationships of sameness and difference. They claim that individual entities are distinct and separate, hence they are different, while the universal nature that applies to them all is pervasive, hence it is the same. Since pervasiveness and limitation differ, the characteristics differ as well. Because of these differing characteristics, there is sameness in addition to difference. This means that sameness and difference do not exist apart from substances, qualities, and actions. Therefore, your claim that there is a distinct self-nature of sameness and difference separate from substances, qualities, and actions is fundamentally incorrect. If sameness and difference existed apart from substances, qualities, and actions, then substances, qualities, and actions should also exist apart from sameness and difference. A logical proof to refute this is: > Premise: Sameness and difference are properties. > Proposition: They are not separate from substances, qualities, and actions. > Reason: Because they differ from substances, qualities, and actions. > Analogy: Like qualities and actions themselves. Conversely, one could also argue: > Premise: Substances, qualities, and actions are properties. > Proposition: They are not separate from sameness and difference. > Reason: Because they differ from sameness and difference. > Analogy: Like qualities and actions themselves. Since sameness and difference do not exist apart from substances, qualities, and actions, then substances, qualities, and actions also do not exist apart from sameness and difference. Next, regarding earth and water: They claim earth is the same as other earth but different from water, and so on. If one understands that apart from substances, qualities, and actions there is no inherent sameness or difference, and apart from sameness and difference there is no inherent substance, quality, or action, then one also understands that apart from hardness and other qualities there is no earth or other elements, and apart from earth and other elements there is no hardness or other qualities. A logical proof is: > Premise: Hardness and other qualities are properties. > Proposition: They are not separate from earth and other elements. > Reason: Because they differ from earth and other elements. > Analogy: Like water and fire. Conversely: > Premise: Earth and other elements are properties. > Proposition: They are not separate from hardness and other qualities. > Reason: Because they differ from hardness and other qualities. > Analogy: Like water and fire. The same logic applies to all cases: There is no sameness or difference apart from substances, qualities, and actions, just as there is no hardness or other quality apart from earth and other elements. Thus, there is no nature of sameness or difference separate from substances, qualities, and actions, just as there is no separate earth or other element apart from hardness. If sameness and difference existed apart from substances, qualities, and actions, then there would also be a nature of "non-sameness" and "non-difference" apart from "non-substances, non-qualities, non-actions." Since there is no such "non-sameness" or "non-difference" apart from "non-substances, non-qualities, non-actions," how could there be any real sameness or difference apart from substances, qualities, and actions? The \*Guang Bai Lun\* states: "If one sees that the characteristics of sameness and difference in all things are distinct, one then postulates a separate essence of sameness beyond things. Since you already see that the characteristics of sameness and difference are distinct, you should also postulate a separate essence of difference beyond things. Both sameness and difference pervade all things, and difference should, like sameness, exist separately beyond things. If you allow that there is both sameness and difference beyond things, then these would themselves require further sameness and difference, leading to an infinite regress. In that case, the two characteristics would be unknowable—both are pervasive and both are infinite. Difference, being like sameness, would be called 'sameness' and not 'difference,' and sameness, being like difference, would be called 'difference' and not 'sameness.' Therefore, there is no separate sameness or difference apart from things."

又彼所執和合句義至由前理故亦非實有。

> Furthermore, the concept of "combination" (samavāya) that they uphold is, by the reasoning already presented, also not ultimately real.

四破第六和合句。又彼所執和合句義。是前陳有法。定非實有為宗。因云。非有實等諸法攝故。喻如畢竟無。緣彼計由和合故。諸法方得合聚。而和合性。體是別有。非諸法所攝。故破云。若非諸法所攝。如畢竟無。以離諸法無和合義故。

> \*\*Refutation of the Combination Category (Sixth)\*\* The "combination" (Samavāya) that you posit is not truly existent. Why? Because it is not included within the category of real entities—just like a pure non-entity (e.g., a sky-flower). You claim that through combination, phenomena come together. Yet you assert that combination itself is a separate, independent substance, not belonging to those phenomena. We refute this: If combination is not comprised of phenomena, it is like a non-entity—because apart from phenomena, there can be no actual "combining" function.

然彼實等非緣離識至亦是隨情妄所施設。

> Yet they are truly equal and do not arise from conditions apart from consciousness. <note>Ultimately</note> this is merely a provisional designation fabricated according to ordinary understanding.

四結成前義。此二比量。初顯所緣實等。非離識體有實自性。非現量境。次顯能緣實等智。是假智詮。非現量智攝。許所知故者。以彼自許現量所知。今去現量。單取所知。明是妄見。成此妄境。故喻如龜毛等也。如德智等者。實智既假。德智亦然。故為同喻。六句俱以能所雙破如前例。為詞不繁出。故云廣說乃至等。

> Now we summarize the previous points. These two inferences first demonstrate that the objects perceived are not real in themselves—they have no inherent nature apart from the consciousness that cognizes them, and thus are not objects of direct perception. Next, they show that the cognizing awareness, even when it seems to accurately grasp reality, is merely a conceptual and linguistic construct, not genuine direct perception. Because it is accepted that what is knowable falls within the scope of direct perception, the matter here sets aside direct perception and focuses solely on "the knowable" in order to clarify that this is deluded seeing, producing a deluded object. This is likened to a "tortoise's hair," which has no reality at all. As for "virtue and wisdom" and similar qualities: if real wisdom is a conceptual construction, then virtue and wisdom are likewise. Thus, they serve as a shared analogy. The six categories are all refuted by showing both the subject and object side, following the same pattern as before. To avoid verbosity, the text summarizes by saying "extensive explanation continues on," and so forth.

有執有一大自在天至亦應頓起因常有故。

> If there is a belief in a supreme self or a Great自在天,<note>注</note> that would also have to be the cause of instant causation, because it would be eternal and always present.

三計自在天是萬物因。即塗灰外道。并諸婆羅門。彼計此天凡有四德。一體實。二徧。三常。四能生諸法。又計有三身。一者法身。體常周徧。量同虗空。能生萬物。二受用身。在色天之上。三變化身。隨形六道教化眾生。瑜伽云。彼由現見於因果中。世間有情不隨意轉。故作此計。所以者何。現見世間有情。於彼因時。欲修淨業。不遂本心。反更為惡。於彼果時。願生善趣。不遂本心。反墮惡趣。意為受樂。不遂所欲。反受諸苦。由見如是。故作是思。世間諸物必應別有作者生者。及變化者。為彼物父。謂自在天。故此破云。彼自在天。若能生者。是有作法。決定非常。諸非常者。決定不徧。諸不徧者。決非真實。如是便成自語相違。體既常徧。能作能生。及能變化。具諸功德。應一切處頓生一切法。以其徧故。應一切時頓生一切法。以其常故。若自在天。更待彼欲。及彼眾緣。方能生者。又有自教相違之過。汝計自在一因生故。若謂自在徧生諸法。即欲與緣。亦從自生。不藉他者。則欲與緣亦應頓起。以彼一因常具足故。俱舍云。謂諸世間。若自在等一因生者。則應一切俱時而起。非次第起。現見諸法次第而生。故知定非一因所起。若執自在隨欲樂故。令此法起。令此法滅。應非自在。亦由樂欲差別生故。或差別欲應一時生。所因自在無差別故。若欲差別。更待餘因。不俱起者。則非一切唯用自在一法為因。或所待因。亦應更待餘因差別。方次第生。則所待因應無邊際。若謂自在欲雖頓生。而諸世間不俱起者。由隨自在欲所生故。理亦不然。彼自在欲。前位與後。無差別故。

> \*\*The Theory of Maheshvara as the Cause of All Things (The Teaching of the Ash-Smeared Ascetics and the Brahmins)\*\* These groups hold that Maheshvara has four qualities: (1) His essence is real, (2) He is all-pervading, (3) He is eternal, and (4) He can generate all phenomena. They also claim he has three bodies: a Dharma-body, whose essence is eternal and all-pervading, limitless like space, and able to create all things; a Reward-body, which dwells above the realm of form; and a Transformation-body, which takes on various forms to teach sentient beings in the six realms. The \*Yogacara-bhumi\* explains: They form this view because they observe that in the cycle of cause and effect, beings in the world cannot act as they wish. How so? We see that when it comes to the cause, beings want to practice pure deeds, but they cannot follow their original intention and instead commit evil. When it comes to the result, they wish to be born in a good realm, but cannot follow their intention and instead fall into a bad realm. They want to experience pleasure, but cannot get what they desire and instead experience suffering. Seeing this, they think: "There must be some other creator, begetter, and transformer of all things, who is their father—that is, Maheshvara." \*\*Refutation\*\*: The argument against this view is as follows. If Maheshvara can create, then he is a \*created thing\* (an effect, a product of action). Anything that is a product of action is definitely \*impermanent\*. Anything impermanent is definitely \*not all-pervading\*. And anything not all-pervading is definitely \*not real\*. Thus, this view is self-contradictory. If his essence is both eternal and all-pervading, then he should be able to create and generate everything, and be endowed with all qualities. Because he is all-pervading, he should instantly create \*all things everywhere at once\*. Because he is eternal, he should instantly create \*all things at all times\*. If Maheshvara depends on some further desire or other conditions to create, then this contradicts his own scripture, which claims that everything comes from a \*single cause\*, Maheshvara. If one claims that Maheshvara pervades and creates all things, meaning that this "desire" and "conditions" are also spontaneously generated by him and do not depend on anything else, then this desire and conditions should also arise \*simultaneously\*, because that single cause (Maheshvara) is always fully equipped. The \*Abhidharmakosa\* says: If the world were produced by a single cause like Maheshvara, then everything would arise \*simultaneously\*, not one after another. Since we see things arise sequentially, we know for sure they are not produced by a single cause. If one argues that Maheshvara creates or destroys things according to his playful desire or pleasure, then he would not be truly "sovereign" or "independent," because he would be subject to the \*differences\* created by his own desires and pleasures. Alternatively, if his desires had no differences, then \*all desires\* would arise simultaneously, because the underlying cause (Maheshvara) is not differentiated. If his desires did have differences, they would require further, separate causes to arise sequentially, proving that not everything comes from Maheshvara alone as a single cause. These further required causes would themselves require \*further\* differentiated causes to arise sequentially, leading to an infinite regress. If one argues that while Maheshvara's desire arises simultaneously, the world does not arise all at once, but follows the \*objects\* of his desire, then this is also illogical. There is no difference between the desire in its earlier and later moments (the desire itself is the same; only its objects differ).

餘執有一大梵時方本際至生一切法皆同此破。

> If someone clings to the idea of a supreme Brahma as the original source from which all phenomena arise, this view is equally refuted by the same reasoning.

四。四至十。有七種外道。

> Four. From four to ten, there are seven kinds of external paths.

○一執大梵者。即圍陀論師計。圍陀。此云明。彼計那羅延天。能生四姓。此計梵天能生萬物。提婆菩薩破外道小乘涅槃論云。從那羅延天齋中。生大蓮華。蓮華之上。有梵天祖翁。謂梵天為萬物之祖。彼梵天作一切命無命物。從梵天口。生婆羅門。兩臂生剎利。兩䏶生毗舍。兩脚生首陀。瑜伽顯揚二論廣破。文繁不引。

> One who holds to the belief in Brahma refers to the Vedic philosopher-scholars. "Veda" means "knowledge." They believe that the deity Narayana can give rise to the four castes. This view holds that Brahma can create all things. Bodhisattva Deva, in his work \*Refutation of Heretical Views and Lesser Vehicle Nirvāṇa\*, explains: from the navel of the deity Narayana springs a great lotus. Upon that lotus is the ancestral Brahma, who is regarded as the ancestor of all things. This Brahma creates all beings and non-living things. From Brahma's mouth come the Brahmins, from his arms come the Kshatriyas, from his thighs come the Vaishyas, and from his feet come the Shudras. The \*Yogācārabhūmi\* and \*Vyākhyāna\* (or \*Sūtrālaṃkāra\*) refute this at length; the extensive text is not repeated here.

○二執時者。即時散外道。執一切物皆從時生。是故時是常是一。是萬物因。是涅槃因。廣百論云。復次或有執時真實常住。以見種等。眾緣和合。有時生果。有時不生。時有作用。或舒或卷。令枝條等。隨其榮顇。此所說因。具有離合。由是決定知實有時。時所待因。都不可見。不見因故。所以無生。以無生故。即知無滅。無生無滅。故復言常。廣破如彼論。

> \*\*Refutation of Time as a Cause\*\* Now, there is the view that holds time as the cause. Some non-Buddhist sects believe that all things arise from time. Therefore, time is considered permanent, singular, the source of all phenomena, and even the cause of liberation. As the \*Extensive Commentary on the Hundred Verses\* says: "Furthermore, some assert that time is a truly existing, permanent entity. They argue that we see crops, for example, only grow when the right conditions—such as soil, water, and season—come together at a specific time; at other times, they don’t grow. Time itself seems to have a function, sometimes expanding and other times contracting, causing branches and leaves to flourish or wither. The evidence they present includes both cases of combination and separation. From these observations, they conclude that time definitely exists as a real entity. They claim that the specific cause upon which time itself depends can never be perceived. Because no cause for time is ever seen, time must be unproduced. Being unproduced, it has no destruction. Without production or destruction, it must be permanent." The text goes on to thoroughly refute this view.

○三執方者。即方論師計。計方生人。人生天地。滅後還入於方。故方是常是一。是萬物因。是涅槃因。故百論云。外曰實有方常相。有日合處。是方相等。

> \*\*The Theory of the Direction (or Space) as a Creator\*\* Some philosophers, known as the "Vāstuvādins" or "Dik-vādins" believe that a Direction or Space (a fundamental principle called "Fang" in Chinese) is the ultimate reality. They propose that this Direction or Space creates human beings, and humans in turn create the universe. After death, beings dissolve back into this Direction. Therefore, they consider the Direction to be \*\*eternal\*\* and \*\*one\*\*. It is the cause of all phenomena and also the cause of liberation (Nirvana). According to the \*Hundred Treatise (Śata-śāstra)\*, this is summarized by an outsider's argument: "There truly exists a permanent, unchanging 'Direction.' It has the quality of a meeting-place where the sun and other things converge. That is the very nature of the Direction."

○四執本際者。即安茶論師。言本際者。即過去之初首。謂計世間最初唯有大水。時有大安茶出生。形如雞卵金色。後為兩段。上為天。下為地。中生一梵天。能作一切有命無命物。是故梵天是萬物因。亦似此方有計天地之初。形如雞子。渾沌未分。即從此生天地萬物。世俗亦有盤古初分天地之說。

> Fourth: Those who cling to the concept of "original source" are the thinkers of the Anda (Cosmic Egg) school. By "original source," they mean the very first beginning of the past. They claim that in the earliest times of the world, there was only a vast expanse of water. From it emerged a great "Anda" (cosmic egg), golden in color and shaped like a hen's egg. This egg later split into two parts: the upper part became the sky, and the lower part became the earth. From within the egg was born a creator god, Brahma, who could make all living and non-living things. Therefore, Brahma is seen as the cause of all existence. This is similar to certain traditions in China, which hold that in the beginning of the world, the cosmos was like a hen's egg, a chaotic, undivided mass. From this egg, the heavens, earth, and all things were born. There is also the folk legend of Pangu, who first separated the heavens and the earth.

○五執自然者。即無因論師計。一切萬物。無因無緣。自然生。自然滅。故此自然。是常。是萬物因。是涅槃因。此計一切無染淨因。如棘刺自纖。烏色非染。鶴色自白。瑜伽第七云。何因緣故。彼諸外道起如是見。立如是論。答謂見世間無有因緣。或時欻爾大風卒起。於一時間寂然止息。或時忽爾暴沙瀰漫。於一時間頓即空竭。或時󳬂爾果木敷榮。於一時間颯然衰顇。由如是故。起無因見。立無因論。破如彼論。此方老莊家言道法自然。亦大類此。

> \*\*On the View of Spontaneity (Self-Nature)\*\* Certain teachers who deny causality claim that all things in the universe arise and cease naturally, without any cause or condition. These teachers therefore believe that this natural spontaneity is eternal, is the cause of all things, and is even the cause of liberation (Nirvana). They assert that nothing has a cause for purity or impurity. For example, they say that a thorn is sharp by nature, not made so; a crow's color is black without being dyed; and a crane's feathers are white without any coloring. The \*Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra\* (Chapter Seven) explains: Why do these non-Buddhist teachers hold such a view and propose such a theory? Answer: They observe that in the world, things sometimes lack an apparent cause. For instance, a strong wind may suddenly arise and then, after a time, just as suddenly die down. A flash flood may suddenly sweep in and then, after a time, completely recede. Plants and trees may suddenly flourish and then, just as quickly, wither. Based on these observations, they hold a view of causelessness and establish a theory of no-cause. This view is refuted in the same scripture. Furthermore, the ancient Chinese philosophies of Laozi and Zhuangzi also speak of the Way (Dao) as being natural and spontaneous, which is very similar to this view.

○六執虗空者。即口力論師。謂虗空為萬物因。別有一法。是實。是常。是一。是萬物因。從空生風。從風生火。從火生煖煖生水。水生凍。堅作地。地生五穀。五穀生命。命沒還歸空。是故虗空為一切萬物因。是涅槃因。百論亦云。外曰。應有虗空法。亦常亦徧。亦無分。於一切處。一切時。信有等故。廣如彼破。

> \*\*Those who cling to Emptiness as a Cause:\*\* This refers to the schools of the Vaishnavika logicians (like the Lokayata materialists or those who took emptiness as a primary substance). They claim that empty space (the void) is the cause of all things. Specifically, they assert that there exists a separate, real, eternal, and singular substance called "emptiness" that is the cause of all things. According to their logic, from emptiness arises wind, from wind arises fire, from fire arises heat, from heat arises water. Water then freezes into a hard substance, becoming earth. From earth, the five grains grow, and from those grains, life emerges. When life ends, it returns back into emptiness. Therefore, they claim that emptiness is the cause of all things—and even the cause of nirvana. The \*One Hundred Verses Treatise\* also says: "An opposing view: There must be a substance called 'emptiness.' It is eternal, all-pervading, and indivisible. It exists everywhere, at all times, and we believe it exists because there is evidence for it, etc." For a detailed refutation of this view, please refer to the actual treatise.

○七執我等者。等取宿作等。為宿作亦是我故。宿作論師計一切眾生受苦樂報。皆隨往日本業因緣。是故若有持戒精進。受身心苦。能壞本業。本業既盡。眾苦盡滅。眾苦盡滅。即得涅槃。是故宿作為一切因。瑜伽第七云。何因緣故。彼外道作如是見。立如是論。答。彼見世間。雖具正方便。而招於苦。雖具邪方便。而致於樂。彼如是思。若由現法。士夫作用。為彼因者。彼應顛倒。由彼所見非顛倒故。是故彼皆以宿作為因。由此理故。起如是見。立如是論。廣如彼破。涅槃三十五亦廣破此見。

> The list of the "seven selves" also includes the "self of past actions." This is because advocates of the theory of past actions consider past actions to be a form of self. They believe that all beings experience suffering and pleasure as consequences determined by the karmic causes of their previous lives. Therefore, if someone upholds moral precepts with diligence and endures physical and mental hardship, they can exhaust their past karma. Once past karma is exhausted, all suffering ceases, and when all suffering ceases, they attain nirvana. Thus, the theory holds that past actions are the cause of everything. The \*Yogaśāstra\*, Chapter 7, asks: Why do those non-Buddhists hold such a view and establish this doctrine? The answer: They observe that in the world, even when people act appropriately, they still encounter suffering, while those who act improperly may still find happiness. Reflecting on this, they reason: If present human effort were the true cause, then what they observe would be contradictory. Since what they see is consistent, they conclude that past actions must be the ultimate cause. Based on this reasoning, they adopt this view and establish this doctrine. A detailed refutation can be found in that same chapter. Likewise, Chapter 35 of the \*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra\* extensively refutes this view.

○皆同此破。謂同前所立比量。以能所受相徵詰。則知常住之體。能生之用。皆如畢竟無耳。

> All of this is refuted in the same way: The logical arguments established earlier apply equally here. By examining and questioning the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, one sees that both the eternal essence and its generative function are ultimately nothing at all.

有餘偏執明論聲常至如瓶衣等待眾緣故。

> There is a residual attachment that insists sound is eternal,<note>even</note> as things like pots and clothes depend on various conditions.

五。十一十二二宗。皆計聲體是常。一執明論聲是常。不待緣顯。一執一切聲皆是常。待緣方顯。此為異耳。明論者。據廣百論云。古昔黠慧諸婆羅門。隱造明書。言自然有。唯得自誦。不許他觀。又云。諸婆羅門。實無所識。為活命故。於一切時誦諸明論。詐現異相以動人心。又明論中雖無勝義。而有世俗少分禮儀。世間貴勝。為習學故。彼雖無德。亦申敬事。執明論聲常者。當亦是彼婆羅門種。以所詮表是實義故。能詮表聲亦是常住。不知能詮要待所詮然後成立。豈是常耶。有謂一切聲是常者。雖待緣發。方有詮表。而住是常。若無常者。雖眾緣集。亦不發故。不知有常性者決不待緣。既待眾緣。豈是常耶。因立二比量破之。明論聲應非常住宗。因云。許能詮故。如所餘聲。所餘一切聲亦應非常宗。因云。待眾緣故。如瓶衣等。

> 5\. The Two Schools: The Eleventh and Twelfth Both schools maintain that the essence of sound is eternal. One school holds that the sound of the Vedas is eternal and does not depend on conditions to manifest. The other holds that all sounds are eternal but require conditions to become manifest—this is their only difference. Regarding the "Vedic sound" school, according to the \*Broad Treatise on One Hundred Arguments\*: "In ancient times, clever Brahmins secretly composed sacred texts and claimed they arose naturally. These texts could only be recited by themselves, and they prohibited others from viewing them." It further states: "The Brahmins actually had no true knowledge. Merely to earn a living, they constantly recited various sacred texts, pretending to possess extraordinary abilities to move people's hearts." Although these texts lack ultimate true meaning, they contain some worldly rituals and decorum. The noble and influential of the world, wishing to study these traditions, would show them respect despite their lack of virtue. The school maintaining that Vedic sound is eternal likely comes from this Brahmin tradition. They reason that since what is expressed (the meaning) is genuinely real, the expression itself (sound) must also be eternal. They fail to realize that the expression depends entirely on what is expressed—how could it therefore be permanent? As for those who claim all sounds are eternal: they say that although sounds must depend on conditions to arise and carry meaning, their inherent nature is permanent. If sounds were impermanent, they argue, even with all necessary conditions, they could never arise. They do not understand that anything truly permanent would never depend on conditions. Since sounds do depend on various conditions, how could they be eternal? Two logical arguments can refute them: First argument: The sound of the Vedas cannot be permanent. Reason: It is admitted to be an expression of meaning, just like any other sound. Second argument: All other sounds cannot be permanent. Reason: They depend on conditions to arise, like clay pots or cloth garments.

有外道執地水火風至雖是無常而體實有。

> Some non-Buddhist traditions hold that the four elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—<note>and</note> although they are impermanent, their underlying substance is ultimately real.

六。十三路迦耶論師。計色心等法。皆極微所作。路迦耶。此云順世外道。計一切色心等法。皆用四大極微為因。然四大中最精靈者。能有緣慮即為心法。如色雖皆是大。而燈發光。餘則不爾。故四大中有能緣慮。其必無失。顯揚第九云。由不如實知緣起故。計有為先。有果集起。離散為先。有果壞滅。由此因緣。彼謂從眾微性。麤動果生。漸析麤物。乃至極微住。是故麤物無常。極微常住。喻伽同故。此能生云云。謂從四大生。後還歸大。言麤色者。即是子微。不越因量者。因者父母微。最初極微。名為父母。聚生諸色。故所生者。名曰子微。子微雖是無常。不越父母。故是實有。

> Six, The Lokāyata (Materialist) teacher argues that all phenomena, both physical and mental, are made from the smallest particles (atoms). Lokāyata is translated as the "Conformist to the World" school. They assert that all phenomena, both material and mental, emerge from the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) as their ultimate cause. Among these four elements, the most subtle and intelligent ones generate the capacity for perception, which constitutes the mind. For example, although all material forms are based on the elements, fire produces light while others do not. Thus, among the four elements, there is indeed one that can perceive, and this is necessarily without error. According to the \*Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra\* (Chapter 9), because they do not truly understand the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), they propose that there is a prior cause, after which an effect arises; and a prior dissolution, after which an effect ceases. Based on this reasoning, they claim that from the subtle atomic nature, a coarse and active effect arises. As coarse objects are progressively broken down, eventually the ultimate atoms are reached. Therefore, coarse objects are impermanent, but the atoms themselves are permanent. This is consistent with the \*Yogācāra\* school's explanation. This means that all things arise from the four elements and later return to them. Coarse matter is considered "child atoms" (subatoms), which do not exceed their "causal measure." The "cause" refers to the "parent atoms"—the most fundamental atoms, called the "parents," which aggregate to produce all forms. Thus, what is produced is called "child atoms." Although child atoms are impermanent, they do not surpass the parent atoms, so they are considered truly real.

彼亦非理所以者何至如何可說極微常住。

> That also is not logically valid. Why?<note>To reach a conclusion:</note>How can it be said that the ultimate particle is permanent?

首句。總破。所以者何下。別破。分二。先破能生極微。分三。次破所生麤色。分四。今初。行音杭。伍也。列也。成業論云。如樹蟻等。行列無過。言是形色。非顯色也。先破極微非實。次破極微不生果。三破極微非常住。立量云。所執極微體應非實宗。因云。有方分故。喻如蟻行等。又所執極微。應不共聚生麤果色宗。因云。無方分故。喻如心心所。又所執極微定非常住宗。因云。能生果故。喻如彼所生。

> This section begins with a general refutation. The phrase "And why?" introduces a detailed refutation, which is divided into two parts. First, it refutes the idea that ultimate particles can be the cause of creation, which itself has three sub-points. Second, it refutes the idea that coarse matter is produced from them, which has four sub-points. This explanation covers the initial sub-point. "In a row" is pronounced "hang" in this context, meaning "array" or "line up." The \*Cheng Ye Lun\* (Karma-siddhi-śāstra) states: "Just as trees or ants have orderly lines, they do not go beyond this." This refers to form as shape, not as visible color. The first point refutes that these ultimate particles are real entities. The second point refutes that they produce results. The third point refutes that they are permanent. This is established through logical reasoning: - The proposition is: The ultimate particles you propose cannot be truly real entities. - The reason is: Because they have spatial divisions. - The analogy is: Like a row of ants, etc. - Another proposition is: The ultimate particles you propose cannot combine to produce coarse matter as a resulting form. - The reason is: Because they lack spatial divisions. - The analogy is: Like mind and mental factors. - Another proposition is: The ultimate particles you propose are definitely not permanent. - The reason is: Because they are capable of producing results. - The analogy is: Like the results they are said to produce.

又所生果不越因量至如麤果色處無別故。

> The result that arises does not go beyond the limits of its cause<note>to</note>, just as a coarse physical form is not distinct from its visual location.

次破所生麤色。分四。初破果色不越因量。量云。汝執所生果應非眼等色根所取宗。因云。不越因量故。喻如極微。便違自執。又出自語相違之過。若謂果色與因量合。非麤似麤。定是根境者。果既同因。原是極微。因應如果。極微亦麤。立量破云。所執果色無麤德合。因云。同因量故。喻如極微。或應極微亦麤德合。因云。處無別故。如麤果色。

> Next, we break down the analysis of the coarse, produced physical forms into four parts. First, we refute the idea that the resultant form does not exceed the size of its cause. The logical reasoning is: You assert that the produced result cannot be perceived by the eye or other sense organs, because it does not exceed the size of its cause, like a minute particle. This contradicts your own stance and also creates a self-contradiction in your own words. If you argue that the resultant form merges with the size of the cause and, though not coarse, appears coarse, and must be an object of the senses, then the result shares the same nature as the cause and is originally a minute particle. The cause, therefore, should be like the result, and even minute particles would be coarse. The logical argument to disprove this is: The resultant form you propose lacks the attributes of coarseness, because it shares the same size as the cause, like a minute particle. Alternatively, even minute particles should have the attributes of coarseness, because their location is not different from that of coarse, resultant forms.

若謂果色遍在自因至由此亦非色根所取。

> If the resulting form were said to pervade its own cause,<note> Likewise,</note> it would also fall outside the scope of the sense faculties’ perception.

二約果如因破。先牒轉計。自因即極微。若謂果色。徧在自因之中。因體非一。可名麤者。因體既多。果亦應多。如多極微。處各別故。量云。所執果色體應非一宗。因云。處各別故。如所在因。果既各各別在因中。還不成麤色。由此果色。亦非眼根所取。

> Second, regarding the result as contained within its cause. The argument is restated: the cause itself is the ultimate particles. If one claims that the resulting form pervades its own cause, and that since the cause's substance is not singular, it can be called "coarse," then because the causes are many, the result should also be many. This is like the many ultimate particles, each occupying a distinct location. Deductive reasoning: The resulting form you posit should not be a single entity (proposition). Reason: each occupies a distinct location (cause). For example, the location of the cause itself. Since results would individually exist in their respective causes, they still would not form a single coarse form. Therefore, this resulting form cannot be perceived by the eye faculty.

若果多分合故成麤至則汝所執前後相違。

> If several parts combined make something coarse<note>to</note>, then your previous and current positions contradict each other.

三約因如果破。先牒轉計。若謂麤色不由極微。以果多分合故成麤者。則合多極微。亦應不細。儘可為五根現量境。何用多果合成麤為。既麤果色由多分成。則是假法。而汝謂是有實體者。違自教矣。

> Three arguments: If the principle of cause and effect is broken, first refute the alternative reasoning. If one claims that coarse matter does not arise from atoms, and that coarseness comes from the combination of many parts, then combining many atoms should also not be subtle. It could then be a direct object of the five senses, so why would coarse matter need to be formed by combining many results? Since coarse matter arises from the combination of many parts, it is an illusory entity. But if you claim it has a real substance, you contradict your own teachings.

又果與因俱有質礙至但是隨情虗妄計度。

> If both cause and effect possess physical obstruction, <note>then</note> this is merely a mistaken and delusional conceptualization.

四約因果同處破。果與因應不同處是宗。因云。俱有質礙故。喻如二極微。若謂果因更相涉入。如沙受水。藥入鎔銅者。誰人許有受水之砂。入藥之銅哉。設許受入。諸分支離。不可言一。砂銅水藥。體各轉變。不可言常。云何汝執。是常是一。廣百論云。復次為破極微因果同處。及顯因體定是無常。故說頌曰。若因為果壞。是因即非常。或許果與因二體不同處。諸質礙物。餘礙逼時。若不移處。必當變壞如是極微。果所侵逼。或相受入。異體同居。如以細流。溉麤砂聚。或復入中。令其轉變。如妙藥汁。注赤鎔銅。若許如前。則有諸分。既相受入。諸分支離。如相離物。不共生果。是則應無一切麤物。又若同彼有諸細分。即應如彼體是無常。若許如後。自說極微體有變壞。何待徵難。若並不許。應許極微互相障隔。因果別處。以有礙物。處必不同。如非因果諸有礙物。又麤色果下。重縱奪破。若謂因相雖多。果體是一者。則得一分時。應得一切分。何以故。彼此是一故。一即一切故。若不許一得一切。便違果體是一之理。若許一得一切。又違彼此各別之事。故彼所執。妄計而已。進退。即上許與不許。

> \*\*Breaking Down the Concept of Cause and Effect Existing in the Same Place\*\* If a result and its cause existed in the same location, they would not be distinct. But this is wrong because: the cause must be in a different place from the effect. Why? Both are physical, obstructing objects—just like two atoms. If you claim that cause and effect interpenetrate, like sand absorbing water or medicine blending into molten copper—who has ever seen sand that truly absorbs water, or copper that absorbs medicine? If such absorption occurs, the parts become separate and cannot be considered a single whole. The sand, copper, water, and medicine each change their nature—they are not permanent. So how can you insist that cause and effect are both permanent and one? The \*Extensive Commentary on the Hundred Verses\* says: "To refute the idea that atoms and their effects coexist in the same place, and to show that cause is inherently impermanent, the verse declares: If a cause is destroyed by its effect, the cause is not permanent. Perhaps you argue that effect and cause have distinct substances and locations." All physical objects, when pressed by another obstacle, will either move or be destroyed. Take atoms: when an effect presses upon them, either they interpenetrate (different substances sharing the same space—like a thin stream soaking a coarse pile of sand), or they transform (like a potent medicine poured into molten copper). If interpenetration occurs, then there are parts within; they become fragmented like separate things, unable to jointly produce a result. In that case, no coarse object could ever arise. Even if they had fine parts, they would share the same impermanent nature as their parts. If transformation occurs, you admit that atoms change—so what need is there for further proof? If you accept neither, then you must agree that atoms obstruct each other, and cause and effect exist in different places. All obstructing objects must occupy different spaces—just like any two physical things that are not cause and effect. \*\*Further Analysis: If One Effect Contains Many Causes\*\* If you argue: "Although the causes are many, the effect is a single entity"—then by obtaining one part of that effect, you should obtain all its parts. Why? Because they are all the same thing; one equals the whole. If you deny that obtaining one part gives all parts, you contradict the principle that the effect is a single entity. If you accept that obtaining one part gives all parts, you contradict the fact that the parts are distinct. Thus, your reasoning is merely arbitrary speculation. (This "accepting or not accepting" refers to the two possibilities mentioned above.)

然諸外道品類雖多所執有法不過四種。

> Although there are many types of non-Buddhist traditions, their views regarding "existence" can be categorized into just four kinds.

此下。總破四執。前以九十五種。束為十三宗。今又束為四種。華嚴疏云。若計一者。則謂因中有果。若計異者。則謂因中無果。三則亦有亦無。四則非有非無。餘諸異計皆不出此。廣百論云。一切世間句義名言所表。心慧所知。情執不同。略有四種。謂有。非有。俱許。俱非。隨次應知配四邪執。謂一。非一。雙許。雙非。

> Now, we will thoroughly dismantle Four False Views. Previously, 95 (non-Buddhist) schools were grouped into 13 sects, and now they are further grouped into Four Types. The \*Avataṃsaka Sūtra Commentary\* states: - If one holds to the view of \*\*Oneness\*\*, they claim that the cause already contains the effect. - If one holds to the view of \*\*Difference\*\*, they claim that the cause does not contain the effect. - The third view accepts \*\*both existence and non-existence\*\*. - The fourth view denies \*\*both existence and non-existence\*\*. All other deviant views never go beyond these four. The \*\[\*Catuhśataka\*? or \*Abhisamayālaṅkāra\*? - Actually \*Guang Bai Lun\*, likely a reference to \*Sataśāstra\*? Let's check: "廣百論" is \*\*Gāṅgā nāma paricchedaḥ\*\* - no, it's \*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra\* related? Actually \*Guang bai lun\* (Skt. \*Sataśāstra\* or \*Śataśāstra\*? No, \*Bai lun\* (百論) is \*Śataśāstra\*. \*Guang bai lun\* (廣百論) is \*Catuḥśatakaśāstra\* \*Gāṅgeśa\*? Wait: \*Guang bai lun\* is \*Caturaśīti-sahasra-prajñā-pāramitā\*? No, better to generalize: The \*Extensive Treatise on the Hundred Principles\* (廣百論) or \*\*Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka\*? Actually it's "\*\*廣百論本\*\*" - \*Catuḥśataka-śāstra-kārikā\* by Āryadeva. I'll leave as \*Extensive Hundred Treatise\* in English.\](\*Extensive Hundred Treatise\*) says: All phrases, meanings, and names expressed in the world, And all that the mind and wisdom perceive, Come down to one of four types of attachment: - \*\*Existence\*\* (有) - \*\*Non-existence\*\* (非有) - \*\*Both existence and non-existence accepted\*\* (俱許) - \*\*Neither existence nor non-existence accepted\*\* (俱非) Correspondingly, these are the Four False Views: - \*\*Oneness\*\* (一) - \*\*Not-oneness\*\* (非一) - \*\*Both oneness and not-oneness accepted\*\* (雙許) - \*\*Neither oneness nor not-oneness accepted\*\* (雙非)

一執有法無有等性至色等應無青黃等異。

> If one insists on the inherent existence or non-existence of dharmas,<note>then</note> forms and so forth should lack distinctions like blue and yellow.

此即因中有果計。有法。即所造之法。有性。即能造之性。彼執下。破。勿一切法即有性者。事理不可執一取故。理雖一而事則殊故。量云。有法與有等性其體定一。是有法。體無差別是宗。因云。一切法即有性故。喻如有性。既違自教。亦違世間。又違現量。青黃色等。現量境故。廣百論云。數論外道執有等性與諸法一。即當有句。此執非真。所以者何。若青等色與色性一。應如色性其體皆同。又樂等聲與聲性一。應如聲性其體皆同。香味觸等。類亦應爾。眼等諸根與根性一。應如根性其體皆同。應一一根取一切境。應一一境對一切根。又一切法與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。又樂苦癡。及與思我。與有性一。應如有性其體皆同。是則汝宗所立差別皆不成就。故彼所執決定非真。

> This is the view that the effect exists within the cause. An "existent thing" refers to what is produced, while a "nature" refers to what can produce. The phrase "they hold" introduces a refutation. Do not claim that all things inherently share a single nature, because phenomena and principles cannot be rigidly grasped as one. Though principle is unified, phenomena are diverse. A logical inference: The essence of an existent thing and its shared nature is definitely one. This existent thing has no difference in essence—this is the thesis. The reason is: All things share the same nature. The analogy: Just as they share nature. This contradicts both your own teachings and the worldly understanding. It also contradicts direct perception, since colors like blue and yellow are objects of direct awareness. The \*Expansive Hundred Treatise\* says: The non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya tradition holds that nature and all things are one, which corresponds to the view of "existence." This view is not true. Why? If colors like blue were one with the nature of color, then all colors would be identical in essence, just like the nature of color. Likewise, if sounds like music were one with the nature of sound, then all sounds would be identical in essence, just like the nature of sound. The same applies to tastes, smells, and tactile objects. If faculties like the eyes were one with the nature of faculties, then all faculties would be identical in essence, just like the nature of faculties. Each faculty would perceive all objects, and each object would correspond to all faculties. Furthermore, if all things were one with the nature of existence, then they would all be identical in essence, just like existence itself. If pleasure, pain, ignorance, thought, and self were one with the nature of existence, then they would all be identical in essence, just like existence itself. In that case, the distinctions your tradition establishes would all fail. Therefore, what you uphold is definitely not true.

二執有法與有等性至應如聲等非眼等境。

> The duality of grasping at existent dharmas and the nature of existence itself—such as sound and other phenomena—should be understood as not being objects of the eye or other senses.

此即因中無果計。先敘執。彼執下。破。勿一切法非有性故者。事理不可分為二故。量云。若有法與有等性。其體定異。是有法。體不可得是宗。因云。一切法非有性故。如已滅無。既違自教。又違世間。廣百論云。勝論外道說有等性與法非一。當非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若青等色與色性異。應如聲等非眼所行。聲等亦然。聲等性應如色等。非耳等境。又一切法非有性者。應如兔角。其體本無。是則應同空無我論。或同餘道邪見師宗。豈不有性非即諸法。法雖非有而有有耶。所依法無。能依豈有。又有性上無別有性。應不名有。所餘諸法雖有有性。非有性故。其體應無。是則一切所立句義皆不得成。便同撥無邪見外道。故彼所執決定非真。

> This explains the view that denies effect in the cause. First, it states the attachment. Under "the above attachment," it refutes it. "Not all dharmas have inherent existence": Because phenomena and principles cannot be divided into two. A logical argument: If a phenomenon and its inherent nature are certainly different, this phenomenon—whose essence is unobtainable—is the subject. The reason is: "All dharmas lack inherent existence," like an already-extinct non-existence. This contradicts both one's own teachings and worldly conventions. The \*Guang Bai Lun\* says: The Vaisheshika heretics claim that the nature of "existence" is not one with phenomena; it should be a statement of non-existence. This is also not true. Why? If blue and other colors are different from the nature of color, they should, like sound, not be perceived by the eyes. Pitch and such should likewise not be objects of the ear, like their respective natures. Furthermore, if all dharmas lack inherent existence, they should be like a rabbit's horn—essentially non-existent. This would then align with the doctrine of emptiness and non-self, or with the views of other heretical teachers. Does this not mean that existence itself is not identical to phenomena? Even if phenomena are nonexistent, can there still be existence? If the basis (the phenomenon) is absent, how can the dependent (existence) exist? Moreover, if existence itself has no distinct nature above it, it should not be called "existence." Other phenomena, though they have the nature of existence, because they lack inherent existence, their essence should be non-existent. Thus, all established doctrines and concepts would be invalid, aligning with the nihilistic views of heretics. Therefore, their clung-to view is certainly not true.

三執有法與有等性至而執為實理定不成。

> Holding firmly to the existence of phenomena and the nature of existence<note>until</note> one grasps them as ultimate truths, such certainty cannot be established.

此即亦有亦無計。先敘執。彼執下。破。廣百論云。無慚外道執有等性與彼諸法亦一亦異。當於亦有亦非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性與色等一。同數論過。與色等異。同勝論失。一異二種。性相相違。而言體同。理不成立。一應非一。即異故如異。異應非異。即一故如一。一異既不成。有非有焉立。一異相異。而言體同。則一切法皆應無異。異相既無。一相何有。一異二相。相待立故。若謂一法待對不同名一異者。即應一異二並非真。或隨一假。一法二相。立相乖違。俱言是真。必不應理。故彼所執。決定非真。

> This is called the "both existent and non-existent" view. First, the attachment is stated. Then, under that attachment, it is refuted. The \*Guang Bai Lun\* (Expanded Hundred Verses) says: The shameless heretics maintain that the nature of existence is both one with and different from all phenomena. This falls under the statement "both existent and non-existent." This view is not true. Why? If the nature of existence is one with forms and other phenomena, it has the same flaw as the Samkhya school. If it is different from forms, it has the same flaw as the Vaisheshika school. The two—oneness and difference—have mutually contradictory natures. To claim they share a single essence is logically untenable. Oneness should not be oneness, because it is identity \[with difference\], like difference itself. Difference should not be difference, because it is identity \[with oneness\], like oneness itself. Since oneness and difference are not established, how can existence and non-existence be? If oneness and difference are distinct in nature yet claimed to share a single essence, then all phenomena should be without distinction. Since the characteristic of difference does not exist, how can the characteristic of oneness exist? The two characteristics of oneness and difference are established relative to each other. If one says that a single thing is called "one" or "different" based on different contexts, then both oneness and difference should be unreal, or at least one of them is merely provisional. For a single thing to have two characteristics creates a conflict in establishing those characteristics. To claim both are real is certainly unreasonable. Therefore, what they uphold is definitely not true.

四執有法與有等性至諸有智者勿謬許之。

> Those who cling to existence and the nature of existence as one and the same—<note>to</note>wise people should not mistakenly accept this view.

此即非有非無計。先敘執。彼執下。破。非一異執同異一者。言此執與前亦異亦一之執同也。以非一即異。非異即一故。廣百論云。邪命外道執有等性與彼諸法非一非異。當於非有非非有句。此亦非真。所以者何。若有等性。與法非一。同勝論過。與法非異。同數論失。又一異相。世共知有。汝獨撥無。違世間失。又汝所說非一異言。為但是遮。為偏有表。若偏有表。應不雙非如立非一以顯一。立一以顯非一。謂之表。今既雙非。復何所表。若但是遮。應無所執如立非一以遮一。立非異以遮異。既為遮過而設。不得更有所執。有遮有表。理互相違遮則非表。表則非遮無表無遮。言成戲論既非遮表徒成謔談。汝執諸法性相非空。而說雙非。但為避過。此雙非語。亦不應論。違汝所宗法性相故。若諸法性一一俱非。此俱非言。亦不應說。舉言必有俱非性故。是則汝曹應常結舌。發言便壞自論所宗。默亦不成。以俱非故。語默俱失。一何苦哉。誰有智人。而不悲愍。故彼所執。決定非真。如是世間四種外道。邪論惡見。擾壞其心。虗妄推尋諸法性相。皆不中理。競執紛紜。於諸法中。起四種謗。謂有。非有。雙許。雙非。增益。損減。相違。戲論。是故世間所執非實。破外道法執竟。

> This refers to the position of neither existence nor non-existence. First, we describe the attachment. The words "that attachment" below are the refutation. The one and different nature: This means that this attachment is the same as the earlier attachment of "both the same and different." Because "not one" means different, and "not different" means the same. The \*Guang Bai Lun\* says: "Heretical ascetics hold that existence, etc., and those phenomena are neither one nor different. This should belong to the category of 'neither existence nor non-existence.' This also is not true. Why? If existence, etc., is not one with phenomena, it falls into the error of the Vaiśeṣika school. If it is not different from phenomena, it falls into the error of the Sāṃkhya school." Furthermore, the characteristics of "one" and "different" are commonly known in the world. You alone reject them, thus incurring the fault of contradicting the world. Moreover, in the statement "neither one nor different" that you speak, is it merely a negation, or does it partially imply an affirmation? If it partially implies an affirmation, it should not be a double negation. <note>For example, positing "not one" to indicate "one," or positing "one" to indicate "not one"—this is called "affirmation." Now that it is a double negation, what is being affirmed? </note> If it is merely a negation, then there should be no object of attachment to grasp. <note>For example, positing "not one" to negate "one," and positing "not different" to negate "different." Since this is set up only to negate faults, there should be no further grasp on any view. </note> "Negation and affirmation" are logically contradictory. <note>Negation is not affirmation, and affirmation is not negation. </note> Without either affirmation or negation, the words become mere frivolous talk. <note>Since it is neither negation nor affirmation, it is nothing more than empty jargon. </note> You cling to the idea that the nature and characteristics of all phenomena are not empty, yet you speak of "double negation" merely to avoid fault. This expression of "double negation" should not even be discussed, for it contradicts the true nature and characteristics of phenomena as established by your own school. If the nature of all phenomena is each individually "neither," then this word "neither" itself should not be uttered either, because whenever you utter a word, it must possess the nature of "neither." Therefore, you people should always keep your mouths shut. Opening your mouths to speak immediately destroys the tenets of your own school. Being silent also does not succeed, because of the nature of "neither." Both speech and silence lead to failure. How unfortunate! What intelligent person would not feel compassion? Therefore, what they cling to is definitively untrue. Thus, these four kinds of worldly heretics, with their wrong views and evil theories, disturb and corrupt their minds. They falsely investigate the nature and characteristics of all phenomena, none of which accord with reason. They argue and dispute, giving rise to four kinds of false statements regarding phenomena: existence, non-existence, both, and neither. These lead to the faults of exaggeration, denial, contradiction, and frivolous talk. Therefore, what the worldly adhere to is not real. (This concludes the refutation of the heretical attachment to phenomena.)

餘乘所執離識實有至及諸無為理非有故。

> Other vehicles hold that there are real existences apart from consciousness, such as unconditioned dharmas, but this is not in accord with reason.

次破餘乘。分二。一問答標數。二正釋所執。今初。餘乘於大乘百法中。止許七十五法。謂色法十一。不相應行法十四。無為法有三。心所法四十六。心法唯一。共七十五。故下破詞。於不相應及無為法。唯舉彼所執之數破之。餘則不舉。色十一者。有對十。無對一。有對十者。五根。五塵。彼計極微所成。經部師計能成極微是實。所成根等是假。以實從假。眼緣麤色。不緣極微。薩婆多計能所皆實。無對一者。謂法處無表色。不相應十四者。一得。二非得。三同分。四命根。五心無定。六滅盡定。七無想報。八生。九住。十異。十一無常。十二名身。十三句身。十四文身。薩婆多計不與色心相應。皆是實有。無為三者。一虗空。二擇滅。三非擇滅。薩婆多計離色心等實有自體。心所法四十六者。大地有十。大善地十。大煩惱地六。大不善地二。小煩惱地十。不定地八。為四十六。大地十者。一受。二想。三思。四觸。五欲。六慧。七念。八作意。九勝解。十三摩地。大善地十者。一信。二不放逸。三輕安。四行捨。五慚。六愧。七無貪。八無嗔。九不害。十勤。大煩惱地六者。一癡。二放逸。三懈怠四不信。五󳬯沉。六掉舉。大不善地二者。一無慚。二無愧。小煩惱地十者。一忿。二覆。三慳。四嫉。五惱。六害。七恨。八諂。九誑。十憍。不定地八者。一貪。二嗔。三慢。四疑。五睡眠。六惡作。七尋。八伺。或問小乘執法。理在不疑。既悟我空。何有執我。答。此說宗徒。非預聖者。至如我等宗大乘教。豈能皆悟法空理耶。

> Now, refuting the Lesser Vehicle’s doctrines. This is divided into two parts: first, a question-and-answer summary of the number of dharmas; second, an explanation of what they are attached to. We begin with the first part. The Lesser Vehicle, within the Hundred Dharmas of the Greater Vehicle, only accepts seventy-five dharmas. These are: eleven material dharmas, fourteen dharmas not associated with mind or matter, three unconditioned dharmas, forty-six mental factors, and one mind dharma—seventy-five in total. Therefore, in the following refutation, when discussing the “not associated” and “unconditioned” dharmas, only the number they themselves accept is mentioned and refuted; the others are not specifically singled out. Regarding the eleven material dharmas: there are ten that have resistance, and one that has no resistance. The ten that have resistance are: the five sense organs and the five sense objects. The Lesser Vehicle holds that these are formed by atoms. The Sautrāntika school asserts that the fundamental atoms are real, but that the sense organs and objects they constitute are provisional. Thus, through the provisional, the real is approached; the eye perceives coarse forms, not atoms themselves. The Sarvāstivāda school maintains that both the atoms and the composed forms are real. The one material dharma that is without resistance is the non-manifest form belonging to the mental-object domain. Regarding the fourteen dharmas not associated with mind or matter: (1) Acquisition, (2) Non-acquisition, (3) Shared condition, (4) Life-force, (5) Mindlessness, (6) Cessation of perception and feeling, (7) No-thought heaven, (8) Birth, (9) Abiding, (10) Change, (11) Impermanence, (12) Term-group, (13) Phrase-group, (14) Syllable-group. The Sarvāstivāda holds that these, not being associated with either matter or mind, are all substantially real. Regarding the three unconditioned dharmas: (1) Space, (2) Cessation through insight, (3) Cessation not through insight. The Sarvāstivāda holds that these, being separate from matter, mind, and so on, have their own independent substantial existence. The forty-six mental factors are categorized as: ten universal factors, ten virtuous factors, six unwholesome root factors, two severely unwholesome factors, ten minor unwholesome factors, and eight indeterminate factors—making forty-six. The ten universal factors are: (1) Feeling, (2) Perception, (3) Volition, (4) Contact, (5) Desire, (6) Wisdom, (7) Mindfulness, (8) Attention, (9) Deciding, (10) Concentration. The ten virtuous factors are: (1) Faith, (2) Vigilance, (3) Serenity, (4) Equanimity, (5) Shame, (6) Remorse, (7) Non-attachment, (8) Non-hatred, (9) Non-harm, (10) Diligence. The six unwholesome root factors are: (1) Ignorance, (2) Carelessness, (3) Laziness, (4) Lack of faith, (5) Torpor, (6) Restlessness. The two severely unwholesome factors are: (1) Shamelessness, (2) No remorse. The ten minor unwholesome factors are: (1) Anger, (2) Concealment, (3) Stinginess, (4) Jealousy, (5) Spite, (6) Harm, (7) Resentment, (8) Flattery, (9) Deceit, (10) Arrogance. The eight indeterminate factors are: (1) Greed, (2) Hatred, (3) Pride, (4) Doubt, (5) Sleepiness, (6) Regret, (7) Initial thought, (8) Sustained thought. Someone may ask: “Followers of the Lesser Vehicle are attached to dharmas as real. This is understandable in principle. But since they have already realized the emptiness of the self, how could they still be attached to a self?” The answer: This refers to the doctrinal followers, not to the saints. As for us followers of the Greater Vehicle, have we all truly realized the emptiness of dharmas?

且所執色總有二種至二者無對非極微成。

> Furthermore, the physical forms that are grasped are of two kinds: the visible and the intangible, which cannot be reduced to atomic particles.

二正破所執。依數分三。一色法分二。一正舉。二正釋三。一正舉分二。一標數。對者礙也。二色相對。互相窒礙。如木與石。互相繫時。體不相過。互對礙住。名有對義。集論云。謂有見者。皆是有對。又三因故。說名有對。謂種類故。積集故。不修治故。種類者。謂諸法互為能礙。互為所礙。積集者。謂極微已上。不修治者。謂非三摩地自在轉色。又損處依處。是有對義。無對反此。有對色者。即五根五塵十種色。無對色者。法處攝色。據大乘教。亦有五種。一極略色。二極逈色。三受所引色。四徧計所執色。五定果色。一極略色者。以極微為體。但是析彼五根五塵四大定果色至極微位。即此極微。便是極略色體。二極迥色者。即空間六般光影明暗等麤色。令析此六般麤色至極微位。取此細色為極迥色體。又若上下空界所見青。黃。赤。白。光。影。明。暗。即總名空一顯色。及門牕孔隙中所現者。即總名迥色。三受所引色者。受者是領納義。所引色者。即思種現上有防發功能。名所引色。意云。由於師教處領受。為能引發起思種現上防發功能。名所引色。即此防發功能。不能表示他故亦名無表色。即以無表色為體。四徧計色者。即妄心徧計。執色為實。從所得色以得其名。五定果色者。定中現境。即如有人作水觀。外人不見人惟見水之類。已上五般法處色。總分三門。一影像門。二無表門。三定果門。一影像門者。影者流類義。像者相似義。即所變相分。是本質之流類。又與本質相似。故名影像。即極略極迥二色。此但是觀心析塵色至色邊際。假立極微。唯有觀心影像。都無實體。散位獨頭意識緣五根五塵水月鏡像時。當情變起徧計影像相分。此是假非實。故與極略等同立一影像門。問。且如水中月。鏡中像。眼識亦緣。如何言假。唯意識緣。答。水月鏡像。唯是法境。但以水鏡為緣。其意識便妄計有月有像。並非眼識之境。亦是徧計色收。又徧計是妄心。極略等是觀心。同是假影像故。所以總立。第二無表門。一律儀有表色者。即師前受戒時是。由此表色故。方熏得善思種子。有防發功能。立無表色。二不律儀有表色者。即正下刀殺生造業時是。由此有表色。方熏得不善思種子。有防發功能。立無表色。若處中有表色者。即正禮佛行道及毆擊罵詈時是。由此無表色。方熏得善惡思種。亦有防發功能。立無表色。餘詳本條。

> II. Breaking Down the Objects Being Grasped. Based on division by number, there are three sections. A. The Division of Form (Rūpa). This is divided into two parts: 1) Explanation of the concept; 2) Detailed elaboration. 1. Explanation of the concept, in two parts: a) Identifying scope. "Opposition" means obstruction. Two forms are opposed when they mutually block each other, like wood and stone—when they come together, their bodies cannot occupy the same space. They stand in mutual opposition and obstruction. This is called "having opposition." The \*Compendium of Abhidharma\* says: "That which is visible is all characterized by opposition. Further, there are three reasons why something is called 'having opposition': due to type; due to accumulation; due to being unrefined. 'Due to type' means that all phenomena can mutually hinder and be hindered. 'Due to accumulation' means a collection of particles as a minimum. 'Due to being unrefined' means form that is not subject to the free transformation of meditative concentration (samādhi)." Moreover, where there is harm and a basis for harm, that is the meaning of opposition. Being without opposition is the opposite of this. "Opposition form" refers to the ten kinds of form: the five sense organs and the five sense objects. "Non-opposition form" refers to the form included in the mental sphere (dharma-āyatana). According to Mahāyāna teachings, this comprises five types: (1) Extremely subtle form; (2) Extremely distant form; (3) Form induced by reception; (4) Form falsely conceptualized; (5) Resultant form from meditation. i) Extremely subtle form: Its substance is the ultimate particle (paramāṇu). It is reached by analyzing the five sense organs, five sense objects, the four great elements, and the resultant form from meditation down to the stage of the ultimate particle. That ultimate particle itself is the substance of extremely subtle form. ii) Extremely distant form: This refers to the gross forms of the six phenomena of light, shadow, brightness, darkness, etc., in space. Breaking these six gross forms down to the stage of the ultimate particle, one takes this subtle form as the substance of extremely distant form. Also, the blue, yellow, red, white, light, shadow, brightness, and darkness seen in the upper and lower reaches of open space are collectively called "the manifest form of empty space." The colors appearing through doors, windows, and crevices are collectively called "distant form." iii) Form induced by reception: "Reception" means the act of receiving. "Induced form" refers to the function of restraint and generation on the seeds and manifestations of volition (cetana). This is called "induced form." The meaning is: Because one receives guidance at the teacher's instruction, this can trigger the function of restraint and generation on the seeds and manifestations of volition—this is "induced form." Since this function of restraint and generation cannot be indicated to others, it is also called "non-indicative form" (avijñapti-rūpa). Its substance is this non-indicative form. iv) Falsely conceptualized form: This is a deluded mind that falsely imagines form to be real. It is named after the form it obtains from this grasping. v) Resultant form from meditation: This is the objective scene that appears within meditation. For example, when someone visualizes themselves as water, outsiders do not see the person but only see water. These five types of form belonging to the mental sphere are generally divided into three categories: (1) The category of images; (2) The category of non-indication; (3) The category of meditative results. (1) The category of images: "Image" (ying) means a flow or type; "appearance" (xiang) means similarity. It is the representative mental image (nimitta) that arises, which is a flow from the object itself (dravya) and also resembles it. Thus it is called an "image." This includes extremely subtle form and extremely distant form. These are merely the analytic mind's breaking down form to the very edge of form, provisionally establishing the ultimate particle. They have only the mental image in contemplation and no real substance. When the unconstrained mind (in a non-meditative state) apprehends the five sense organs, five sense objects, or things like the moon in water or a reflection in a mirror, it gives rise to falsely conceptualized representational images. These are provisional, not real. Therefore, they are grouped with extremely subtle form, etc., under the category of images. Question: For instance, the moon in water or a reflection in a mirror can also be apprehended by eye-consciousness. How can it be said to be merely mental and only apprehended by the mind-consciousness? Answer: The moon in water and the reflection in a mirror are solely objects of the mental sphere. Using the water or mirror as a basis, the mind-consciousness falsely imagines a moon or a reflection. These are not objects of eye-consciousness. They are also included under falsely conceptualized form. Furthermore, falsely conceptualized form pertains to a deluded mind, while extremely subtle form, etc., pertain to a contemplating mind. Both are equally provisional mental images, so they are grouped together. (2) The category of non-indication: a) Indicative form of moral discipline (saṃvara): This is when one receives precepts in front of a teacher. It is because of this indicative form that one can perfume Good volitional seeds, giving them a function of restraint and generation, thus establishing non-indicative form. b) Indicative form of immorality: This is when one actively kills or commits an act creating karma. Through this indicative form, a person perfumes unwholesome volitional seeds, which acquire a function of restraint and generation, leading to the establishment of non-indicative form. c) For neutral or intermediate states: This occurs when one is formally bowing to the Buddha, practicing the path, or hitting, striking, or cursing. Through this indicative form, one perfumes either Good or evil volitional seeds, which also acquire a function of restraint and generation, establishing non-indicative form. For further details, see the relevant entry. \[Note: The remaining details are extensive; see the original text for the full entry.\]

彼有對色定非實有能成極微非實有故。

> When it comes to forms that are objects of contact, they are definitely not truly existent, because the atoms that constitute them are not truly existent either.

二正釋分二。一破有對色。但破能成。則所成不立。此總句。廣如下破。

> II. Proper Explanation (in two parts). A. Refuting Visible Matter — By refuting the primary elements (the four great elements), the secondary matter (derived form) is not established. This is the general statement. The detailed refutation is given below.

謂諸極微若有質礙至如何可集成瓶衣等。

> If all the tiniest particles still have physical substance and obstruct each other, how could they possibly come together to form things like a vase or a piece of clothing?

先約質礙破。量云。極微是有法。是假非實宗。因云。有質礙故。喻如瓶等。又諸極微如何可集成瓶衣等是宗。因云。無質礙故。喻如非色。

> First, use "having physical obstruction" to refute it. The syllogism goes: The ultimate particle is the subject; it is provisional and not ultimately real (the proposition). Because it has physical obstruction (the reason). Like a vase or other objects (the example). Furthermore, as to the claim: how can ultimate particles aggregate to form vases, clothes, etc.? (the proposition) Because they lack physical obstruction (the reason). Like non-material phenomena (the example).

又諸極微若有方分至故有對色實有不成。

> Furthermore, if these minutest particles had spatial dimensions, then physical matter which occupies space could not truly exist.

後約方分破。方謂方隅。分謂分位。謂此極微。若有方分。便可分析。既可分析。便非實有。若無方分。則此極微不屬色法。云何和合以成麤色。而能承光發影耶。廣百論頌云。微若有東方。必有東方分。極微若有分。如何是極微。論曰。是諸極微。既有質礙。日輪纔舉。舒光觸時。東西兩邊。光影各現。逐日光移。隨光影轉。承光發影。處既不同。故知極微定有方分。既有方分。便失極微。如是極微即可分折。應如麤物非實非常。違汝論宗極微無方分。常住實有。造世間萬物。又佛性論破云。為當一塵中有六方不。若有六方。即成六分。若無六方。非謂為色。既有六分。即可分折。若有方無分。是則六塵共入一塵。無量諸塵並應如是。則無成大義。又如一塵。日光照時。為照一邊。為東西俱達。若唯照一邊。則有六分。若東西俱達。色則非有。故知方分不實。悉併是空。皆可與此互相發也。觸壁等。足上承光發影之義。和合物。即壁等。日光在東。決不在西。物影在西。決不在東。既柱壁等即諸極微。故此極微定有方分。又諸極微。隨處必有方隅差別。若不爾者。便無共相和集之義。若言眾微更相涉入。無方分者。則應塵塵涉入無礙。是名如來殊勝妙色。不成世間質礙麤相。故知極微定有方分。汝執有對即色極微。若無方分。則山川壁石皆可直入。更無障隔。若爾。即是果位聖人所證之色。決非世間障礙有對凡色可比。是故極微必有方分。展轉救釋。竟成就一有方分義。故有對色皆可分析。而執為實有者其義不成。

> Then we examine the concept of "spatial parts." "Space" refers to direction, and "parts" refers to position. This means: if an atom has spatial parts, it can be further divided. Since it can be divided, it cannot be truly real. If it has no spatial parts, then this atom would not belong to the realm of physical matter. How then could it combine to form coarse matter, or receive light and cast shadows? The \*Verses on the Hundred Dharmas\* says: "If a particle has an eastern direction, it must have an eastern part. If a particle has parts, how can it be a particle?" Explanation: Since these atoms have physical obstruction, as soon as the sun rises and its light touches them, shadows appear on both their east and west sides. As the sunlight shifts, the shadows follow. Because the places where they receive light and cast shadows differ, we know for certain that atoms have spatial parts. If they have spatial parts, they lose their status as atoms. Such "atoms" can then be divided, and should be like coarse objects—neither real nor permanent. This contradicts the assertion that atoms have no spatial parts, are eternal and real, and create all things in the world. Furthermore, the \*Treatise on Buddha-Nature\* refutes this: "Does a single speck of dust contain six directions? If it has six directions, it becomes six parts. If it has no six directions, it cannot be called matter. Since it has six parts, it can be divided. If it has directions but no parts, then six dust-motes would all merge into one dust-mote. Countless dust-motes should all be like this—then the concept of coarseness would not arise. Also, when sunlight falls on a single speck of dust, does it illuminate only one side, or both east and west? If only one side, then it has six parts. If both east and west, then the matter itself is not real. Therefore, spatial parts are not real—they are all empty." These arguments all reinforce each other. The examples of "touching a wall" and so on further illustrate the meaning of receiving light and casting shadows. "Composite objects" refers to walls and so forth. When sunlight is in the east, it is certainly not in the west; when an object's shadow falls in the west, it is certainly not in the east. Since pillars, walls, and so forth are themselves collections of atoms, these atoms must definitely have spatial parts. Moreover, every atom must have directional differences in its position. If not, there would be no basis for the concept of co-existing and aggregating. If it were argued that atoms interpenetrate and have no spatial parts, then each speck of dust should interpenetrate without hindrance—this would be the sublime form of a Buddha, not the coarse, obstructing matter of the ordinary world. Therefore, atoms must have spatial parts. You assert that "obstructive matter" refers to material atoms. If they had no spatial parts, then mountains, rivers, walls, and stones could all be directly penetrated without any barrier. If so, that would be the matter realized by enlightened beings, entirely incomparable to the ordinary, obstructing matter of the world. Hence, atoms must have spatial parts. Through this series of arguments and counter-arguments, we finally establish that atoms do have spatial parts. Therefore, all obstructive matter can be analyzed and divided, and the view that holds them as truly real cannot be upheld.

五識豈無所依緣色至自識所變為所緣緣。

> Could the five sense consciousnesses lack their basis and support? The forms (rūpa) that they perceive are transformations of their own consciousness, and these serve as the perceived objects.

此顯正義。外人問言。五識所依所緣。必有實色。若有對非實。則五識遂無所緣緣耶。論主答云。眼等雖有所依所緣之色。而是識所變現。非是心外別有極微以成根境。但八識生時。內因緣種子力等第八識變似五根五塵。眼等五識。依彼所變根。緣彼本質塵境。雖親不得。要託彼生。實於本識色塵之上。變作五塵相現。即以彼五根為所依。以彼及彼二種五塵為所緣緣。五識若不託第八所變。便無所緣。緣所緣緣中。有親疎故。然眼等下。先明依。色等五塵。世間共見。現量所得。眼等五根。非現量得。除第八識緣。及如來等緣。是現量得。世不共信。餘散心中。無現量得。此但能有發識之用。比知是有。此但有功能。非是心外別有大種所造之色。此功能言。即是發生五識作用。觀用知體。如觀生芽。比知種體是有。問。云何而知色是內識所變。曰。外有對色。以理推徵。既不成就。當知定是內識所變。問。既眼等是識所變。何故眼等名根又名所依。曰。以能引發眼等識故。名眼等根。即以此根為俱有依。生眼等識。故又名所依也。此眼等識下。後明緣。此眼等識。外所緣緣。理既非有。應許自識所變為所緣緣。言應許者。是大乘自許。以小乘但許離眼識本質色。不許不離眼識相分色故。大乘以自許言簡。則免隨他一分不極成過。

> Here is the correct meaning explained. An outsider asks: "The five sense-consciousnesses must rely on real, physical objects as their base and object. If objects are interactive yet not ultimately real, does that mean the five consciousnesses have no actual ‘object condition’ (ālambana-pratyaya)?" The Treatise Master replies: "Although the eyes and other senses have objects they rely on—namely, forms—these forms are actually transformations of consciousness. They are not external, mind-independent, gross particles that make up sense organs and their objects. Rather, when the eight consciousnesses arise, the power of internal causal seeds causes the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) to manifest in forms resembling the five sense organs and five sense objects. The five consciousnesses rely on those transformed sense organs as their base and take those essential sense objects as their focus. Although they do not directly perceive these objects in their raw state, they depend on them to arise, effectively transforming them into the appearances of the five sense objects within the basic consciousness. Hence, those transformed sense organs serve as the base, and both those bases and their two kinds of sense objects serve as the object condition (\*ālambana-pratyaya\*). If the five consciousnesses did not rely on what the eighth consciousness transforms, they would have no object condition at all. Within the category of object conditions, there are both close and distant ones." As for "the eyes, etc.": first, clarify their function as a base. The five sense objects (forms, sounds, etc.) are commonly seen in the world and directly perceived. The five sense organs (eyes, etc.), however, are not directly perceived in ordinary experience—except through the perception of the eighth consciousness or by enlightened beings like the Tathāgata. In these cases, they are directly perceived, but this is not commonly accepted. In ordinary distracted minds, there is no direct perception. We only infer their existence through their function of triggering consciousness. They are functional entities, not external objects produced by gross elements (mahābhūta) existing outside the mind. The term "function" here refers to their capacity to generate the five consciousnesses. By observing the function, we infer the existence of the organ—just as from seeing a sprout, we infer a seed exists. Question: "How do we know that form (rūpa) is actually a transformation of inner consciousness?" Answer: "If we rationally investigate external, interactive form, we find it untenable. Therefore, we should recognize that it is indeed a transformation of inner consciousness." Question: "If the eyes and other sense organs are transformations of consciousness, why are they called ‘sense organs’ (indriya) and also ‘base’ (āśraya)?" Answer: "Because they trigger the arising of the eye-consciousness, etc., they are called eye-organs, etc. And because they serve as the simultaneous base for the arising of eye-consciousness, they are also called the 'base.'" Regarding "the eye-consciousness, etc.": next, clarify the object condition. For the five consciousnesses, an external object condition, in principle, does not exist. Therefore, we should accept that a transformation of one's own consciousness serves as the object condition. The phrase "should accept" expresses the Mahāyāna’s own position. The Hīnayāna only accepts the existence of a material form separate from eye-consciousness; it does not accept form as an aspect of consciousness itself. The Mahāyāna uses this self-acceptance to avoid the error of partially disagreeing with others on a point that is not universally established.

謂能引生似自識者至勿第二月等能生五識故。

> That which can give rise to what appears as one's own consciousness—<note>to</note> not like a second moon, etc., which can produce the five sense-consciousnesses.

此破和合也。經部師以外和合色。亦能引生似自識相。可作眼等識所緣緣。故觀所緣緣論云。或執和合。以識生時。帶彼相故。非但能生者。謂能緣識帶彼相起。及有實體。令能緣識託彼而生。具此二支。名所緣緣。不但以能生一支。便可名所緣緣也。若以能生一支名為所緣緣者。則因緣。等無間緣。增上緣。皆有能生一義。皆可名為所緣緣。而四緣混濫無別矣。勿者。猶言莫得也。和合與和集不同和合。即金剛經所謂一合相。如男女天地等。以眾。緣合故。攬眾微以成於色。合五陰以成於人。名一合相。其瓶甌等。名和集相。或謂和合即和集。以瓶甌為和合。皆非也。眼等五識了色等時。但緣和合似色之相。此和合相。非離極微有實自體。能生識者既無實體。則所生之識何自而有哉。故和合相。於眼等識。縱作所緣。且無緣義。若有緣義。莫得錯亂眼所見第二月。亦能生五識耶。立量云。汝和合麤色是有法。設為眼識所緣非緣宗。因云。汝執假色無體故。喻如第二月。

> This passage refutes the concept of "combination" (\*hehe\*). The Sautrāntika school holds that external combinations of form (\*rūpa\*) can also give rise to cognition that appears to bear their own characteristics, and thus can serve as the cognitive object (\*ālambana-pratyaya\*) for eye-consciousness and other sense-consciousnesses. Therefore, the \*Investigation of the Cognitive Object\* says: "Some postulate a combination, because when consciousness arises, it bears the appearance of that combination." It is not merely what gives rise to cognition—meaning, the perceiving consciousness arises bearing the appearance of that object—but also that there must be a real entity upon which the perceiving consciousness relies for its arising. Only when both of these conditions are met can it be called a cognitive object. If merely the condition of giving rise to cognition were enough to constitute a cognitive object, then the causal condition (\*hetu-pratyaya\*), the immediately antecedent condition (\*samanantara-pratyaya\*), and the predominating condition (\*adhipati-pratyaya\*) would all also give rise to cognition and could each be called a cognitive object. This would confuse and conflate the four conditions without distinction. "Do not" (\*wù\*) means "do not allow." Combination is different from aggregation (\*hejí\*). Combination is what the \*Diamond Sūtra\* calls "a unity of composite phenomena" (\*eka-lakṣaṇa-saṅghāta\*), such as man and woman in the world. Because conditions combine, gathering numerous atoms to form a physical object, and assembling the five aggregates to form a person, it is called a unity of composite phenomena. Things like vases or pots are called aggregation. Some say combination is the same as aggregation, taking vases and pots as combination—both are incorrect. When the five types of sense-consciousness perceive forms, they perceive only the combination that appears as form. This combination does not exist as a real entity apart from the elementary particles. Since that which gives rise to cognition lacks a real entity, how could the cognition that arises have any basis? Thus, for sense-consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness, a combination may appear as a cognitive object, but it cannot truly function as one. If it could function as a cognitive object, then one would mistakenly consider the second moon seen by the eye to also give rise to the five types of consciousness. We can formulate a logical reasoning: "Your combination—a gross form—is a thesis. It may be taken as an object by eye-consciousness, but it does not truly function as a cognitive object. Reason: because you maintain it is a false form without real substance. Analogy: like the second moon."

非諸極微共和合位至色等極微非五識境。

> Extremely small particles, even when they come together and combine, up to the point of forming what we call "form" or "matter," cannot be directly perceived by the five senses.

此破和合中極微也。正量部救云。和合麤色。雖則是假。而有能成一一極微。此是實有。各得為緣。能生五識。故此破云。非諸極微共和合位。可與五識各作所緣。以眼等識上。不帶極微相故。猶如眼識不帶眼根相。其眼等五根。但能生眼等五識。然眼等五識。即不能緣眼等五根。將根為喻。立量云。汝和合色等能成極微是有法。設為五識緣非所緣宗。因云。五識生時。不帶彼相故。同喻如五根。非諸下。明極微上無和合相。文顯可知。以無和合相故。即越諸根境。縱許為緣。不為所緣。

> This passage explains the refutation of atoms existing within composite matter. The Sāṃmitīya school argues: “Although coarse, composite forms are merely conventional existents, each of the individual atoms that form them is genuinely real. Each atom acts as a condition that generates the five sense-consciousnesses.” The counter-argument then states: “Composite atoms cannot serve as the direct object for each of the five sense-consciousnesses. This is because the eye-consciousness, for example, does not bear the characteristic mark of an atom. Similarly, the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic mark of the eye faculty itself.” The analogy is drawn using the sense faculties: “The five sense faculties (such as the eye faculty) can only give rise to the five sense-consciousnesses, yet those sense-consciousnesses cannot take the faculties themselves as their object.” A formal reasoning is presented: - \*\*Subject:\*\* The atoms composing a composite form - \*\*Proposition:\*\* Even if they were conditions for the five consciousnesses, they are not their actual objects - \*\*Reason:\*\* Because when a consciousness arises, it does not bear the appearance of those atoms - \*\*Example:\*\* Just as the five sense faculties The next passage clarifies that there is no composite characteristic to be found within the individual atoms. The meaning is straightforward: since no composite form exists in the atoms themselves, the atoms escape being the objects of the sense faculties. Even if they are admitted as conditions, they are not the actual objects.

有執色等一一極微至況無識外真實極微。

> If they cling to the existence of even the tiniest particles of form or other elements, how much more would they cling to the idea of real particles existing outside of consciousness?

此破極微中和集相也。據集論說。和合聚集。二相不同。和合者。謂極微已上。一切有方分色。更互和合。如濁水中一地水極微。更互和合。聚集者。謂方分聚色。展轉集會。如二泥團。相擊成聚。若水和砂。必不成聚。以水和土。即成泥團。可作瓶等。可見水土一一極微。各各具有和集之相。不和集時。無相可見。非五識境。共和集位。展轉集會。有麤相生。此和集相。與極微俱。乃是實有。以大乘縱許極微實有故。既帶彼相。又能生識。此乃雙支皆是有故。可與五識為所緣緣。此外計意也。彼執下。破。共和集位。與未集時。極微之體。和集之相。無差別故。還是極微。不成所緣。故觀所緣緣論云。和集如堅等。設於眼等識。是緣非所緣。許極微相故。如堅等相。雖是實有。於眼等識。容有緣義。而非所緣。眼等識上。無彼相故。色等極微諸和集相。理亦應爾。彼俱執為極微相故。瓶甌等物下。破轉計。彼遮體相是一之難。計有別相能生識故。如瓶甌等差別可見。為所緣緣。故彼論云。執眼等識能緣極微諸和集相。復有別生。瓶甌等覺相。彼執應無別。非形別故別。形別非實故。瓶甌等物大小等者。能成極微多少同故。緣彼覺相應無差別。若謂彼形物相別故。覺相別者。理亦不然。項等別形。惟在瓶等假法上有非極微故。彼不應執極微亦有差別形相。所以者何。極微量等故。形別唯在假。析彼至極微。彼覺定捨故。非瓶甌等能成極微有形量別。捨微圓相。故知別形在假非實。又形別物。析至極微。彼覺定捨。非青等物析至極微彼覺可捨。由此形別唯世俗有。非如青等亦在實物。微圓相者。極微自相。各各圓滿。不外假而足者也。麤相即和合。色處所攝。是五識境。細相即極微。法處所攝。是意識境。若麤相識可緣細相境。則色境識亦可緣聲境。而一識可緣一切境矣。即與世間現見共知事理相違。成大過失。許有極微。尚致如此。況汝所執心外極微。如龜毛等。本非實有。而可作五識所緣緣哉。

> This refutes the notion of the "collected and combined" appearance within atoms. According to the \*Collection Treatise\*, "combination" and "aggregation" are two different concepts. "Combination" refers to atoms and the larger aggregations of matter that have spatial parts, mixing and combining with each other. This is like the atoms of earth and water in muddy water mixing together. "Aggregation" refers to these spatial clusters gathering and assembling, like two lumps of clay striking and coming together into a clump. If you mix water with sand, it won't form a clump. But when you mix water with earth, it becomes a clay lump, which can be made into a pot and so on. We can see that each individual atom of water and earth possesses the quality of being able to combine and aggregate. When they are not combined, this quality is not apparent, and they are not objects of the five sense consciousnesses. When they enter a state of combination and aggregation, a coarse appearance emerges. This appearance of "collectedness" exists together with the atoms, and is truly real. This is because the Mahayana school provisionally allows that atoms are real. Since it possesses that atom-appearance and can generate consciousness, both the supporting element (the atom) and the generated element (the consciousness) exist. Therefore, it can serve as the "object condition" for the five consciousnesses. This is the position of the opponent (the Vaibhashika school, etc.). The text then states, "Their assertion is refuted." In the state of combination and aggregation, and in the non-combined state, the substance of the atoms and the appearance of their combination are no different. They are still just atoms, and therefore they cannot become objects of perception. Hence, the \*Examination of the Object Condition\* says: "Combinations, like hardness, etc., are conditions for eye consciousness, etc., but they are not objects. This is because we accept them as possessing the characteristic of atoms. For example, the characteristic of hardness is truly real, and for eye consciousness, etc., it may have the meaning of a condition, but it is not an object. This is because there is no appearance of hardness in eye consciousness itself. The same principle applies to the combined appearances of the atoms of visible form, etc. This is because both sides hold them to be the characteristics of atoms." The text then moves to refuting further arguments about "pots and cups, etc." This counters the opponent's attempt to avoid the difficulty that the substance and appearance of the whole are the same, by asserting that there is a separate, distinct appearance that can generate consciousness. They argue that because pots, cups, and other objects have visible, distinct shapes, they can serve as objects and conditions. The \*Examination of the Object Condition\* therefore states: "If one holds that eye consciousness can perceive the combined appearances of atoms, then there would arise separate, distinct mental perceptions of 'pot', 'cup', etc. But this position should have no distinction. This is not because the shapes differ. Shapes are not ultimately real. For example, the atoms that constitute pots and cups of different sizes are equal in number. The mental perceptions that arise based on them should have no difference." If one argues that these physical objects have different shapes, so the mental perceptions are different, this is also incorrect. Distinct shapes like a neck, a belly, etc., exist only on the conventional, fabricated entities like pots, not on the atoms themselves. One should not argue that atoms also have distinct shapes. Why? Because atoms are uniform in measure. Differences in shape exist only in the conventional. When you break down a shape-differing object to the atomic level, that perception of shape is definitely abandoned. Therefore, the atoms that constitute pots, etc., do not have differences in shape or size; they lose their perfectly round form. Thus, we know that shape exists only in the conventional, not in reality. Furthermore, when a thing with a certain shape is broken down to atoms, the perception of that shape certainly disappears. This is not like a color, such as blue, where if you break it down to atoms, the perception of blue can still be maintained. Therefore, shape is only conventional, not truly real like color is. "Perfect roundness" is the self-characteristic of an atom, each one complete in and of itself, not relying on a conventional whole. Coarse appearances are what we call "aggregations," which are included in the category of "visible forms" (the sensory object of the eye) and are objects of the five consciousnesses. Subtle appearances are the atoms themselves, which are included in the category of "mental objects" and are objects of mental consciousness. If a coarse-appearance-consciousness could perceive subtle-appearance objects, then a visual consciousness could also perceive sound objects, and one single consciousness could perceive all objects. This would contradict the commonly known and experienced reality of the world. It would be a great fault. If we provisionally accept atoms, this is already a problem. What's more, the external atoms that you (the opponent) assert to exist outside the mind are like a tortoise's hair or a rabbit's horn—fundamentally not real. How could they possibly serve as an object condition for the five consciousnesses?

由此定知自識所變至皆識變現非極微成。

> Thus it can be conclusively understood that all phenomena perceived by consciousness are manifestations of consciousness itself, and are not composed of ultimate particles.

結成五識正所緣緣義。觀所緣緣論頌云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。內色即相分色。外境即本質色。且如眼根對色塵時。即眼識自證分現行。從自種而生。變似二分。其所變見分。說名眼識。其所變相分。似外境現。說名眼境。為所緣緣。是依他性。有體法故。不緣心外所執無法故。見託彼生者。謂能緣見分。託彼實體而生。即是緣義。然心起時。帶彼相起。名為所緣。別行鈔云。所緣緣者。謂是心之所慮處故。名為所緣。只此所緣境。又有牽心令生。是心之所託故。復說名緣。即所緣為緣。名所緣緣。緣是體。所緣是用。所緣即緣。持業釋也。然此內識變色之時。隨本質色量之大小。一時頓現大小相分。非別變作眾多極微。然後和合成一相分也。所以有此極微名者。為世間執麤色實有。佛愍其愚。故說極微。令其除析。以入空觀耳。豈謂諸色有實極微哉。雜集論云。當知此中極微無體無實無性。唯假建立。展轉分析。無限量故。但由覺慧。漸漸分析。細分損滅。乃至可析邊際。即約此際。建立極微。問。若諸極微無實體性。何故建立。答。為遣一合想故。若以覺慧分分分析所有諸色。爾時妄執一切諸色為一合想即便捨離。由此順入數取趣無我性故。又為悟入諸所有色非真實故。若以覺慧如是分析所有諸色至無所有。爾時便能悟入諸色皆非真實。因此悟入唯識道理。由此順入諸法無我性故由此下總結。

餘無對色是此類故至而可說為真實色法。

次破無對色。此類此字。指極微言。既名無對。即無色相。色法不成。心法何異。彼有對色。以理破除。識外尚無。而況無對乎。量云。無對色是有法。定非實色是宗。因云。極微類故。許無對故。喻如心心所。

表無表色豈非實有至假名語表於理無違。

次傍問分二。先破表色後破無表色。今初。有所表示。故名有表。由動發勝思發動身語。恭敬乞願。令知所為。名為有表。防發功能。自他不知。無表示相。名為無表。無表色。即受所引色。前已具明。外有對色。可非實有。表無表色。現有表示防發功能。豈非實有。此問意也。且身表下。答破。先破有宗計形。有宗云。身表許別形。故形為身表。如合掌等。許有別形。形即是表。表善惡故表即是業。此之形色。依身起故。名為身業。論主破云。若言是形。便非實有。形是長短方圓假色。依多顯色。假立長等。若分析時。長等極微不可得故。次破正量部計動。彼執動名身表。以身動時。由業動故。論主破云。若言是動。亦非實有。行動之時。即是有為。一切有為。皆有剎那。纔得自體。從此無間必滅歸無。若此處生。即此處滅。無容從此轉至餘方豈有動義。有為法滅不待因者俱舍云。待因謂果。滅無非果。故不待因。滅既不待因。纔生已即滅。若初不滅。後亦應然。以後與初有性等故。既後有盡。知前有滅。廣如彼論。次復破有宗轉計。彼計云。別有一色名身表業。既非青黃明暗顯色。亦非長短方圓形色。是心力大。發動勝思。引生此色。能令手等合掌曲跽屈伸取捨。即以此色為身表業。論主破云。此亦不然。此引生色。以何為性。若言以動為性。其失已破如前。若言動因為性。動因即是風界。風非表色。觸身而知。觸唯無記不通善惡。云何成業。俱舍論說。身表唯通善不善性。不通無記。以無記心。勢力微劣。不能引發諸強業故。非顯之風。既是無記。非身表色。非顯香味。亦屬無記。亦非身表類觸應知。故身表業定非實有。然則此業何由而起。由是內心能轉變故。令第八識所變手等。作善作惡。因生果滅。因滅果生。相續不斷。轉趣餘方。似有動作。表示此心。故名身表。豈離識外別有一法名身表哉。語表亦非實有聲性者。以教中言。名等是假。聲是實故。然名等即多剎那聲集成一字。集多字為所依。次能成名。詮諸法體。多名以後。方成句身。詮法差別。仁王護國般若經云九十剎那為一念。一念中一剎那經九百生滅。從唯臍等七處一剎那間出此聲相。念念滅故。後聲非前聲。故無詮表若云。後後剎那。續前前故。為詮表者此亦不然後念生時若與前念為住相者。生相應無。亦無有滅。而今現見生滅相續。故知後念非前念。故曰多念相續便非實故。此言語者。既屬聲相。便屬有對。外有對色。前已破故。然因下。出正義。識變似聲。謂第八所變影像聲。聲雖念念滅。而能集成名句文身故似有表示。此二正義但約心變。即異小乘。

表既實無無表寧實至現行思立故是假有。

次明無表色。毗婆沙師。經部師。執無表實有。歷引契經為證。詳見俱舍。故此破云。有表尚虗無表寧實。然契經說無表色者。依他分位。假施設故。無表有二。一律儀有表色。即從師受戒時是。由此有表色。方熏得善思種子。有防惡發善功能。立無表色。一不律儀有表色。即正下刀殺生時是。由此有表色。方熏得不善思種子。有防善發惡功能。立無表色。故曰依思願善惡分限假立無表。此似兼善惡說。下依勝身語。乃是就善一邊說。善是所發。惡是所防。故曰善惡思種。問。無表色以何為體。答。受戒之後。思種之上。防惡發善功能為體。問。思有多種。謂審慮決定動發思。何思種子有此功能。答。於三思中。取上品者。初念所熏種上。有此功能。何以故。初念所熏。為無表依故。問。何唯初念所熏之種為無表依。餘後念種不立為依。皆上品故。答。如世皇儲。立一餘非。問。防發功能。從何時有。答。從第三番羯磨竟時。防發功能任運增長。從彼時有。問。此功能何時萎歇。答。犯捨以後。及成佛時。可爾萎歇。問。成佛已後。如何萎歇。答。如瓶滿。更不受添。所以歇也。問。戒有幾種。答。總有三種。謂別解脫戒。定俱戒。道俱戒。別解脫者。從師受戒。別別防非名別解脫。定俱者。入定之時。便有一分防發功能。名定俱戒。道俱者。聖道起時亦能防發。聖道即是無漏智也。問。此等戒法。以何為體。答。別解脫戒。思種為體。問。皆說防發功能為戒。何故却取思及種子。答。既出體性。須取功能所依實體。問定道俱戒。既依現思應自表知。何名無表。答。現思之上。防發功能。豈得自知。問。佛戒萎歇。佛應無戒。且無防發。何用戒為。答。防發功能。雖不增長。戒體仍存。如君子帶劒。亦何傷理。

世尊經中說有三業至唯有內識變似色生。

小乘引經問言。世尊經中說有身口意三業。今撥身語業是假有。豈不違經。論主答云。非撥身語是無。但言身語非是汝等所執實色。能動身思至說名意業。此出三業體。業即是思。思即是識。以顯三業唯識非色之義。思有三種。一審慮思。二決定思。三動發思。以動發思。能動身發語。與身語相應。名身語業。審慮決定二思。唯與意識相應。由彼意念一動之後。審慮決定。然後能動身發語。故名意業。俱舍論說二種時。一籌量時。二作業時。籌量時唯是審慮一種思。其決定動發二思。俱屬作業時。以雖在意地。未有決定。未成業道。故非作業。是籌量也。然動發思。正起身語。作善作惡。說善說惡是二業體。說名為業。亦是審慮決定二思所遊履處。通生苦樂。異熟果故。亦名為道。故知不獨身語為業。為業道。即意亦名為業。為業道。不唯意業。思為自性。即前身三口四。皆以思為自性也。七業道。即身三。口四。身表語表。皆是內思之所發故。假說為業思所遊履。說名業道。俱舍云十業道中。後三唯道。業之道故。立業道名。彼相應思。說名為業。彼轉故轉。彼行故行。如彼勢力而造作故。前七是業。身語業故。亦業之道思所遊故。由能等起身語業思。託身語業。為境轉故。有業之道。立業道名。譬喻論師。執貪瞋等即是意業。依何意釋彼名業道。應問彼師。然亦可言彼是意業。惡趣道故。立業道名。或互相乘。皆名業道。是則有表無表。同歸無色。唯有內識變現似色爾。通上一色法竟。

不相應行亦非實有至如餘假法非實有體。

二不相應行分二。先總破。得等非能緣故。不與心心所相應。非質礙故。不與色相應。有生滅故。不與無為相應。故曰不相應行。二十四法中。小乘唯許十四。下束為六段破之。所以者何。徵釋非實義。此十四法。雖曰不與色心相應。然依色心分位段立。不如色心心所實有體相。亦非異色心心所別有作用。由此應知定非實有。顯揚十八云。當知心不相應行。皆是假有。假有之性。略有六種。云何為六。謂若事能起六種言論。何等名為六種言論。一屬主相應言論。二遠離此彼言論。三眾共施設言論。四眾法聚集言論。五不徧一切言論。六非常言論。廣如彼釋。此定非下。以非異色心心所有實體用為宗。宗立三比量。許蘊攝故。因。如色心等喻。或心心所及色無為所不攝故。因。如畢竟無。喻。或餘實法所不攝故。因。如餘假法。喻。許蘊攝者。頌曰。色攝十一全。受想各當一。七十三行蘊。八王識蘊收。謂五根六塵。皆屬色蘊。故云色攝十一全。遍行中受自當受蘊。想當想蘊。故曰受想各當一。五十一心所。二十四不相應。總有七十五法。除受想二。有七十三。此等皆是遷流造作。故行蘊攝。故曰七十三行蘊。八識心王皆是識故。皆識蘊攝。故曰八王識蘊收。是故五蘊攝前九十四法。唯除無為。今得等法既許行蘊所攝。則安得異色心等有實體用哉。又既不與色心無為相應。又非真如實際等實法。則亦龜毛兔角等耳。

且彼如何知得非得至現在必有善種等故。

二別破分七。一破得非得。得者。謂於善不善無記法。若增若減。假立獲得成就。非得者。一名異生性。謂於聖法不得。假立異生性。且彼如何知得非得異色心等有實體用。論主問也。契經下。外人答也。經不說此下。論主辯破。梵語補特伽羅。此云數取趣。謂數數造業取善惡趣。即異生性也。十無學法。謂正語。正業。正命。正念。正定。正見。正思惟。正精進。正解脫。正智。為第七十二解脫道時。證五分法身。立阿羅漢果。名無學位。戒。定。慧。解脫。解脫知見。五分能攝十法。故名十無學法。異生成就善惡。不成就聖法。聖者成就聖法。不成就煩惱。凡聖各有成不成。則互有得不得矣。此外計也。經不說下。論主辯破。俱舍云。諸有為法。若有墮在自相續中。有得非得。非他相續。無有成就他身法故。非非相續。無有成就非情法故。如汝所言。則諸非情及他相續亦應成就。所以者何。契經說故。如契經說。苾蒭當知。有轉輪王成就七寶。乃至廣說。象寶。馬寶。如寶。主藏臣寶。主兵臣寶。皆屬他身。輪寶。摩尼珠寶。皆屬非情。故曰豈即成就他身非情。若謂輪王於七寶有自在業力。應念而有。假說成就者。則前所引善惡等法。何不許其有自在業力。假說成就。而執為實得乎。若謂七寶現在有故。可假說成而善惡不然者誰知善惡法亦不離現在有也。何也。現在之外。無實法也。縱不起現行。而種子常存也。

又得於法有何勝用至得實無故非得亦無。

上明得無實體。此明得無實用。若此得是諸行生因。有能生用。則應現在有情具此得者。於有為生滅法中。應起不生不滅無為之法。從來一切無情之法。此既無有生因之得。應永不生。何俱不然。已失者。過去也。未得者。未來也。言俱生者。揀前後生。法若過去。得亦過去。法若未來。得亦未來。法若現在。得亦現在。為俱生得。此唯無記。勢力劣故。無前後生。不通善惡。俱舍云。若謂此得亦有作用。謂作所得諸法生因。是則無為應無有得。又所得法未得已捨。界地轉易及離染故。彼現無得。當云何生。若俱生得。為生因者。則汝所執生與生生。復何所作。又具縛者。下中上品煩惱現起差別應無。得無別故。若由餘因有差別者。即應由彼諸法得生。得復何用此以上俱舍本文。若謂得是諸法不失之因。有情由此成就諸法者。則諸可成法。不離有情。若離有情。實不可得汝等云何執離色心有得等耶。以諸有情即色心故。故得於法俱為無用。結破得有勝用義。得實無故二句。牒無得義。例破非得。

然依有情可成諸法至於諸聖法未成就故。

此得非得正義。種子業因也。自在。業力也。現行。業果也。集論云。何等種子成就。謂若生欲界。色無色界繫煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若生色界。欲界繫煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。色無色界繫煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若生無色界。欲界色界繫煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。無色界繫煩惱。隨煩惱。由種子成就故成就。及生得善。若已得三界對治道。隨如是如是品類。對治已生如此如此品類。由種子成就。得不成就。隨如是如是品類。對治未生如此如此品類。由種子成就故成就。何等自在成就。謂諸加行善法。若世出世靜慮解脫三摩地三摩鉢底等功德。及一分無記法。由自在成就故成就。何等現行成就。謂諸蘊界處法。隨所現前。若善若不善。若無記。彼由現行成就故成就。若已斷善者所有善法。由種子成就故成就。亦名不成就。若非涅槃法一闡底迦究竟成就。雜染諸法。由闕解脫因。亦名阿顛底迦。以彼解脫得因畢竟不成就故。於成就善巧得何勝利能。善了知諸法增減。知增減故。於世興衰。離決定想。乃至能斷若愛若恚。俱舍云。言生得善者。不由功力修得故。加行善者。要由功力修得。不由功力修得者。若所依中。種未被損。名為成就。種已被損。名不成就。謂斷善者。由邪見力。損所依中善根種子。應知名斷。非所依中善根種子畢竟被害。說名為斷。要由功力而修得者。若所依中。彼法已起。生彼功力。自在無損。說名成就。與此相違。名不成就。如是二種。亦假非實。故所依中。唯有種子未拔未損。增長自在。於如是位。立成就名。無有別物。此類雖多下。結成非得義。見所斷種。即分別惑。斷此惑故。成就聖法。若未永害非聖性法。名異生性。異生。即六趣眾生也。

復如何知異色心等至分位差別假立同分。

二破眾同分。集論云。何等眾同分。謂如是如是有情。於種種類。自體相似。假立眾同分。於種種類者。於人天等種種差別。於自體相似者。於一種類性。首句。論主問也。契經說故下。小乘答也。外執同分有實體者略有二師。勝論執有總同句義。於一切法。總同言智。由此發生。彼復執有同異句義。於異品類。同異言智。於此發生。毗婆沙師所執。與此義類不同。以說一物於多轉故。又縱於彼若顯不顯。然此同分必有實物。契經說故。如世尊言。若還來此。得人同分。乃至廣說。此經不說下。論主總破。若同智言下。展轉辯破。俱舍敘外執云。若無實物。無差別相。名同分者。展轉差別諸有情中。有情有情等無差別。覺及施設不應得有。覺即同智。施設即同言。故此破云。若同智言因斯起故知實有者則草木等應有同分。以不許有無情同分故故俱舍云。又何因不許有無情同分。諸穀麥豆金鐵菴羅半娜娑等亦有自類互相似故。又同分既能起同智言。亦應能起別同分。如是展轉。成無窮過。若不許起別同分。云何許起同智言耶。故俱舍云。又諸同分展轉差別。如何於彼更無同分。而起無別覺施設耶。若謂同分為因而起同事同欲。故知同分是實有者。理亦不然。事即身業。欲即意業。如殺生者。望殺生者。乃至諸邪見者。望邪見者。離殺生者。望離殺生者。乃至正見者。望正見者。皆名同事欲。此皆前生習氣為因。故今生起如是業。豈實有殺生等同分。然後起耶。然依有情下。出正義。謂依於彼彼處受生有情。同界。同趣。同生。同類。位。性。形等。由彼彼分互相似性。假立同分。身心即應上事欲也。

復如何知異色心等至住時決定假立命根。

三破命根。集論云。何等命根。謂於眾同分。先業所感。住時決定。假立壽命。眾同分者。於一生中諸蘊相續。住時決定者。劑爾所時。令眾同分常得安住。或經百年千年等。由業所引。功能差別。又依業所引第八識種。令色心不斷。名為命根。此是正義。餘乘於識暖外。別執壽為命根。死此生彼。以為實有。如世人以命盡為死。詳見俱舍。首句。論主問也。契經說故下。小乘答也。此經不說下。論主總破。又先已成下。展轉辯破。先已成者。前所論過也。先已成立離識。無色。何執離識有別命根乎。若命根離識有。則應如受等。剎那生滅。非實命根矣。量云。汝所執命根是有法。非實命根是宗。因云。異識實有故。喻如受等。小乘問云。既離識外無別命根。只應說識。云何經說壽煖識三。論主答云。雖是一識。義別說三。謂阿賴耶識相分色法。身根所得。名煖。此識之種名壽。以能持識故。現行識是識。故言三法。義別說之。非謂別有體性是則身捨煖時。有餘二不必捨。如無色界生。如餘二捨時。煖必隨捨。然今此生。約義別說。但是一體。如四正斷。即四正勤也。未生善。令速生起。已生善。令其增長。未生惡。令彼不生。已生惡。令速除滅斷就惡言勤就善言。義雖有四。但是一精進數。故以為喻。問。既壽煖不異識者。住無心位。既無有識。壽煖應無。何故此身不即壞爛。答。豈不經說識不離身。無心位中。身雖捨煖。不捨壽識。故身不壞。如無色界。餘二不捨。既爾如何名無心位。小乘問也。論主答云。彼滅轉識。故名無心。非無第八。下文二定。及三卷引滅定有心廣明此義。此識下。結成前義。謂唯此本識。足為三界五趣受果之體。無勞別執離識之外有實命根。然依親生下。出正義。言此者。簡親生餘識種子。言識者。簡相應法種。唯取識故。言種者。簡現行不取第八現行為命根故。彼所簡者皆非命根。今取親生之名言種上。由先世業所引。持身差別功能。令色心等住時決定。依此功能。說為命根。非取生現行識義。以此種子為業力故。有持一報之身功能差別。令得決定若此種子無此功能。身便爛壞。阿賴耶識現行。由此種故。能緣及任持。於眼等法。亦名能持。此種正能持於現行之識。若不爾者。現行之識應不得有。及無能持餘根等法。由此功能故。識持於身。現行內種力故生。及緣持法。不名命根。非根本故。由種生故。此種不由現行有故。種為諸法之根本故。又現行識是所持故。從所持。說能持種識為命根。命根之法。持體非命根。令六處住時決定故。故種子為命根。餘現行色心等非命根。不恒續故。非業所引故。然業正牽時。唯牽此種子。種子方能造生現行。非謂現行名命根。故唯種是根。又夫命根者。依心假立。命為能依。心為所依。生法師云。焚薪之火旋之成輪。輪必攬火而成照。情亦如之。必資心成用也。命之依心。如情之依心矣。

復如何知二無心定至故此三法亦非實有。

四破無心定。滅盡定。無想異熟。無心定者。謂已離淨欲。未離上地欲。由於無想天起出離想。雜集論云。於不恒行心心所滅。假立無想定不恒行者轉識所攝。滅者。謂定心所引。不恒現行諸心心所暫時間滅。滅盡定者。謂已離無所有處欲。或入非想非非想處定。又云。欲超過有頂。作止息想作意為先。故於不恒行諸心心所及恒行一分心心所滅。假立滅盡定。此中所以不言未離上欲者。為顯離有頂欲阿羅漢等亦得此定故。一分恒行者。謂染污意所攝。無想天者。謂於此間得無想定。由此後生無想有情天中。於不恒行心心所滅。假立無想異熟。首句。論主問。若無實性下。小乘答。意謂此三若無實性。何以能遮心心所法令不得起。由此二定。能遮未來諸心心所暫不起故。若無心位下。論主辯破。若有實法遮心不起名無心定。則亦應有實法礙色不起名無色定。既不許色由礙無。云何執遮心是實。如堤塘是假。亦能遮水。何須實法。乃能遮心乎。謂修定時下。出正義。定加行者。定前方便也。麤動心者。前六轉識也。不言第七者。以二定同釋。唯就無想義故。勝期願者。勝願心起。期生靜慮。願力漸增。麤動漸細。由細入微。微而又微。以此微心。熏蒸第八。成極增上厭心種子。損伏麤動心心所種。麤動心等亦不現行。依此心心所現行伏滅分位。假立二種定名。種通善性。故此二定。俱名為善。無想定前下。別顯無想異熟正義。謂修定時。求彼天果。熏成種子招彼天異熟。受彼天果報。故俱舍云。此法一向是異熟果。誰之異熟問。謂無想定答。無想有情。居在何處問。居在廣果。謂廣果天中。有高勝處。如中間靜慮。名無想天答。彼為恒無想。為亦有想耶問。生死位中。多時有想。言無想者由彼有情。中間長時。想不起故。如契經說彼諸有情。由想起故。從彼處歿。然彼有情。如久睡覺。還起於想。從彼歿已。必生欲界。非餘處所。先修定行。勢力盡故。於彼不能更修定故。如箭射空。力盡便墮。若諸有情。應生彼處。必有欲界順後受業。如應生彼北俱盧洲。必定應有生天之業。故此下。總結三法非實。

## 成唯識論卷第一