俱舍論頌疏
Abhidharmakosha Shastra
破我品
**Chapter on Destroying Self-Grasping**
夫雲披月現。執喪空明。若不摧邪。將何顯正。此品來意。良有以焉。有滯相之賓迷方之子。法無主宰。橫生我執。身見一起。諸惑隨生。溺三有河。背八正路。其為過也。不亦悲哉。論主將登一子。情慇四心。傷而愍之。故制斯論。執我不同。總有三種。一犢子部。二數論宗。三勝論宗。破此三計。廣如長論。
Clouds part, moon appears. When you lose your grip, space and clarity remain. If you don't cut down the false, how will you reveal the true? There is a reason this chapter appears.
Those who cling to appearances are lost wanderers. Dharma has no master; yet they forcibly cling to a self. Once the view of self arises, all confusion follows. They drown in the river of the three realms, Turning their backs on the eightfold path. How sad is this fault!
The author, with compassion for all beings like an only child, moved by deep feeling, wrote this treatise.
Clinging to self takes three forms: 1. The Vätsīputrīya school 2. The Sāṃkhya school 3. The Vaiśeṣika school
The refutation of these three views is fully explained in the longer text.
今唯釋頌。不可具陳。略舉總宗。以為發起。犢子部者。十八部中之一部也。佛在世時。有一外道。厥名犢子。今此部執。同斯外道。故以標名。此品破中。先破犢子。次破數論。後破勝論。良為此部。是佛弟子。見同外道。殊所不應。故先破之。今言破彼。先料其計。論云。然犢子部執。有補特伽羅。其體與五蘊。不一不異。解云。彼計真我。名補特伽羅。此云數取趣。蘊剎那滅。於轉無能。但由於我。能捨此蘊。能續餘蘊。數取諸趣。故執實我無。名補特伽羅。計我與蘊。不一不異。非斷非常。若言蘊一。蘊滅我滅。便成斷見。若言蘊異。蘊滅我在。是則常見計。皆墮其邊。故知此我。與五蘊法。不一不異。非斷非常。論主破云。汝所執我。為實為假。若言是實。應與蘊異。有別性故。如色等實。與受等異。又有實體。必應有因。如五蘊實。從因生故。若計因生。是則無常。便違汝宗。我非無常。若有實體。不從因生。應是無為。同外道見。又汝計我非無為也。若非因生。又非無為。汝所執我。應成無用。若我是假。便因我說。無實我故。又彼部法。有五法藏。三世為三。無為為四。我為第五不可說藏。我在生死。不可說與三世。為一為異。若入涅槃。不可說與無為亦為一為異。故立此我。為不可說藏。破云。我與前四法藏。若不可說為異故。即不應說為第五法藏。我與前四。若不可說為一故。即不可說為非第五。非第五者。即是前四法藏。既第五非第五。俱不可說。但應建立前四法藏。上來理破。已下教證。論云。薄伽梵告梵志言。我說一切有。唯是十二處攝。若數取趣。非是處攝。無體理成。若是處攝。則不應言是不可說。又汝部誦契經亦言。諸所有眼。諸所有色。廣說乃至苾蒭當知。如來齊此。施設一切。建立一切。有實體法。此中無有補特伽羅。如何可說彼有實體。頻婆娑羅經亦說。此中無有我我所性。唯有一切眾苦法體。將正已生。乃至廣說。據上理教。都無我性。如何犢子橫計執我耶。
Now I will explain the verse. It is not possible to do so in full detail; I will merely outline its main essential points in order to introduce the discussion.
The Vātsīputrīya school is one of the eighteen schools of Buddhism. During the time of the Buddha, there was a non-Buddhist ascetic named Vātsīputra. The views held by this school are similar to those of that non-Buddhist, hence it takes his name. In this chapter's refutation, we first refute the Vātsīputrīyas, then the Sāṃkhya school, and finally the Vaiśeṣika school. The reason is that this school, though composed of Buddhist disciples, holds views identical to those of non-Buddhists, which is entirely inappropriate. Therefore, we refute them first.
Now, in refuting them, we must first examine their doctrine. The treatise says: "The Vātsīputrīya school asserts the existence of a *pudgala* (self), whose essence is neither identical to nor different from the five aggregates." This means that they postulate a true self called *pudgala*, which literally means "that which repeatedly takes births." The aggregates perishing moment by moment, they lack the ability to transmigrate. It is only due to the self that one can abandon this set of aggregates and take up another, repeatedly taking births in various realms. Therefore, they insist on a truly existing self, calling it *pudgala*. They claim that this self is neither one with nor different from the aggregates, and is neither annihilated nor permanent. If it were one with the aggregates, then when the aggregates cease, the self would also cease, which would be the view of annihilation. If it were different from the aggregates, then when the aggregates cease, the self would still exist, which would be the view of permanence. Both views fall into extremes. Hence, they maintain that this self and the five aggregates are neither identical nor different, and neither annihilated nor permanent.
The author of the treatise refutes this, saying: The self you uphold—is it real or conventional? If it is real, it should be different from the aggregates, having a distinct nature, just as real entities like form are different from other aggregates like feeling. Moreover, any real entity must have a cause, just as the five aggregates are real entities because they arise from causes. If you maintain it arises from causes, then it would be impermanent, contradicting your tenet that the self is not impermanent. If it is a real entity not arising from causes, then it should be unconditioned, falling into the view of non-Buddhists. Yet you also maintain the self is not unconditioned. So if it neither arises from mental causes nor is unconditioned, the self you uphold should be useless. If the self is conventional, then it exists merely by convention due to our speech; there is no real self in actuality.
Furthermore, this school's doctrine posits five categories of dharmas: three categories for past, present, and future time; a fourth for the unconditioned; and a fifth, the "inexpressible category," which is the self. During existence in saṃsāra, the self cannot be said to be either one with or different from the three time periods. Upon entering nirvāṇa, it cannot be said to be either one with or different from the unconditioned. Thus, they establish this self as the "inexpressible category."
Refutation: If the self cannot be said to be different from the previous four categories, then it should not be called a fifth category. If the self cannot be said to be one with the previous four categories, then it cannot be said not to be the fifth category—since "not the fifth" would simply be the previous four categories. Since it is impossible to say whether it is the fifth or not the fifth, you should only establish the first four categories, not a fifth.
Thus far, we have refuted this view through reasoning. Now follow scriptural proofs. The treatise says: "The Bhagavān declared to the brahmin, 'I say that all existence is merely included within the twelve sense bases. If the *pudgala* (self) is not included within the sense bases, then logically it has no substance. If it were included within the sense bases, then one could not say it is inexpressible.'" Furthermore, the scriptures your own school recites state: "All eyes, all forms... Monks, you should know—the Tathāgata, only to this extent, designates and establishes all states as having real substance. Within this, there is no *pudgala*. How then can you claim it has real substance?" The *Bimbisāra Sūtra* also states: "In this, there is no nature of self or what belongs to self; there is merely the essence of all suffering dharmas, which are about to arise, or have already arisen," and so on in detail.
Based on the above reasoning and scriptures, there is ultimately no self-nature. How, then, can Vātsīputra mistakenly and obstinately postulate the existence of a self?
從此論主引頌證破。於中有二。一正破。二流通。初有十七行頌是正破。後有三行是流通。初正破中。束成六分。一正顯真空分。第二明佛遍知分。第三置答益物分。第四因相不測分。第五果生先後分。第六業報難知分。就正顯真空分中。初是羅漢尼說。次是世尊說。今則是初。論云。有阿羅漢尼。名世羅(此云小山)為魔王說。
Thus, the author of the treatise presents verses to refute the opponent. This is divided into two parts: first, the actual refutation; second, the concluding transmission. The first part consists of seventeen verses, the second of three.
Within the initial refutation, there are six sections. First, the section revealing the true nature of emptiness. Second, the section on the Buddha's omniscience. Third, the section on setting aside answers for beings' benefit. Fourth, the section on the inconceivability of causes and conditions. Fifth, the section on the sequence of effect and cause. Sixth, the section on the difficulty of understanding karmic retribution.
As for the section revealing the true nature of emptiness, it begins with a nun's teaching, followed by the World-Honored One's teaching. The present text is the first part. The treatise says: There was an Arhat nun named Shaila (meaning "Little Mountain") who spoke to the demon king.
汝墮惡見趣 於空行聚中 妄執有有情
智者達非有 如即攬眾分 假想立為車
世俗立有情 應知攬諸蘊
釋曰。汝墮惡見趣者。標魔過也。汝此魔王。墮惡見趣。身見名惡。一障聖道。二為癡覆。三為惑因。稱之為惡。趣向生死。為流轉因。因之為趣。惡見即趣。名惡見趣。於空行聚中。妄執有有情者。正釋惡見也。五蘊和合。名為行聚。都無作者。稱之為空。執實有情。為惡見也。智者達非有者。顯真空也。有情是假。聖道達非有。既除我執。故顯真空。如即攬眾分至攬諸蘊者。舉喻釋成。初則喻顯。後則法合。攬輪輞等以成其車。車即是假。攬五蘊法。以成有情。情何得實。
The commentary explains: "You have fallen into a wrong view" points out the Mara's fault. O Mara, you have fallen into wrong views. The view of self is called wrong—first, it obstructs the holy path; second, it is covered by ignorance; third, it becomes a cause of confusion. This is why it is called "wrong." Rushing toward rebirth and death is the cause of ongoing transmigration, which we call "tendency." Wrong views themselves are the tendency, which we call "the tendency of wrong views." "In the empty flow of aggregates, mistakenly clinging to a sentient being" is the explanation of the wrong view. The coming together of the five aggregates is called the "flow of aggregates." It is empty because there is no agent. Holding that there is a real sentient being is the wrong view. "The wise realize there is none" reveals the true emptiness. The sentient being is merely a concept. The holy path realizes that it does not truly exist. Once the attachment to a self is removed, true emptiness is revealed. For example, just as one assembles various parts—such as the wheel's rim and spokes—to form a chariot, the chariot is merely a conceptual whole. In the same way, one brings together the five aggregates to form a sentient being. How can this being have any true reality?
其次世尊。於雜阿笈摩中為婆羅門婆抱梨說(婆抱梨此云棗。父母怜子。目此棗名也)。
婆抱梨諦聽 能解諸結法 謂依心故染
亦依心故淨 我實無我性 顛倒故執有
無有情無我 唯有有因法 謂十二有支
所攝蘊處界 審思此一切 無補特伽羅
既觀內是空 觀外空亦爾 能修知觀者
亦都不可得
釋曰。婆抱梨諦聽。能解諸結法者。勸聽法也。結謂結縛。解結妙法。汝善聽之。謂依心故染。亦依心故淨者。標所說法也。心染即染。心淨便淨。汝依淨心結能解矣。我實無我性。顛倒故執有者。釋前依心染也。都無實我。橫計作者。倒想起其心成染焉。無有情無我。唯有有因法者。據依心淨也。果由因起。名有因法。但由因力。果遂得生。果由因生。實無作者。故無我見也。因果和合。假名為人。故元有情也。達有因法。情我見滅。心便淨矣。謂十二有支。至亦都不可得者。釋前有因法也。十二有支。薀處界三。此一切法。唯有因果。無數取趣。但有情身。無數取趣。即是內空。外非情法。亦復法空。修此空觀。亦不可得。詳此經頌。是佛世尊。於小乘經。密談大教。真空之理。於斯盡矣。犢子部難。若無實我。是則世尊非一切智。要因真我。非剎那滅。方頓遍知。以心心所剎那剎那異生滅故。故心心所。非頓遍知。論主答云。但約相續。有堪能故。知一切法名一切智。非由一念能頓遍知。
從此已下舉頌以答。即是第二明佛通知分。於中有二。一舉頌正明。第二引頌證成。今則是初。頌曰。
由相續有能 如火食一切 如是一切智
非由頓遍知
釋曰。火食一切。豈一念火。能燒一切。但約相續。說燒一切。佛智亦爾。但據相續。名一切智。
從此第二引證。犢子部問。如何得知。約相續說。知一切法非我遍知。論主答云。說佛世尊有三世故。犢子部問。於何處說。
從此論主引頌成證。如有頌曰。
若過去諸佛 若未來諸佛 及現在諸佛
皆滅眾生憂
釋曰。此頌既說有三世佛。故約佛智。於相續位。知一切法。不由於我。能頓遍知。以佛世尊三世攝故。彼此計我體是佛世尊。復說我體非三世攝。此頌既說佛在三世。故汝計我非是世尊。我既非佛。明知遍知不由於我。名頓遍知。理必應爾。
俱舍頌疏 論本第二十九