Vinaya Essentials from the Four-Part Vinaya (四分律拾毗尼義鈔)

Briefly explaining the topic, preserving six sections.

Among the ninety precepts, thirty-one are committed through the body alone and not through speech. As the summary verse says: one who is female, not yet fully ordained, forcefully removing robes, covering, and in a secluded place giving separately — these offenses are neither serious nor residual, not apart from sitting in a secluded spot, exposing oneself, and the four cases of armies and wine, striking with water, and half-white, two follow and strike. The palace has twenty-one precepts that are committed through speech alone and not through the body. As the verse says: intentionally, destroying, both together speaking the way, a woman differently despising a nun, ridiculing the Dharma, frightening, doubting, initiating desire, refusing, and the adjacent desire without root defamation — these twenty-one Vinaya matters, as previously explained, and those not fully ordained and of age are offenses through speech. The present explanation is not so. The Vinaya says: the preceptor raises the Sangha's transgression. Therefore, one knows that one's own actions performed through another's speech — the thirty-eight precepts are both speech and body, the thirty-one precepts involve actions of speech combined with body and mind. There are seven precepts where the action of speech ceases and is committed together with body and mind. In the treatise on former actions, there are also three — body, speech, and actions performed through another's body. There are nineteen precepts. If discussing self-action, they are committed solely through body and mind. If according to the teaching of persons, name, and self-speech action through another's body — therefore the verse says: digging, breaking, pulling, using, persuading, then hiding, drinking, killing, driving away, and with a nun, grasping, falling, and valuable — the high bed. The seven precepts are all subsequent. There are seven precepts of self-speech action through self and other's body. For example, walking together with a nun requires one's own speech, having made an appointment together, and afterward the bodily action transgresses the boundary and only then is it an offense. As the verse says: in a secluded place, two places, spreading out, the four periods, requesting delicious food — there are five precepts of one's own action through another's speech. For example, eating and a nun praising food through a nun's speech action, praising the body action, swallowing, and only then is it an offense. The rest are likewise. The verse says: praising, admonishing, and the two hearing and not fully ordained and of age — the five. The offense of violating admonition also includes verbal violation. For now, speaking from one aspect, it does not exhaust the reasoning. Next, discussing the ceasing action committed together with body: the one precept of covering and concealing — the treatise explanations differ. The Abhidharma treatise says: it is committed through mental action. This is spoken from the root; it is not only mental. The Mātikā is also like this. The Ten Recitations also says: a nun covering a grave offense is also committed through single mind. The Good Explanation says: one who commits through body and mind — seeing and hearing others commit — this is generally called body action. It does not yet constitute an offense. If one exposes it verbally, originally there is no offense. Because of what one has seen and heard, one stops and does not expose it, and conceals it in the mind — therefore the ceasing action of speech is through body and mind. Therefore the verse says: covering, turning the back, the foot is not timely, the household, truly not giving desire.

Regarding the second category—the distinction between doing an action yourself versus telling others to do it—there are twelve precepts where doing it yourself and having someone else do it carry the same offense. The rest are: doing it yourself is the actual transgression, while telling someone else to do it is a lighter offense.

The verse says: Digging and destroying, pulling and using, urging and frightening, burning and hiding, killing and drinking, rootless accusation, grabbing and dropping, and jewels—doing it yourself or telling another, the offense is the same in all these cases.

No matter whether it is for yourself or not for yourself, in these cases the harm is the same, so all are equally transgressions.

There are ten precepts where telling someone else to do it—when it is not for yourself—brings no personal benefit. Even though harm is done, the offense is minor. Which are these?

The verse says: In private or in the open, giving robes to a nun, and high beds—seven precepts together.

Of these first ten precepts, if you tell someone else to do it for your own sake, then both the one who does it and the one who tells them commit a grave offense. If a messenger is sent, it is a minor offense.

If it is not for your own sake, then the one who accepts the instruction commits a grave offense, while the one who gives the instruction commits a minor offense.

This reasoning is not yet complete. For example, in beating and striking, both oneself and others cause harm—why is that not equally a transgression, while only the rootless accusation or drinking water with insects in it and the like are said to be without that rule?

The meaning is decisively settled as equal. Therefore we know it is not fully covered.

The Samantapāsādikā says: "Instructing a nun without being asked is a conventional prohibition, not intrinsically evil." That is why only the thirty precepts are taken as intrinsically evil, while the remaining sixty are all called conventional prohibitions.

Here we are only listing the intrinsically evil ones for now, and need not discuss the conventional prohibitions by name. Therefore the verse says: Thus destroying, the two ways of speaking differently, dislike, forcing, pulling and using, ridiculing yet not driving away, frightening, concealing, doubt, drinking, causing to speak, following and following, refusing, destroying, the same as not doing, beating and striking—none.

The third section explains the differences between "observance" and "violation." Among the ninety precepts, twelve can be either observed or violated. Which twelve are they? They are: obtaining formal approval through the monastic assembly, confessing grave offenses, instructing nuns, accepting the merit robe, eating separately by invitation, eating apart from the group, entrusting offerings, eating at improper times with prior arrangement, entering others' homes before or after the noon meal, performing the leftover-food procedure without violation, eating enough and urging others to eat, and the seven-day and lifelong medicines. By performing the oral procedure of acceptance, one does not commit an offense even if the medicine is kept overnight or received without purification. Also, asking the owner and undertaking lawful monastic business, and expressing consent before leaving—these twelve precepts, by the Buddha's compassionate allowance for following the teaching through procedural action, carry no offense. This is called "observance through action." If one refrains from performing the procedure and the act itself is contrary, this is called "violation through inaction." If judged from the perspective of the act performed, it is called "violation through action." These two violations share the same mental factor of volition and are one in essence, though their names differ. Refraining from the procedure and refraining from the act—completely not doing them—is called "observance through inaction." Thus the two observances, through action and through inaction, differ in name and essence.

An earlier interpretation held that for the seven-day medicine, once the oral procedure of acceptance is completed, it guards against eating at improper times, and this is called "observance through action." The current interpretation disagrees. Before the seven-day medicine has undergone the oral procedure, its nature permits eating at improper times—there is originally no day limit. But once the oral procedure is performed, exceeding seven days becomes "improper time." This arises from the oral procedure itself. How can one say it is "guarding" and call it "observance through action"?

Regarding concealment, the earlier interpretation also called it "observance through action." This too is incorrect. Is there any case where performing a procedure of concealment in accordance with the teaching results in no offense? If I enter a village at an improper time in accordance with the teaching and perform the act, because it is an improper time I enter the village yet incur no offense—can this be called "observance through action"? Therefore we know the earlier view is wrong, and the current one stands.

For the remaining twelve, apart from these, there is no procedural action following the teaching, so it is not called "observance through action."

Question: If one instructs another to dig the earth, and the Buddha allows this through the "knowing it is pure" declaration, one guards against offense in instructing others and incurs no guilt—is this not "observance through action"?

Answer: These twelve, when performed by oneself in accordance with the teaching through procedural action, incur no fault and can be called "observance through action." In the case of the "knowing it is pure" statement, only instructing others is allowed; since performing it oneself is not allowed, it is not called "observance through action."

Next, there are two precepts where the action itself is observance and refraining is violation: concealment and not listening with attentive ears. The remaining seventy-six precepts involve observance through inaction and violation through action, or observance through action and violation through action, with meanings as explained above.

Now, explaining "violation through inaction" and "observance through inaction": Regarding "observance through inaction," there are nine categories divided into three grades. The upper grade has one category: knowing the Dharma, knowing the violation and non-violation of the root, and further being free from delusion, not failing to study, not being ignorant—pure and clear. This is the upper grade. The middle grade has four categories: first, knowing the Dharma but doubting the violation; second, knowing the Dharma but not knowing the violation; third, doubting the Dharma but knowing the violation; fourth, not knowing the Dharma but knowing the violation. These four do not violate the root, and the rule establishes them as "observance through inaction." They have four kinds of ignorance, falling short of the upper grade, so they are the middle grade. The lower grade has four categories: first, doubting the Dharma and doubting the violation; second, doubting the Dharma but not knowing the violation; third, not knowing the Dharma but doubting the violation; fourth, not knowing the Dharma and not knowing the violation. These four all do not violate the root and are called "observance through inaction." They have eight offenses, inferior to the previous two, so they are the lower grade.

Next, discussing "violation through inaction": there are nine categories, but eight are established—there is no "knowing the Dharma and knowing the violation." This reverses the progressive pursuit of study to illustrate "violation through inaction." Since it is called "violation through inaction," arising from not studying, how could there be "knowing the Dharma and knowing the violation"? Therefore there are only eight. The current interpretation: if one reverses the explanation to illustrate inaction, only eight are obtained, not nine. If one reverses the cultivation to illustrate inaction, then there are nine categories—such as not accepting the three robes, not making the purification declaration, and so on—understanding yet not doing. How can there not be nine? "Knowing the Dharma and knowing the violation"—in terms of not performing the root action, it is called "violation through inaction." Yet knowing the teaching characteristics without delusion is called the lower grade. The middle grade's four categories each incur one offense. The upper grade's four categories each incur two offenses. Because in the violation category, more offenses are superior, reversing the previous observance category where no offense was superior. The categories can be exchanged, and the higher and lower can be understood accordingly.

The fourth section on the differences between monks and nuns: among the ninety precepts, sixty-nine are shared offenses for both monks and nuns, and the nun's code has textual references, so there is no need to recount them. There are twenty-one precepts that differ from those for nuns, with three kinds of distinctions.

First, the difference of whether an offense exists or not: this refers to teaching nuns directly and speaking until dusk, and criticizing the instructing teacher. These three precepts do not exist for nuns. There is no sequential causation and no meaning to be understood in them.

There are thirteen precepts with differences in lightness and heaviness, which is why the verse says: making robes, carrying and sitting in a secluded place, the three-period observance, receiving praise and food, urging completion, beautifying teeth, horns exceeding measure, and covering the three robes. These thirteen involve the same deed but the offense has grades, which is why it is called the meaning of differences in lightness and heaviness, as explained in the Vinaya.

Next, there are five precepts where the offense is the same but the circumstances differ. The verse says: declining an invitation, the outer path with the rainy-season robe for the year. In these five precepts, the place of incurring guilt is the same, which is called the same offense but different circumstances, and so they fall among the different precepts. This is extensively explained in the Vinaya.

Although the text is like this, now with respect to meaning I further establish that there should be three types.

First, dragging others out — for spring and winter quarters, monks and nuns share the offense; for summer quarters, monks incur a transgression and nuns incur a grave offense.

Second, reviling nuns — this applies to both communities, but monks are light and nuns are heavy.

Third, concealing — one precept covers two categories; for nuns, concealing an initial offense is heavy, while for monks it is light. The various schools differ on this, as explained in a separate chapter.

At the time of the fifth novice, there were skillful means for advancing to receive full ordination—the twenty-two precepts have the meaning of spontaneous occurrence. As for the remaining precepts, since no one is taught to commit the same offense, there is no spontaneous occurrence. Which ones are these? They are the previously mentioned second round of precepts, where teaching others to commit the same offense does not require further counting. Although there are still slight differences: in an exposed place, there is completely no spontaneous occurrence; in a secluded place, there may be partial occurrence. If one leaves permanently, there is completely none; if one leaves temporarily, staying outside the boundary for two nights, then there can be spontaneous occurrence. After receiving the precepts and then committing offenses, we further examine the ninety precepts to clarify their characteristics—there are nine categories. First, from false speech to destroying the dwelling place of spirits, there are eleven precepts, clarifying the practice of guarding the mouth, collecting the mind, and not offending with the body, well-tuning the three actions. Second, from divisive speech angering the community through the three sections of covering a house, there are nine precepts, clarifying the practice of skillfully guiding people's minds, following and protecting the community's intentions, and not causing irritation. Third, from admonishing nuns without authorization to walking together with lay women, there are ten precepts, clarifying the practice of avoiding suspicion and remaining pure. Fourth, from giving one meal to accepting an invitation for four months, there are seventeen precepts, clarifying the practice of moderating inner sustenance, having few desires, and being content. Fifth, from watching military formations to not making three-color dye, there are thirteen precepts, clarifying the practice of reckoning intentions according to conditions, avoiding negligence, cultivating the path of renunciation, and non-attachment. Sixth, from intentionally cutting off the lives of living beings to traveling with thieves, there are seven precepts, clarifying the practice of always dwelling in seclusion and cultivating compassion for all beings. Seventh, from saying that desire does not obstruct the path to not listening with the ear, there are six precepts, clarifying the practice of deep faith and understanding, and respectfully following all the Buddha's teachings. Eighth, from regretting after consensus karma to groundless accusation, there are seven precepts, clarifying the practice of dwelling together in peace, not disturbing one another, harmonious and without duality, mutually respecting and upholding. Ninth, from forcibly entering the royal palace to the end of this section, there are ten precepts, clarifying the practice of moderation and careful restraint in outer deportment regarding clothing, without violation.

Question: If someone deliberately hides another's robe or bowl as a joke, why is it only a light offense, while hiding them with the intent to cause distress is a heavy offense? And why are both cases of lying equally a heavy offense?

Answer: Lying is not rooted in causing distress to others, so when a sentient being is wronged, even a joke still involves wrongdoing toward a sentient being. But hiding belongings involves causing distress, and although the hider's mind may be light or heavy, the person who suffers the distress experiences it no differently. That is why both cases are equally a heavy offense.

Question: If hiding the belongings of a junior monk still causes distress, should it also be a heavy offense?

Answer: When a fellow monk of the same community suffers distress, the emotional weight is heavy, and it can also obstruct the confession ceremony, so it is a heavy offense. But if it is someone of a different kind, even if distress is caused, as long as there is no dispute or litigation, it does not obstruct communal matters. Therefore, it is only a light offense.

Question: In the precepts concerning false accusation, the seven categories of offenses involving false accusation are graded in descending severity. Why is it that when someone slanders a person who has committed a Pārājika offense, the penalty is only a Vinaya transgression?

Answer: Because false accusation causes harm and distress, and since there are degrees of increase and decrease, the resulting offenses are graded accordingly. In the case of harsh speech and slander, the offense is determined solely from the perspective of the distress inflicted.

Question: If that is so, then if I harshly slander someone who has committed the four Pārājika offenses with the intent to cause distress, the offense should be heavy; but with a mere Vinaya transgression of harsh speech, it should also be light?

Answer: Harsh speech and slander involve two types of evil conduct—all evil acts are Vinaya transgressions, and all good acts are Vinaya transgressions as well. In the case of false accusation, however, there is only the evil act of false accusation and no good act of false accusation, so the two are not on the same level.

Question: If that is so, why is there no gradation for harsh speech within evil acts?

Answer: False accusation originally has three aspects: first, causing harm and distress; second, imposing punishment; third, requiring confrontation before others. Harsh speech involves only causing harm and distress, lacking the imposition of punishment, and therefore has no gradation.

<note>Question: How are the two assemblies—nuns and monks—classified regarding the offense of slander, and how does the matter of a nun reviling a monk or a nun [reviling others] differ for each?

Answer: For slander, the basis for punishment rests on the principle that reviling carries the fault of violating respect according to superior and inferior, higher and lower. Hence there are lighter and heavier [offenses]. A nun scolding the great assembly of monks is a "transgression (dukkata)"—the meaning of this [as a designated offense] is rare; it should be permissible [to treat it as such] for [a monk] scolding the assembly of nuns as a "transgression (dukkata)" by count. But if that were so, slander of the great assembly of monks being rare should also be light.

Answer: Because the person [involved] is one who is repeatedly afflicted, [and] because the great assembly of monks knows the Dharma, the meaning of reviling the assembly is rare; therefore for both assemblies alike it is a "transgression (dukkata)."</note>

Question: Why is the Precept against Lying specified for the assembly, while the other precepts are not?

Answer: The Precept against Lying is committed by all seven assemblies. For harsh speech and divisive speech, only monks commit a grave offense; for everyone else, these are minor. Therefore they are not specified.

Question: Regarding sharing a room, the Precepts of the Path to Cessation, and whether monastics and laypeople may sit or travel by boat together—what is the difference between monastics and laypeople?

Answer: When a monk sits together with two women for an entire day, whether or not he is giving teachings makes a difference; therefore he must keep his distance.

Answer regarding staying overnight: For monks and nuns alike, there is no case of giving teachings. When a monk travels together with two women, for nuns there are two allowances and one prohibition—because of the difficulty, and because of having many companions. For laywomen, the circumstances are simply different; staying overnight is likewise the rule.

As for sharing a boat: this invites criticism and the harm is serious. Unlike laywomen, they must not travel together.

Question: Why is there no offense of "exceeding three nights" in the Precept when staying together with a woman?

Answer: The Buddha laid down a rule not to allow staying in the same room with a woman, so this was never permitted in the first place. Therefore, the Vinaya commentary says: if one stays together with a woman for three consecutive nights, there is only the offense of sharing a room, not the offense of exceeding three nights.

A current explanation: staying overnight with a woman, though forbidden by rule, still carries the offense of exceeding three nights. If staying overnight with a woman did not constitute the offense of exceeding three nights, then keeping oversized possessions without formally assigning them would likewise be an offense — and there should be no such offense as "obstruction and difficulty."

If someone asks: If two offenses are bound together, why does the Four-Part Vinaya only mention the celestial man? Answer: Because it was already prohibited earlier, and to distinguish it from the previous precept, the celestial man is specified. If it were said that because the person is male, a female does not commit an offense, then in the same recitation passage it also says a male asura may recite together with a woman without offense. Therefore, for those who have not received full ordination, aside from monks and nuns, the rest are included. Since "aside from" here applies to both assemblies, we know that "included" in this context covers the five assemblies. The Abhidharma Treatise further asks: At first, staying overnight was prohibited; later, two or three nights were permitted. How is it that in the precept concerning observing the army, at first seeing it was an offense, and later two or three nights were permitted as a separate precept, and yet there are still cases where merely seeing it constitutes an offense? Answer: Among those who have not received the precepts, the original offense arose from staying overnight; after the later allowance of two or three nights, there is no longer any offense of staying the first night. The origin of the army precept was due to observing; after the offense was committed, the allowance of three nights was made on that account. In the precept text, exceeding three [nights] is an offense. Observing the army is not the same as staying overnight, and yet there is still the offense of observing the army.

You ask: according to this Vinaya, the two categories of wrongdoing called "Saṅghādisesa" — causing a schism in the Sangha and shedding the blood of a Buddha — are light in name but very deep in karmic consequence. Teaching them also corrupts the community, so one commits the same offense as someone who promotes them. Why does the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya say, when discussing the coarse precepts, that it only excludes the two sections and does not list the Sthūlātyaya? The answer: because the names differ in weight. If the Sthūlātyaya were listed by name, people would think the other Sthūlātyaya offenses are also to be raised, so to prevent confusion, it is omitted.

Question: According to the second chapter, those who commit the same offense as the one who raises the matter—what about one who slanders others? In the second chapter, are the offenses of slandering others light or heavy?

Answer: Slandering others in the second chapter carries the meaning of punishment, and because the harm done varies in depth, the offenses are spoken of as light or heavy. But stating the second chapter's own offenses involves no meaning of punishment; since the damage to the community is equal in every case, they are assigned to a single category.