觀因緣門第一
Chapter 1: Contemplating Causation
初門中三：初、標起章門；二、立頌略示；後、釋頌廣顯。頌中上半舉法，下半徵情。又上半明緣生故無性，下半顯無性故即空。若具言，此中有兩重比量，以初成後。何者？上半明一切有為法皆無自性，宗；以從緣生故，因；喻，可知。下半明有為法定空，宗；以無自性故，因；喻，亦可知。三、釋頌廣顯中二：初、明有為空，後類顯我及無為一切皆空。前中三：一、牒舉果；二、「如是」下，破顯無性；三、「是故」下，結有為空。初中三：先開果有內外；二、開緣亦內外；三、釋顯內外緣果。此中先辨外事有五事，各有因緣及所生法，並可知。後顯內報，謂十二因緣。依小乘宗，皆前支為因，生後支故，具有因緣及所生法亦可知，亦是釋頌中初句竟。二、破顯無性中二：先總顯，謂內外法既各如是攬緣而成，豈非即是無自性耶？若有自體，豈更緣？故《涅槃經》云「譬如青黃，合成綠色」。當知是二本無綠性。若本有者，何須合成？二、「若法自性無」下，別顯無性。於中先外後內。外中二：先正破，後類結。前中，初標列自他共三章俱無；二、「何以故」下，徵釋。於中先徵後釋。釋中，先釋自性無、後釋他性無，不釋第三共生。以自他若破，無別共故。就釋初中，謂自性若有，則不因他，以因他故，自性無也。二、「若謂」下，釋他性無中有三：初、他成別體故非因；二、「若謂」下，因同果體故非他；三、「又蒲」下，因復無性失自他。又釋此三：初、約疏；二、約親；三、俱非。初中二：先約情縱破，謂若他生者，牛應生馬、種梨生柰等也。後「而實不然」者，就理奪破也。二、「若謂」下，就親破，亦是明因同果體故非他。於中三：初、牒救總非，謂外計云他有二種：一、非因之他，如牛於馬，可不相生；二、是因之他，如蒲於席，何得不生？前文但云他不言因，此中說因而不言他故也。此救非理，故云「不然」。二、徵不然所以。三、正釋破，於中初、存因失他故非因，是奪破也。若謂是因而非他者，因既於果而非他，則蒲席一體；體既是一，則失於因，因既失矣，他生之義安在？二、存他失因，是緣破也。謂若是他因非因故，前則以因為他不成，後則以他為因。又前由一故不成生，後由異故亦不生，是故他不生也。亦可前中量云：因定不生果，以與果法不別故，猶如果法。後義量云：因定不生果，以與果異故，猶如非因法。三、推因無性失他，於中遮外救云：上來或異同非因，或一同果法，俱不得生，而實生理非一非異，故得相生。今破意云：若有此因，可與果非一異，而能生於果。今推求此因亦無自性，以從眾緣成故，猶如果法，是故無體可能生也。文中有四：初、標；二、徵；三、釋；四、結。釋中，先釋蒲無自體，後辨無力成席。謂自體尚無，何有力用？「是故」下，結可知。二、「餘缾」下，類餘一切外因緣法皆不可得。第二、釋破內法緣果之中有二：初、略指同前破，亦是懸標後文破。二、引頌廣顯破，此中二：初引頌相傳，此《七十論》亦是龍樹所造，有七十頌故名也。頌中，初句顯正理，次句牒執，下二句徵破。又可初句奪破，後三句縱破。又可初句標無生，後三句釋無生。二、釋頌中，先釋文顯宗，後結因果俱空。釋中先立正義，亦是釋頌初句，就理奪破。二、「若謂」下，破外情計，亦釋下三句縱破。此中三：先、開兩關定；二、次第別破；三、雙結俱非。第二別破中二：先約一心破，俱縱其所立，謂正無明上心時，行等亦應同時。「又因果」下，奪其因果。文中先標舉，後釋成。二、約多心破，有三：初、因果別異破，以不相搆及故非緣生法也。二、後果無因破，謂先分無明與前心俱謝，後分行等，誰為其因？三、遮救重破，謂外救云：我前念無明雖滅，能引後行支故為因，如等無間緣；本識中種子，前滅後生等。今破云：汝前心為已滅？為未滅？若已滅，滅是無物，以何為因？若未滅，則果不得生，以前心破故。三、「十二因緣」下，雙結，可知。第三、「是故」下，結緣果皆空，可知。二、類破中四：初、結有為法空，可知；二、「有為尚空」下，以法空故，顯我無依，故亦空也。論說法執為因，人執為果，本因既亡，末果隨喪也。以此論明人、法二空故。先辨法空者，以正破二乘兼破外道故。此中三：一、標況破；二、釋法破；三、引證破。釋中二：先、順釋，謂因三科有為法積聚故，假說為我。有為既空，假我安在？可然是薪，然是火，反釋可知。引證中，如經說因我故有我所，如因法有我相似。又釋前法空故我空，此明我空故所空，以所是我之用故，此乃從本向末以說空也。三、類顯無為空中先標類，謂涅槃名寂滅也。二、「何以故」下，釋成。釋成中三：初、無法可滅故無滅；二、無能得滅故無滅；三、「復次」下，明闕生待對故無滅；四、「是故」下，結三空，可知。
**The initial entry has three parts: First, outlining the chapter's topics; second, presenting verses as a brief summary; third, an extensive explanation of the verses.**
**The first half of the verse indicates phenomena, and the second half investigates our attachments. Also, the first half explains that because things arise from conditions, they have no intrinsic nature, and the second half shows that because they have no intrinsic nature, they are empty.**
**To elaborate, there are two chains of reasoning here, with the first establishing the second. Why? The first half establishes that all conditioned phenomena lack intrinsic nature (the claim), because they arise from conditions (the reason). The example is understood. The second half establishes that conditioned phenomena are necessarily empty (the claim), because they lack intrinsic nature (the reason). The example is also understood.**
**Third, the extensive explanation of the verses has two parts: first, explaining the emptiness of conditioned phenomena; second, extending this to show that the self and unconditioned phenomena are also all empty. The former has three parts: first, listing the objects (results); second, "Thus…" reveals they lack intrinsic nature; third, "Therefore…" concludes conditioned phenomena are empty.**
**In part one, three points: first, opening the results into internal and external; second, opening the conditions into internal and external; third, explaining internal and external results and conditions. The external things are discussed under five categories, each with its causes, conditions, and produced result. The internal results refer to the twelve links of dependent origination. According to the Small Vehicle school, each preceding link is the cause of the succeeding one, so it's understood that they also have causes, conditions, and produced results. This completes the explanation of the first sentence of the verse.**
**Part two, revealing the lack of intrinsic nature, has two parts: first, a general statement: since internal and external phenomena are assembled from conditions, isn't that already lacking intrinsic nature? If they had an inherent self-nature, why would they need conditions? The *Nirvana Sutra* says, "It is like combining blue and yellow to make green." Know that these two do not originally have a 'green' nature. If they did, why would they need to be combined? Second, "If a dharma lacks intrinsic nature…" specifically reveals the lack of intrinsic nature. This covers external first, then internal. The external has two parts: first, the main refutation; second, a concluding analogy. In the first: first, list the three possibilities (self, other, and combination) and state they all fail; second, "Why?" analyze. In the analysis, first the question, then the explanation. The explanation first explains "self-nature" and then "other-nature," not explaining the third "combination," because if self and other are refuted, combination is not separate.**
**To explain "self-nature": If a self-nature existed, it wouldn't depend on another. Since it depends on another, it lacks self-nature. Second, "If it is said…" explaining the non-existence of other-nature, has three points: first, the other has a separate entity, so it cannot be the cause; second, "If it is said…" the cause sharing the same nature as the result is not 'other'; third, "Moreover, a reed…" the cause itself lacks self-nature, losing the basis for 'self' and 'other'. Another interpretation of these three: first, a distant relation; second, a close relation; third, neither. The first has two parts: first, a counter-argument based on faulty logic: if other could produce, then a cow should give birth to a horse-seed and a pear planting should yield an apple; second, "but this is not the case" is a disproof based on principle.**
**Second, "If it is said…" refutes a close relation, also showing that effect and cause share the same nature, so it's not "other." Three parts: first, presenting the opponent's objection and rejecting it. The opponent argues: 'other' has two types: [1] the other that is not the cause, like a cow to a horse, so they don't produce each other; [2] the other that is the cause, like a reed to a mat, why shouldn't it arise? The previous statement said "other," not "cause"; here it says "cause," not "other." This objection is unreasonable, so it's rejected. Second, questioning the reason for its incorrectness. Third, proper refutation. Two aspects: [a] Maintaining 'cause' loses 'other', invalidating the cause – a direct rebuttal. If it is called cause and not other, then the cause and effect are identical; if they are one entity, 'cause' is lost; since cause is lost, where is the meaning of arising from another? [b] Maintaining 'other' loses the defining characteristic of being a cause, repudiating its claim. If it is other, then it's not truly the cause. The first alternative fails because taking cause as 'other' doesn't work; the second fails because taking 'other' as 'cause' doesn't work. Thus 'other' doesn't produce.**
**The line of reasoning for the first is: a cause necessarily does not produce an effect, because it is not separate from the effect-dharma, just like the effect-dharma itself. The line of reasoning for the second is: a cause necessarily does not produce an effect, because it is distinct from the effect, just like a non-cause dharma.**
**Third, pushing to show that the cause lacks intrinsic nature loses the 'other'. This counters a potential objection: "From above, whether [cause is] different or same as the effect, [you claim] it cannot produce, but in reality, production relies on neither being identical nor being different, so it can produce." The refutation means: If this cause existed, it could be non-identical and non-different to the effect and produce it. But now, investigating this cause, it also lacks intrinsic nature, because it is formed by a collection of conditions [just like the effect-dharma]. Thus it has no substance to produce. The passage has four stages: first, statement; second, question; third, explanation; fourth, conclusion. The explanation first explains the reed has no self-substance, then explains it has no power to form a mat. Since its own substance is absent, what power could it have? "Therefore…" concludes. This is understandable.**
**Second, "Other, such as the vase…" categorizes all external phenomena of dependent origination as unobtainable.**
**Part two, explaining the refutation of internal dharmas of conditions and results, has two parts: first, a brief indication that the refutation is the same as before (also a preview of later explanation); second, quoting a verse for extensive refutation. The verse from the *Seventy Verses on Emptiness*, also by Nagarjuna. In the verse, the first sentence states the correct principle, the second states the opponent's attachment, and the last two sentences question and refute. Another interpretation: the first sentence is a direct refutation, and the last three sentences are a hypothetical refutation. Yet another: the first sentence declares 'no birth' and the last three sentences explain it. Second, in the explanation of the verse, first explain the text and manifest the principle, then conclude that both cause and effect are empty. The explanation first establishes the correct meaning (also an explanation of the verse's first sentence, a logical refutation). Second, "If it is said…" refutes the opponent's position (also explaining the last three sentences as a hypothetical refutation). This has three points: first, posing two alternatives; second, refuting them one by one; third, concluding both as invalid.**
**The refutation has two parts: first, refuting the "single mind" view, refuting its claim: when ignorance is present, [the next links, like] formations, should be simultaneous. "Also, cause and effect…" refutes its juxtaposition of cause and effect. The text [first] lists, then explains. Second, refuting the "multiple minds" view, has three: [a] refuting the view that cause and effect are essentially distinct, because they do not connect; so it's not a dependently arisen dharma; [b] refuting the "effect without a cause" view: the earlier moment of ignorance perishes with the previous mind; what is the cause of the later formation, etc.? [c] Countering a hypothetical objection and refuting it again. The opponent objects: "Although the earlier mind of ignorance has ceased, it can still cause the later formation-link, like the condition of temporal contiguity; or like the seeds in the root-consciousness which cease as the earlier fruit arises." The refutation: "Has your previous mind ceased or not? If it has ceased, [what remains is] a non-entity; what is the cause? If it has not ceased, the effect cannot arise, because the previous mind remains [and is not yet a cause]."**
**Third, "The twelve links of dependent origination…" concluding both as invalid. This is clear.** **Third, "Therefore…" concludes that the results of conditions are all empty. This is clear.**
**Part three, the analogical refutation has four points: first, it concludes that conditioned dharmas are empty; second, "Since conditioned phenomena are empty…" because dharmas are empty, it shows that the self has no support, so it is also empty. The treatises say that dharma-attachment is the cause, and self-attachment is the effect. Since the basis is gone, the derived effect also disappears. This treatise demonstrates the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas. The discussion of dharma-emptiness is for refuting the Two Vehicles and also the Non-Buddhists. This has three parts: [a] statement by analogy to refute; [b] explanation of the principle to refute; [c] citation of scripture to refute.** **In the explanation, [two parts]: [i] direct explanation: because the conditioned dharmas of the five aggregates are a collection, the 'self' is merely a conventional designation. Since conditioned phenomena are empty, where could the false self exist? [ii] Like firewood and fire, the reverse analogy clarifies. In the scriptural citation, the Sutra says, "Because of the self, there is what is 'mine'." This is similar to "because of dharmas, there is the self." Furthermore, the earlier explanation 'dharmas empty, therefore self empty' denotes 'self empty, therefore 'mine' empty' because 'mine' is the function of the self. This explains emptiness from the root to the branches.**
**Third, the analogical extension to the emptiness of unconditioned phenomena. First, point out the analogy: Nirvana is called 'Extinction'. Second, "Why…" explains. The explanation has three parts: [a] because there is no dharma to be quenched, therefore there is no extinction; [b] because there is no one who can achieve extinction, therefore there is no extinction; [c] "Moreover…" clarifies that lacking production, there is also nothing to oppose (so no true extinction of arising); [d] "Therefore…" concludes the threefold emptiness. This is clear.**
十二門論宗致義記卷上
Commentary on the Twelve Gate Treatise: Essential Meaning, Volume 1