Nyāyapraveśa (因明正理門論)

Nyāyapraveśa

Translation by Tripitaka Master Yijing of the Tang Dynasty, by Imperial Command

The Treatise states: In order to succinctly grasp the true principles of establishing correct views and refuting erroneous ones, this treatise was composed. The verse says:

The Treatise states: This treatise is now composed to establish the correct meaning and to verify the true principle. The statement "the proposition and so forth, these multiple expressions, are called the means of establishment" is made to clarify the purpose, the subject matter, and the objective. The purpose refers to the motivation of benefiting all sentient beings and so on. The subject matter refers to the meaning to be explained, namely the proposition and so forth. The objective is to verify and confirm the true meaning. If it is said that to clarify the purpose and other aspects, this statement is placed at the beginning of the treatise, because this meaning has already been explained elsewhere—just like direct perception—what is meant by "explained elsewhere"? When the treatise is understood later, this should not be stated at the beginning. If so, it is not a part of the treatise, just like other statements. The reason "because this meaning has already been explained elsewhere" is invalid. If one understands the meaning only after studying the treatise later, the intellect, having first heard about the purpose and so on, would not engage at the outset without understanding; it is through this understanding that one later grasps the meaning. Not being a part of the treatise, this too is invalid. Suppose it is argued thus: since it is not a sutra nor a commentary, it certainly is not a component. Who would comment on this sutra? Who would treat this as a sutra? Therefore, it should be known that, just as the words of Devadatta are not a component, the purpose of treatises also constitutes a part; since this reason exists, the objection of invalidity is far-fetched. Others further object: Do not compose this treatise, for it lacks a purpose and so on, like the words of a madman. To show that this reason is invalid, the reply is: what is called the means of establishment, the refutation of erroneous meanings, and so on. If it is said thus: do not compose this treatise, because it explains meanings already clarified, like the second *Nyāyamukha*. The characteristics of the proposition and so on have already been explained in the *Udāna*; this reason shows that the objection is invalid. Is it not that the means of establishment and so on verify the true meaning? Yet this treatise and so on do not verify the true meaning, so it does not constitute a fault. Thus far, the author's presentation of the thesis has been clarified. Below, the main text will be explained in order.

"Many statements such as the thesis are capable of establishing" means that through many statements—the thesis, reason, and example—one debates and explains to open up and reveal meanings that others have not yet understood. These many statements are called "capable of establishing" in texts like the *Treatise on Reasoning*. Also, speaking of "a single statement capable of establishing" is to show that they collectively form one capacity to establish. From this, it should be understood that if any part is missing, it is called a fault in the capacity to establish.

The phrase "in this" serves to initiate the discussion or to specify and hold. It is within the thesis and so on, hence "in this." The word "only" is used to distinguish and exclude. "According to one's own intention" shows that one establishes the thesis without regard for the opponent's position, following one's own will. "What one is pleased with" refers to what is to be established, meaning it is not pleased to be the nature of what is capable of establishing. If it were otherwise, what is said to be established would resemble a reason or example and should also be called a thesis. To show the avoidance of other faults in establishing a thesis, it says, "not contradicted by that meaning." If it is not contradicted by the meaning expressed, as in establishing "all statements are false"; or if it contradicts a previously established thesis, as when the fox cub establishes "sound is permanent"; or if, due to being unshared, there is no inference, and it is contradicted by the meaning of an agreed-upon statement, as in saying "the one carrying a rabbit is not the moon, because it is not the case"; or if, regarding the subject, what is established is contradicted by the meaning of agreed-upon direct perception or inference, as in establishing "sound is not audible" or "a pot is permanent," etc.

Those who say that a contradiction between thesis and reason is called "thesis contradiction" are mistaken; this is not a fault of the thesis. For in this case, establishing "sound is permanent, because all things are impermanent" is a faulty method of using an example to establish a dissimilar case. By combining the example, it shows it is not "all things." This reason does not exist, because sound is included in "all things." Or it is part of what is to be established, so this meaning is not established, which is called a fault of the reason. The example also has a fault, because the dissimilar example first shows the absence of the thesis, then says the reason is absent. It should be stated: "impermanent all things" means it is not the case of "not all things"; however, here it is颠倒 stated as "all things are impermanent," so in this case, the example also has a fault.

Thus, the thesis and pseudo-thesis have been explained. Reasons and pseudo-reasons are mostly properties of the thesis. Their distinguishing characteristics will now be shown. The verse says:

Discussion: Isn't it that the thesis is generally established by what is agreeable to both parties? Why then is it said here that the thesis only takes the subject as its basis? There is no error in this. Because general terms can also apply to specific instances, like saying "the robe is burning"; or sometimes the term "thesis" refers only to the property. Here, the property of the thesis is taken only as what both the proponent and the opponent definitively agree upon. The same applies to being present or absent in the similar instance, and so on. Why? Because here we rely solely on the inferential cause for understanding; it is only through the power of intelligence that we comprehend the meaning expressed, not like the productive cause that brings about an effect. If so, since intelligence is taken as the inferential cause, wouldn't the statement lose its capacity to establish? This is not the case either, because it causes the other to recall what was originally agreed upon. Therefore, here we take only what is definitively agreed upon by both sides as the proper expression. Thus, if there is no mutual agreement, it is definitely not the property of the thesis, as in establishing "sound is impermanent because it is visible." Also, if the opponent does not agree, as in arguing "because it is produced" against the Sāṃkhya school. Or if there is doubt, as when relying on smoke to raise suspicion, establishing "there is fire where the elements are combined because smoke is observed." Or where the subject is not established, as in establishing "the self is all-pervading because pleasure, etc., arise everywhere." All such statements of every kind are not valid means of proof. Regarding presence or absence in the similar instance, and so on, it should be understood accordingly. In what will be discussed regarding the reason, contradictory reasons, and inconclusive reasons, only mutually agreed-upon definitive statements are called valid proof or valid refutation. Not statements that are mutually unestablished or doubtful, which require further proof. Now, to establish the property of the thesis, one should logically use another property as the reason to establish this property. If one instead establishes the subject as existent or nonexistent, as in establishing "the Supreme exists because we see individual things having a universal class," or establishing it as "nonexistent because it is unperceived"—what does this mean? Here, one only establishes "individual things necessarily have a cause" as the thesis, not "the Supreme," so there is no such error. If establishing it as "nonexistent," one provisionally posits "the unperceived," so there is also no fault regarding the subject. If one uses a subject to establish another subject or a property, as using smoke to establish fire, or using fire to establish heat—what does this mean? Here, it is not that "fire" or "heat" is established as the thesis, but only that the corresponding thing is established. If not, then relying on smoke to establish fire or relying on fire to establish heat would make a part of the thesis the reason. Also, here it is not intended to establish the existence of fire or heat, as they are already known. Furthermore, here the property and subject are considered in terms of what is to be established, not as quality and possessor of quality, so there is no fault. To reiterate in verse:

Discussion: If one establishes the argument, "Sound is not permanent, because it is produced by actions, and what is permanent should be perceivable," how can this be called a valid logical reason? This points out the flaw in the opponent's reasoning, because the reason given within the argument already presupposes what is to be proved, as indicated by the word "should." It first assumes "permanence implies being intangible," and then merely asserts the thesis while refuting the reason given.

If one instead argues, "Sound is impermanent, because what is produced is not permanent, and what is permanent is not produced," how does this work? This is an example of proper reasoning. Through positive and negative examples, one demonstrates that the reason necessarily accompanies the thesis, and where the thesis is absent, the reason is necessarily absent. Here, by showing the connection, the reason "being produced" is established. Thus, this sound is definitely produced, not unproduced, and this property of being produced is certainly a valid logical reason. To reiterate in verse form:

The treatise states: This has already explained the method of refutation by contradiction, because the property of being produced is seen in impermanent things, and not seen in permanent things. Thus, it establishes that "sound is not permanent, because it is produced." Therefore, the method of direct proof and refutation by contradiction are not separate types of logical reasons. As for refuting the Sāṅkhya school, I have already extensively debated it, so we should now stop expanding on these side discussions.

The three types of relationship between the reason and the subject are: presence in the similar class, absence in the similar class, and both presence and absence in the similar class. First, let's set aside the word "both."

Here, a "similar class" refers to a class of things that is closely related and equivalent to what is to be proven, because all characteristics can be called a "class." If what is to be proven is absent, it is called a "dissimilar class," but this does not mean it is contradictory to or different from the similar class. If it were contradictory, it would only serve to exclude; if it were merely different, there would be no reason. Based on this principle, the reason "because it is produced" can prove "impermanence" and "non-self," etc., without contradiction. If a reason can prove contradictory conclusions, it is a contradictory fallacy and is called a false reason. Just as with non-contradictory reasons, contradictory reasons also follow: where the property to be proven is absent, the reason must also be absent. Unlike the case of a vase, where the reason leads to uncertainty because the reason is present in some cases where the property is absent. For example, "being produced" is observed in things like cloth apart from vases, but "being produced" is not observed apart from impermanence in cases like non-self, etc. How can a different property apply in a different context? Because they are similar, we do not use a different name but say it is the same, so there is no error. If we do not say it is different, how can this reason be called a property of the subject? Here, we only say it must be a property of the subject, not that it is exclusively a property of the subject. If that were the case, the similar class should also be called the subject? No, because the property to be proven is discussed separately. The reason must be non-deviating to form a valid inference, so they are not similar.

Furthermore, each of these has three subtypes: within the category of presence in all similar cases, regarding the dissimilar class, it may be present, absent, or both present and absent. For the categories of absence in the similar class and both presence and absence in the similar class, each also has these three subtypes. If there is no dissimilar class for the thesis of impermanence, as in a debate where the opponent does not assert the existence of space, etc., how can we say the reason is absent there? If it is not present there, it does not apply there, and there is no doubt at all, so there is no fallacy.

Thus, combining these, we have nine types of relationship between the reason and the subject. In order, they are briefly explained as follows:

1. Proving "sound is permanent, because it is knowable"; 2. Proving "sound is impermanent, because it is produced"; 3. Proving "sound is produced by effort, because it is impermanent"; 4. Proving "sound is permanent, because it is produced"; 5. Proving "sound is permanent, because it is audible"; 6. Proving "sound is permanent, because it is produced by effort"; 7. Proving "sound is not produced by effort, because it is impermanent"; 8. Proving "sound is impermanent, because it is produced by effort"; 9. Proving "sound is permanent, because it is intangible."

These nine types are summarized in two verses:

The verses say:

The treatise states: Such distinctions are explained as the reasons of valid proof, contradiction, and inconclusiveness. Therefore, the root verse says:

Here, only two types are called "definitive reasons": First, when the reason is fully present in all similar cases and entirely absent in dissimilar cases. Second, when the reason is sometimes present and sometimes absent in similar cases, but entirely absent in dissimilar cases. Among the first and third categories, take the middle one.

Only two types are called "contradictory reasons," because they overturn the argument: When the reason is present in dissimilar cases, or present in both types; And when it is entirely absent in all similar cases. From the second and third categories, take the first and last.

The remaining five types are uncertain, both as reasons and as contradictions, meaning they are doubtful reasons.

Moreover, in all cases of reasons and their counterparts, it is said that only one characteristic should be considered of the same kind. Do not say that two opposing characteristics can coexist in the same reason, or that one characteristic acting in two ways makes the reason incomplete.

Logically, four types should be called "uncertain reasons," because they are present in both similar and dissimilar cases.

What about "the audible"? Because it is unique. If it is unique, then all distinctions of the property to be established are included, making it a doubtful reason. Only that property exists and is included, because it is entirely separate.

All shared properties lack distinguishing reasons. These only do not contradict both sides, making them doubtful.

If a property is partially present in both, it is also a definitive reason, because it distinguishes the rest. This is called "differentiation."

If one accepts that sound is eternal, this could be a reason. If at that time there is no demonstration that "being produced" is a reason for impermanence, this might be acceptable. But since both can be shown to contradict a single meaning, it is not permissible. Thus, it is a hesitant reason.

Here, the power of direct perception and scriptural authority is superior. Therefore, one should rely on these to seek certainty.

To summarize in verse:

The Treatise states: Having thus distinguished between valid reasons and fallacious reasons, I shall now explain valid examples and fallacious examples. The verse says:

Discussion: There are two types of analogy: the method of similarity and the method of difference.

The method of similarity is illustrated by the argument: "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced by effort. All things produced by effort are seen to be impermanent, like a jar, and so on."

The method of difference is illustrated by: "All things that are permanent are seen not to be produced by effort, like space, and so on."

The former affirms by exclusion, while the latter merely prevents misunderstanding. Through combination and separation, we infer the meaning.

Thus, even when facing those who do not assert the real existence of space and the like, we can still demonstrate that there is no case where the proposition lacks a reason.

Furthermore, why is it that in the first method we say the reason follows the proposition, while in the second we say the proposition does not exist without the reason, but we do not say the reason does not exist without the proposition?

By stating it this way, we can show that the reason is definitely present in similar cases and entirely absent in dissimilar cases, without stating it incorrectly.

A verse also states:

Now, having explained the two methods of agreement and difference in correct and inverted examples, what remains similar to these constitutes the meaning of fallacious examples. What is this remainder? It refers to cases where, although there is agreement or difference between the thesis, the reason, and dissimilar instances, they are stated in a reversed manner. Or cases where neither agreement nor difference is established, but only the co-presence of the thesis and reason is shown, while their absence in dissimilar instances is displayed. In such cases, the two methods may have one or both aspects unestablished or unexcluded.

For example, when establishing the proposition "Sound is eternal because it is intangible," the example of agreement is stated as: "Whatever is intangible is seen to be eternal, such as karma, atoms, or a vase," etc. The example of difference is stated as: "Whatever is non-eternal is seen to be tangible, such as atoms, karma, or space," etc. From this, it has been explained that in the example of agreement, the subject may be unestablished, as when referring to space, which is not accepted as eternal, etc.

Is it necessary to have both types of examples to establish a valid proof? Or, as with the reason, is stating one sufficient? According to correct reasoning, both should be stated, as this fully demonstrates that the thesis does not deviate from the reason. By fully displaying the necessary presence in similar instances and the universal absence in dissimilar instances, one correctly counteracts contradictions and uncertainties. If one part is already established for someone, stating only the other part can also constitute a valid proof. If, as with sound, both meanings are mutually accepted, neither needs to be stated. Or, by implication, one can reveal both.

Furthermore, in inference, only this principle is observed: If the characteristic is ascertained in the subject of inference, one remembers its necessary presence in other similar instances, and its universal absence in instances where it is not found. Therefore, through this, certainty arises. Hence, the original verse states:

The treatise states: To reveal the nature of the property in the proposition to be proved, the reason is stated; to reveal the inseparability of this property, the example is stated; to reveal what is to be proved, the proposition is stated. In the process of proving, aside from these, there are no other components. Thus, other elements such as detailed examination, combination, and conclusion are excluded. If that is so, should the example not be considered a separate component, since it clarifies the meaning of the reason? Although this is true in practice, the reason is stated solely to reveal that it is a property of the subject, not to reveal the presence or absence of the property in similar or dissimilar cases. Therefore, the similar and dissimilar examples must be stated separately. If only the meaning expressed by the reason is called the reason, what error would there be? And what benefit would there be? The benefit is that stating the example separately is considered an advantage. It should be like the expedient means spoken of in the world, which does not correspond to the meaning of the reason. If so, what is the error? This explanation should only analogize the meaning of what is to be established, lacking the function of being a valid proof. Because it only states the property of being produced, analogizing to similar cases, it does not state the meaning of the reason and what is to be established. Moreover, when the reason and example are separate, even with similar and dissimilar cases of what is to be established, they ultimately cannot reveal the inseparability of the reason and what is to be established. Therefore, it only analogizes the meaning of what is to be established but lacks function. Why does it lack function? Because in the similar example, it is not necessary that the property of the subject and the meaning of the proposition are analogous. Furthermore, since this relies on other analogies to establish what is to be proved, it would lead to an infinite regress. Also, it is not necessarily the case that there are fixed categories, nor is it that in dissimilar cases, the absence of the property cannot be shown to distinguish and serve as an analogy. Therefore, it is stated in verse:

Discussion states: In the world, it is only shown that the dissimilar example of the thesis and the reason possessing the same property in the same location serves as the dissimilar example, not that the absence of the thesis means the absence of the reason, thus it definitely lacks capability. If only the thesis's property is taken as the nature of the reason, then even what is indeterminate should also become a reason. How can there be this error when possessing both the thesis, the reason, and the two kinds of examples—similar and dissimilar? If at that time the dissimilar example of the thesis is not of a single kind, then this error arises, as in the first and last three cases each with their final example. Therefore, the three characteristics are definitely only to reveal the reason. By this reasoning, although all parts can serve as reasons to reveal the thesis, only one part is provisionally called the reason. Thus, briefly stated, the thesis and so forth, as well as their semblances, are collectively called the valid proof and semblances of valid proof. According to what is appropriate, for the sake of enlightening others, this valid proof and semblances of valid proof are explained. For one's own enlightenment, there are only perception and inference. Verbal testimony, example, and so forth are included within these, thus there are only two means of knowledge. Through these, one can understand the particular and the universal. There is no other object of knowledge apart from these two, and to know it, no other means of knowledge is established. Therefore, the root verse says:

The text states: "Direct perception eliminates conceptualization" means that if there is cognition of objects such as form, free from all kinds of conceptual constructs—categories, names, conventional designations, undifferentiated notions, various conceptual frameworks, and discriminations—and it arises from a unique condition, manifesting distinctly in each moment, it is called direct perception. Therefore, the verse says:

Discussion: The mental ground also possesses states free from all conceptual discrimination, which are realized only through direct experience. Moreover, the self-aware aspects of desires such as greed, as well as the meditators’ freedom from doctrinal distinctions, are all direct perception. Here, there is no separate result of cognition, for it is this very nature that appears as objects and seems to function—thus provisionally called cognition. If the self-aware aspects of desires like greed are also direct perception, why are discriminative knowledges excluded here? This does not deny the direct perception of self-awareness, as it is non-conceptual. However, in this context, the aspect that cognizes other objects is not called direct perception. Hence, it is said that recollections, inferences, wishes, doubts, confused knowledges, and the like—such as the mirage-like perceptions—are not direct perception, because they operate based on prior conceptual conditioning. All conventional existences, such as the knowledge of pots, numbers, actions, existence, pot-nature, and so forth, are semblances of direct perception. Regarding truly existent things, they impose other characteristics, artificially combining with other meanings, and thus operate through conceptual discrimination.

Having explained direct perception, we now turn to inference. "The remainder arises from the stated reason" means that the cognition is preceded by a prior cognition, and the remainder arises from the valid reason as described, serving as the basis for that meaning. This has two aspects: first, the discerning cognition regarding the object of inference, which arises either from direct perception or from inference; and second, the recollection that this reason is inseparable from the proposition to be established. Through this, the previously mentioned power of the stated reason is accomplished, because one recalls that the reason necessarily exists in similar cases, and so on. Since it is the reason for inference, whether immediate or remote, both are called inference. This is stated in terms of the means and the agent. Thus, it should be understood that the inference for the sake of others also does not depart from this in order to establish validity. Therefore, the verse states:

Discussion: Why is this section established separately from the previous section on direct perception? For the sake of presenting two distinct approaches, here we should also speak of inference in terms of its result, while there we should also speak of direct perception in terms of its cause—neither is excluded.

Having explained valid proof and fallacious proof, we shall now explain valid refutation and fallacious refutation. The verse states:

The text states: The phrase "statements that point out flaws such as incompleteness" here refers to the various types of faults in the statements mentioned earlier, like incompleteness. Each of these statements is called a "valid refutation," because each one can reveal that the previous argument was not well-constructed.

The phrase "fallacious refutations refer to the categories" means that fallacies such as the "similar example" and others are called "fallacious refutations." This is because they are mostly set up to confuse others about sound reasoning. They do not demonstrate that the previous argument is unsound, since they refute it incorrectly and are applied where a valid refutation should be used. Because they belong to that category, they are called "fallacy types."

If such fallacies are employed in an incorrectly constructed argument, or if one does not understand the faults in the reasoning, or if they are presented merely to illustrate those faults, they are not called "fallacy types."

Discussion: Here, "demonstrating a different class: by establishing similarity through the same method, it is called similarity of the same method" means that establishing something in a reversed manner is called "different establishment." This is explained in terms of the means and the agent. The same method is similarity, hence called "similarity of the same method," as it encompasses all types of fallacies within establishment. The term "similarity" is neuter in gender, corresponding to refutation or following the verses. How does similarity of the same method refute? By stating the cause in the effect and generating transformation, it is explained in this way. Later, as appropriate, it is similarly explained. Here, by establishing through the same method in a reversed manner, it is called "similarity of the same method." For example, if one establishes "sound is impermanent because it is produced by continuous effort," using space as the dissimilar example. Some present space as the similar example, arguing "sound is permanent because it lacks materiality, etc." Thus, in this stated reason, a pot should be the similar example, but space, being a dissimilar example, is presented as similar. Hence, it is called "similarity of the same method."

"Others by the dissimilar method" refers to "similarity of the dissimilar method," which is the remainder of the previous similarity of the same method. Demonstrating a different class, established in a reversed manner through the dissimilar example, in the two types of examples, as previously established, the pot is the dissimilar example. Hence, it is called "similarity of the dissimilar method."

"Distinguishing differences is called distinction": previously, demonstration, etc., were explained; now, distinguishing differences is explained. Understand this as distinguishing the differences within the same method. As previously stated, the pot is the similar example. Within that similar example, there are distinguishing characteristics such as being combustible, etc. Thus, the pot should be impermanent, but sound is not; sound should be permanent because it lacks combustibility, etc. By distinguishing in this reversed manner, it is called "similarity of distinction."

"Should become one without difference": demonstrating the same method was already explained earlier. Because of this, it should become one with that. What is "that"? Since no other method is heard and they are closely related, understand it as the thesis. "Becoming without difference" means falling into the fallacy of no difference. The meaning is clear from these words, so it is not stated who or what becomes without difference. Since it is not separately explained, it means all of this with all of that. For example, if someone says: seeing that pots, etc., share the same method, then other attributes should also be without difference; all attributes of pots should also belong to sound. Thus, all things sharing methods should become one. Here, the fallacy of forcing no difference is suppressed, and to show the distinction between pot and sound, it is not very different from the previous similarity of distinction, so it should be separately explained. If "produced by continuous effort" is used to establish "impermanence," intending to show both are non-permanent in nature, then the thesis and reason fall into the fallacy of no difference. Forcing this to become without difference is called "similarity of no difference." Some say this reason, as it establishes the property to be proved, can also establish its opposite. Because there is no difference, it is called "similarity of no difference."

"Showing another reason for the property to be proved is called similarity of availability": meaning, if it is shown that another reason is available for the property to be proved, then it is called "similarity of availability." For example, someone says: as previously established, "sound is impermanent," but this is not the correct reason because for lightning, light, etc., impermanence can be established through other reasons like direct perception, etc. If that can be established without this, then this is not its reason. Others here provide a different explanation: this is not the correct reason for impermanence because it is not universal. For example, "all forests have consciousness because they have sleep."

"Doubting the reason due to different meanings is called similarity of doubt": corresponding to fallacies, it is expressed in feminine gender. Here, distinguishing different meanings of the thesis leads to the reason being inconclusive, hence called "similarity of doubt." Or distinguishing different meanings of the reason is called the fallacy of similarity of doubt. For example, someone says: as previously established, "sound is impermanent because it is produced by continuous effort." But it is observed that things produced by continuous effort are either manifest or generated, leading to doubt: what is being established here, manifestation or generation? Therefore, such a reason should not be used to prove impermanence.

"Stating the meaning of the dissimilar class, which is undesirable, is called similarity of implication": meaning, someone says: if "produced by continuous effort" is used to argue for impermanence, then by implication, things not produced by continuous effort, like lightning, light, etc., should all be permanent. This is called "similarity of implication." Understand that here the latter part is omitted, so it is only called similarity of doubt and implication.

Furthermore, by what principle are these fallacies of similarity—same method, etc.—arranged differently by other logicians? Because they resemble refutations. The verse states:

The treatise states: The word "many" is used to indicate that there may be alternative objections, and to reveal the fallacy of an unestablished reason that appears valid. Among these, the first four do not correspond at all to the analogical method I have described. They merely follow the conventional analogical method of the world. Although they do not clearly show that the reason is definitive, they encompass its essence, hence they are explained in this way.

By using uncertain reasons such as the "same nature" or "equal example" to establish one's own position, one provisionally claims that the opponent also possesses this attribute. Consequently, this becomes similar to the fallacy of "common uncertainty" or resembles "contradictory determination."

If it is argued that this is solely for establishing one's own position, how can an uncertain argument be called a refutation? It is not that this itself is considered the refutation. Rather, the objection based on uncertainty is called "uncertainty." Since the meaning is expressed through the words, there is no fallacy here. Other cases should also be established in this manner.

If the proposed inference contains the fallacy of uncertainty, or if a definitive reason like "same nature" or "equal example" establishes something, then it can be called a refutation. Such are these objections.

If the power of direct perception is present, inferential reasoning cannot negate its nature. For example, if someone proposes, "Sound is not audible, like a pot, etc.," but we directly perceive that sound is audible, then we should not use its audibility to negate its impermanence. It is not merely because we do not see a negation that it is negated; otherwise, permanence would also be negated.

The second type, "non-difference similarity," resembles the fallacy of an unestablished reason. It erroneously superimposes "arising from non-existence" onto the proposition, thereby creating a single fallacy for both the proposition and the reason. Here, the well-established property of "arising from non-existence" is used to prove non-existence after cessation. If one directly establishes that, it could constitute a valid refutation.

The third type, "non-difference similarity," establishes a contradiction to the proposition. Because it poses a difficulty, it resembles a fallacy. Since attributes like "being burnable" are not definitive, if they were definitive, it could constitute a contradiction.

The "attainability similarity" involves an uncertain proposition, hence it resembles a fallacy. If the reason proposed also applied to permanence, it could constitute a refutation. The second type of "attainability," though not universal, lacks other categories, thus resembling the fallacy of being unestablished. If the proposition is negated, it could be called a refutation. However, the intention here is not to establish that everything is impermanent.

The "indecision similarity" refers to using "produced by continuous effort" to establish destruction. If one superimposes "production" onto the proposition to raise an objection of uncertainty, this resembles the fallacy of uncertainty. If one does not discriminate regarding the proposition but only raises a difficulty by distinguishing the reason of "production," this resembles the fallacy of being unestablished. This is because the intention here is not to establish destruction solely through production. Whether through production or manifestation, all are subject to destruction; it is not a matter of uncertainty.

The "implication similarity" uses an inverted uncertainty as an objection, thus resembling the fallacy of uncertainty. If one establishes permanence or impermanence without "produced by continuous effort," or establishes that only what is produced by continuous effort is impermanent and nothing else, then it could constitute a refutation.

The verse says:

The treatise states: "If one argues based on 'arriving or not arriving,' 'the three times,' or 'no cause' to make unfavorable claims—these are fallacies." Regarding the "arriving or not arriving" fallacy: If the establishing reason arrives at the thesis to be proven, then since there is no distinction between them, it should not be considered the thesis to be established—just as when pond water merges with seawater, they become indistinguishable. Moreover, if it does not succeed in proving, then it cannot be said to have arrived. If the thesis is already established, what need is there for a reason? If the establishing reason does not arrive at the thesis, then since "not arriving" and "not being a reason" are no different, it should not qualify as a reason. This is called the "arriving/not arriving" fallacy.

Regarding the "three times" fallacy: If the establishing reason exists before the thesis, then since the thesis is not yet established, whose reason is it? If it exists afterward, the thesis is already established—what need is there for a reason? If they exist simultaneously, then both the reason and what depends on it fail to be established, like the two horns of an ox. This is called the "no cause" fallacy.

Here, as explained earlier, these are sequentially distinct fallacies, but they are both categorized as "apparent deficiencies in reasoning." Why? Because they unreasonably deny all valid reasoning. What is flawed here? Merely not arriving does not negate a valid reason—even if the characteristics of a reason correspond, it is still not called a reason. Similarly, what is flawed? Merely existing before the thesis does not disqualify it from being a reason—it does not thereby cease to be an establishing factor.

Moreover, these arguments suffer from self-contradiction, as they refute their own basis. Thus, in arguments based on verbal reasoning and intellect, there appear to be deficiencies in reasoning. In arguments based on meaning, there appears to be a failure of establishment, as they unreasonably deny the causes of all phenomena. As with the two reasons mentioned earlier, in terms of meaning, neither is established as a "non-created capacity to create"—this does not accord with right reasoning. Only when refuting through correct reasoning can it be called a valid refutation.

The verse says:

The text states: "The argument that says, 'Since the cause did not exist before, there should be nothing to establish, and this is called the 'no-statement' fallacy,'" refers to a claim such as: In the previously established argument, if the impermanent nature is proven by this cause, but before this statement was made, the cause did not exist at all, then because the cause does not exist, impermanence should not be established. This is called the "no-statement" fallacy.

"Similarly, the 'unproduced' fallacy arises from the absence of a cause before production, so there is nothing to establish." This is also called the "unproduced" fallacy. The phrase "similarly" indicates an analogy: just as the cause did not exist before the sound, there should be nothing to establish. In this case, just as there is nothing to establish, it should also be understood that there is a contradiction to what is established. For example, someone might argue: In the previously established argument, if the sound before its production did not arise from effort, it should not be impermanent; and since it did not arise from effort, it should be permanent. This is called the "unproduced" fallacy.

"The 'produced' fallacy differs slightly, showing that what is established is not valid, and is called the 'produced' fallacy." This refers to the established argument: "Because it is produced, like a pot, sound is impermanent." If the pot differs in its produced nature, it could be impermanent, but what does that have to do with sound? This is called the "produced" fallacy.

"Many such fallacies resemble the thesis." This means that many fallacies, such as the "no-statement" fallacy, resemble the thesis, like the fallacy of an invalid reason. The word "many" indicates that some may resemble other fallacies. Here, the "no-statement" fallacy adds to the inference by arguing that, based on the proponent's statement establishing impermanence, before the statement was made, the cause did not exist, so this resembles the fallacy of an unestablished reason; or it resembles the fallacy of a missing reason, because before the statement, the reason was added to the proof. If in this case the meaning is shown to be absent, and if during the establishment of the argument no statement is made, it could become a valid refutation.

The "unproduced" fallacy adds to what is established before the sound is produced, arguing that the cause does not exist, and this is called a fallacious refutation. If at the time of establishment, it is shown that this is absent, it could become a valid refutation. If before production, it is argued that "since it did not arise from effort, it must be permanent," this is an implicit inference and also resembles the fallacy of inconclusive reason.

The "produced" fallacy has three types: If it is argued that the produced nature of the pot does not exist in the sound, this resembles the fallacy of an unestablished reason. If it is argued that the produced nature of the sound does not exist in the pot, this resembles the fallacy of contradictory reason. If it is argued that this nature also does not exist in permanence, because it is not shared, it resembles the fallacy of inconclusive reason. Or it resembles the fallacy of the example, because it cites a similar case. Why? Because inference is established by taking the general characteristic, not the specific one. If specific characteristics are taken, they are definitely different, and inference would be impossible. The verse says:

The treatise states: "By accepting both and then demanding a cause, it is called the fallacy of 'seeming contradiction.'" This means that there is an objection: as in the previously established argument that "vases and the like are impermanent," what further proof is there? "This is a challenge directed at the example, called 'seeming example argument.'" This means that the impermanence of vases and the like is already accepted as established, yet one claims it is not established—thus it resembles a challenge against the example, and is called a "seeming example argument." The verse says: