Vinaya Essentials from the Four-Part Vinaya (四分律拾毗尼義鈔)

Explaining the Four Parajikas Briefly in Seven Sections

The first of the precepts to be transgressed through the three poisons: the precept against sexual misconduct. Because it brings harm to oneself and serves one's own benefit, it arises from greed. It comes about through the three matters, and because it is motivated by a greedy mind, it succeeds. The Sutra of the Profound Meaning of Good Birth says: if one acts for pleasure and does not practice chastity, this is called "arising from greed." When the sense object is exchanged internally and flows smoothly, the mental act is decisively completed—therefore greed accomplishes it. A deluded mind is not in accord, and hatred is contradictory, so these cannot accomplish it. For the precepts against killing and stealing, the harm extends to both loss and gain; they arise through the three matters and are accomplished through the three matters, as explained in detail in the Good Birth Sutra and in the treatise.

Also, the Monastic Rules say: a monastery administrator who misappropriates communal property—this is called a deluded mind arising and accomplishing the offense. There is no need for labored quoting. The precept against gross false speech: for the sake of benefiting oneself, it arises from greed and delusion, and is accomplished by greed and delusion—seeking fame and profit, it is not accomplished through hatred. It differs from minor false speech, which can also be accomplished through hatred. Even where some texts say it is accomplished through the three matters, that is a general discussion of the three poisons in terms of weight and lightness. When discussing this specifically as karma: the first three are bodily offenses; the latter one is a verbal offense—this is the rough division. Speaking more subtly: for the precept against sexual misconduct, even if there is physical union, it is not completed without the body—so body and mind accomplish the offense; there is no sense in which speech can accomplish it. The precepts against killing and stealing: whether doing it oneself or instructing others to do it, both parties are mutually engaged—so both body and speech can accomplish them. The body is the root and speech is the branch. Why? Though spoken words are clear, one must still rely upon the other person's bodily action to cut off life or remove something from its place. When instructing another, the offense is heavy. Therefore, it is asked: does speech not accomplish killing and stealing by itself? How is it that verbal karma—as when a spell causes an object to pass through a checkpoint, or when killing is accomplished—must rely on bodily assistance? Answer: all spell methods cause spirits and yakshas, through their bodily karma, to support an object through a checkpoint or to cut off life. It is not without bodily assistance.

It is asked: if so, how is it that the lion's roar kills beasts, or a strong man's shout kills a person—how do spirits and yakshas assist with bodily karma here? Answer: these too occur because the body is strong and the voice is great—like a deep river whose channel is shallow. The categories of killing people and the like can be understood by analogy. Here, according to the miscellaneous and the two treatises, the three karmas do not create one another. Because the nature of karma is distinct and the matter is not completed, the statement that "the words are clear" does not yet constitute a heavy offense; one must rely on the body. Some interpret the three karmas as creating one another, and the sutras and treatises differ—this cannot be harmonized. The Satyasiddhi Treatise permits mutual creation: body and speech mutually act, as explained above. As the Sutra of Hori says: an outer-path immortal, by arising in a single thought of hatred, destroyed the kingdom of Nalada—this is mental karma creating bodily karma. When the monastic community performs the posadha, receiving a silent false-speech offense—this is mental karma creating verbal karma.

It is asked: if the mind can create the two karmas of body and speech, why is it not permitted for body and speech to create mental karma? Answer: the mind is the root, so it can create body and speech. Body and speech are the branch, so they cannot create mental karma. As for the single precept of false speech: desiring to reveal oneself as having attained sainthood, seeking fame and profit—without speech it is not proclaimed, so verbal karma alone accomplishes it. There is also the case where bodily karma displays a sign and accomplishes the heavy offense—bodily expression is verbal karma, so one judges from the root. In the mutual creation of verbal karma, if one discusses the three karmas as root and branch mutually creating one another throughout, there is no obstruction.

Second: the difference between doing it oneself and instructing others. For the precept against sexual misconduct: doing it oneself accomplishes the heavy offense; instructing others does not. This is because pleasure lies with the other person. For the precepts against killing and stealing: the harm extends to both loss and gain; whether doing it oneself or instructing another, the harm to the object and the satisfaction of the intent are both equal—so both are equally offenses. For the precept against gross false speech: one does not, by one's own speech, instruct another to proclaim one as a saint; there is no benefit to oneself, so one only receives a light offense.

Here the treatise discusses the difference between self and other, beginning and end. Self and other are of three kinds: first, oneself acting upon another; second, another acting upon oneself; third, oneself acting upon oneself. For the precept against sexual misconduct: all three are offenses. For the precept against stealing: stealing from another is heavy; the other two are without offense. It is asked: if so, why does the Four-Part Vinaya say that stealing back one's own robe incurs a transgression of the sanghavasesa? Answer: this is viewed in terms of the object being different—it is not about harming oneself. One's own gift does not succeed—this is likewise. For the precept against killing: killing oneself, another killing oneself—these can be understood. Self-killing by oneself: as the Ten Recitations say, self-killing is without offense. The Good See also agrees. Why? The Good Birth Sutra says: because one does not give rise to the perception of another and has no hatred. If according to the Five-Part Vinaya, the preliminary effort is incurred and when life is cut off it is a sanghavasesa—so the Correct Principle is likewise. Now the Four-Part Vinaya's intent does not establish progressive approach; self-killing is without offense, and when life is cut off there is no precept-transgression. In that case, for self-killing, both the parajika and the sanghavasesa do not exist—but one obtains the unwholesome path of the karma of killing. It is asked: if so, why does the Adjudication Section say that self-killing incurs a sanghavasesa? Answer: this refers to the preliminary effort of self-killing; since the precept does not succeed but still exists, it leads to a sanghavasesa. Even if one establishes progressive approach, what fault is there? One should not object that self-hitting, self-slandering, self-concealing and the like are also without offense—because the precept still exists. The three false speeches can be understood.

The treatise's beginning and end: for the first precept, upon entry one immediately offends—one does not wait to obtain pleasure. For killing, it is judged at the end—one must wait for life to be cut off. For stealing and false speech, it is in the middle—for wealth, though removed from the ground, it is not yet used; for false speech, though the words are clear, fame and profit are not yet obtained.

Now, regarding the third point—errors and indiscriminate violations. Here, "errors" all refer to situations that are improper and seriously mistaken. To briefly discuss the distinctions: an "error" (錯) relates to a present condition where the focus shifts to a different object; a "mistake" (誤) relates to a non-present condition where the mind misidentifies. Since errors and mistakes are distinguished, they must be matched with the four precepts.

Regarding the precept against sexual misconduct: whether it is an error or a mistake, if the defilement arises from internal desire, as long as the actual sexual act occurs, it does not matter whether one knew or did not know—whether the partner is male, female, human, non-human, or animal. Even if the mind intended one person but engaged with another by mistake, it still constitutes a violation. Even if the objects are multiple and involve confusion, an error still constitutes a violation.

Regarding the precept against stealing: if the mind is indiscriminate and unattached, then anything not belonging to oneself is an object of theft. It does not matter whether the objects belong to the three realms of existence or whether there are differences among them; if the mind is deluded, it is still called "according to one's original intention," and therefore both errors and mistakes constitute violations. If the mind is fixed on taking a specific person's property and does not intend to steal from other realms, then when the fixed intention takes something, that is the object of theft; other objects are not. But if, when actually carrying out the act, the objects become confused and the mind becomes deluded, even if one lifts the object from its place, it does not constitute "taking possession." Since the original owner's expectation is not met and the mind and object no longer correspond, what fault is there? Therefore, in such cases of error and mistake, there is no violation.

If one uses that object and obtains the previous "sthūlātyaya" (serious offense), there is no offense in the act of taking itself. If, after knowing, one returns it, there is no offense; if not, it constitutes a grave offense.

Regarding the precept against killing: if one speaks of indiscriminate killing—when the mind is unrestricted and all three realms of existence are harmed—then whether it is an error or a mistake, it constitutes a violation. If one fixes the mind on killing a specific person and does not kill others in other realms, but if the harmful intention is directed at that object, it is the object of killing. When the act is carried out and meets its target, cutting off life constitutes a violation. If it is not the intended target, then it is not the object of killing. If, when carrying out the act, the mind becomes deluded—even if a non-human or animal dies—it does not match the intended target, and since there was no killing intention, neither error nor mistake constitutes a violation.

Speaking specifically of humans: an error (錯) does not constitute a violation, but a mistake (誤) does constitute a violation. Why? Suppose one intends to kill Zhang but mistakenly kills Wang. Though Wang was not the intended target, because the mind was unclear and took this for that, the intention to kill a human is still present in every case, and so the mistake also constitutes a violation, since the conditions are complete. This is unlike the stealing precept. Therefore, the Vinaya text says: killing one's mother but killing a non-mother; killing a non-mother but killing one's mother; killing an arhat, an ordinary person, one's mother, father, or an outsider—all these are sthūlātyaya offenses. The same applies to humans and non-humans.

Question: If a mistake is heavy and an error is light, why does the Five-Part Vinaya say: "Intending to kill that one but mistakenly killing this one, one doubts; the Buddha said it is a sthūlātyaya offense"? Answer: This is because the mistaken object is treated as an error. The Vinaya commentary says: "Killing by error is an offense; killing by mistake is not." That same Vinaya says: "When many people are chasing one another and one intends to kill the person in front but mistakenly wounds someone in the middle or behind, there is no offense." Thus we know that when objects cross, it is called a "mistake"; when the mind takes this for that, it is called an "error." Therefore one should not raise objections.

Regarding the precept against false speech, speaking of different realms: an error constitutes a violation, but a mistake does not. With an indiscriminate mind making no distinctions, both errors and mistakes constitute violations, because one falsely displays spiritual attainment, deceiving others, showing oneself as having attained sainthood. The act of harming the object is accomplished, and one oneself gains benefit. Therefore both errors and mistakes constitute violations.

The Ten-Recitation Vinaya says: "Intending to speak of the first fruit but mistakenly speaking of the third or fourth also constitutes a violation." The Good See Vinaya says: "Mistakenly speaking of the third or fourth dhyāna, etc., all constitute violations."

Question: If false speech is complete as soon as it is understood, and errors and mistakes are not exempted—just as when I steal an object and remove it from its place, the offense is already incurred—should there be no errors or mistakes? Answer: Stealing inherently involves harming the owner; once removed from its place, errors and mistakes are possible. False speech, once understood, is already a false understanding; therefore there are no errors or mistakes.

Now that errors and mistakes are distinguished, let us discuss fixed versus indiscriminate intention. Regarding the precept against sexual misconduct: there is no fixed intention initially directed at one person but later meeting another—whether male or female, Zhang or Wang, human or animal—all constitute violations. Regarding the precepts against killing and stealing: a fixed intention, when fulfilled, constitutes a violation; when directed at other objects, it does not. One should understand that killing and stealing can also be done with a fixed intention that is not fulfilled. For example, if one wishes to kill an enemy and destroy an enemy's wealth, but that person is sitting with many others and that wealth is in one place with many others, and one sets fire to it knowing there are other people and wealth present, and they all burn—this is what was previously called "fulfillment." This is spoken with reference to objects that can be distinguished.

Regarding false speech with a fixed intention: the offense may or may not be committed. It is committed when mind and object correspond; it is not committed when mind and object do not correspond. Suppose one is sitting together and intends to deceive the person from the east, but the person from the west hears—there is no violation, because there was no intention to deceive the person from the west. The first explanation: if all three realms of existence are present and one knows in one's mind, the offense is committed even without a fixed intention toward the other objects; if the three realms are not all present and one has a fixed intention, the offense is committed but not toward the other objects. This is explained in detail elsewhere.

Fourth, one must understand the purpose of the original establishment of the precepts. Why were four established? The sages established them to prevent the sources of trouble. Greed, hatred, and delusion—for greed and love, the first two precepts were established; for hatred and delusion, one was established separately. Because of these distinctions, four were established.

Question: Hatred and delusion each have one, but greed alone has two—why? Answer: Although greed is one, its objects differ as internal and external, and so two precepts were established. The objects of hatred are two, but the offenses are not equal. Delusion, pride, and deceit have objects limited to sentient beings and do not extend to insentient things, and so only one was established. Therefore the Four-Part Vinaya records Ananda answering Kong Cao's question: "The higher training in precepts was established to regulate greed, hatred, and delusion and bring them to an end." Thus we know it is for the three.

Question: Precepts can prevent wrongdoing but do not eliminate the underlying fetters. Why were precepts established in contrast to these? Answer: This refers to the antidotes: precepts prevent coarse wrongdoing; concentration subdues subtle confusion; wisdom cuts off the underlying fetters. But wisdom does not arise alone; it must rely on concentration. Concentration has a source; its power comes from pure precepts. Tracing to the root and expressing it, therefore it is said that precepts eliminate.

Question: We already know the four correspond to the three, and the precepts were established accordingly. We do not yet understand what the eight rules for nuns correspond to and at what stage they were established. Answer: Although there are eight kinds for nuns, the first four are the root and are no different from what has been explained here. The latter four are branches, separated from the root, and so are not separately matched. This is also explained in the stealing precept.

The Buddha asked King Bimbisara: "What is called a root offense?" The king said: "If one intentionally cuts off life, steals five coins, commits sexual misconduct with another's wife, or for one's own sake intentionally speaks falsehood in the original assembly—if one commits these four, this is called not living. The Buddha said: I now also establish these four grave offenses for the monks." According to this, the other three are omitted and have no separate basis.

The Sarvāstivāda question: "Why does this precept alone depend on the law of the country, while the other three do not?" Answer: There are two reasons. First, because stealing royal property requires reliance on the king's law; the other three do not arise from the king. Second, this precept differs according to the law of the country: sometimes stealing much wealth brings the death penalty, sometimes stealing little wealth brings the death penalty—the amount is not fixed. Now, because stealing royal property is involved, the king's law is consulted. For sexual misconduct and killing, once the act is accomplished, the offense is established and the characteristics are fixed; therefore the law of the country is not consulted. For false speech, the state does not punish it, and so it is also not consulted.

According to the Great Collection, the four precepts are established in dependence on the king's law, just as in the stealing precept. The Good See Vinaya asks: "The Buddha, the Omniscient One, the Buddhas of the three times, know the weight of offenses when establishing precepts. Why did the World-Honored One ask the minister?" Answer: He did not ask in order to deliberate together. "If one coin is stolen, the offense is grave. Worldly people criticize and disdain this. The merit of a monk who keeps precepts is immeasurable, like space and earth, which cannot be measured. How could the Tathāgata establish a grave offense based on one coin? The Tathāgata uses wisdom to weigh and measure, causing the precepts to endure long, causing people to have faith and their minds to submit." Therefore the first explanation: in the immediate sense, the Buddha relied on the king; in the broader sense, the king relied on the Buddha when establishing precepts. Why? The brahmins and others collected the scriptures and vinaya precepts of past Buddhas, organized their divisions, and placed them in their own texts, using them as royal teachers and establishing laws for kings to govern the country and transform people. Thus we know they relied on the Buddha.

The Fifth Precept: On the Order and Sequence of the Precepts and Their Remedies

Regarding the remedies: because people love the Dharma and delight in it, the first offense is sexual misconduct, and so on up to the fourth—emitting semen, and the offenses concerning long robes and false speech can be understood by analogy.

Therefore, the Samantapāsādikā says: The Buddha, twenty years after attaining enlightenment, first established the precept against sexual misconduct. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya says: Five years after the Buddha's enlightenment, in the winter, in the second half-month, on the twelfth day, after midday, when one person cast a half-shadow, the first precept was established for Yaśas. In the sixth year, winter, second half-month, on the tenth day, sitting facing east, after the meal, when two people cast a half-shadow, this precept was established. In the sixth year, winter, third half-month, on the ninth day, before the meal, sitting facing west, when one person cast a half-shadow, this precept was established for the sake of many sick monks, on account of the Deer-Staff ascetic. In the sixth year, winter, fourth half-month, on the thirteenth day, after the meal, when three people cast a half-shadow, sitting facing east, this precept was established.

Question: Both are renunciates—why do the novice monk's first precepts differ from those of the fully ordained monks?

Answer: For novices, the first five are still lay precepts; the latter five are added on top. Moreover, for lay people, it is a matter of merit—one's own wife is not an obstacle, so merely cutting off sexual misconduct suffices, and it is not a complete severance. Therefore, killing comes first, because it is a complete severance.

If that is so, then for novices, by the same logic of wisdom, sexual misconduct should come first, because it is a complete severance.

Answer: But because the persons are the same and the methods are similar, and both are partial, they do not follow the same pattern. Also, the young and small have not yet aroused the affliction of sexual desire, and the young mostly lack compassion, so killing comes first, and sexual misconduct is established later.

Since the intent of establishing the precepts is thus, we must now discuss their remedies. The precept against sexual misconduct is remedied by detachment from defilement and pure conduct. The precept against stealing is remedied by few desires and contentment. The precept against killing is remedied by compassion and mercy. The precept against false speech is remedied by truthfulness, and so forth.

The sixth case: the sandimitta (novice monk) and spontaneous transgression.

As the Shansheng Sheng says: “In the eight precepts, if one first sends a message to have someone killed or punished, but the message is delayed and does not arrive, and the person has already left — then later, when one arouses the intention to receive the precepts, the message arrives and the person is killed — although it is the same single act, by the power of the precepts one does not incur the offense of killing. Since one has obtained the precepts, there is no offense of killing. Therefore we know there is no spontaneous transgression.”

Question: If by the power of the precepts one does not incur the offense of killing, why does the Shansheng say: “There are noblemen who constantly order evil deeds to be done. If one wishes to receive the precepts, one must first order these evils to be stopped; only then can the precepts be accomplished. If one does not stop them first and directly receives the precepts, one does not obtain the precepts.”

Answer: These noblemen are sovereign and constantly command killings — this is equivalent to a person of evil discipline. Because their doing of evil is forceful and long-lasting, while the one here receiving the precepts is doing good dharmas that are brief and weak, these can be obstructed, and therefore one does not obtain the precepts. When one has only temporarily done evil — brief and weak — even if one does not stop it beforehand, one still obtains the precepts. Therefore the two cases are not the same.

Question: If evil discipline — unwholesome and previously established, forceful and long-lasting — obstructs the eight precepts and prevents their accomplishment, then for one who receives the lifetime precepts, which are also a good discipline previously established, forceful, and long-lasting — why is it that when great wrong views arise, one is immediately obstructed by them and loses the precepts?

Answer: The earlier evil was superior, long-lasting, while the eight precepts were weak and brief, so the obstruction prevented the precepts from arising. Now, great wrong views are the mark of cutting off wholesome roots and are contradictory to them, so one loses the precepts — because wrong views are superior and goodness is inferior.

If one has obtained the lifetime precepts, even if one later receives evil discipline, one will certainly not lose the precepts, because it is not a cutting off of wholesome roots. However, the treatise only speaks of four kinds of relinquishment; it does not say that one relinquishes when receiving evil precepts. Although one may commit evil and thereby violate the precepts, this is not called losing the precepts. According to the Satyasiddhi Shastra and the Shansheng, when one receives evil precepts, one immediately loses the good precepts. This differs from the Hridaya and Vasubandhu, which say that when one receives evil precepts, the good precepts are mutually relinquished altogether.

The first explanation: I have not seen in the scriptures or treatises any spontaneous transgression. Now, investigating by principle and comparing with the Vinaya, it seems there is spontaneous transgression. What is it? First, one instructs someone to kill, and so on; afterward, without stopping it or regretting it, the seed of the evil fruit is established. After receiving full ordination, when the fruit is completed, one incurs the offense. In this, the precept against sexual misconduct has no case of instructing another to commit the same, so there is no spontaneous transgression.

If, while a novice, one instructed someone to kill or steal, or claimed to have attained sagehood, and then afterward proceeded to receive full ordination — once the ordination is complete and the message accomplishes these three matters — the instructor, with a mind of the three natures, spontaneously incurs the three grave offenses, because the non-action is produced. If we speak of doing it oneself, unwholesome by nature, with wholesome and indeterminate also present, and without a prior or subsequent karmic act mutually completing it, this too extends to the three natures.

If the precepts have not yet been fully received and the instructed deed is accomplished, then it is an immediate offense, and one does not obtain the precepts. If the precepts are about to be fully received and the instructed deed is also accomplished, then both offense and precepts are obtained, because the force of the two causes — good and evil — mutually support each other, and each is accomplished.

A Brief Explanation of the Fourth Precept

Regarding the precept against sexual misconduct: In the past, when explaining it in accordance with the sacred teachings, it was understood that among the five precepts, only others' spouses are prohibited, while in the eight precepts, both self and others are restricted, though only for a limited period of days and nights. Only in the major precepts is one's own spouse also prohibited, and this extends for the whole life. Why is this? Since others' spouses are already prohibited by the five precepts, no separate mention is made here.

Regarding the two difficulties discussed in this text: The difficulty of seduction by Brahma — this refers specifically to the fear of violating the precepts. Therefore, in the two offenses of Pārājika and Saṃghāvaśeṣa, no exemption is allowed, because enduring seduction by Brahma is consistent with protecting the precepts. As for the difficulty of life-threatening danger — this refers to situations where one's life is threatened. Thus, in the first Pārājika offense, an exemption is allowed for committing the preceding act under coercion, because the threat of force compels the mind. The Vinaya says: "If one does not experience pleasure, there is no offense."

Regarding the precept against stealing: Although there is no explicit textual allowance, in terms of meaning there is an exemption. As long as no harm is done to another's property, and one temporarily moves something here or there for the sake of protecting life or safeguarding the precepts from the difficulties of seduction or life-threat, there should be no offense. But if one is forced to burn or destroy something, there is no exemption.

If, to protect one's own life or precepts from such difficulties, one cannot kill another — therefore no exemption is granted. The same applies to false speech.

The *Five Hundred Questions* says: "If one does not speak falsely for one's own sake, there is a general and a specific exemption, as explained elsewhere."

Also, the *Abhidharma Questions* asks: "Stealing five coins constitutes a grave offense — which kind of coins?" The answer: "Commentaries explain this variously. Some say gold, silver, copper, or iron coins. The Buddha established the precept based on the law of King Bimbisāra's country. In that country, whatever coins were in use — in any place where the Dharma exists, the measure is five coins, which constitutes a grave offense. Since it is not specified which coins were used in Rājagṛha, it says 'various.' Another explanation: According to whatever coins are used in each country, wherever the Dharma exists, that coin is used as the measure of five coins. Since usage differs, it says 'various.' Another explanation: Originally, based on Rājagṛha law, stealing five coins incurred the death penalty, and this precept was established accordingly, thus limited to five coins. Since Rājagṛha was like this, in other countries, according to their laws, whatever amount of money constitutes a capital offense — stealing that much violates this precept. Therefore it says 'various.'"

Although the first explanation gives three interpretations, observing the intent of the Vinaya masters, the latter explanation is considered definitive.

The *Ten Recitations Vinaya* says: "Stealing five coins — if they are ancient large copper coins, one incurs a grave offense. If one steals small coins worth eighty cash, then according to the small coins used in that locality — the scriptures and treatises themselves are not definitive on this point, and practice is also difficult to determine. At the time of incurring the offense, one should lean toward leniency. When protecting the precepts, one should not steal even a blade of grass."

Since the light and heavy are not definitively established, one should urgently protect the precepts.

The *Vinaya* also says: "Stealing from gods, northern people, or objects — this is a Saṃghāvaśeṣa offense." Because one has no sense of ownership toward such objects.

The *Abhidharma Treatise* also says: "People of the three continents — a grave offense is determined by this coin." The *Nāga Vinaya* says: "A lion's leftover — if its value is five coins, one incurs a grave offense. Even leftovers from hawks or chickens — if taken, it is also grave."

Now, the *Four-Part Vinaya* has no text about stealing from non-human beings. The various masters' explanations vary — the meaning is found elsewhere.

The *Abhidharma Treatise* also says: "Lifting an object off the ground and putting it back in its original place — one incurs one offense. Taking it away — one incurs two offenses. First, the karmic-path offense, because one steals another's property. Second, the Pārājika offense, because the Buddha established the precept." The commentary explains: "According to this treatise, in a single instance, two meanings of offense are distinguished — they are different."

Question: "If in the precept against stealing, there is no offense when one has no owner-perception or no stealing-mind, why does the precept against killing allow for the case of non-human perception?"

Answer: "The perception of 'no owner' refers to rag robes — it is not a cause for offense. The perception of 'human or non-human' can be a cause for offense. Therefore they are not analogous."

Question: "If so, then an unassigned object perceived as assigned is also not a cause for offense — why is it different from the stealing precept?"

Answer: "The one is not learnable; the other is learnable."

Question: "If so, then ground perceived as non-ground is also not learnable — why does it incur a minor offense?"

Another explanation: "This is a case of transformed perception — one incurs a minor offense for the preceding mind."

Question: "If someone who is fundamentally deluded kills a person while perceiving them as non-human — on the side of the person's death, there is no offense. On the side of perceiving them as non-human, there is mind but no object — one should only incur a minor offense. Why then does the Vinaya say that killing with non-human perception incurs a Saṃghāvaśeṣa?"

Answer: "This is based on originally having human perception when killing. When one breaks proper deportment and approaches, one has already incurred a Saṃghāvaśeṣa. At the moment of facing the person, one transforms to non-human perception. If one were to assign the offense of transformed perception to the latter mind, it should be a minor offense. The Vinaya conceals the latter mind's offense and assigns the Saṃghāvaśeṣa to the former mind."

Question: "When facing the person and transforming to non-human perception, if the latter mind has no Saṃghāvaśeṣa, why does the Vinaya say that non-human perception incurs a Saṃghāvaśeṣa?"

Answer: "When transforming perception to non-human, there is actually no Saṃghāvaśeṣa. But because of transforming perception to non-human, the former mind's Saṃghāvaśeṣa cannot be taken as cause and ripened as result. Because of the transformed perception, the former mind's offense is assigned. This is the Vinaya's intent."

This precept being so, all precepts are likewise.

Question: "Killing one's parents — if one knows they are one's parents, does one incur the offense of patricide/matricide? If one does not know, does one incur it?"

Answer: "If one's original intent was indiscriminate, with no exclusion, and one acts toward one's parents — even if one does not know — if it fits the four conditions, one incurs it. Suppose one first sees a sheep and with indiscriminate mind kills it. Even if the sheep moves aside and one's parents take its place, and one kills with sheep-perception, one incurs the grave offense of patricide/matricide. If one's original intent was specifically not to kill one's parents, and though one's parents die, one does not know it is them — one only incurs the Pārājika offense, not the offense of patricide/matricide."

Question: "If one's parent has left home and become an Arhat, does one incur two offenses — patricide/matricide and Pārājika?"

Answer: "The *Ten Recitations Vinaya* says one incurs the Pārājika offense and two patricide/matricide offenses. Also, the *Nirvana Sutra* says: first, killing one's father the king; second, killing a Stream-enterer — the offense combines two grave offenses. When life is cut off, one both harms the nurturing kindness and harms the field of merit. Since the two objects are distinct and the mind engages both harms, one incurs two patricide/matricide offenses and the Pārājika. The principle is evident. The *Five-Part Vinaya* says one only incurs one offense. Why? Although the field of merit and the kindness are different, it is one action. Since there is no second life, how can there be two offenses? The name 'patricide/matricide' simply indicates that this Pārājika karma is heavy. Therefore it says Pārājika and patricide/matricide — there are not two separate patricide/matricide offenses."

Question: "If one's father has transformed into a nun and one kills her, does one incur the patricide/matricide offense? If so, then if I hit this nun, do I incur the offense of hitting a nun?"

Answer: "One only incurs the offense of hitting a nun."

Question: "If so, one should incur the offense of killing a nun, as in the case of hitting."

Answer: "At the time of hitting, the position is that of a woman, so one incurs the offense of hitting a nun. In killing, the offense is assigned based on violating kindness, not based on position."

Question: "If one's father's wholesome karma is exhausted and he transforms into an animal, and one kills this animal — does one also incur the patricide/matricide offense for violating kindness?"

Answer: "Not analogous. Father transforming into a woman — though the root differs, both are still in the human realm. Therefore, with respect to the father, one incurs the patricide/matricide offense. An animal and a human have different realms, and the retribution should also differ. Therefore one incurs the Pāyattika offense of killing an animal. If only a small part has transformed, one should also incur the Pārājika. If the whole body has transformed, one cannot kill at all — one only incurs the Saṃghāvaśeṣa of a strong object. But if one knows the transformation and kills, supposing a novice — if one knows the transformation and kills, one still incurs the Pārājika and patricide/matricide, because at the time of death one is the father, not another object. If one does not know, there is no patricide/matricide."

Here, the first explanation: "Because slandering the Dharma is heavy, it is not included in the five heinous offenses. Just as the five heinous offenses are not included in the four Pārājikas — the meaning is as in the *Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom*."

Another explanation: "Slandering the Dharma is heavy — this refers to the Mahāyāna teachings. If one destroys the Hīnayāna teachings, one only incurs the offense of slandering the Dharma, which is the aforementioned 'turning the wheel of Dharma.'"

Question: "If so, why does the Vinaya say that reviling the Sūtras and Abhidharma incurs a minor offense?"

Answer: "The former speaks of 'offense' as destruction and slander. The latter speaks of 'minor offense' as mere reviling. Therefore there is no contradiction."

Question: "If killing a human incurs a grave offense and killing an animal incurs a Pāyattika, why does the *Ten Recitations Vinaya* say that killing a human fetus does not incur a grave offense, while killing an animal fetus incurs an offense?"

Answer: "That Vinaya explains: the former is a human conceived in an animal womb; the latter is an animal conceived in a human womb. Killing a manifested human is a Saṃghāvaśeṣa."

Question: "If one kills a Buddha without knowing it is a Buddha, one does not incur the patricide/matricide offense. But if one makes offerings to a Buddha without knowing it is a Buddha, should one not obtain merit from the Buddha?"

Answer: "Making offerings is fundamentally with an indiscriminate mind. In all places where merit is born, one generates the intention of offering. Even if one takes the Buddha as a tree spirit, because one's original mind made no exclusion, one obtains merit from the Buddha. If one's original intent was specifically to make offerings to a tree spirit, and one faces the Buddha with tree-spirit perception and makes offerings, one obtains no merit from the Buddha. Killing and offering both have indiscriminate and specific minds — one cannot use the indiscriminate mind of offering to challenge the specific mind of killing."

Question: "The first explanation says: A noble one has two kinds of truthful speech. First, truthful speech by personal realization, eliminating false speech and speaking in accordance with reality. Second, truthful speech by perception and principle-contemplation — as when Maudgalyayana and others heard the sound of waves in water through expedient means. Is it unknown whether the Buddha also has [perception-based truthful speech]?"

Answer: "The Buddha only has truthful speech by personal realization. Why? A śrāvaka's knowledge of objects is incomplete — when entering concentration they know, when leaving they do not. Therefore they have perception-based truthful speech. The Tathāgata is not like this. Ordinary people also have truthful speech based on personal realization in worldly matters, with perception and mind. But since it is not based on understanding principle, none can sever the mind of deception. Later, when the mind contradicts and betrays perception, it becomes false speech."

False speech, though manifold, does not go beyond five kinds: Pārājika, Saṃghāvaśeṣa, Saṃghāvaśeṣa, Pāyattika, and minor offense. In general, they are judged as two: Pārājika and Saṃghāvaśeṣa. Both involve deceiving others with supramundane Dharma to incur offense. Deceiving humans causes heavy harm; deceiving non-humans causes lighter harm and the transgression is shallower. Therefore there are light and heavy. The remaining three kinds of false speech all involve deceiving others with worldly Dharma. The heavy and light form three categories — the meaning can be understood accordingly. If discussing in detail, there are cases of speaking of the noble and incurring a light offense, and cases of speaking of the ordinary and incurring a heavy offense — extensively as in the *Ten Recitations Vinaya*.

Among these, the first two kinds of false speech, though having four possibilities, require both mind and object to be false for an offense. The remaining three kinds of false speech — regardless of whether the object is false or real — as long as the mind is false, all constitute false speech.

Question: "False speech is fundamentally for deceiving people into giving rise to faith. Now, at the time of assigning the offense, does it not wait for faith to arise? Is the offense assigned as soon as one knows?"

Answer: "Knowing is coarse; faith is subtle. Faith can only arise after knowing — it cannot arise before knowing. Therefore it does not wait for faith."

Question: "If so, when one urges a man with biased mind to eat — how can the sign of receiving be difficult to know? Why say the offense is assigned as soon as it is understood?"

Answer: "That is because it binds him to slander the laity. Therefore it says the offense is assigned as soon as it is understood."

The first explanation: "All verbal karma — when the words are clear and the other person immediately understands, the condition of damaging the object is complete. Why wait for faith? Just as verbal karma creating bodily karma — urging someone to eat, generally teaching another to receive food with biased mind, killing, stealing, and so forth — though the words are clear, if the object is not yet damaged, one cannot assign a grave offense."

Question: "This one precept — why is it placed with the self-proclamation [offense], citing falsehood, while the other three precepts are not? What is the meaning?"

Former explanation: "This one offense is heavy and has the meaning of damaging the community. It requires the Saṃgha to administer punishment. Without self-proclamation, the community would not know and could not administer punishment — the framework would not be established. Now, placing it [with self-proclamation] is the opposite of the previous. The other three are within one's own practice and do not require community punishment, nor do they have the meaning of damaging the community. Just as concealing another's grave offense — for monks it is light, for nuns it is heavy — the presence or absence of [self-proclamation] differs."

Question: "If so, the first section has three precepts, the second section has eleven — the meaning of damaging the community is the same. Why is [self-proclamation] not placed [with them]?"

Answer: "By principle it should be. But the compilers of the collection, regarding those whose marks are hidden and difficult to know, placed them heavily; regarding the light, they omitted them. Just as great false speech and small false speech, great concealment and small concealment, great slander and small slander — all heavy ones are placed, light ones omitted. This meaning is not absent."

The first explanation: "Self-proclamation has two kinds: first, self-proclamation upon questioning; second, self-proclamation without questioning. The first applies to all precepts; the latter is as explained above. However, in the Pārājikas, because it existed at the time, it is immediately included in the precept text. In the remaining Pāyattikas, because it did not exist at the time, it is not preserved in the precept text. For example, the precept on emission — at the time, there was a dream, so it was exempted in the precept text. The first precept of the Pārājika section logically has [self-proclamation], but since it did not exist at the time, it is therefore missing from the precept text. This is also so."

Question: "If so, the text says 'if questioned' — this is questioning about self-proclamation. Since it did not exist at the time, why is it included?"

Answer: "According to the general principle for all precepts, it truly need not be included. But because there is self-proclamation without questioning, it is necessary. If it were not included, people at the time, seeing that there is self-proclamation without questioning, would think questioning about self-proclamation is unnecessary. Therefore it is included in contrast. The others have no contrast, so the questioning about self-proclamation is also not included."

The *Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya* says: "The precept was established in the sixth year." The *Abhidharma Treatise* says: "The karma ritual began in the eighth year." Extensively as in separate chapters.

Collected Notes on the Meaning of Vinaya from the Four-Part Vinaya, Volume 1, Part 2