Mahāyāna Ratnakara Śāstra (大乘掌珍論)

Treatise on the Jewel in the Palm of the Mahayana, Volume 2

Chapter by Qingbian Bodhisattva

Translator: Xuanzang, Tripitaka Master of the Great Tang, by Imperial Decree

Thus it has already been explained that a practitioner of insight, by grasping the general characteristics, awakens to the emptiness of the conditioned; but this does not yet include awakening to the emptiness of the unconditioned. Without explanation there is no means to awaken; and without awakening to non-conceptual wisdom, the practices leading to entry can never be accomplished. To explain this, the following is therefore stated: "The unconditioned has no reality; it does not arise, like a sky-flower." Here the words of the thesis are set forth with a qualification; the meaning of the qualification concerning ultimate reality, as above, should be understood accordingly. It is with respect to ultimate reality that the emptiness of the unconditioned is established, not with respect to conventional reality; and it is because it is not conditioned that it is called unconditioned. The sense of "unconditioned" is the counterpart of "conditioned"; that is, space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation, and the nature of true thusness. That is, a portion of the previously eliminated dharma-base is first shown for awakening—the emptiness of the nature of space, because it is easy to explain. It is only with respect to being empty of obstructive material things that the world commonly designates it as "space." Through this as a gate, one awakens to the emptiness of the nature of the remaining unconditioned. This very space known to the world, with respect to ultimate reality, is empty and without reality—this is what is established as the thesis. Since this space, established as without reality with respect to ultimate reality, is admitted by both theses to be non-arising, or is conventionally posited as a non-arising dharma, it is stated as the reason. Since the sky-flower is without reality and also non-arising, it is established as the similar example; no exclusion of the opposite class is stated, so it is not established as a dissimilar example—this should be understood as before. How is the inference established here? "With respect to ultimate reality, space is without reality, because it does not arise. Whatever does not arise is known by both the foolish and the wise to be without reality, like a sky-flower." The reason stated here—"because it does not arise"—briefly cites the name and characteristic; there are further reasons: because it is not made, because it does not make, because it has no destruction. Such reasons can refute the stated emptiness of the unconditioned; therefore, as appropriate, all may serve as reasons. As when it is said, "You should guard this ghee and not let crows come near," to protect the guarded thing from damage, one should also guard against cats, rats, and the like.

The Vaibhāṣika teachers all raise this objection: If the thesis we establish—that unconditioned space is without real existence—were true, then it would be meaningless, and the attainment of the sphere of infinite space would have no object. How could that attainment then occur? But unobstructedness is the characteristic of space. If one formulates an inference for the sake of skillful means, saying "The attainment of the sphere of infinite space truly has an object," or "Its object truly exists, because it is an attainment," or "because it is the object of an attainment"—then, like other attainments or like the objects of those attainments, since the remaining attainments and their objects are conditioned, once we have established that their nature is empty there is no valid example. This is how we analyze the characteristic of space from the ultimate standpoint. From the conventional standpoint, the space that is posited is also not truly existent, because it does not arise—like a flower in the sky. By this inference, what they establish as truly existent is not proven. Moreover, by the very reason I have stated, your reason—"because it is the object of an attainment"—suffers the fault of definite contradiction. Therefore the thesis I established earlier stands, since it is free of obstruction.

There are those who belong to our own school and to other schools who make this statement: "If, with respect to true nature, space is without reality, this is because it does not arise." By this reasoning, whatever arises is real. If one says that things which arise are also without reality, then this reason does not extend to the similar class, and the nature of the reason is not established. This is a case of reasoning by implication, a pseudo-defect resembling the defect of non-establishment. This is an ascertaining statement: all things that do not arise are without reality. It is not an ascertaining statement that all things without reality are entirely non-arising. Even though effort and continuous exertion are not pervasive within the similar class, they are still accepted as a reason; therefore there is no defect here.

There is a further objection: "Space has an intrinsic nature, as the world universally knows; a flower also has an intrinsic nature, as the world directly perceives in the blue lotus and the like. Although space and flower are not mutually associated, they are not without intrinsic nature. Therefore, the analogy of the sky-flower fails to establish what is to be proven." This objection is not valid. This analogy of the sky-flower is to be interpreted, in accordance with the sixth case-ending, as a possessive compound meaning "the flower of space," and thus it is called "sky-flower." Since this does not exist, the analogy is not non-existent.

For this reason, practitioners of insight meditation should correctly realize the emptiness of the nature of space, and should also realize the same truth of emptiness regarding the three kinds of unconditioned phenomena, including analytical cessation.

The Vaibhāṣika teachers, unwilling to accept the refutation of cessation-by-choice as an unconditioned dharma, raise this objection: "The Buddha taught that cessation-by-choice is the antidote to the conditioned, and therefore called it 'escape.' If you claim it does not exist, you incur the fault of contradicting your own doctrine. Moreover, the World-Honored One said: 'The complete destruction and cessation of all cravings accompanied by delight and greed is called Nirvana—peaceful and subtle.' How can you say it does not exist?"

Here the World-Honored One, wishing to lead those to be trained to diligently cultivate detachment toward conditioned objects and to gladly accord with unconditioned objects, spoke in terms of conventional truth of a cessation-by-choice that is escape, Nirvana, peaceful and subtle. Just as the Buddha spoke of spontaneously born sentient beings, so too he spoke of an unconditioned Nirvana; since this existence is accepted, there is no fault of contradicting the doctrine.

It is only with respect to ultimate reality that cessation-by-choice is refuted. Thus the World-Honored One said: "Those who seek the existence of Nirvana as an entity—I call them foolish people, followers of outside paths," and so on in extensive detail. He also said: "The Tathāgata does not see birth and death, nor Nirvana. What is called Nirvana is a provisional designation by the Tathāgata; therein there is no intrinsic nature of Nirvana at all," and so on in extensive detail.

Nor is there the fault of slandering the noble truths, because it is with respect to conventional truth that there is said to be the utter non-arising of craving and Suffering, escape, and Nirvana—peaceful, subtle, and free from distortion—but it is not with respect to ultimate truth that there is said to be the utter non-arising of craving and Suffering, the intrinsically quiescent, called the truth of Cessation. By these sacred teachings and the reasoning stated, since it is with respect to ultimate reality that cessation-by-choice is said not to exist, there is no such fault.

Some who argue correctly about the remaining unwholesome points raise this objection: "The thesis states that the unconditioned has no reality; since the unconditioned does not exist, the thesis is not established and the basis is not established; because the sky-flower does not exist, the subject is not established, and the thesis, reason, and example all have faults."

This objection is not valid. By the power of conceptual designation, "space" is posited solely in relation to the absence of any material thing that obstructs; by the discernment of Wisdom, "cessation through discernment" is posited solely in relation to the absence of the arising of afflictions; through the absence of contributing conditions, "cessation without discernment" is posited solely in relation to the absence of the arising of all Dharmas; and in relation to the total absence of all that is clung to as real, "suchness" is posited. Since the power of conceptual designation allows for the provisional positing of space and the like, no distinction is made apparent; by the power of common agreement, the subject is established in a general way, while the specific qualification that excludes what is not commonly known is established as the property of the thesis. That which is commonly understood, such as "does not arise," is established as the property of the reason. Therefore there is no fault in the thesis or the reason.

The sky-flower that was mentioned, though it has no existent thing, is the subject for such Dharmas as "does not arise" because of the nature of non-nature; by this, the meaning to be established can be established, and so there is no fault of the subject not being established.

The Vaibhāṣika teachers further state: This is also not correct. Pratisamkhyā-nirodha (cessation through discernment) truly exists, because it is the object of the Path and because it opposes the afflictions; without a truly existent dharma, such a thing could not occur. This statement only serves to exclude opposing categories, just as one excludes the truly existent nature of space; this has already been fully refuted above and should not be grasped again.

The Sautrāntika masters all make this statement: positing space and the like as substantially existent is not [the case]; thus the inference (比量) committed the fault of proving what is already established. If the meaning here is that the nature of matter possessing resistance and the like is non-existent, that is not proving what is already established, because that is what is being refuted. The thesis stated, "the unconditioned is not substantially real," primarily eliminates clinging to substantial existence, and also incidentally eliminates clinging to substantial non-existence.

The Copper-basket school teachers also make this claim: the colors of open gaps are called space. Our tradition holds that these are conditioned, so your refutation of the unconditioned does not apply to what we have established. The intrinsic nature of the conditioned has already been refuted above, so this too does not hold. The Vibhāṣā masters hold much in common with the Vātsīputrīya school, and should be refuted as they are.

The Sautrāntika master says this: In the ultimate sense there is no further ultimate beyond the ultimate; true suchness (tathatā) is itself the ultimate of all dharmas. Therefore, when speaking from the standpoint of the ultimate, one says that true suchness is empty. This statement accords with reason. But to say that true suchness is not truly existent — this does not accord with reason. Why? The supramundane non-discriminating wisdom, and the pure mundane wisdom that follows it, take the unconditioned as their object — this is reasonable; the opposite is not reasonable. Just as it is unreasonable to say that mundane wisdom takes the unconditioned as its object, so too is it unreasonable to say that this wisdom takes the conditioned as its object. It is not reasonable to hold that true suchness truly exists, for this nature of true existence is difficult to establish. The wisdom that takes true suchness as its object is not truly supramundane non-discriminating wisdom, because it has an object and because it is conditioned, like mundane wisdom that takes an object. Therefore the sūtra says: "Mañjuśrī, what does the wisdom-eye see?" He answered: "The wisdom-eye sees nothing at all." It also says: "What is called the ultimate truth?" He answered: "Here even wisdom does not operate — how much less names?" It also says: "Brahmin, the Tathāgata's enlightenment cannot be directly realized." And a sūtra says: "Mañjuśrī, how does one see the truth?" He answered: "Here no dharma can be seen or remembered." These sūtras do not permit one to accept that this non-discriminating wisdom directly realizes and takes true suchness as its object. Moreover, that true suchness is not the true ultimate, because it is an object, like form and so on. As for your statement that "in the ultimate there is no further ultimate beyond the ultimate" and so on — if one says that because there is nothing further beyond this, it is called empty, then since on cloth and silk there is no further cloth and silk, and cowherds and others also understand this in common, they too should be called seers of the truth. Furthermore, such emptiness is taught to counteract all wrong views. Since the wrong view that there is a further ultimate beyond the ultimate has never existed, one should not teach such emptiness to refute it. Moreover, that true suchness is not a nature of true existence — this contradicts what was said before, by the principle of inference. As it is said that the Tathāgata does not see birth and death or Nirvana, and has rightly understood that afflictions arisen from the non-existent and the inverted are by nature ultimately without arising, with no intrinsic nature — such right knowledge of the ultimately non-arising nature is neither right knowledge nor not right knowledge. From this sacred teaching one should know that true suchness is solely the complete cessation of all discrimination, not a nature of true existence, and not separate from or apart from the non-existent. The true nature, true suchness, with transformation of the basis as its characteristic, is the accomplishment of the Dharma-body: by attaining the true antidotal path that contemplates emptiness, the seeds of all discrimination and conceptual construction in the ālaya-vijñāna, the ripened consciousness that is their support, along with the seeds of discrimination and so on, are utterly and without remainder cut off; because causes and conditions are absent, they ultimately do not arise; by nature non-arising, by nature permanently abiding — this is called the Tathāgata's transformation of the basis, the Dharma-body. As the sūtra says: "Mañjuśrī, the word 'Tathāgata' is the phrase of ultimate non-arising. The dharma that is eternally non-arising is called the Tathāgata," and so on in full. If one says that true suchness, though beyond verbal expression, is truly existent, then this is just the non-Buddhist self (ātman), designated by a different name and idea as true suchness. Just as that true suchness, though truly existent, cannot be established through such discriminations as "existent" or "non-existent" from the standpoint of the ultimate — so too is my self. They too hold that the self, though truly existent, omnipresent and permanent, as agent and experiencer, is beyond discrimination, because it is not a sphere of verbal activity and is not an object of discriminating intellect — hence "beyond discrimination." In their teaching it is said: "Where words do not operate and mind does not cognize — this is called the self." Since the characteristic of the self is thus, and yet they also say that it is wisdom taking true suchness as its object that attains liberation, not wisdom taking the self as its object — what is the difference between these? Both have no verbal expression and a truly existent nature; it is merely partisan attachment that speaks thus. Therefore I cannot accept that this pseudo-true-suchness, which resembles the self, is truly existent or non-existent. Let us stop this extensive dispute, for those who are weary of and dread lengthy words and meanings find it hard to uphold. Having entered the true ambrosia, the distinctions have already been set forth.