Nyāyapraveśa. (因明入正理論)

A Primer on Logic

Treatise by Acharya Shankarasvamin

Tripitaka Master Xuanzang's Imperial Translation

Thus, this summarizes the essential meanings of all treatises. Here, multiple statements called a "proof" (Skt. *sādhana*) are so named because, through statements of the thesis, reason, and example, they reveal what is not yet understood to those who have questions. A thesis is defined as possessing a property that is commonly accepted and a predicate that is commonly accepted, expressing a distinction that is intended by oneself to be established. For example, one might assert: "Sound is impermanent."

The cause has three characteristics. What are these three? Namely: (1) the property of being present throughout the subject, (2) the property of being present in similar instances, and (3) the property of being entirely absent from dissimilar instances.

What is meant by "similar instances" and "dissimilar instances"? Any instance that shares the property you are trying to prove is called a "similar instance." For example, if you are establishing that something is "impermanent," then things like pots, which are impermanent, are considered similar instances.

"Dissimilar instances" are those where the property you are trying to prove is absent—for instance, "whatever is permanent is not made by effort, like space."

Now, among these, the property of being produced by effort or being created, which is present throughout the subject, is the first characteristic. The property of being present in similar instances and the property of being absent from dissimilar instances are the other two characteristics. Together, these three are the cause for establishing qualities like impermanence.

There are two kinds of analogies: one is the positive analogy, and the other is the negative analogy.

The positive analogy refers to the case where the cause is shown to accompany the quality to be proved in similar instances. For example: “If something is produced, you will see that it is impermanent, like a pot.”

The negative analogy refers to the case where, when the quality to be proved is absent, the cause is also entirely absent. For example: “If something is permanent, you will see that it is not produced, like space.”

In this context, “permanent” means “not impermanent,” and “not produced” means “without production.” Just as something can exist as non-existent, we call it “non-existent.”

When an argument is presented with these multiple statements to enlighten others, it is called a "valid proof." For example:

- "Sound is impermanent" is the statement of the thesis. - "Because it is produced" is the statement of the reason. - "Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot" is the statement of the universal example. - "Whatever is permanent is seen not to be produced, like space" is the statement of the counterexample.

These three parts alone constitute what is called a "valid proof."

Even though a thesis aims to establish a logical point, if it contradicts direct perception or other valid means of knowledge, it is called a Fallacious Thesis. These fallacies include: contradicting direct perception, contradicting inference, contradicting one’s own tradition, contradicting common sense, contradicting one’s own statements, having an unaccepted predicate, having an unaccepted subject, having both unaccepted, and being trivially accepted.

Among these: - Contradicting direct perception: For example, saying "sound is not heard." - Contradicting inference: For example, saying "a pot is eternal." - Contradicting one’s own tradition: For example, a Vaisheshika philosopher asserting "sound is eternal." - Contradicting common sense: For example, saying "the rabbit in the moon is not the moon, because it exists," or "a human skull is pure because it is part of a living being, like a conch shell." - Contradicting one’s own statements: For example, saying "my mother is barren." - Unaccepted predicate: For example, a Buddhist telling a Samkhya philosopher, "sound is destructible." - Unaccepted subject: For example, a Samkhya telling a Buddhist, "the self is consciousness." - Both unaccepted: For example, a Vaisheshika telling a Buddhist, "the self is the cause of combination and causation." - Trivially accepted: For example, saying "sound is audible."

All such statements are considered faults of fallacious thesis because they block the true nature of things, fail to achieve their aim, and yield no valid conclusion.

Having explained 'Seeming-Statements' (fallacious theses), we shall now explain 'Seeming-Reasons' (fallacious reasoning). Inconsistent reasons, inconclusive reasons, and contrary reasons — these are known as seeming-reasons.

There are four types of "unestablished" [in logical inference]:

1. Unestablished for Both Sides 2. Unestablished for One Side 3. Dubious Unestablished 4. Unestablished Basis

For example, when trying to prove that "sound is impermanent," saying "because it is visible to the eye" is *unestablished for both sides* — neither side accepts that sounds can be seen.

Saying "because it is produced" is *unestablished for one side* — when arguing against those who believe sound is eternal (Sound Manifestation theory), the reason is only accepted by one side.

When you see something like fog or haze and want to prove "there is fire composed of the elements" by saying "because I see something," that is *dubious unestablished* — you are not even sure what you see is smoke.

Saying "space is a real substance, because it is the basis for qualities" is *unestablished basis* — when arguing against those who deny the existence of space, your reasoning's basis is not accepted by the other side.

The reasons that lead to doubt can be six in number: First, shared; second, unshared; third, present in some similar instances, but present in all dissimilar instances; fourth, present in some dissimilar instances, but present in all similar instances; fifth, present in some similar and some dissimilar instances; sixth, contradictory certainty.

Regarding the first, "shared": for example, saying "Sound is eternal, because it is an object of cognition." This reason is equally present in both eternal and non-eternal things, and is therefore a cause for doubt. Is sound impermanent, like a pot, because it is an object of cognition? Or is it eternal, like space, because it is an object of cognition?

Regarding the second, "unshared": for example, saying "Sound is eternal, because it is audible." This reason is absent from both eternal and non-eternal things, and besides these there is nothing else, so it is a reason that causes hesitation. What sort of thing is this 'audibility' equal to?

Regarding the third, "present in some similar instances, but present in all dissimilar instances": for example, saying "Sound is not produced by human effort, because it is impermanent." Here, the property of not being produced by human effort has things like lightning and space as its similar instances. This 'impermanence' is present in lightning and so on, but absent in space and so on. The property of not being produced by human effort has things like a pot as its dissimilar instances, and impermanence is present in all of them. Since this reason is present in both things like lightning (similar) and things like a pot (dissimilar), it is also a cause for doubt. Is sound produced by human effort, like a pot, because it is impermanent? Or is it not produced by human effort, like lightning, because it is impermanent?

Regarding the fourth, "present in some dissimilar instances, but present in all similar instances": for example, establishing the thesis "Sound is produced by human effort, because it is impermanent." The property of being produced by human effort has things like a pot as its similar instances, and impermanence is present in all of them. Things like lightning and space serve as its dissimilar instances; impermanence is present in some of these, such as lightning, but absent in others, such as space. Therefore, just as before, this is also a reason that leads to doubt.

Regarding the fifth, "present in some similar and some dissimilar instances": for example, saying "Sound is eternal, because it is immaterial." Here, the property of 'eternal' has things like space and atoms as its similar instances; immateriality is present in space and so on, but absent in atoms and so on. Things like a pot and pleasure serve as its dissimilar instances; immateriality is present in pleasure and so on, but absent in a pot and so on. Therefore, because this reason is found in both things like pleasure (dissimilar) and things like space (similar), it is also called a cause for doubt.

Regarding the sixth, "contradictory certainty": for example, establishing the thesis "Sound is impermanent, because it is made by effort, like a pot"; and another establishing "Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like sound-ness itself." Since both of these are reasons that cause hesitation, they are both called causes for doubt.

There are four types of contradictory reasons:

1) A reason contradictory to the self-nature of the predicate (dharma-svarūpa-viruddha-hetu): For example, saying "Sound is eternal because it is produced by effort, or because it arises from continuous effort." This reason exists only in the dissimilar class, thus it is contradictory.

2) A reason contradictory to the special characteristic of the predicate (dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu): For example, saying "The eyes and so forth must be for the use of another because they are composite, like bedding and seats." Just as this reason can establish that the eyes are for the use of another (a self), it can also establish the opposite of the intended predicate—namely, that they are for the use of a composite self—since bedding and seats are used by a composite self.

3) A reason contradictory to the self-nature of the subject (pakkha-svarūpa-viruddha-hetu): For example, saying "'Being' (or 'substance-hood') is not a substance, not a quality, not an action, because it possesses a single substance, possesses qualities and actions, like 'similarity-difference.'" Just as this reason can be used to negate substancehood and so forth, it can also be used to negate "being" itself, since it is equally established in both cases.

4) A reason contradictory to the special characteristic of the subject (pakkha-viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu): For example, the same reason used in the previous case can, with respect to the subject's special characteristic of being a "possessor of existence" (or "capable of being qualified by existence"), also establish the opposite—namely, being a "non-possessor of existence." Just as it can negate substancehood and so forth, it is equally established in both cases.

Thus have the fallacious reasons been explained. Next, the fallacious examples shall be explained.

The incorrect examples of positive analogies are of five types: 1. The example fails to prove the property to be established (the subject’s attribute). 2. The example fails to prove the property used as the reason. 3. The example fails to prove both properties. 4. The example lacks the necessary combination. 5. The example reverses the combination.

The incorrect examples of negative analogies are also of five types: 1. The example fails to exclude what should be excluded for the property to be established. 2. The example fails to exclude what should be excluded for the property used as the reason. 3. The example fails to exclude both. 4. The example does not present the necessary separation. 5. The example reverses the separation.

For the first type of error in positive analogies (the example fails to prove the property to be established): For instance, saying, “Sound is permanent because it has no physical obstruction. Whatever has no physical obstruction is seen to be permanent, like a subtle particle.” But in that case, the subtle particle does possess the property to be established (permanence) but lacks the property used as the reason (no physical obstruction), because subtle particles are physically obstructive.

For the second type (the example fails to prove the property used as the reason): For instance, saying, “Like consciousness.” All instances of consciousness do possess the property used as the reason (no physical obstruction) but lack the property to be established (permanence), because all conscious states are impermanent.

For the third type (the example fails to prove both): This is of two subtypes: existence and non-existence. If one says, “Like a pot,” it fails to prove both (since a pot is both impermanent and physically obstructive). If one says, “Like space,” to someone who denies the existence of space, it fails to prove both regarding non-existence.

For the fourth type (lack of combination): The example does not properly join the two properties; it merely presents both the reason and the conclusion in the same thing, such as saying, “In a pot, we see both being made and being impermanent.”

For the fifth type (reversed combination): One should say, “Whatever is made is impermanent,” but instead says, “Whatever is impermanent is made.” This describes the category of incorrect positive analogies.

Within differing viewpoints, meaning neither what is established nor what is rejected are truly eliminated. For example, someone might say: "All impermanent things are observed to have material obstruction, like an atom." However, the atom does not eliminate the established quality of being eternal, because the atom itself is asserted to be eternal. Similarly, the reasoning (material obstruction) does not eliminate what was supposed to be proven, since the atom is presented as having no material obstruction.

What is not eliminated by the reasoning includes statements like: "Like karma." Here, only the object of proof is eliminated, but not the reasoning itself, since karma is said to have no material obstruction.

What is not eliminated entirely—neither by the object of proof nor by the reasoning—is seen in statements like: "Like space." Space does not eliminate permanence or non-materiality, because space is described as both eternal and immaterial.

What is not separate means: "Like a pot, which is seen to be impermanent and materially obstructive."

What is incorrectly separated means: "All materially obstructive things are impermanent," and so forth.

These kinds of flawed examples—whether concerning the proposition, reason, or example—do not constitute a valid proof.

Furthermore, for one's own awakening, it should be known that there are only two forms of direct knowledge: direct perception and inference. Here, direct perception is that which is without conceptual discrimination. When a correct understanding, regarding forms and other objects of the senses, is free from all conceptual discriminations of names, categories, etc., and engages directly with the object as it presents itself, this is called direct perception. As for inference: it is to examine an object by relying on various characteristic signs. There are three kinds of such signs, as previously explained. Using these as a basis, a correct understanding arises about the object to be inferred — for example, understanding that where there is smoke, there is fire, or that whatever is produced is impermanent. This is called inference. In these two forms of knowing, the cognition itself is considered the result, because it is the nature of verification. And since it appears as if it has a function, it is also considered a standard of knowledge.

**False Perception**

When discriminative understanding processes objects incorrectly, it is called false perception. For instance, when an understanding arises that distinguishes "vessel" or "clothing" based on conceptual labels—such understanding does not take the object's own intrinsic characteristics as its field of focus. Hence, it is called false perception.

**False Inference**

When an inference arises based on false reasons, this is called false inference. There are many kinds of false reasons, as previously explained. When an understanding arises based on such false reasons regarding a supposed object of inference, and it fails to arrive at a correct understanding, this is called false inference.

Next, demonstrating the faults in a valid proof is called a valid refutation. This refers to pointing out: the deficiency of a valid proof itself, faults in the proposition, invalid reasons, indeterminate reasons, contradictory reasons, and faults in the examples. By explaining these faults with clear statements to enlighten the questioner, it is called a valid refutation.

If one falsely claims to show faults in a proof when none exist, it is called a false refutation. For example: claiming that a complete and correct proof is deficient, faulting a flawless proposition, calling a valid reason invalid, labeling a definitive reason indeterminate, branding a consistent reason contradictory, or finding flaws in a perfect example. Such statements are called false refutations, because they fail to reveal any actual faults in the opponent's argument, since no faults are present.

Let us leave this topic here.

A Primer on Logic

Colophon to the Nyāyapraveśa

**Introduction to the Logic of Valid Reasoning**

This treatise on the *Nyāyapraveśa* (Gateways to Reason) serves as a threshold for debate—a means to uphold true principles, refute false views, and reveal what is correct. "*In*" refers to illuminating reality; "*clear*" means clarifying the truth; "*approach*" points toward the fundamental; "*correct*" means departing from error; "*reason*" involves weighing words, discerning their core, and understanding the essential meeting points.

Long ago, when the Buddha attained enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, this system was fully realized. When he turned the wheel of Dharma at Deer Park, its influence spread like wind. The six heretical teachers bowed their heads in defeat and fell silent; the ten ascetic sages submitted and knew where to return. Yet as the celestial light of truth dimmed and the waves of falsehood rose, the wicked multiplied in great numbers. Thus, Vasubandhu (*Shiqin*) carried forward the majestic tradition before him, and Dignāga (*Chenna*) continued the legacy after, refining truth and eliminating error, smoothing difficulties and resolving disputes. Their divine achievements are detailed in other commentaries.

Then came the bodhisattva Āryadeva (Tianzhu Pusa), a sage of the highest caliber, born to continue this work. He studied widely, researched thoroughly, and skillfully compiled the essence, adapting it to the times. He opened eight gateways and revealed two kinds of benefits, trimmed the five-part syllogism, and established the three-part proof. His meaning was simple yet clear; his words concise yet illuminating. The brilliant scholars of the West revered this work deeply, knowing that without mastering this systematic approach, one could not enter into profound discussion.

Emperor Taizong of the Great Tang, rising with the times, unfurled his golden mirror and turned the golden wheel of governance. Receiving the heavenly mandate, he sounded the jade drum and harmonized the jade candle. He spread the profound transformation far and wide, restored the proper order, lit the torch of wisdom to illuminate the city of darkness, and steered the ship of knowledge to ferry beings across the sea of suffering.

Our Tripitaka Master, Xuanzang, possessed extraordinary spiritual insight and noble character, surpassing all others. He practiced the four diligent efforts as if fearing he might fall short; he investigated the three traditions with a thirst for inquiry. Scholars of the Tang region each mastered their own specialties, but Xuanzang, upon seeing them, grasped their subtle points; upon receiving their teachings, he exhausted their profundities. Sighing at the vast distance of sacred traces and the decline of the Buddha's teachings, he often gazed at corrupted texts with regret and pondered doubtful meanings with deep sigh. Looking toward the Snow Mountains, he set his sights high and resolved to journey to Vulture Peak.

Braving dangers and facing hardships, he traveled to seek teachers and inquire about the Dharma. Arriving at the country of Kashmir in northern India, he met the great master Samghayasas. He questioned him deeply on the eight canons and examined the five vehicles. The master, recognizing Xuanzang's solid foundation in great doctrines, taught him the subtle art of logic, which he had not yet fully understood. At the sound of the Sanskrit words, his doubts melted like ice. Later, in the country of Magadha in central India, he encountered the bodhisattva Śīlabhadra, who expanded the examples further, extending their application and refining them with gentle skill.

Thus, he visited many sacred sites, inquiring into the remaining traditions. Though encountering those who argued with brass plates on their stomachs, his eloquence was unmatched, and he caused false doctrines to fall like reeds before the wind. He simultaneously spread this treatise and promoted the transformative influence of the Dharma, bringing blessings and prosperity.

On the sixth day of the eighth lunar month in the twenty-first year of Zhenguan (647 CE), at Hongfu Monastery, the translation was completed by imperial decree. The following monks assisted: - *Ming Jun* (Hongfu Monastery) recorded and verified the text. - *Xuan Mo* (Hongfu Monastery) verified the Sanskrit. - *Xuan Ying* (Great General Maintenance Monastery) corrected the characters. - *Dao Hong* (Great General Maintenance Monastery), - *Ming Yan* (Practical Monastery), - *Hui Gui* (Arhat Monastery), - *Fa Xiang* (Precious Chang Monastery), - *Wen Bei* (Hongfu Monastery), - *Dao Shen* (Fajiang Monastery, Guozhou), - *Shen Tai* (Qiyan Monastery, Puzhou) – all verified the great meaning. The imperial official *Xu Jingzong*, Silver Blue Minister of the Left and Duke of Gaoyang County, supervised the translation by imperial order.

The Tripitaka Master, with humble receptivity, opened this gate of profound mystery. The ocean of meaning is vast and sourceless; the peaks of expression are lofty and hard to scale. Scholars from distant lands all gathered to receive his direct teaching. Their written notes and treatises have spread throughout the world. I, being of limited ability, have been unworthily involved. Receiving the command to verify the text, I happen to participate in this auspicious gathering. I dare to record these events for future generations, that the excellent model and great cause may never fade.