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  1. Three Means of Inference Treatise (三支比量義鈔終)
  1. Three Means of Valid Inference Treatise (三支比量義鈔)
  2. Three Means of Inference Treatise (三支比量義鈔終)

Three Means of Valid Inference Treatise (三支比量義鈔)

About 三支比量義鈔

Tang · by 玄奘立 宋 延壽造 明 明昱鈔

8,976 · about 30 min

*The Record of the Three-Part Syllogism* is a Buddhist classic established by the eminent monk Xuanzang of the Tang Dynasty, composed by Yanshou of the Song Dynasty, and transcribed by Mingyu of the Ming Dynasty. It belongs to the important literature of Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā). As the founder of the Consciousness-Only school (Yogācāra) in Chinese Buddhism, Xuanzang introduced Indian logic into China, laying the foundation for Buddhist logic within the Chinese Buddhist tradition. This text systematically expounds the reasoning rules of the three-part syllogism (proposition, reason, and example), serving as a core text for the study of Buddhist logic. The Song Dynasty master Yongming Yanshou added commentaries and annotations, while the Ming Dynasty scholar Mingyu compiled and transcribed it, ensuring its transmission. This classic holds milestone significance in the developmental history of Buddhist logic, providing crucial theoretical foundations for later studies on Buddhist epistemology and debate methodology, and occupies an important academic position within the intellectual system of Chinese Buddhism.


三支比量義鈔

Three-Category Inference Commentary

唐三藏法師 玄奘 立

Tripitaka Master Xuanzang

永明寺主 延壽 造

Compiled by Yanshou, Abbot of Yongming Temple

西蜀沙門 明昱 鈔

Commentary by Mingyu, Monk of Western Shu

真唯識量者。此量即大唐三藏。於中印土曲女城。戒日王。與設十八日無遮大會。廣召五天竺國解法義沙門婆羅門等。并及小乘外道。而為對敵。立一比量。書在金牌。經十八日。無有一人敢破斥者。

The True Consciousness-Only Syllogism. This syllogism was established by the Great Tang Master of the Tripitaka. In the land of Central India, in the city of Kanyakubja, King Shiladitya held a great, unrestricted assembly for eighteen days. He widely summoned monks and Brahmins from the five regions of India who understood the Dharma's meaning, including those from the Hinayana schools and non-Buddhist paths, to serve as opponents. He set forth a single syllogism, inscribed it upon a golden plaque, and for eighteen days, not a single person dared to refute it.

按本傳云。大師名振五天。有東印土鳩摩羅王。三遣書達戒賢法師。欲迎供奉。初云。弟子願見支那大德。乞師遣臨。慰我欽恩。次云。必願垂顧。勿復致違。二書不報。三發書云。弟子凡夫。喜怒無恒。因聞外國僧名。身心歡喜。堅求一面。若再不來。弟子分是惡人。恐興夙染。又當整理象軍。踏那爛陀寺使碎如塵。此言如日。師好試看。戒賢法師得書。謂奘師曰。彼王善心素薄。況境內佛法未甚流行。自聞仁名。故深發意。若違不去。或有魔事。是宜隨順。勿憚小勞。奘師如命。辭師與使俱往。及與王會。一見甚喜。延入內宮供養月餘。戒日王知。發使語鳩摩羅王。急送支那僧來。王曰。我頭可得。法師不可得也。戒日王怒。更遣責曰。頭可得者。即付使來。鳩摩羅王。深懼言失。即命象軍二萬乘。水軍三萬載共師同發。泝殑伽河以赴王所。王出境迎師。深生慶慰。躬陳珍膳。作樂散花。復請云。聞師作制惡見論何在。奘師即出所立比量與王。王觀。歡喜讚歎不已。然後遍示百寮。及諸淨行。尋謂師曰。此立甚正。弟子及諸師並皆信伏。但思餘國小乘外道。尚守愚迷。欲於曲女城。作一勝會。集諸國義學。觀法師高論立敵同許。取信當世。師為何如。法師然之。遂聞諸國。定日建會。奘師共王。自冬初逆殑伽河而上。至臘盡。方到會所。先有五印土十八國王。并大小乘僧三千餘人。婆羅門及尼乾外道二千餘人。那爛陀寺千餘僧。普集已久。斯皆博蘊文義。富贍辯才。思聽法音。咸來赴會。兼有侍從象輿能旛。雲興霧湧。雖六齊之舉袂成帷。三吳之揮汗如雨。未足方其盛也。王遣內外施設食器等畢。別設寶狀。請奘師坐為論主。稱揚大乘。敘作論意。仍請戒賢法師讀示大眾。別寫一本。懸於門外。竟十八日。無人發論。王舉奘師袈裟遍唱曰。支那法師。立大乘義。破諸異見。自十八日來。無敢論者。汝宜知之。一眾歡喜。皆稱奘師為大乘天。

According to the biography, the Master's reputation spread throughout the Five Regions of India. A King named Kumara from eastern India sent three letters to Venerable Shilabhadra, requesting to host the Master. The first letter said: "Your disciple wishes to see the great teacher from China. I beg you to send him, to comfort my longing." The second letter said: "I sincerely hope you will grant this request; do not refuse me again." Neither letter received a reply. The third letter said: "Your disciple is an ordinary man with unpredictable moods. Hearing the name of the foreign monk fills me with joy, and I earnestly seek just one meeting. If he does not come, I fear I may be an evil person, acting on past habits. I will then gather my elephant troops and trample Nalanda Monastery to dust. This promise is as certain as the sun. Please take it seriously."

Upon receiving the letter, Venerable Shilabhadra said to Master Xuanzang: "That king has little innate good nature, and Buddhism is not yet widespread in his land. But since hearing your name, he has developed deep interest. If you refuse to go, there may be trouble. So you should comply, and not fear a little inconvenience."

The Master obeyed and, bidding farewell to his teacher, left with the messenger. When he met the king, the king was overjoyed at first sight and invited him into the palace for over a month of hospitality. When King Harsha learned of this, he sent a message to King Kumara: "Send the Chinese monk to me immediately." King Kumara replied: "You may take my head, but you cannot have the Master." In anger, King Harsha sent another demand: "If your head can be taken, then send it with the messenger." King Kumara, fearing his words had gone too far, ordered an army of twenty thousand elephants and thirty thousand soldiers to escort the Master as they sailed up the Ganges to King Harsha's court.

King Harsha came out of his domain to welcome the Master, deeply delighted. He personally presented fine food, with music and flower scatterings. He then asked: "I heard you wrote a treatise called 'Refuting False Views.' Where is it?" The Master presented his logical argument to the king. The king read it, rejoiced, and praised it endlessly. He then showed it to his officials and ascetics. Afterward, he said to the Master: "This argument is very correct. Your disciple and all the teachers here accept and believe it. But I think there are still Hinayana and non-Buddhist scholars in other kingdoms who cling to ignorance. Let us hold a grand assembly at Kanyakubja. Gather all the learned from various lands to witness your high discourse. Let both sides agree, so that the truth may be believed by the world. What do you think?" The Master agreed.

So they announced the event across all kingdoms and set a date. The Master and the king traveled up the Ganges from early winter and arrived at the assembly site by year's end. Already gathered were eighteen kings from all Five Regions of India, over three thousand monks from both Mahayana and Hinayana traditions, over two thousand Brahmins and non-Buddhist ascetics, and over a thousand monks from Nalanda. All were well-versed in scriptures and eloquent in debate, eager to hear the Dharma. With attendants, elephants, carriages, and banners, the crowd was like a rising mist or surging clouds. Even the grand gatherings of ancient China, where sleeves raised covered the sky and sweat rained like rain, could not compare.

The king arranged everything, from food vessels to seats. He set up a special jeweled seat for the Master and invited him to sit as the debate master. The Master praised the Mahayana and explained the purpose of his treatise. He also invited Venerable Shilabhadra to read it to the assembly. A copy was hung outside the gate. For eighteen days, no one came forward to challenge it. The king then lifted the Master's robe and proclaimed to all: "The Chinese Master has established the meaning of Mahayana, refuting all different views. For eighteen days now, no one has dared to debate. Let this be known."

The entire assembly rejoiced and hailed Master Xuanzang as "Mahayana Deva" (the Heavenly One of the Great Vehicle).

故因明疏云且如大師。周游西域。學滿將還。時戒日王。王五印土。為設十八日無遮大會。令大師立義。徧諸天竺。揀選賢良。皆集會所。遣外道小乘。競生難詰。大師立量。無敢對揚者。

The Treatise on the Reasons of Logic says: At that time, the Great Master traveled through the Western Regions, completing his studies and preparing to return home. King Harshavardhana, who ruled over the Five Regions of India, organized an eighteen-day unrestricted assembly. He requested the Great Master to present his teachings, inviting virtuous and learned people from all over India to gather. He sent non-Buddhist and Lesser Vehicle practitioners to challenge and dispute. The Great Master established his arguments, and no one dared to respond.

此引基法師所作因明疏。以證前事也。然大師立量。正如日光既出。螢燭奪明。致使左道亂正之徒。結舌吞聲。守文疑理之輩。絕議沉思。其在因明之力歟。

This is a commentary on Hetuvidya (Buddhist logic) composed by Master Yīn Jī, serving as evidence for the preceding matter. However, when the Great Master established his logical arguments (liàng), it was as if the sun had already risen, dimming the light of fireflies and candles. Consequently, those who followed devious paths and distorted the truth were left speechless, swallowing their words, while those who clung rigidly to texts and doubted the principles fell silent in contemplation. Such is the power of Hetuvidya!

大師立唯識比量云。真故極成色是有法。定不離眼識宗。因云自許初三攝眼所不攝故。同喻如眼識合云。諸初三攝眼所不攝故者。皆不離眼識。同喻如眼識。異喻如眼根。

The Great Master established the inference of Consciousness-Only, saying:

**Subject:** "Truly, ultimately, color that is universally acknowledged" **Property:** "Certainly is not separate from eye-consciousness" (thesis) **Reason:** "Because it is included in the first three, yet not included in the eye faculty" (as accepted by our tradition) **Similar example:** "Just like eye-consciousness itself" **Application:** "All things included in the first three but not included in the eye faculty are not separate from eye-consciousness — similar example: eye-consciousness. Dissimilar example: the eye faculty itself."

真故極成四字。是寄言簡過之辭。下文自釋。色之一字。正是有法。以前陳有法。名為宗依。定不離眼識者。是後陳宗體。以推有法之色。原為眼識自證分所變。既從識變。本不離識。故立宗云。定不離眼識。因云。自許初三攝眼所不攝故者。是能成立法名因。謂所立之宗色不離識。則宗之因。唯除眼根是顯色不離識義。攝者。持也。謂根塵識三。各有六界。言初三攝者。且取眼家三界。眼所不攝者。謂眼根不攝。以眼識不見眼根。是許離義。唯取二界。以顯色識不離。同喻如眼識者。謂眼謂見分緣色時親取色體。是不離義。喻宗中眼識自證分。與所變色不離。合云下。合成宗體。合則先因次宗。然後引喻。以成比量軌式。異喻如眼根者。是因中眼所不攝之眼根。以識不見眼根。是遠離義。異於同品宗因喻中色識皆不相離。故名異喻。聲香味觸若為有法宗依。宗體因喻。取法同前。

The phrase "True and Ultimate Attainment" is a concise expression explaining transcendence through language. The text itself clarifies this. The word "form" specifically refers to a designated object of discussion. This designated object, called the "subject of the thesis," is established first. The phrase "is definitely not separate from eye-consciousness" constitutes the "body of the thesis," which is the predicate. It deduces that the designated object—form—originally arises from the "self-validating cognition" of eye-consciousness. Since this form arises from consciousness, it is inherently not separate from consciousness. Therefore, the thesis is established: "Form is definitely not separate from eye-consciousness."

The "logical reason," stated as "because it is included in the first three [sense bases] but not included in the eye faculty," serves as the proof for establishing this. This reason shows that the thesis—form being inseparable from consciousness—is based on the principle that, except for the eye faculty itself, form is inseparable from eye-consciousness. "Included" means containing or holding. The first three [sense bases] refer to the six realms each for faculties, objects, and consciousnesses. "Included in the first three" here specifically takes the three realms of the eye. "Not included in the eye faculty" means the eye faculty is not included, because eye-consciousness does not see the eye faculty itself. This is the meaning of "separation" as accepted. Only the two realms (objects and consciousness) are taken to demonstrate the inseparability of form and consciousness.

The "similar example," such as eye-consciousness itself, means that when the seeing part of consciousness perceives a form, it directly grasps the form's own essence. This illustrates inseparability. This example mirrors the self-validating cognition of eye-consciousness in the thesis, which is not separate from the form it produces. When combined (as stated after "combining"), the body of the thesis is formed. The combination begins with the logical reason, then the thesis, followed by the example, completing the standard structure of inference.

The "dissimilar example," such as the eye faculty itself, means the eye faculty was excluded from the reason because eye-consciousness does not see it, representing separation. This differs from the "similar class" since in the thesis, reason, and example, form and consciousness are all not separate, which is why it is called "dissimilar example."

The same method applies when sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile objects serve as the subject of the thesis. The body of the thesis, logical reason, and examples follow the same principles as above.

問。何不合自許之言。答非是正因。但是因初寄言簡過。亦非小乘不許。大乘自許。因於有法上轉。三支皆是共故。

Question: "Why doesn't it align with your own accepted position?"

Answer: "This is not a valid logical reason. It is merely a preliminary statement used to point out a flaw for the sake of simplicity. It is not that the Small Vehicle does not accept it, nor that the Great Vehicle itself accepts it. The reason operates on the basis of the subject—the 'dharma'—and all three components of a syllogism are shared by both parties."

由大乘宗。自許有他方佛色。故以自許之言。寄於因初。用簡有法中差別相違過。故云亦非小乘不許。大乘自許。以初三攝眼所不攝因。大小乘共許故。因於有法上轉。三支皆是共故者。謂初三攝因宗喻皆共。於定離眼識色。非定離眼識色俱轉。是因有不定過故。着自許之言。簡此過耳。

From within the Mahayana tradition, some assert the existence of physical forms of Buddhas in other realms. For this reason, the phrase "as Mahayana itself claims" is placed at the beginning of the logical reason (hetu). This serves to avoid the fault of a "contradictory inference regarding the property to be proven" (dharma-viparyaya) within the subject (dharmin).

Thus, the statement "which the Lesser Vehicle does not accept" also applies here. The Mahayana tradition itself asserts this. Since the reason involved in "the first three of the five senses" is not included among visual perceptions, this reasoning is accepted by both the Greater and Lesser Vehicles.

The reason (hetu) operates on the subject (dharmin), and all three components of the logical inference—subject, reason, and example—are common ground [between both traditions].

The "first three" refers to the fact that the reasoning, the proposition, and the example are all shared. However, with regard to "forms that are definitely separate from visual consciousness," and those "not definitely separate from visual consciousness," both are included. This is because the reasoning contains the fault of being indefinite (anaikāntika). By adding the qualification "as Mahayana itself claims," this fault is avoided.

初明宗因。後申問答。初文有二。初辯宗。次解因。且初宗前陳言。真故極成色五箇字。色之一字。正是有法。餘之四字。但是防過。且初真故二字防過者。簡其世間相違過。及違教等過。

First, we clarify the thesis, then we explain the reasoning. The first part has two sections: initially defining the thesis, and next explaining the premise.

For instance, consider the opening statement "truly established form." The single word "form" is the actual subject. The remaining four words serve only to prevent logical faults.

Take the first two words "truly established"—they guard against errors like contradicting everyday experience or conflicting with scriptural teachings.

將釋比量。先自分科以明章法。且初宗前陳言者。釋成色字為前陳有法。餘皆防過。且初真故下。明所簡之過有二。下文自釋。

Now let us explain the concept of "inference by analogy." First, we will divide it into its own sections to clarify the structure. The initial statement, "the primary premise," is explained as follows: the word "form" is established as the primary subject of discussion. The rest serves to prevent errors. At the very beginning, under the phrase "truly, therefore," there are two types of errors that are clarified and removed, which the following text will explain on its own.

外人問云。世間淺近。生而知之色離識有。今者大乘立色不離眼識。以不共世間共所知故。比量何不犯世間相違過。答。夫立比量。有自他共。隨其所應。各有標簡。若自比量。自許言簡。若他比量。汝執言簡。若共比量。勝義言簡。今此共比量。有所簡別。真故之言。表依勝義。即依四種勝義諦中。體用顯現諦立。

Question: In the ordinary world, even a beginner knows that color exists independently of the eye's perception. Yet the Mahayana doctrine asserts that color does not exist apart from eye-consciousness—this contradicts the world's common understanding. Why does this logical inference not commit the fallacy of contradicting worldly consensus?

Answer: When constructing logical inferences, there are three types: inferences for oneself, inferences for others, and inferences for both parties. Each type has its own specific qualifications:

- In an inference for oneself, the phrase "according to my view" qualifies the position. - In an inference for others, the phrase "according to your view" qualifies the position. - In an inference for both parties, the phrase "according to ultimate truth" qualifies the position.

This particular inference uses the latter form, with the phrase "based on ultimate truth." It is established according to the fourth level of the Four Noble Truths, known as the truth of the manifestation of essence and function.

此問世間相違之過。答以真故言簡。言四種勝義者。簡非四種世俗故。四世俗者。一世間世俗。謂瓶盆軍林等。二道理世俗。謂蘊處界等。三證得世俗。謂預流等。四安立世俗。謂二空理。勝義四者。一體用顯現諦。謂蘊處等。有實體性。過初世俗。說名勝義。隨事差別。說名蘊等。各有作用。故名顯現。二因果差別諦。謂苦集等。智斷證修。因果差別。三依門顯實諦。謂二空理。過俗證得。故名勝義。依空能證。以顯於實。故名依門。四廢詮談旨諦。謂一真如。體妙離言。已名勝義。今依初義者。以根塵識。各有體用顯現義故。

Now, the question arises concerning the conflict with conventional appearances. The answer is given concisely based on ultimate truth. To clarify, there are four kinds of ultimate truth, which are distinct from the four kinds of conventional truth.

The four conventional truths are: 1) Worldly conventional truth, such as pots, bowls, armies, and forests; 2) Rational conventional truth, such as the aggregates, sense bases, and elements; 3) Attainment conventional truth, such as the stream-enterer and so on; 4) Established conventional truth, such as the principle of emptiness of self and phenomena.

The four ultimate truths are: 1) The truth of manifestation through essence and function—this refers to the aggregates, sense bases, and so on, which possess a real essence. It surpasses the first kind of conventional truth and is therefore called ultimate. According to specific circumstances, they are designated as aggregates, etc., each having its own function, hence the term "manifestation." 2) The truth of distinctions in cause and effect—this refers to suffering, its origin, and so on. It involves wisdom, abandonment, realization, and cultivation, and the distinctions of cause and effect. 3) The truth that reveals reality through a medium—this refers to the principle of emptiness of self and phenomena. It surpasses conventional attainment truth and is thus called ultimate. By relying on emptiness as a medium, it reveals reality, hence the term "through a medium." 4) The truth that discusses the intrinsic meaning by abandoning verbal expression—this refers to the single true suchness. Its essence is subtle, beyond words, and is already considered ultimate.

Here, we adopt the first meaning because the sense faculties, sense objects, and sense consciousnesses each embody the principle of manifestation through essence and function.

問。不違世間非學。即可爾。又如世尊於小乘阿含經。亦許色離識有。學者小乘。共計心外有其實境。豈不違於阿含等教。學者小乘。答。但依大乘殊勝義立。不違小乘之教。學者世間之失。

Question: "Not contradicting worldly understanding or non-learning such. Is this acceptable? Furthermore, the World-Honored One, in the Small Vehicle Agama Sutras, also allowed for the existence of form separate from consciousness. Small Vehicle practitioners collectively believe there are real objects outside the mind. Would this not contradict the Agama teachings and the Small Vehicle practitioners?"

Answer: "This is established solely based on the supreme meaning of the Great Vehicle, so it does not contradict the Small Vehicle teachings or the error of worldly understanding."

復問違教等過。亦答以真故言簡。佛說色離識有。元為小機。彼於客塵主空得解。為說心境兩分。未達能所相見本空。不言心境不二。今依大乘勝義。故不相違。

They also asked about errors like contradicting the teachings. The answer is simple: because it is the truth. When the Buddha said that form exists apart from consciousness, this was originally taught for those of lesser capacity. Such learners found understanding through seeing the distinction between adventitious dust and true emptiness. For them, he spoke of mind and objects as two separate things. They had not yet realized that the subject and object¹, the perceiver and the perceived, are fundamentally empty. He did not teach that mind and objects are non-dual. Now, based on the ultimate truth of the Great Vehicle, there is no contradiction.

¹ The terms 'subject' (能) and 'object' (所) refer to the perceiving mind and perceived phenomena. In English, 'subject/object' or 'perceiver/perceived' are equally valid. I have used 'subject and object' for immediate clarity, as it is a common philosophical pair.

問。真故之言。簡世間。及違教等過。極成二字。簡何過耶。答。置極成言。簡兩般不極成色。小乘二十部中。除一說部。說假部。說出世部。雞胤部等四。餘十六部。皆許最後身菩薩染汙色。及佛有漏色。大乘不許。是一般不極成色。大乘說他方佛色。及佛無漏色。經部雖許他方佛色。而不許是無漏。餘十九部皆不許有。并前兩般不極成色。

Question: The use of "true," "actual," and "words" eliminates errors related to the mundane and violations of doctrine. How does the phrase "widely accepted" eliminate errors?

Answer: By including the term "widely accepted," it eliminates two types of colors that are not universally agreed upon. Among the twenty schools of the Lesser Vehicle, except for the One-Statement School, the Provisional-Statement School, the Supramundane School, and the Kukkutika School—four in total—the remaining sixteen schools all accept that the final-body Bodhisattva possesses defiled colors, and that the Buddha possesses tainted colors. The Greater Vehicle does not accept this. This is one type of not universally agreed-upon color. The Greater Vehicle speaks of colors of Buddhas in other realms and the Buddha's untainted colors. Although the Sutra School accepts colors of Buddhas in other realms, it does not accept them as untainted. The other nineteen schools do not accept their existence at all. Together with the two previously mentioned types of not universally agreed-upon colors...

結前真故之言。但簡宗體上違教等過。復問極成二字。所簡何過。答。以極成言。簡兩宗不極成色。是簡宗依上違宗之失。二十部者。佛滅度後。百有餘年。佛法大眾初破(破即分也)。因龍象。邊鄙。多聞。大德。四眾共議無常。苦。空。無我。涅槃寂靜。五事不同。分為兩部。一大眾部。二上座部。從大眾部。流出八部。共根本有九部。一大眾部。二一說部。三說出世部。四雞胤部。五多聞部。六說假部。七制多山部。八西山部。九北山部。從上座部。分為兩部。一說一切有部。二即上座部。轉名雪山部。從說一切有部。展轉流出九部。共前根本兩部。成十一部。一說一切有部。二雪山部。三犢子部。四法上部。五賢胄部。六正量部。七密林山部。八化地部。九法藏部。十飲光部。十一經量部。共前九部。為二十部。除一說等四部。餘十六部。許菩薩染汙色佛有漏色者。說一切有部云。阿羅漢。猶受故業。佛與二乘。解脫無異。應言菩薩猶是異生。諸結未斷。是執菩薩染汙色。及佛有漏色的意。經部不許佛無漏色者。彼執多與說一切有部同。此皆小乘許者。大乘不許。而大乘許者。小乘不許。故置極成言。簡此兩般不極成色。

Now, let us clarify the meaning of "true" and "thus." These terms simply limit the case where the thesis of the inference contradicts the scriptures or other sources. Next, the question arises: what fault is excluded by the phrase "universally accepted" (extremely accomplished)? The answer: By saying "universally accepted," we exclude the two disputants' non-universally-accepted forms. This corrects the fault of contradicting the inference's own thesis (the basis of the proposition).

Now, regarding the twenty schools: After the Buddha's parinirvana, over a hundred years later, the great Buddhist community first split ("split" means division). Due to the "Elephant-Dragon," "Borderlanders," "Erudites," and "Elders"—four groups—they debated five points: impermanence, suffering, emptiness, no-self, and nirvana's stillness. These five matters differed, and the community split into two schools: the Mahāsaṃghika and the Sthavira.

From the Mahāsaṃghika flowed eight schools, making nine including the root: 1. Mahāsaṃghika, 2. Ekavyāvahārika, 3. Lokottaravāda, 4. Kaukkutika, 5. Bahuśrutīya, 6. Prajñaptivāda, 7. Caitika, 8. Western Mountain School, 9. Northern Mountain School.

From the Sthavira school, two schools formed: 1. Sarvāstivāda, 2. The Sthavira itself, renamed the Haimavata school.

From the Sarvāstivāda, nine schools successively flowed forth. Together with the two root schools, these became eleven schools: 1. Sarvāstivāda, 2. Haimavata, 3. Vātsīputrīya, 4. Dharmottara, 5. Bhadrayānīya, 6. Saṃmatīya, 7. Sannagarika, 8. Mahīśāsaka, 9. Dharmaguptaka, 10. Kāśyapīya, 11. Sautrāntika.

Together with the earlier nine, this makes twenty schools. Excluding four schools like Ekavyāvahārika, etc., the remaining sixteen schools accept that Bodhisattvas have tainted form and Buddhas have defiled form. The Sarvāstivāda says: "Arhats still receive the results of past karma. Buddhas and the two vehicles are identical in liberation. It should be said that Bodhisattvas are still ordinary beings, with their bonds of attachment unsevered." This is the meaning behind accepting Bodhisattvas' tainted form and Buddhas' defiled form.

The Sautrāntikas do not accept that Buddhas have undefiled form. Their views largely resemble those of the Sarvāstivāda. These are the positions accepted by the Lesser Vehicle, but not by the Greater Vehicle. Conversely, what the Greater Vehicle accepts, the Lesser Vehicle does not. Therefore, the phrase "universally accepted" is used to exclude these two kinds of non-universally-accepted form.

若不言極成。但言真故色是有法。定不離眼識是宗。且言色時。許之不許。盡包有法之中。在前小乘許者。大乘不許。今若立為唯識。便犯一分自所別不極成。亦犯一分違教之失。又大乘許者。小乘不許。今立為有法。即犯他一分所別不極成。及至舉初三攝眼所不攝因。便犯自他隨一一分所依不成。前陳無極成色為所依故。今具簡此四般。故置極成言。

If we simply say "form" without including the term "universally acknowledged," then in the statement "form is a valid subject, and it is necessarily inseparable from eye-consciousness," the word "form" would include both what is accepted and what is not accepted within the scope of the subject. The earlier Lesser Vehicle schools accept a certain definition of form, while the Greater Vehicle does not. If we were to establish that form is merely consciousness, we would commit the fault of having part of our own subject not universally acknowledged (one-sided self-universal non-acceptance) and also commit the fault of partly contradicting scriptural teaching. Conversely, what the Greater Vehicle accepts, the Lesser Vehicle does not. So if we propose that as the subject, we would commit the fault of the other party not accepting part of the subject (one-sided other-universal non-acceptance). Moreover, when we cite the reason "because it is included within the first three sense-fields but not included within the eye sense-field," we would then commit the fault of the basis not being established for one side or the other (one-sided basis non-establishment). This is because the prior subject term "form" is not universally acknowledged as a valid basis. Therefore, to thoroughly avoid these four faults, we include the qualifier "universally acknowledged."

結成極成二字所簡之外。餘一切色圓滿成就。是謂極成。大小乘宗。各不許者。是帶所別不極成過。故云。若不言極成。但言真故色等。則前許與不許帶過之色。盡包有法色中。將何簡別。在前下。明犯二種過。以自大乘不許之色。立為唯識。是犯自不許一分所別不極成過。亦犯一分違自教失。又大乘下。謂小乘不許之色。立為唯識。則犯他不許一分所別不極成過。及至下。謂舉因合成宗體時。總收自他不許之色。便犯自他隨一一分所依不極成之過。以無極成色為所依。則四過理不可免。今置極成兩言。簡此四般過也。
問。極成二字。簡其兩宗不極成色。未審三藏立何色為唯識。答。除二宗不極成色外。取立敵共許餘一切色。總為唯識故因明疏云。立二所餘共許諸色。為唯識故。
結前已簡。復問何色立為唯識。答云。除二不極成外。餘一切色。皆共許立故。因明下。引證立所餘色為唯識義。已上宗前陳言竟。
宗後陳言。定不離眼轉。是極成能別。問。何不犯能別不極成過。且小乘誰許色不離於眼識。答。今此是有法宗依。但他宗中有不離義便得。以小乘許眼識緣色。親取其體。有不離義。兼許眼識當體。亦不離眼識。故無能別不極成過。
牒比量中。所成立之宗體。顯是極成能別。復申問答。以明立宗之意。謂小乘不許色不離識。則所立不離眼識之宗。是不極成。答意。謂小乘說色離眼識者。色是比量有法宗依。未合宗體。無所簡別。小乘唯於本質色推。故說離識。大乘意許是相分色。故定不離。但他下。明小乘宗有不離義。便得將言就意立宗。兼許下。謂小乘許眼識。本有為體。緣色為用。以緣色時。不離其體。縱不緣色。亦不離用。彼既兩許不離。故定不離眼識之宗。無有能別不極成過。
問。既許眼識取所緣色。有不相離義。後合成宗體。應有相扶過耶。答。無相扶失。今大乘但取境不離心。外無實境。若前陳後陳和合為宗了。立者即許。敵者不許。立敵共諍。名為宗體。此中但諍言陳。未推意許。辯宗竟。
問意。謂小乘宗有不離義。大乘立定不離眼識宗。是為相扶之過。答意。謂大乘為明唯識之旨。故說心外無境。若將前陳後陳和合。立敵共諍。是為宗體。以彼唯在本質色上推明。故云但諍言陳。未明大乘意許相分色。故云未推意許。
次辯因者。有二。初明正因。次辯寄言簡過。且初正因言初三攝者。十八界中三六界。皆取初之一界也。即眼根界。眼識界。色境界。是十八界中初三界也。
將釋此因。亦先分科以明次第詳辯。且初下。釋前半因。三六界者。根塵識三。各有六法。六各分疆。故名為界。即眼耳鼻舌身意六根。色聲香味觸法六塵。識隨根塵。亦有六名。皆取初之一界者。於根取眼根界。於塵取色塵界。於識取眼識界。故云是十八界中初三界也。
問。設不言初三攝。但言眼所不攝。復有何過。答。有二過。一不定過。二違自教過。且不定過者若立量云。真故極成色。定不離眼識。因云眼所不攝。喻如眼識。即眼所不攝因濶。向異喻後五三上轉。皆是眼所不攝故。被外人出不定過云。為如眼識眼所不攝。眼識不離眼識。證極成色不離眼識耶。為如後五三。亦是眼所不攝。後五三定離眼識。却證汝極成色定離眼識耶。問。今大乘言後五三亦不離眼識得不。答。設大乘許後五三亦不離眼識。免犯不定。便違自宗。大乘宗說後五三定離眼識故。故置初三攝半因。遮後五三非初三攝故。
因有後半初半。和合成就圓滿無過。苟闕其一。眾過生焉。故論主問答。以辯其詳。設不言下。問答顯過且不定下。標定三支。即眼下。出半因之過。被外人下。牒定同品。為如眼識者。是同喻眼識。眼所不攝者。根識各別故。眼識不離眼識者。謂同喻眼識不離後陳眼識。證極成色不離眼識者。以同喻眼識。證成前陳有法之色。亦不離後陳眼識。為如後五三下。申相違量。顯因有不定過。後五三者。即耳鼻舌身意。各有根塵識之三。亦是眼所不攝者。謂後五三界。不同初三界。故亦不攝。後五三定離眼識者。謂後五三與初三界中眼識決定相離。却證汝極成色定離眼識者。以異喻後五三。定離眼識證成極成色亦定離眼識。是因於同品異品共轉。為不定過。問。今大乘下。意謂既立萬法唯識。決不以後五三為離識有。故答云。設許不離。免犯不定。便違自宗。以大乘宗說後五三。宗離眼識故。
問。但言初三攝。不言眼所不攝。復有何過。答。亦犯二過。一不定過。二法自相決定相違過。且不定者。若立量云。真故極成色。定不離眼識。因云初三攝。喻如眼識。即初三攝因濶。向異喻眼根上轉。出不定云。為如眼識初三攝。眼識不離眼識。證極成色不離眼識耶。為如眼根亦初三攝。眼根非定不離眼識。證汝極成色非定不離眼識耶。問。何不言定離。而言非定不離。答。大乘眼根望於眼識。非定即離。且非離者。根因識果。以同時故。即是非離也。又色心各別。名非即故。今但言非定不離。二犯法自相決定相違過者。言法自相者。即宗後陳法之自相。言決定相違者。即因違於宗也。外人申相違量云。真故極成色是有法。非不離眼識宗。因云初三攝故。喻如眼根。即外人將前量異喻為同喻。將同喻為異喻。
謂前唯用後半因。已犯二過。今若唯用前半因。其過者何。故答云。亦犯二過。且不定下。標定三支。即初三下。明因有不定過。為如眼識下。牒定同品。謂同喻眼識。是初三攝中眼識。同喻眼識不離後陳眼識。則證極成色亦不離後陳眼識。為如眼根下。申相違量。顯因有不定過。謂異喻眼根。亦是初三攝中所攝。根識各別。非定不離。故云眼根非定不離後陳眼識。則證極成色。非定不離後陳眼識。以初三攝因。同品異品俱轉。是不定過。問。何不言定離下。辯相違量中非定不離義。原大乘眼根望於眼識。有二義差別。謂非定即。非定離。因果同時。是非離義。色心各別是非即義。故於即離。但言非定者。二義相關。二犯法自相下。釋第二種過。外人申相違量者。以前所立之宗為定不離眼識。今以非定不離眼識為宗。是相違義。前量以眼根為異喻。今以眼根為同喻。亦是相違。異喻既轉為同喻。則同喻亦得為異喻。雖則宗喻俱有同異相違。此中唯顯初三攝因濶。與後陳法之自相決定相違也。
問。得成法自相相違耶。答。非真能破。夫法自相相違之量。須立者同無異有。敵者同有異無。方成法自相相違。今立敵兩家。同喻有。異喻有。故非真法自相相違過。問。既非法自相相違。作決定相違不定過得不。答。亦非。夫決定相違不定過。立敵共諍一有法。因喻各異。皆具三相。徧是宗法性。同品定有性。異品徧無性。但互不生其正智。兩家猶豫。不能定成一宗。名決定相違不定過。今真故極成色雖是共諍一有法。因且是共。又各闕第三相。故非決定相違不定過。問。既無此過。何以因明疏云。犯法自相相違決定過。答。但是疏主縱筆之勢。是前共不定過中分出。是似法自相相違決定過。非真有故。有此所因。故置初三攝眼所不攝。更互簡諸不定。及相違等過。
原似比量。總三十三過。因具十四。此過於彼。名同義異。故論主發問。以辯真偽。夫法自相下。釋因明四相違中第一種過。言同無異有者。謂立者同品無因。異品有因。同有異無者。謂敵者同品有因。異品無因。今立敵下。釋成此過非真。同喻有異喻有者。謂同喻異喻共以初三攝為因。問。既非下。轉微別過。夫決定下。釋因明六不定中第六種過。今真故下。顯此過非真。言各闕第三相者。謂闕異品徧無性。以根識二法各為同品。無異品體。故云各闕第三。問。既無此過下。釋因明疏主之過悞。以遵先輩。故但言縱筆之勢。言共不定分出者。是從因明不定六中。第一種過分出。以非真過。故云相似。有此所因者。謂有唯將初半後半為因。致有如是四過。故置圓滿成就之因。更互簡之。
次明寄言簡過者。問。因初自許之言何用。答。緣三藏量中犯有法差別相違過。因明之法。量若有過。許着言遮。今三藏量既有此過。故置自許言遮。問。何得有此過耶。答。謂三藏量有法中。言雖不帶。意許諳含。緣大乘宗有兩般色。有離眼識本質色。有不離眼識相分色。若離眼識色。小乘即許。若不離眼識色。小乘不許。
已辯正因。當辯寄言簡過。故論主牒科發問。以明著言遮過之意。有法差別相違過者。即因明四相違中第四種過。以有法有差別二義。則因與彼相違。問。何得有此過下。釋成有法差別義。言諳含者。諳。知也。即意許義。謂意中自許。不發於言。謂之諳含。本質色者。即諸根身。及於器界。謂眼意緣時。託彼為質。變影為相。以彼本有。說名本質。故說本質離於眼識。相分色者。即託前本質。變影為相。眼識緣色時。於自證體上。雖變相緣。以是現量。親得境體。不起分別。故於本質唯得相分。名親非緣。以變相故。隔越本質名踈所緣。又相分色。與能緣識。同一體生。故說相分不離眼識。小乘志在本質。故不許色不離眼識。殊不知即本質。亦從無始以來一切眾生共相所變。豈離心有。
今三藏量云。真故極成色是有法。若望言陳自相。是立敵共許色。及舉初三攝眼所不攝因。亦但成立共許色不離於眼識。若望三藏意中所許。但立相分色。不離眼識。將初三攝眼所不攝因。成立有法上意之差別相分色。定不離眼識。故因明疏云。謂真故極成色。是有法自相。定不離眼識色。是法自相。定離眼識色非定離眼識色。是有法差別。立者意許是不離眼識色。
論主推明三藏量中言陳意許之義。謂若望言陳自相。唯是立敵共許本質色為前陳。及至舉因合成宗體。亦是成立共許本質色不離眼識。是為立敵共許一有法以成宗體。若望三藏意許。但將此因成立有法上意許差別一分相分色。定不離眼識。故因明疏下。引證前陳有法有差別義。
問。外人出三藏量有法相違過時。自許之言。如何遮得。答。待外人申違量時。將自許二字。出外人量不定過。外量既自帶過。更有何理。能顯得三藏量中有法差別相違過耶。
問答以明互相帶過。不得成真能破義。
問。小乘申違量行相如何。答。小乘云。乍觀立者言陳自相。三支無過。及推所立。元是諳含。若於有法上意之差別。將因喻成立有法上意許相分色不離眼識者。即眼識不得為同喻。且如眼識。無不離色。以一切色皆離眼識故。既離眼識。不得為同喻。便成異喻。即初三等因。却向異喻眼識上轉。故論云。同品無處。不成立者之宗。異品有處。反成敵者相違宗義。
此中問答。明小乘將申相違量時。推尋前量帶過有無。然後可成能破。謂乍觀言陳。三支無過。及推所成立之宗。知含有過。若將因喻成立相分色不離眼識。即不得以眼識為同喻。且如眼識。無不離色者。眼耳二識。離中取境。色與眼識。決定相離。離則不得為同喻。反成異喻。即前量因。却向異喻眼識上轉。故論云下。引證差別相違義。以初三等因。既向異喻中轉。則同品處無。是為差別相違。
即小乘不改立者之因。申相違量云。真故極成色是有法。非不離眼識宗。因云初三攝眼所不攝故。同喻如眼識。合云。諸初三攝眼所不攝故者。皆非不離眼識。同喻如眼識。言非者無也。小乘云。無不離眼識色即遮三藏意許相分色是無也。
小乘相違量中。不改前因。及前同喻。但以非不離眼識之宗。與前宗相違。則因喻隨之。是為因中不定相違過也。真故下。正申相違量。言非下。釋成與前量相違。名有法差別相違因。
所以三藏預著自許之言句。取他方佛色。却與外人量作不定過。出過云。為如眼識。是初三攝眼所不攝。眼識非不離眼識色。證汝極成色非不離眼識色耶。為如我自許他方佛色。亦是初三攝眼所不攝。他方佛色。是不離眼識色。却證汝極成色是不離眼識耶。外人相違量。既犯共中他不定過。明知非真能破也。三藏量。却成真能立也。
此將自許之言。相違小乘量中有不定過。他方佛色。原是大乘自許。既屬大乘。亦是不離眼識色。即將初三等因。成立他方佛色不離眼識。與彼初三等因。成立眼識非不離眼識色。是相違義。亦是因明六不定中第一種過。為如眼識下。牒小乘相違量。為如我自許下。大乘自立與彼相違量。彼自帶過。則能破非真。彼既非真。三藏量却成真能立也。
問。因中若不言自許。空將他方佛色與外人相違量作不定過。有何不可。答。若空將他方佛色。不言自許者。即他小乘不許。犯一分他隨一過。他不許此一分他方佛色在初三攝眼所不攝因中故。故因明疏云。若不言自許。即不得以他方佛色而為不定。此言便有隨一過故。問。何不待外人申違量後。著自許言。何要預前著耶。答。臨時恐難。所以先防。
此中問答以明自許之言。著與不著之意。若不著自許之言於因初。即不得以他方佛色與小乘相違。以彼不許他方佛色在因中。即犯四不成中第二種過。由彼不許。是謂隨一不成之過。故因明疏云下。引證不言自許。必有隨一過故。問。何不待外人下。徵明先防為要。
次申問答者。一問真故二字。已簡違教過。何故前陳宗依上。若不著極成言。又有違宗之失。答。真故二字。但簡宗體上違教過。不簡宗依上違宗。若極成二字。即簡宗依上違宗等過也。
由前寄言所簡之過。於宗體宗依混淆。恐學者難辯。故論主重申問答詳明。真故二字。但簡宗體上違教過者。前量立色定不離眼識以為宗體。而世間淺近。生而知之。色離識有。阿含經中。亦許色離識有。是違世間。及違教過。色離識有。關於宗體色不離識。今以真故勝義簡之。故云但簡宗體上違教等過。極成二字。即簡宗依上違宗等過者。前陳有法色為宗依。所言色者。總包菩薩染汙色。及佛有漏色。他方佛色。佛無漏色。小乘不許。即犯他一分所別不極成。大乘不許。即犯自一分所別不極成。總收兩宗。即犯自他隨一一分所依不極成。已上四色。關於真故之色。今以極成二字簡之。故云即簡宗依上違宗等過。
問。後陳眼識。與同喻眼識何別。答言後陳眼識雖同。意許各別。後陳眼識。意許是自證分。同喻眼識。意許是見分。即見不離自證分故。如同宗中相分不離自證分也。問。若爾。何不立量云。相分是有法。定不離自證分是宗。因云初三攝眼所不攝故。同喻如見分。答。小乘不許有四分故。恐犯隨一等過。故但言眼識。
由前量中宗體同喻俱名眼識。恐學者不知名同義異。故有此問。謂八種識。各有四分。各有所緣境。名為相分。各有能緣心。名為見分。見分各有現量果體。名自證分。自證分各有現量果體。名證自證分。後陳眼識。名自證分者。以是眼家果體。相見二分從體變現而能了別。故自證分名為眼識。同喻眼識名見分者。以是眼家能緣之心。能了境故。亦名眼識。今據見相二分俱不離彼自證分體。故依相分為有法。兼取自證分立宗。即以見分為喻。若爾下。徵明小乘不許四分。不得以四分之名立宗。故於後陳。同喻。俱言眼識。
問。此量言陳立得何色耶。答。若但望言陳。即相質二色皆成不得。若將意就言。即立得相分色也。又解。若小乘未徵問前。即將言就意立。若大乘答後。即將意就言立也。問。既分相分本質兩種色。便是不極成故。前陳何言極成色耶。相分非共許故。答。若望言陳有法自相立敵共許色。故著極成。若相分色。是大乘意許。何關言陳自相寧有不極成乎。諸鈔皆云不得分開者。非也。若爾。小乘執佛有漏色。大乘佛無漏色。等在於前陳。若不分開。應名極成色耶。彼既不爾。此云何然。
此中問答明前量中所立宗依之色。言相質二色皆成不得者。謂於言陳色時。色之一字。於眼識上非不遠離。故不得成定不離眼識之宗。是明共諍言陳時。若將意就言立相分色者。謂將意許相分之色。就於言陳本質色立。此明已立意許時。又解下。重明言陳意許。未徵問前。立者將言就意。似立言陳。大乘答後。敵者知意就言。却成意許。既分相分下。問色有二種。便是有法不極成。何言前陳為極成色。相分非共許故者。謂犯隨一不極成過。若望下。答明言陳自相。當著極成。以簡兩宗不許之色。若是大乘自許相分。不涉言陳。自極成矣。諸鈔皆云不得分開者。謂因明鈔中。不許分開本質相分。此非理也。若爾者。牒上不分之意。謂若不分。即如小乘執佛色有漏。大乘明佛色無漏。一等在有法中。若亦不分。豈總收為極成色耶。彼之極成與不極成。既不許不分。此相質二色。云何然也。
問。今談宗顯性。云何廣引三支比量之文。答。諸佛說法。尚依俗諦。況三支比量。理貫五明。以破立為宗。言生智了為體。摧凡小之異執。定佛法之綱宗。所以教無智而不圓。木非繩而靡直。比之可以生誠信。伏邪倒之疑心。量之可以定真詮。杜狂愚之妄說。故得正法之輪永轉。唯識之旨廣行。則事有顯理之功。言有定邦之力。如慈恩大師云。因明論者。元唯佛說。文廣義散。備在眾經。故地持論云。菩薩求法。當於何求。當於一切五明處求。求因明者。為破邪論。安立正道。
永明大師。深窮性相。精覈禪宗。觀諸時彥。各崇其尚。立宗以統之。故此問云。談宗顯性。乃宗鏡之旨。比量之文。乃宗鏡錄中所引餘論。答中。謂世尊說法。皆談宗顯性。尚依俗諦而演。比量之理。貫攝五明。則真俗兼具。豈非談宗顯性乎。五明者。內明。因明。聲明。醫方明。工巧明。以破立下。釋因明之體用。所以下。喻因明之力用。比之下。以法合喻。故得下。顯因明之效騐。如慈恩下。皆證前義。
劫初足目。創標真似。爰暨世親。再陳軌式。雖紀綱已列。而幽致未分。故使賓主對揚。猶疑立破之則。有陳那菩薩。是稱命世。賢劫千佛之一佛也。匿跡巖藪。棲巒等持。觀述作之利害。審文義之繁約。於時巖谷振吼。雲霞變彩。山神捧菩薩足。高數百尺。唱言。佛說因明。玄妙難究。如來滅後。大義淪絕。今幸福智攸邈。深達聖旨。因明論道。願請重弘。菩薩乃放神光。照燭機感。時彼南印土按達羅國王。見放光明。疑入金剛喻定。請證無學果。菩薩曰。入定觀察。將釋深經。心期大覺。非願小果。王言。無學果者。諸聖攸仰。請尊速證。菩薩撫之。欲遂王請。妙吉祥菩薩。因彈指警曰。何捨大心。方興小志。為廣利益者。當轉慈氏所說瑜伽。匡正頹綱。可製因明。重成規矩。陳那敬受指誨。奉以周旋。於是覃思研精。乃作因明正理門論。
足目者。始標真似兩門之論師也。龍樹云。如是過類。足目所說。多分說為似能破性。世親軌式。亦不出真似兩門。義散諸論。未集成編。陳那下。述菩薩造論之由。至於山神捧足唱言。國王疑定請證。文殊彈指誡警。證之此論。功非小果。
正理者。諸法本真之體義。門者。權衡照解之所由。又瑜伽論云。云何名因明處。為於觀察義中諸所有事。所建立法。名觀察義。能隨順法。名諸所有事。諸所有事。即是因明為因。照明觀察義故。且如外道執聲為常。若不以量比破之。何由破執。如外道立量云。聲是有法。定常為宗。因云所作性故。同喻如虗空。所以虗空非所作性。則因上不轉。引喻不齊。立聲為常不成。若佛法中。聲是無常。立量云。聲是有法。定無常為宗。因云所作性故。同喻如瓶盆。異喻如虗空等。是知若無此量。曷能顯正摧邪。所以實際理地。不受一塵。佛事門中。不捨一法。若欲學諸佛方便。須具菩薩徧行。一一洞明。方成大化。
正理者下。釋正理門三字。又瑜伽下。引論釋因明二字。所建立法名觀察義者。為所成立之宗。能隨順法名諸所有事者。為前陳有法。即是因明為因照明觀察義故者。正釋因明二字。因明為因者。以三支為因。能生照明觀察諸義之智為果。智即明義。故名因明。且如下。舉例。明外宗執常帶過。若佛下。顯大乘立量為真能破。實際理地。常寂光也。廓然無象。故不受一塵。佛事門中。利生道也。萬行斯備。故不捨一法。菩薩徧行。即是五明。洞達五明。行方周徧。
三支比量義鈔(終)

CBETA Code: X0861

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