Vinaya Essentials from the Four-Part Vinaya (四分律拾毗尼義鈔)

(From the Shifen Lü Shi Pini Yi Chao, Fascicle 2, Part 1)

Written by Shih Daoxuan, a monk from Zhongnan Mountain

A Brief Explanation of the Sanghavasesa in Seven Sections

First, regarding how the three poisons produce karma: acting as a matchmaker between two parties—this is a minor precept. The remaining ten precepts are inherently unwholesome, which is called "intrinsically evil."

Among these, the first seven precepts arise from three causes: they are accomplished through a mind stained by greed. The next two precepts arise from a mind of anger: they are accomplished through a mind of anger and jealousy. The next two precepts arise from three causes: they are accomplished through a mind of delusion and arrogance. The next two precepts arise from anger and delusion: they are accomplished through a mind of anger and delusion.

According to the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya: there are offenses born from desire—such as inappropriate bodily contact, touching, and all lustful speech, matchmaking—these are called born from desire. There are offenses born from anger—such as baseless accusations, slander, defamation, expulsion, beating, and so on—these are called born from anger. There are offenses born from delusion—such as wrong views, extreme views, and so on. There are offenses not born from the three poisons—namely, when an arhat commits an offense.

The second section explains how offenses are committed through the two karmas of body and speech.

On the body: Loss of semen, improper contact, and the two cases involving private chambers—these are offenses of the body karma. Loss of semen and improper contact are committed by body and mind together, not by speech. The chamber offenses also include cases where one instructs another person to speak, so these are offenses of the speech karma. As for the remaining nine precepts, offenses occur through speech karma, and there is also the sense of being aided by body karma. Since this principle applies throughout, it must be assigned individually.

The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya says: There are offenses that are neither bodily nor verbal but arise from the mind. One should ask: with what intention did one take another's property, kill a person, touch a woman, cut grass, or dig the earth? These are called "taking the mind but not the action"—there is an offense. When the action is taken but not the mind, one should not ask with what intention—as in the case of sexual desire, offering alcohol to a woman, sleeping with a woman, or exceeding three nights with someone not fully ordained. If any of these are violated, one should be dealt with according to the Dharma.

As for the third instructional category—the same and different aspects of doing something oneself versus instructing others to do it—we must first clarify that the positions of doing it oneself and instructing others fall into two groups.

There are five precepts where doing it oneself constitutes a serious offense, but instructing others is consistently a light offense. These are: the two kinds of coarse speech, arranging a marriage, and the two relating to dwelling places. If one instructs another to do these five things, there is no personal gratification involved, so it is not the same offense.

In the case of the two kinds of coarse speech, if both the agent and the recipient have defiled minds, or if both lack defiled minds, or if one has and the other lacks—the offenses differ. If both have defiled minds, both commit the same offense. The same reasoning applies to arranging a marriage, where both parties may derive gratification and benefit. As for the two dwelling-place precepts, there is also the possibility of joint action, and thus the same offense can occur.

Next, there are two precepts where doing it oneself and instructing others are consistently the same offense, regardless of whether it is for oneself or for others—because the harm to the object and the satisfaction of the intention are no different. By reasoning, this should be so. However, the *Shan Jian* says that Cidi received a *saṅghādiśeṣa* offense while the nun received a *duṣkṛta*. The meaning is this: if one instructs another, saying, "Take my three roots and slander that person," the one instructed bears a lighter offense. Why? Because if the saṅgha investigates, the one instructed is not held responsible.

There are also six precepts where doing it oneself is a serious offense, but instructing others is consistently light. These are: emission of semen, physical contact, and [similar offenses]. Doing it oneself constitutes a serious offense; instructing another to do it results in a *sthūlātyaya*. This is because there is no personal gratification involved.

The next four precepts concerning admonishment: if the saṅgha has not yet admonished someone, and one instructs that person not to give up [the offense], the offense is a light *duṣkṛta*, because there is as yet no saṅgha command to violate. If the saṅgha has already admonished, and one instructs the person not to give up, it is a *sthūlātyaya*, because there is a communal procedure to violate.

Question: In the above case of instructing another regarding emission of semen and so forth—if the instructor commits a *sthūlātyaya* and the one who has not yet done the act commits a *duṣkṛta*—now, when one instructs another and before the act is completed, the instructor already incurs a *sthūlātyaya*. Explanation: The instructor merely harms himself and damages others; since there is no saṅgha command or communal procedure, the violation is minor. Therefore, one must wait until the act is completed. The instructor incurs a *sthūlātyaya*. In the present case, one who instructs another harms himself, damages others, and also violates a saṅgha command and communal procedure. Therefore, one does not need to wait for the act to be completed—it is already a serious offense.

Question: If Devadatta, before the motion is completed, instructs someone, saying, "Do not give it up," and the person who receives the instruction commits only a *duṣkṛta*—how can it be that the one who gives the instruction commits a serious offense while the one instructed commits a light offense? Answer: Devadatta is precisely the person being admonished. Since there is a dharmic admonishment to violate, the limit for establishing the offense is this: because the motion was not yet completed, the fruit—being a *sthūlātyaya*—means that before the motion is completed, the causal offense is a minor one.

If one instructs and sends another, in the first nine cases, both the one who does it himself and the one sent commit the full offense. In the remaining four cases, there is no sending of another for oneself that incurs the offense.

Now, regarding whether a novice monk, at the time of expedient means, may commit an offense spontaneously: in the cases of the two kinds of coarse speech, arranging a marriage, the two dwelling-place precepts, and the two slander precepts—these seven precepts—if a novice monk employs expedient means, sends another, and for his own sake, before receiving full ordination, the matter is completed by the sent person—then, spontaneously, in the three natures of mind, he commits the seven *saṅghādiśeṣa* offenses. The rest, where there is no sending of another, are the same offense by reasoning; therefore, there is no spontaneous offense.

Regarding the fourth category—the distinction of types in the initial section: as the *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra* states, among the thirteen [Saṃghāvaśeṣa offenses], the first five precepts; among the thirty [Naiḥsargika-Pātayantika offenses], taking robes, washing robes, dyeing wool; among the ninety [Pātayantika offenses], a woman teaching Dharma, sleeping under the same roof as a woman, sitting with a woman in a secluded place, sitting forcibly, sitting in the open, teaching nuns; the latter precepts in the ten [Pātayantika offenses]; and among the hundred rules of training, looking up high—these belong to the category of sexual misconduct.

The second: building a hut, keeping precious things, trading precious things, buying and selling, begging for thread, seizing robes, misappropriating the community's property, hiding robes and bowls, not informing the owner, keeping company with thieves; the third precept among the four [Pātayantika] confession offenses; among the hundred rules of training, covering rice with soup, grass, and clean water—these belong to the category of theft.

Among the thirteen [Saṃghāvaśeṣa offenses], corrupting families; among the thirty [Naiḥsargika-Pātayantika offenses], silk; among the ninety [Pātayantika offenses], using water containing insects, striking others, killing living beings; the first precept among the four [Pātayantika] confession offenses; among the hundred rules of training, taking large mouthfuls of rice, clean grass, clean water—these belong to the category of killing.

Among the thirteen [Saṃghāvaśeṣa offenses], the two [offenses of] false accusation, the two [offenses of] creating schism, harsh speech; among the thirty [Naiḥsargika-Pātayantika offenses], one or two householders, kings and ministers sending messengers; among the ninety [Pātayantika offenses], the first precept; among the [Pātayantika] confession offenses, the second precept; among the hundred rules of training, all precepts concerning teaching Dharma—these are of the category of the precept against false speech.

Fifth, regarding the guidelines for upholding and violating the precepts: only the two types of dwellings involve both upholding and violating; for all other precepts, simply stopping constitutes upholding, while acting constitutes violating.

The two types of upholding regarding the two dwellings are: stopping and not building a dwelling is called "upholding by stopping"; requesting the Dharma from the Sangha for permission is called "upholding by acting."

As for the two types of violating: stopping and not requesting the Dharma is called "violating by stopping"; proceeding to build the dwelling is called "violating by acting." The essence of this offense is one, but its names differ. "Upholding by stopping" and "upholding by acting" have distinct names and essences.

Here we only explain "upholding by acting" in nine cases.

The superior grade involves only one case: being aware of the Dharma. Aware of the offense, one follows the Sangha in requesting permission to build — this is called "upholding by acting." Being aware of the offense without delusion and not committing the two offenses is named the superior grade.

The middling grade has four cases, obtaining the Dharma without offense — this is called "upholding by acting." Each case involves some delusion and does not reach the superior grade, so it is classified as the middling grade. The four cases are: first, aware of the Dharma but doubtful about the offense; second, aware of the Dharma but unaware of the offense; third, doubtful about the Dharma but aware of the offense; fourth, unaware of the Dharma but aware of the offense.

The inferior grade also has four cases, distinguished primarily by greater delusion, and is classified as the inferior grade. The four cases are: first, doubtful about the Dharma and doubtful about the offense; second, doubtful about the Dharma but unaware of the offense; third, unaware of the Dharma but doubtful about the offense; fourth, unaware of the Dharma and unaware of the offense.

For full details, see the Great Commentary.

The sixth category, "Nuns' Offenses Differing [from Monks']," contains six precepts whose relative weight differs.

The precept on emission: for monks it is heavy, for nuns it is light. Why? According to the Abhidharma commentary, a woman must be in a secluded place, and it takes many conditions and much effort before the flow is completed—hence it is light. A man can emit at will—hence it is heavy.

The precept on touching: for nuns it is heavy, for monks it is light. Why? A nun's delusion is thick and heavy; if she is touched again, she will certainly be violated by the external object and a great transgression will result. Therefore, within the framework of skillful means, it is classified as heavy. For a man, there is certainly no such violation, so deep protection is not needed; because it is classified in the limited category, it is light.

Second, coarse speech: for monks it is heavy, for nuns it is light. A monk's intent is frequent, so it is heavy; a woman's aspiration is weak, so coarse speech is rare, so it is light.

Second, the two chambers: for monks it is heavy, for nuns it is light. Why? A monk can travel alone and sleep alone in the two chambers and incur the remaining offense; a nun cannot. From the precept on acting as a matchmaker and the two [instructions] onward, the remaining seven precepts are equally committed by monks and nuns; their meaning can be understood by reflection.

Question: The *Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā* says that dreams can be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral. Since they can be good or bad, they should bring about corresponding karmic results. So why is it that in the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya*, dreaming does not count as an offense in the rules on emission?

Answer: This is said with regard to the overall karmic result, and so it is said not to be an offense. But if we look at specific karmic results, the offense can be either wholesome or unwholesome. The *Five-Part Vinaya* says one incurs five *dukkaṭa* offenses—this is what that means.

Question: In the ninetieth rule, the precept about sitting is the same for both monastics and laypeople, but when it comes to the precept on touching and grasping, why does Venerable Yin say they are combined? He says that because assigning the offense is convenient, they are combined. For monks, whether facing a laywoman or a nun, both cases entail a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. For nuns, whether facing a monk or a layman, both entail an expulsion. So for convenience they are combined. In the case of sitting, when a monk sits with two kinds of women, in both cases it is a *pācittika*—logically it should be combined. But when assigning the offense for nuns, because the weight differs between laypersons and monastics, they must be separated.

Question: If that is so, for nuns, being apart from the five robes is a *pācittika* in both cases. For monks, sitting with two kinds of women is a *pācittika* in both cases. In the monks' case there are three heavy and two light; for nuns facing two kinds of men, the weight differs. Should they not then be combined?

Answer: If one assigns the offense based on the three or five [categories], it is inconvenient; the principle would require separation. But all cases involve discerning the separation based on whether one has received the precepts. Therefore they must be combined. In the case of a private versus public place with two kinds of women, since the matter concerns direct reproach, the offenses are assigned separately according to meaning. Thus it differs from the robes, where there is a principle of facing [the object].

Question: If, in the case of touching, the offense is assigned conveniently and thus combined—as in the rule on going [to a woman], where two kinds of women both entail a *pācittika*, and for nuns with two kinds of men both entail a *dukkaṭa*—is this also a matter of convenience? Why are they not combined?

Answer: The principle of assigning the offense is also a matter of convenience, and they should also be combined. But because the circumstances of the allowance differ—when walking together with a nun, there may be doubt and fear, and the Buddha allowed monks to use force to rescue her from danger—a layperson has no such situation. Therefore they are not combined.

Question: In touching, since the near, heavy object alone reaches a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* but is not called a preparatory *saṃghāvaśeṣa*; stealing four coins, also a near, heavy object, is called a preparatory *sthūlātyaya* but is not called the final offense. Why?

Answer: For theft, a person [stealing] five coins must make use of four to complete the fifth; thus when one short, one assigns a preparatory offense; when one more, one assigns the final offense. In the case of sexual intercourse, the person does not make use of touching—thus the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says there may be a sexual offense without bodily contact, as in the case of one's own two bodily parts.

The first commentator explains that theft has the meaning of a continued process completing a heavy offense, and so it is made a preparatory offense. Touching has no meaning of completing a heavy offense, and so it is made the final offense. As the Vinaya says: "If one steals again but does not reach five, the Buddha said: 'Because of the continuing mind, the previous and later [acts] together make five, and it is an expulsion.'"

Question: When the dwelling is the same, one receives the precepts according to position. The four rules [on dwellings] are not practiced, yet the noble ones do not make it an offense. The four allowances later are open. Why the difference in weight and prohibition?

Answer: The four rules are for few desires, established to perfect the superior grade. If one does not practice them, one falls into the middle and lower. Therefore the precepts prohibit non-practice, but the noble ones do not make it an offense. The four allowances are not superior; they are called one's own share. But now, if one's own share is not practiced, then the weight is differentiated. However, the dwelling is a loose condition and not urgently needed. Once the fault of building is committed, there are many [offenses] among the five. Therefore the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* is established; the remaining three depend on... The necessities of body and livelihood are essential and cannot be lacking. The emotional fault is slight, and so only a *pācittika* is established.

Question: Both the first and the last are about dwellings—why are they not combined?

Answer: Although the dwelling is the same in appearance, there is a difference in whether there is an owner and in measure. Performing the ceremony is difficult, so they must be separated.

Question: If that is so, since the first two rules on dwellings are already separate, why are they not divided?

Answer: From the perspective of assigning the offense separately, they should be divided. But because excessive size and not assigning [the site] both arise from the same cause—building a dwelling—they are combined. Also, to show that building one dwelling brings four offenses, so that practitioners will fear it and not do it, therefore they are not divided. Also, to show that whether or not the site is assigned, there is the offense of excessive size, therefore they are not divided.

In this, the first dwelling is excessive in size, the latter is unassigned. But the first text is not in sequence because this is the intention of the compilers. It is like the rule on killing: in the *pācittika* on killing living beings, this *sūtra* follows the momentum and concludes—it does not mean this *pācittika* refers to Kāludāyin's earlier offense. If not, then Kāludāyin killing an animal would be the second [offense], and it should not be criticized as "the first offense."

Question: Can a site with obstacles and difficulties be validly assigned?

Answer: Formerly it was explained as valid.

Question: If so, the Vinaya says one should not be given the assignment.

Answer: Originally this does not guard against obstacles and difficulties. What is guarded against differs. Although there are obstacles and difficulties, one just follows the *saṃgha*'s request, avoiding the fault of exclusive responsibility. Therefore the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* says: "If there are difficulties and obstacles, and [the dwelling] is not excessive in size, the *saṃgha* assigns it, and there are two *dukkaṭa* offenses." Thus we know it is valid.

The first commentator says it is not valid, because to perform the *karma* the matter must be in accordance with the Dharma. Therefore the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* says: "If difficulties and obstacles are both absent, one should not give the assignment." But the statement about two *dukkaṭa* offenses means the assignment is first valid, and difficulties and obstacles arise later. Since the Dharma is first established and not destroyed, the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* cannot arise. Difficulties and obstacles arise later; one should not act but acts, and so commits two *dukkaṭa* offenses.

Question: If a site with difficulties and obstacles makes the assignment invalid, then just as in ordination, where heavy difficulties obstruct the precepts, the principle is the same—the hundred obstructions are the same. How can ordination be valid?

Answer: It is not a root matter, so one can avoid it and build the dwelling elsewhere. Ordination concerns oneself and cannot be avoided by ordaining elsewhere, so it is not so.

Question: If difficulties and obstacles arise after the Dharma is still present, as in the case of a person who is ill and whose robes are heavy, and the *karma* of separation is performed—when the illness is cured, does the Dharma remain?

Answer: Because the time limit has been set for separation, when the illness is cured the Dharma ceases. Just as after ordination, if difficulties arise, the previous precepts are not lost; but at death or when one gives them up and the time limit passes, they are lost.

Question: If that is so, then when madness ceases, one must be released [from the *karma*]. Answer: This was originally obtained not by the mind; there was no time limit. Therefore when the illness is cured, the Dharma remains and one must be released.

Question: Does the assignment *karma* guard against difficulties and obstacles? Answer: It does not.

Question: If so, the "speaking of purity" should not guard against growth [of offenses]. Answer: If there were guarding against difficulties, originally one would not be allowed to assign; only when there are no obstacles is one allowed. Therefore the assignment does not guard against difficulties and obstacles. The "speaking of purity" is a precaution against exceeding the limit, and so it guards against growth. For this reason, after the assignment is complete, difficulties and obstacles may arise. If the "speaking of purity" has already been done, there will certainly be no offense of exceeding the limit.

Question: Is the assignment Dharma connected with the person or with the place? Answer: It is connected with the place. Therefore the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "One may build a dwelling at the assigned place, but not elsewhere."

Question: Since it is connected with the place, may others build a dwelling at this place? Answer: They may not.

Question: If so, boundary-setting is also connected with the place; may others not perform all *karma* there? Answer: When setting the boundary, no person's name is stated, and the Dharma is not limited. Therefore after this *saṃgha* has set it, another *saṃgha* may perform [karma there]. The assignment is not so.

Question: If the initial assignment is in accordance with the limit, and when the time of building passes and one does not know—does one incur the offense of not assigning at the place of exceeding the limit? Answer: This is not a case of complete non-assignment; there may be a small offense but not a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. Another explanation: one incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* because, although within the originally assigned [area], one does not build there but instead builds outside. But the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* says: "Exceeding the measure in the assigned place entails one *saṃghāvaśeṣa*." Thus we know this explanation is wrong.

Question: A novice requests the assignment and only after becoming a full monk may build the dwelling. How is this explained? Answer: There is no need to request again. Although the position differs, the matter has already been entrusted to the *saṃgha*, and the person is no different.

Another explanation: although the person is the same, the completeness [of ordination] differs, so one must request again.

Question: Is the offense incurred for mutual transgression or for both transgressions? Answer: The *Sudarśana* says: "If in length one reduces one span and in width exceeds one span, or in width one reduces one span and in length exceeds one span, in all cases one commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*." If mutual transgression alone is an offense, how much more when both length and width are excessive?

Question: Does groundless accusation of a person, in relation to the *saṃgha* falsely understanding, incur the *pācittika* of lying? Answer: The *Sudarśana* says it does not. Because the accusation is entirely false and fabricated—this is said with regard to accusation by specific words. If one also has the intention to deceive the *saṃgha*, then in relation to the accused one incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*, and in relation to the *saṃgha* one incurs a *pācittika*.

Question: For monks and nuns following each other, it is a *dukkaṭa*. Why is accusation the same as for a full monk, and hitting the same as for a novice? Answer: Hitting is based on position; accusation is based on full cultivation. If following other Vinayas, hitting and accusation are similar.

Question: If a monk must be pure, and because the origin is pure... why does the Vinaya say "that person is impure"? Answer: Because one has committed the lower four sections, one is said to be impure. Another explanation: "impure" means one also becomes [liable for] accusation. In all cases, the pure among those seen and heard may perform the Dharma. Now, because one goes against the seen purity and falsely says one has committed [an offense], one harms oneself and harms others—regardless of pure or impure, the offense of accusation is established.

Another explanation: hitting a monk who has broken the precepts incurs a *pācittika*, because it is judged by position; accusation takes punishment into account, so pure and impure are distinguished.

Question: If the accused is in fact impure, and the accuser's mind thinks he is pure but speaks to others of his impurity, and [the accuser] incurs the final *saṃghāvaśeṣa*—then if I kill a non-human while my mind thinks "human," I should also incur the final expulsion. If the killed is in fact a non-human, and what I accuse is in fact impure, but my mind thinks "pure" and my mind thinks "human"—if with a pure thought I speak of impurity and thereby incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*, then with a human thought killing a non-human I should equally incur a *pārājika*. If you say that accusing another is evil and the offense is assigned by mind, then likewise intending to kill a human is most evil; it is not merely mind that assigns the offense, but one must act with intention. If one accuses without intending to destroy life, the evil mind is light, and so the offense is assigned by mind. If I arouse a great evil mind to destroy a human life, why is it not assigned by mind? Also, if in fact pure one thinks "impure" and speaks to another of impurity, there is no *saṃghāvaśeṣa*; if in fact human one thinks "stump" and kills, there is also no *pārājika*. Also, killing is against both mind and object; this accusation is also against both mind and object. Why is one a final offense and the other not?

Answer: Accusation takes mental falsity as its meaning; killing takes the reality of both mind and object, and so the offense is committed. As the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya* says: "Tapasvin himself said he was pure; Candra said this was an accusation."

Question: The Buddha is omniscient and well knows pure and impure. Why did he not speak to testify that Tapasvin was pure and Candra was offensive, but instead accepted their own words? Answer: The treatise says there are two meanings: First, if the Buddha testified that one was right and one was wrong, people would slander him, saying the Buddha had love and hatred. Second, if he testified that Tapasvin was offensive, he was in fact not offensive at present. If he did not speak of the offense, then the karmic result would fall away. Therefore their own words were required.

Question: What is called a "root"? Answer: Seeing and hearing are the root, because they can produce the words of accusation.

Question: If so, what is without seeing and hearing can produce accusatory words—why is it not called a root? If accusation is based on the angry mind and is called a root, then when I accuse, it is also based on mind and is called a root.

Answer: In reality it should also apply. All are based on mind, but the distant root differs. In that case, because there is seeing and hearing, the mind of accusation then arises. Therefore seeing and hearing are the root. This is a case of adding something without basis; one must first arouse an angry mind and then produce the accusation—this is what is meant by "having" [a root].

Question: If so, when I have no root and it is "having" [a root], and then an accusing mind arises, should it not also be that the prior "having" is the root? Answer: This must not be because of no root that the accusing mind arises. That one, because of seeing, arouses the mind of accusation. If so, there are cases where even without a root the accusing mind does not arise, and so no root cannot be the root of accusation. Just as there are cases of seeing but not accusing, seeing may also not be the root of accusation.

Answer: The Buddha established accusation when there is a root, and did not establish it when there is no root. Therefore they are not analogous.

Question: Among the three roots, why are only seeing and hearing explained, and not touch and cognition? Answer: Touch is only contact and cannot taste—that person is offensive, so we know. Cognition is knowing after seeing and hearing, and so it falls under seeing and hearing. Knowing after touch is not determined by the above; if one directly says "I know by mind," not from seeing and hearing, the cognition is not established as testimony.

Question: If so, after seeing and hearing there is a mind conforming to seeing and hearing; conforming to that is knowing. Why is there no conforming cognition? Answer: This is not self-knowing; it must be from seeing and hearing that one knows the prior offense. This is an external object; it must be from seeing and hearing. If there is no seeing and hearing, one does not know the offense.

Question: If so, how can there be cognition in minor lying? Answer: In minor lying, it is not necessary to take an external object, so one must establish cognition. Therefore the object of accusation is not a separate name; it is a mental object, and so it is not called cognition. According to the **Liaolun* commentary, doubt pervades the five sense objects. Among the five sense objects, what is not clearly discerned is called the root of doubt. Think and you will know.

Another explanation: From hearing, doubt arises. Each has four cases. But in the case of doubt arising from seeing, there are only the two matters of sexual intercourse and killing, because their marks are evident. Stealing has no root of doubt. The root of seeing is only three; one cannot speak of seeing lying.

Question: If so, in the ninetieth minor accusation, one sees coarse and evil words. Answer: This also is at that time seen by the eye and heard spoken. Thus it is so.

Question: There is only doubt arising after seeing and hearing, but not hearing arising after doubt from seeing, and not seeing arising after doubt from hearing. Answer: Although doubt arises after both seeing and hearing, there are cases where doubt does not arise. If the root of seeing and hearing is real, then doubt does not arise. If it is not clear, doubt may arise. But hearing is originally directed at sound; doubt from seeing is not sound, because seeing is directed at form, and the doubter is only mind—it is not what the ear hears. Therefore hearing cannot arise after doubt from seeing. Also, seeing is directed at form; doubt from hearing is not form, because hearing is directed at sound, and the doubter is only inner mind—it is not what the eye sees. Therefore seeing cannot arise after doubt from hearing.

Question: If seeing cannot arise after hearing, why does the Vinaya say: "If one hears from that person, this is called the root of seeing"? Answer: This seeing is spoken of as the root of seeing from hearing; it is not that the root of seeing arises from hearing. What is spoken of is originally produced, and later arises. Also, hearing pervades the five sense objects, and so from hearing one can speak of the five. Also, hearing cannot be spoken of after seeing, because seeing is limited and does not pervade. Also, the five sense objects and hearing do not arise together, as explained above.

Question: Why is the offense different for accusing the first two [pārājika and saṃghāvaśeṣa], while covering and speaking of the first two are both assigned one *pācittika*? Answer: In all cases of accusation, the punishment has weight. The first section falsely destroys; the second is light. Therefore the assignment differs. Covering the two is both a *pācittika*: covering a heavy offense secretly is rare; covering a light offense openly is frequent. The rare must be lightly regulated; the frequent must be heavily regulated. Therefore they are in the same category.

Another explanation: Although the first two differ, the meaning of protecting the mind is one, and the damage to the *saṃgha* is no different. Therefore they are the same *pācittika*. Speaking of the two is also a *pācittika*, because what is heavy is rare and what is light is frequent; both damage the outer protection—laypeople are not practiced in weight and their reproach is equal. Therefore they are the same *pācittika*.

Question: For accusation, covering, and speaking of the lower three offenses, why are they all assigned a *dukkaṭa*? Answer: Although the offenses are graded, the punishment is slight, and so it is a *dukkaṭa*.

Question: Accusation incurs three; covering and speaking incur two; advising and so on are equally assigned one *pācittika*. Answer: Accusation concerns punishment; covering and speaking damage the *saṃgha*. The loss has weight, and so two and three differ. Advising out of doubt and so on, the general annoyance is equal, and is not specifically directed at the offense or the thirteen difficulties. Accusing a pure person all incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. And speaking ill incurs the root *pācittika*. But among the difficulties there is no covering and speaking of offenses, because they are not monks.

Question: The text on settling disputes says: "Covering another's offense is heavy; covering one's own offense is light. Covering another has a root; covering oneself has no root." Therefore the *pācittika* and *dukkaṭa* differ. Speaking of oneself is rare and light; speaking of another is frequent and heavy. Therefore the *pācittika* and *dukkaṭa* differ. But the Vinaya also says: "Accusing oneself is no offense; speaking of oneself incurs a *dukkaṭa*." Why? Answer: Accusation is in relation to the *saṃgha*, and so it is no offense. Speaking [of oneself] is in relation to the *saṃgha* or laypeople, and does not yet incur reproach. Therefore it incurs a *dukkaṭa*.

Question: Among the thirteen, the first nine require no advice; the latter four require advice. Why? Answer: The first nine are clear-cut, right and wrong, with no confusion or ambiguity, and are completely evident, so no advice is needed. The latter four all have ambiguity, and the principle and practice of the two teachings are mixed, right and wrong intermingled, true and false hard to distinguish. The confused fall into evil. Therefore they are pitiable, and the *saṃgha* must advise them.

Question: Breaking the *saṃgha* and going against advice are two rules; the others are single. Why? Answer: The matter of breaking the *saṃgha* is great and requires a leader and followers to help each other. When advising the leader who does not give up, the first rule is established. When advising the leader, the four followers shadow and assist. The *saṃgha* then advises. If they do not give up, the second rule is established. The other two are handled by one person alone, without a leader and followers, and so there are no two rules.

Question: Going against advice incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. Does *Liṭha* going against advice incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*? Answer: One explanation is that all four rules rely on ambiguous practice and teaching, where words are confused and factions help each other, and the matter succeeds in breaking the *saṃgha*. The first two destroy the Dharma-wheel; the latter two destroy the *karma*. Also, the matters advised in the first two are heavy, and the mind of advice is also heavy, and so a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* is incurred. In the latter two, although the matters are not heavy, all commit many offenses, defiling families, with evil nature, and may commit root offenses of the lower groups. Also, they unreasonably accuse the *saṃgha*, relying on themselves and bullying others. All these offenses accumulate. If the *saṃgha* advises three times and they do not give up, a heavy offense is also assigned. *Liṭha* speaking his desire does not obstruct principle and teaching, but goes against the *saṃgha*'s Dharma without confusion. Also, his words do not yet commit a root offense; what he does is slight. If advised three times and he does not give up, a *pācittika* is assigned.

Question: If so, Devadatta was the leader and committed a root offense, which is heavy; the four followers committed light offenses. Why did they not give up and going against advice equally incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*? Also, a nun setting up a leader and followers with mutual influence only makes preparations and in the end does not succeed. Why does going against advice also incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*? Also, going against one person's advice—testing the matter advised, which pervades the seven categories—the offense of going against advice is equally assigned one *pācittika*. Thus we know it is not based on the weight of the matter advised.

One explanation: It is based on the falsity or reality of the mind. In these four rules, the person advised can be known; what he does is false, and the *saṃgha*'s advice is true. Therefore going against the feeling is a heavy offense; not giving up incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. In "speaking his desire does not obstruct," the mind is deluded and attached, truly thinking his own view is right and the *saṃgha*'s advice is wrong. He has no mind of going against the *saṃgha*; the emotional offense is slight, and so he only incurs a *pācittika*. How do we know? As in breaking the *saṃgha*, with the five points as wrong, the first statement's mind is false and heavy; the fourth statement's mind is true and light. Also, going against one person's advice—testing the mind's reality—incurs a *dukkaṭa*; if false, a *pācittika*. How much more so in the *saṃgha*'s advice: if the mind is false the offense is heavy; if true it is light. Thus they are equal in falsity and reality, but going against the *saṃgha*'s command is heavy, and going against an individual is not. Therefore there is weight and lightness.

One explanation: It cannot be said that the mind's falsity or reality assigns the weight of the offense. If so, one should say *Liṭha*'s mind is false and he incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. As the **Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "*Liṭha* was a disciple of a non-Buddhist, clever and sharp. He was sent into the Buddha's Dharma, learned, and then taught inverted views." This is a false mind and should incur a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. The fourth statement of breaking the *saṃgha* has a true mind and should incur a *pācittika*. One should [also say] killing an animal with a false mind incurs an expulsion, and killing a human with a true mind incurs a *pācittika*. If you use *saṃghāvaśeṣa* to compare with *pācittika*, I would also use *pārājika* to compare with *pācittika*. If you say humans and animals are not parallel, I would also say going against [the *saṃgha*] and speaking one's desire are not the same. I will not again speak of the above mind-deluded-attached-true view.

The first commentator's explanation: The mind's falsity and reality are contradictory in principle. Now I maintain the first explanation: the offense is assigned according to the weight of the matter, and so it differs. As in killing, stealing, procuring, accusing, and even the numerous trainings, all are equally directed at going against the teaching; the offense should be uniform. But because the matter rises and falls, the offense is graded. Also, although the four statements of breaking the *saṃgha* have falsity and reality, going against advice equally incurs a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. Thus we know it is based on the matter and does not discuss falsity and reality.

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* asks: The *sūtra* says, "One should only contemplate one's own bodily conduct, and carefully observe good and evil." The *Prātimokṣa* says, "How do you teach one another?" Why are these contradictory? Answer: The Buddha established precepts according to the time. The words differ but the intent coincides; they are not contradictory. But because the people of former times had minds of love and hatred, were dull-rooted and ignorant, had little learning and little seeing, and did not speak for the benefit [of others]—for such people he said, "One should only contemplate one's own bodily conduct." If one has a compassionate mind and it is beneficial, is sharp-rooted and speaks beneficially, has wide learning, and speaks for the benefit of others and hears the Dharma—for such people he said, "You should together speak and advise one another."

Question: The Vinaya says one must not force another to confess, but then says one must force another. Answer: This is with regard to the former individual's practice of purity, and so one must force another. But one must not force him, because that takes the *saṃgha*'s *karma* and the mind at that time; one fears it will delay the speaking of the precepts. After the speaking of the precepts is over, then one must ask. This is explained in detail in the eighth volume.