一、同相難者，對物同相立難，是名同相難。論曰：聲無常，因功力生，無中間生故，譬如瓦器因功力生，生已破滅。聲亦如是，故聲無常是義已立。外曰：若聲無常與器同相者，聲即常住，與空同相故。是故如空，聲亦常住，同相者同無身故。論曰：復次聲無常，因功力生，無中間生故。若物常住，不因功力生，譬如虛空常住，不因功力生。聲不如此，是故聲無常，此義已立。外曰：若聲與常住空不同相故，是故聲無常，則何所至？若與空同相，聲即是常。同相者是無身，是故常。論曰：此兩難悉是顛倒不成難。何以故？決定一味法立為因，顯一切物因功力生故無常。是顯無常因決定一味，是故無常不動，欲顯其同類，故說瓦器等譬。外依不決定一味立難云：若汝依同相立聲無常義，我亦依同相立聲常義。若汝義成就，我義亦成就。論曰：汝難不如。何以故？汝立因不決定，常無常遍顯故。我立因三種相是根本法，同類所攝、異類相離，是故立因成就不動。汝因不如，是故汝難顛倒。若汝立因同我因者，汝難則成正難。若無常立義難常義，是難成就。何以故？立常因難。立無常因極不能顯無常顛倒過失，常因不決定一味故，無常因決定一味故。

1. The Question of Shared Characteristics

This question establishes a challenge based on things sharing the same characteristics. The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it is produced by effort and does not arise continuously from itself. Consider a clay pot: it is produced by effort, and once produced, it decays and breaks. Sound is just the same. Therefore, we have already established that sound is impermanent.

The Opponent says: If you claim sound is impermanent because it shares characteristics with a clay pot, then sound could just as easily be permanent because it shares characteristics with empty space. Both sound and space share the characteristic of being without a physical body. Therefore, like space, sound should also be permanent.

The Treatise responds: Again, sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort and does not arise continuously on its own. If something were permanent, it would not be produced by effort. For example, empty space is permanent and not produced by effort. Sound is not like this, so the argument that sound is impermanent is established.

The Opponent says: If you say sound is impermanent because it does not share characteristics with permanent space, then where does that reasoning lead? If it shared characteristics with space, sound would be permanent. Both share the characteristic of being without a physical body, and therefore, sound would be permanent.

The Treatise says: Both of these challenges are misguided and do not form valid objections. Why? Because a valid reason must be consistently applied. The reason "produced by effort" consistently demonstrates that all such things are impermanent. This is a stable and unwavering reason. To illustrate its consistent application, we used the example of a clay pot and other similar things.

The Opponent tries to use an inconsistent application of the reason, saying: "If you use the common characteristic to establish impermanence, then I can use another common characteristic to establish permanence. If your argument works, then mine should work too."

The Treatise says: Your objection is not valid. Why? Because the reason you propose is inconsistent—it could apply to both permanent and impermanent things. The reason I propose, however, has three essential qualities: it is the fundamental principle, it only applies to things in the same category, and it is absent from things in the opposite category. Therefore, the reason I have established is stable and unwavering. Your reason does not meet these criteria, so your challenge is misguided.

If the reason you proposed were exactly like mine, then your challenge would be a valid one. But when you try to establish permanence while attacking impermanence, your attempt fails. Why? Because the reason used to establish permanence cannot effectively demonstrate impermanence; it is flawed because it is inconsistent. My reason for impermanence, however, is consistent and unshakable.

二、異相難者，對物不同相立難，是名異相難。論曰：聲無常。何以故？因緣所生故。若有物依因緣生即是無常，譬如虛空。虛空者常住，不依因緣生。聲不如是，是故聲無常。外曰：若聲與常住空不同相故，無常復何所至？若與瓦器不同相，聲即常住。不同相者，聲無身、瓦器有身，是故瓦器無常，聲則是常。論曰：聲無常，依因緣生故，譬如瓦器依因緣生故無常，聲亦如是。外曰：若汝立聲無常與瓦器同相者，復何所至？聲即常住，與瓦器不同相故。不同相者，聲無身、瓦器有身故。論曰：此兩難悉顛倒。何以故？我立無常，因決定一味故；汝立常，因不決定一味，常無常遍顯故。是故不定因不能難決定因。我立因者，是依因緣生故聲無常，是因是根本法，同類所攝、異類相離，具足三相故不可動。汝立因者是無身故聲常住，是因根本法同類異類所攝，是故不成因。

Second: The Difficulty of Different Characteristics. This difficulty arises when one argues against a position by pointing out differences in characteristics between two things. This is called the "difficulty of different characteristics."

The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent. Why? Because it is produced through causes and conditions. Whatever is produced through causes and conditions is impermanent. For example, space is permanent, as it is not produced through causes and conditions. Sound is not like that; therefore, sound is impermanent.

The Opponent says: If sound and permanent space have different characteristics, then what does that prove about sound being impermanent? If sound and a clay pot have different characteristics, then sound should be permanent. The difference is: sound is non-physical, while a clay pot is physical. Therefore, the clay pot is impermanent, but sound is permanent.

The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent because it is produced through causes and conditions. For example, a clay pot is impermanent because it is produced through causes and conditions. Sound is the same.

The Opponent says: If you argue that sound is impermanent by comparing it to a clay pot, then what does that prove? Sound should be permanent because it has different characteristics from a clay pot. The difference is: sound is non-physical, while a clay pot is physical.

The Treatise says: These two difficulties are both completely mistaken. Why? I establish impermanence based on a cause that is decisive and singular. You establish permanence based on a cause that is not decisive or singular, as it applies equally to both the permanent and the impermanent. Therefore, an inconclusive cause cannot refute a decisive cause. The cause I establish is: "Because it is produced through causes and conditions, sound is impermanent." This cause is a fundamental principle, included within the same class and excluded from different classes. It possesses the three characteristics and is therefore unshakable. The cause you establish is: "Because it is non-physical, sound is permanent." This cause is a fundamental principle that is included within both the same class and different classes, and thus it is not a valid cause.

三、長相難者，於同相顯別相，是名長相難。論曰：聲無常，因功力生故，譬如瓦器，是故聲無常。外曰：汝立聲與瓦器同相，因功力生故。別有所以，一可燒熟不可燒熟、二為眼所見不為眼所見等。如是別聲與瓦器各有所以，聲因功力生常住，瓦器因功力生無常，是故聲常住。論曰：是難顛倒。何以故？我立因與無常不相離、與常相離，顯此因為無常比智，譬如為火比智顯煙，煙者與火不相離，是故我立因成就不可動。汝顯別聲不可燒熟是故常者，欲瞋苦樂風等不可燒熟而是無常，是故不可燒熟不可立為常因。不為眼所見者亦不可立為常因。何以故？欲瞋苦樂風等亦不為眼所見而是無常。汝因同類異類所攝，是故不成。若汝因與我因同，能難我立義；我立義者依三種相因，是故不同。不同者汝說同，是故汝難顛倒。

Third, the "elaboration on common characteristics" refers to highlighting distinctions within things that share common characteristics. This is called "elaboration on common characteristics."

The Treatise says: Sound is impermanent, because it is produced by effort, like a clay pot. Therefore, sound is impermanent.

The Opponent says: You claim sound and a clay pot share the same characteristic—both are produced by effort. But there are specific differences: (1) one can be fired and cooked, the other cannot; (2) one is visible to the eye, the other is not. So, sound and a clay pot each have their own distinct reasons. Sound, though produced by effort, is permanent; a clay pot, produced by effort, is impermanent. Therefore, sound is permanent.

The Treatise says: This argument is misguided. Why? The reason I establish (that sound is produced by effort) is inseparable from impermanence and separate from permanence. This reason serves as a means of inference for impermanence, just as smoke serves as a sign for inferring fire—smoke is inseparable from fire. Therefore, the reason I establish is valid and unshakable.

You claim that the fact sound cannot be fired and cooked makes it permanent. But desire, anger, suffering, pleasure, wind—these also cannot be fired and cooked, yet they are impermanent. Thus, "not being able to be fired and cooked" cannot be taken as a reason for permanence. Similarly, "not being visible to the eye" cannot be taken as a reason for permanence. Why? Desire, anger, suffering, pleasure, wind—these also are not visible to the eye, yet they are impermanent. Your reason falls into both the same class and the opposite class, and therefore it is invalid.

If your reason were the same as mine, you would be able to refute my position. But my position is based on the three characteristics of a valid reason. Hence, it is different. Because it is different, you wrongly claim it is the same—therefore your argument is misguided.

四、無異難者，顯一同相故立一切無所以，是名無異難。論曰：聲無常，依因緣異故聲即異，譬如燈若炷大明大、炷小明小，是義已立。外曰：若依同相，瓦器等無常，聲亦如是者，則一切物與一切物無異。何以故？一切物與異物有同相故。何者同相？有一可知等是名同相。若有同相，一切物與別物異者，聲亦如是，與瓦器等有同相，聲是常、瓦器等無常。何以故？一切於有等同相中有自性異故，如燈聲人馬，若依同相比知則不成就。論曰：是難顛倒。何以故？於一切物有等同相，我亦不捨。我撿有別，同相具足三相者立無常義，說此為無常因，不取唯同相。若不如是思擇道理，則無別有道理。何以故？無有一物與異物不同不別。是故若有同相則同類所攝、一切異類相離。若取此立因，是因成就。唯同相立因則不成就，是故顛倒。復次論曰：聲無常，依因緣生故，譬如瓦器等，是故聲無常。外曰：因與立義二無無異。何以故？依因生是何義？因未和合聲未生，未生故無有是其義。聲無常是何義？聲未生得生，生已即滅，滅故無有是其義，因與立義同無有故。論曰：是難顛倒。何以故？我立義無有，是壞滅無有。我立因無有，是未生無有。未生無有者，一切世間多信故成就，立為無常因。滅壞無有者，僧佉等不信故不成就，為令成就故立為義。若取成就立義、不成就為因，汝難則勝不顛倒。我說一切物前世未有，後世見無，是故聲前世是無、後世亦無。若前世無汝不信者，汝自思惟，若前世有聲而無礙者，何故耳不聞耶？是故汝知前世無，猶如蛇足。有人競勝心不能成就義意，欲成就而無道理，是義應捨。

4. **The Objection of Non-Distinction (Wu Yi Nan)** This objection argues people mistakenly base their reasoning only on shared qualities, claiming all things are the same without distinction.

**Text:** "Sound is impermanent. Because sound arises from conditions, it changes. For example, if a lamp's wick is large, the flame is large; if the wick is small, the flame is small—this principle is already established."

**Opponent:** "If we rely only on shared qualities, then things like pottery are impermanent, and sound is the same as them. Then all things would be no different from each other. Why? Because everything shares common qualities with other things. What are these shared qualities? 'Existence' and 'knowability'—these are the commonalities. If there are commonalities, why are all things distinct? Sound also shares common qualities with pottery—yet sound is permanent, while pottery is impermanent. Why? Because within common qualities like 'existence,' each thing has its own unique nature. For example, lamps, sounds, and horses. Basing reasoning solely on commonalities does not establish the conclusion."

**Text:** "This objection is misguided. Why? I do not deny that all things share common qualities like 'existence.' However, I specifically identify distinctions. Only when shared qualities are combined with complete evidence (three characteristics) can impermanence be established. I use this as the cause for impermanence, not just shared qualities alone. Without such careful analysis, there is no valid reasoning. Why? No object exists that is entirely undifferentiated from another. Therefore, when objects share qualities, they belong to the same category, but are distinct from other categories. If you take commonalities alone as the proof, it fails; that is why your objection is backwards."

**Text continued:** "Sound is impermanent because it arises from causes and conditions, like pottery. Therefore, sound is impermanent."

**Opponent:** "The reason and the claim are no different. What does 'arising from conditions' mean? It means before causes unite, sound does not exist; non-existence is its meaning. What does 'impermanent' mean? Sound is born, then ceases, so non-existence after cessation is its meaning. Both the reason (non-existence before arising) and the claim (non-existence after cessation) are the same in being 'non-existence.'"

**Text:** "This objection is also backwards. Why? The non-existence in my claim is the non-existence of destruction. The non-existence in my reason is the non-existence before arising. Non-existence before arising is widely accepted by common people, so it works as a valid reason for impermanence. But non-existence after destruction is not accepted by schools like Samkhya, so I cannot use it as the reason; instead, I must establish it as the conclusion. If you try to use an established truth (the claim) as the reason and a disputed truth as the claim, your objection would be valid—but that is not what I am doing. I explain that all things did not exist before, and will disappear later. Therefore, sound did not exist before, nor will it exist later. If you doubt that sound did not exist before, consider this: if sound previously existed without obstruction, why couldn't you hear it then? You should realize that sound had no prior existence, just like a snake's legs (a nonexistent thing). Some people, driven by a competitive spirit, try to make their invalid arguments seem correct, but such reasoning should be abandoned."

五、至不至難者，因為至所立義、為不至所立義？若因至，所立義則不成因；因若不至，所立義亦不成因，是名至不至難。外曰：若因至，所立義共、所立義雜，則不成立義，譬如江水入海水無復江水，因亦如是，故不成因。若所立義未成就，因不能至。若至，所立義已成就，用因何為？是故因不成就。若因不至所立義者，則同餘物不能成因，是故因不成就。若因不至則無所能，譬如火不至不能燒、刀不至不能斫。論曰：是難顛倒。因有二種：一生因、二顯不相離因。汝難若依生因則成難，若依顯因則是顛倒。何以故？我說因，不為生所立義，為他得信，能顯所立義不相離故，立義已有。於立義中如義智未起。何以故？愚癡故，是故說能顯因，譬如已有色，用燈顯之，不為生之。是故難生因，於顯因中是難顛倒。

5. The Objection of “Reaching or Not Reaching”

Because the logical reason either reaches the proposition to be proved or does not reach it. If the reason reaches, then the proposition is not established by it. If the reason does not reach, the proposition is also not established by it. This is called the objection of “reaching or not reaching.”

The Opponent says: “If the reason reaches, it becomes mixed with and inseparable from the proposition, then it cannot establish the proposition. For example, when the water of the Ganges enters the ocean, there is no longer any ‘Ganges water.’ The reason is likewise, and therefore it does not establish the proposition. If the proposition has not yet been established, the reason cannot reach it. If it does reach, the proposition is already established—what use is the reason? Therefore, the reason does not function. If the reason does not reach the proposition, it is just like any other thing and cannot act as a reason. Therefore, the reason does not function. If the reason does not reach, it is powerless—just as fire that does not reach cannot burn, and a knife that does not reach cannot cut.”

Response: This objection is mistaken. There are two kinds of reasons: (1) a generating reason, and (2) a revealing reason that shows the inseparable connection. If your objection relies on the generating reason, it is valid. But if it relies on the revealing reason, then it is mistaken. Why? I state the reason not to generate the proposition, but for others to gain conviction. It is able to reveal that the proposition is never separate from it, because the proposition already exists. With regard to the proposition, the knowledge of its meaning has not yet arisen, due to ignorance. Therefore, we speak of a revealing reason. For example, the color already exists, and a lamp reveals it, not generates it. Therefore, your objection, which targets only the generating reason, is mistaken when applied to the revealing reason.

六、無因難者，於三世說無因，是名無因難。外曰：因為在所立義前世、為在後世、為同世耶？若因在前世、立義在後世者，立義未有，因何所因？若在後世、立義在前世者，立義已成就，復何用因為？若同世俱生則非是因，譬如牛角種芽等一時而有，不得言左右相生，是故是同時則無有因。論曰：是難顛倒。何以故？前世已生，依因為生，譬如然燈為顯已有物，不為生未有物。汝以生因難我顯因，是難顛倒不成就。若汝難言：是因若是顯因，智慧未有是因，是因是誰因？是故不成顯因。若作如此難者，未得因名，乃至事未有。若事成有，即得因名。是能顯事，是時得因名，是言在前未得因名、在後方得因名。若說因前事後則無過失。有人難言：若如此者，事不從因生。此亦不成難。何以故？是前物於後得因名，若物已滅後事生者，此難成就。既不如此，前有未得名，後有方得名，是故果從因生。

6. **The Objection of Causelessness**: "The doctrine that nothing arises without a cause should not be spoken of in relation to the past, present, and future." **Outer [Opponent] says**: "Does the cause exist before the effect, after the effect, or simultaneously with it? - If the cause precedes the effect, then before the effect exists, what is the cause for? - If the cause follows the effect, then the effect already exists—what use is the cause? - If they arise simultaneously, they are not cause and effect, just like a pair of horns or a seed and a sprout that come into being at the same time cannot be said to give rise to each other. Therefore, simultaneous existence has no causal relationship."

**Treatise says**: This objection is mistaken. Why? Because the effect, having already arisen earlier, depends on the cause for its arising. For example, lighting a lamp reveals what is already present; it does not produce something that did not exist. You are confusing the **effecting cause** (which brings something into existence) with the **revealing cause** (which makes evident what already exists). Thus, your objection is invalid.

If you further argue: "If this 'cause' is a revealing cause, then before wisdom exists, for whom is this cause intended? Therefore, it is not a valid revealing cause." This objection itself is flawed. A thing does not acquire the name "cause" until the event occurs. Once the event comes into being, it becomes the cause. So, to say that the cause exists *before* the event does not mean it is causally unrelated—it only lacks the name "cause" at that point. The name "cause" is applied afterward. Thus, claiming that "the cause precedes the event" does not lead to error.

Another objection: "If this is so, then the event does not arise from a cause." This too fails as an objection. Why? Because the earlier thing later receives the name "cause." If the prior thing had ceased to exist and then the later event arose, that would be a valid objection. But this is not the case. The earlier thing exists, though unnamed; the later event arises, and only then is it called "cause." Therefore, the effect indeed arises from the cause.

七、顯別因難者，依別因無常法顯，故此則非因，是名顯別因難。外曰：若依功力聲無常者，若無功力處即應是常，如電光風等不依功力生亦為無常所攝，是故立無常不須依功力，功力非因故。若是因者，離功力餘處應無無常，譬如離火立煙，煙是火正因，煙與火不相離故。功力則不如此，是故不成因。復次功力不能立無常義。何以故？不遍故依功力生。若遍者得立無常，若不遍者則不得立無常。譬如有人立義：一切樹有神識。何以故？樹能眠故，譬如尸利沙樹。有人難言：樹神識不成就。何以故？因不遍故。一尸利沙樹眠，餘樹不眠，是眠不遍一切樹，是故眠不能立一切樹有神識。依功力生亦如是，不遍一切無常故，是故不能立無常。

**7. Showing the Difficulty of the Specific Cause**

The specific cause is revealed through impermanent phenomena that depend on a specific condition. Therefore, that specific condition is not the cause itself; this is called the difficulty of the specific cause.

**Opponent:** If you say that anything produced through effort is impermanent, then things not produced through effort should be permanent. Yet lightning, wind, and so on are not produced through effort, yet they are still included in the category of impermanence. Therefore, establishing impermanence does not require effort; effort is not the cause. If it were the cause, then apart from effort, nothing else would be impermanent. For example, smoke is the direct cause of fire, and smoke and fire are inseparable. Effort is not like that, so it cannot serve as the cause.

Furthermore, effort cannot establish the meaning of impermanence. Why? Because it is not universal. Things produced through effort are impermanent. If it were universal, it could establish impermanence; if not, it cannot.

For example, someone argues that all trees have consciousness because trees sleep, using the example of the Shiriṣa tree. Someone else objects: The notion that trees have consciousness is not established. Why? Because the reason is not universal. One Shiriṣa tree sleeps, but other trees do not. The property of sleeping is not universal to all trees, so it cannot establish that all trees have consciousness. Similarly, the notion "produced through effort" does not apply universally to all impermanent things, so it cannot establish impermanence.

八、疑難者，於異類同相而說疑難。論曰：聲無常，依功力生故。若有物依功力生，是物無常，譬如瓦器，是義已立。外曰，已生依功力得顯，譬如根水等依功力得顯，非依功力得生。聲亦如是，是故立依功力因不定，未生已生中有故。故依此因於聲起疑，此聲定如何？為如瓦器未生得生、為如根水已有得顯？故非決定。若依此生因起疑，當知非是立義因。何以故？能生能顯故。論曰：是難顛倒。何以故？我不說聲依功力得顯，我說聲依功力得生，是故聲無常。汝何所難？若汝言功力事有二種：一生、二顯。生者，瓦器等。顯者，根水等。聲是功力事，是故於中起常無常疑。是義不然。何以故？根水等非是功力事故。若汝言根水顯了功力事，是亦不難我義。何以故？顯了未生依功力得生。是故功力事一種同是無常，故汝難不然。若汝又顯功力事有二種無常，瓦器生是無常、瓦器滅是常，聲亦如是。是疑亦不然。何以故？不成就故。若汝瓦器滅，是有於滅中有，有故滅義則無有。若滅中無有，即是滅無有。何以故？無體故。若汝說如闇，闇中無光故有闇。滅亦如是，滅中無有故有滅。是義不然，空華、石女兒、兔角等中無有，是則應有。若汝不許空華等有，瓦器滅亦如是，不可說有。是故功力事一種同是無常，故汝疑不然。汝不信，為汝得信。故我說了因聲無常。何以故？前世無障，依功力得顯生故，是故知聲無有，譬如瓦器。汝立依功力所得、功力所造二義有異。是義不然。何者為義？一切依功力所得即是無常。何以故？未生得生、已生滅故。是故根水等亦如是無常，何用汝立顯了為常？

**8. Doubt Argument**

Some raise a doubt based on the idea that one cause can have two different effects.

**Treatise**: Sound is impermanent because it is produced by effort. This principle has already been established: anything produced by effort is impermanent, like a clay pot.

**Opponent**: What is already existing merely manifests through effort—for example, the sense faculties and water are revealed through effort, not produced by it. Sound is the same way. Therefore, your reason “produced by effort” is not conclusive, because it applies to both the unproduced (which arises) and the already existing (which manifests). Thus, based on this reason, doubt arises about whether sound is truly impermanent: is it like a clay pot that arises when not yet produced, or like the sense faculties and water that are already there and merely revealed? Therefore it is not decisive. If a reason gives rise to such doubt, it should not be accepted as a valid proof. Why? Because a valid proof must either produce knowledge of something new or clarify what already exists.

**Treatise**: This objection is misguided. Why? I do not say sound is merely *manifested* by effort—I say sound is *produced* by effort, and therefore it is impermanent. What are you objecting to?

If you say that effort has two functions: production (as with a clay pot) and manifestation (as with the senses and water), and sound falls within the scope of effort, thus leading to doubt about whether it is permanent or impermanent—this reasoning is incorrect. Why? Because the senses and water are not things produced by effort in the same way.

If you argue that the senses and water are matters of manifesting effort, this still does not refute my position. Why? Because manifestation itself is simply the production of something previously unmanifest. Therefore, all things accomplished through effort are equally impermanent. Your objection does not hold.

If you further argue that there are two types of impermanence in effort-related things—(1) the arising of a clay pot is impermanent, and (2) the destruction of a clay pot is permanent—and that sound is the same, this doubt is also unfounded. Why? Because such a distinction cannot be established.

If you say that destruction exists in a clay pot, then if destruction had being, the concept of “destruction” would be meaningless. If destruction has no being, then there is no destruction. Why? Because it has no substance.

If you argue that, just as darkness is said to exist because there is no light in it, so destruction exists because there is no existence *in* destruction—this is incorrect. For then, empty space flowers, a barren woman’s son, and a rabbit’s horn would also have to be said to exist, since there is no existence in them.

If you deny that empty space flowers and the like have any existence, then the destruction of a clay pot is likewise something that cannot be said to exist. Therefore, all things accomplished by effort are equally impermanent, so your doubt is unfounded.

Since you do not accept this, to help you gain conviction, I offer a proof of sound’s impermanence: Because sound arises from its causes—it is manifested and produced through effort. Therefore, we know sound is non-eternal, just like a clay pot.

You claim there is a difference between “things obtained by effort” and “things produced by effort.” This is incorrect. Why? Because the meaning is this: everything *obtained* by effort is necessarily impermanent. Why? Because what is not yet produced arises, and what has already arisen ceases. Therefore, even the senses and water are impermanent in this way. What use is your claim that manifestation is permanent?