Treatise on the Hundred Verses Commentary (百論疏)

Chapter 4: Refuting Differences

There are three kinds of difference: first, the difference of distinct particulars, as this person and that person; second, the difference of transformation, as a lump of cow dung turning into a lump of ash; third, the difference of combination, as when things combine into a single pot. Now we refute the difference of combination. The Vaiśeṣika teacher, in the latter establishment of his thesis, also has three meanings, as stated at the beginning of the chapter on the Self: first, arising in the world later; second, its meaning not being widespread; third, differing in the order of words. This is the second. He establishes three dharmas as different substances, roughly with five meanings: first, with respect to the six categories, the pot is the principal category, the one is the dependent category, and existence is the general category; second, the difference of permanent and impermanent, the pot being one and impermanent, the great existent being permanent; third, the difference of producing and making-known, the pot being one produced by a producing cause, existence being the making-known cause; fourth, the difference of names; fifth, the difference of the knower and knowledge. Because of these five differences, the three dharmas are different substances. Now, in refuting difference, above we refuted the view of oneness; now we refute the view of difference. Moreover, now we refute difference in order to establish non-oneness; above we refuted oneness in order to establish non-difference. Question: The outsiders establish the general and particular as one or different—how does this correspond to our own meaning? Answer: It corresponds to our own ultimate and conventional as one substance or different substances. The outsiders explain that the great existent is permanent while particular dharmas are impermanent—permanent and impermanent as one substance or different substances. How is this different from our own ultimate being permanent and conventional being impermanent, with the ultimate and conventional as one or different substances? Further, the outsiders say the great existent pervades all dharmas as one or different substance; our own ultimate also pervades all dharmas as one or different substance. Further, the Sāṃkhya earlier posited oneness, the Vaiśeṣika later established difference—just as Kaishan earlier established one substance, and Longguang later clarified different substances. Furthermore, even if the meanings differ, since Āryadeva used oneness and difference to refute the outsiders, he would also use oneness and difference to refute those within. The old masters of the Ten Stages Treatise held that the true is permanent and the false is impermanent; this too can be refuted by oneness and difference—one may grasp the intent. The chapter opens into four parts: first, refuting the outsiders' doctrine of the general and particular as different substances; second, refuting those within who hold the general and particular as different substances; third, refuting the cause of the general and particular both within and without; fourth, refuting the outsiders' arbitrary faulting of the treatise master. These four form a sequence. First, the outsiders cite the treatise master's statement that the three dharmas are different substances as a fault, and request that he state its error. Further, the outsiders say: if the three dharmas were one substance, that would be a fault; that the three dharmas are different substances they claim is without fault. If you say there is a fault, you may bring it forth. Further, above we borrowed difference to refute oneness; the outsiders say the one dharma has fault while the different dharmas are without fault, and so they ask. Further, oneness and difference are mutually dependent; fault and faultlessness are mutually dependent. Since oneness has fault, the position of difference is without fault. Question: Why does this outsider passage have no sūtra verse? Answer: Āryadeva's Hundred Verses always preserves conciseness; merely by clarifying the refutation of difference, the establishment of difference is known, and so he omits the outsiders' establishment. Vasubandhu, wishing to generate the meaning and provoke the outsiders' question, may also have it as an actual original question, but since it is easy to understand he does not explain it, and so there is no sūtra verse. "Inner: If there is oneness and difference, each one is nonexistent." Above, refuting the three dharmas as one substance, when mutually compared there are three faults—namely, production, non-production, and inversion. Now, refuting the three dharmas as different substances, when the three dharmas are mutually compared there are also three faults—namely, the total nonexistence of the three dharmas. If the pot is different from the two, what serves as pot? If the one is different from the two, what serves as one? If existence is different from the two, what serves as existence? Therefore the three dharmas are totally nonexistent. The commentary has one more round of exchange than the previous chapter; in explaining this chapter it mostly uses paired oppositions. Now there are two difficulties: first, the difficulty of total loss; "Further" below is the second, the difficulty of mutual loss. When the three dharmas as different substances mutually have removal and retention, compared to before there should be four alternatives: one, both removed; two, both retained; three and four, mutual removal and retention. "Outer: Not so"—this rescues the difficulty of total loss. If the three dharmas as different substances did not combine together, the three dharmas would be totally lost; since the three dharmas, though different, do combine together, the three dharmas are all established. The outsider actually takes "not being able to be separated" as combination, not that the three things each separate and afterward combine. The commentary has two parts: first, explaining that the three dharmas combine together to rescue the difficulty of total loss; "If you say the pot is lost" below rescues the difficulty of mutual loss. Further, it opens into four parts: first, citing the difficulty; "This statement is not so" is the second, general rejection; "For what reason" below is the third, explaining the rejection; "Because of combination of the different" below is the fourth, concluding and establishing his meaning. He says the treatise master does not understand the meaning of difference, and clings to distinct difference to fault his combination-difference; therefore he now brings up combination-difference to exclude distinct difference. "Inner: If so, many pots." Above it was clarified that if the three dharmas are different, the three dharmas are totally nonexistent; now it is clarified that if the three dharmas combine, one falls into many threes. Existence combining with pot is named existent pot; the one combining with pot again becomes pot; pot upon pot, and so it becomes three pots. The reason for making the difficulty of three pots is that he has three things as substances, and uses two things to combine with one thing, receiving the name from the one thing, and so it becomes three. Since in the pot there are three, in the one there are also three, making nine dharmas. The commentary has two parts: first, explaining the difficulty of many pots; "If you say" below refutes the second combination-difference above. Though there are two different differences, in the end it is still difference. If combination were not called difference, then it would be non-difference; now combination is still difference—using difference to rescue difference is like using spirit to rescue spirit. "One should further state the reason"—reason means the why. "Outer: Because of the general and because of the attribute, there is the one but not the pot"—this rescues the difficulty of many pots. Among the three dharmas, two are meaning-combinations, and therefore are not pot; the pot is the principal category, and only the pot is pot, and so there is no many pots and no many ones. Further, answering the above "one should further state the reason," he clarifies that the two are not pot—this is the principle, and is called stating the reason. Thus with one answer he answers the previous two difficulties. "Inner: If so, no pot." If one excludes the two dharmas, what serves as pot? Therefore he says no pot. One should also say: if so, no existence; if so, no one. Above one would fall into many; now one avoids many but falls into nonexistence—this too refutes his stating the reason. Though you make this statement of reason, in the end it is not the principle, and is not called stating the reason. "Outer: Accept many pots." Above, using establishment as establishment; now he grasps refutation as establishment. Above, in using establishment as establishment, there were only two difficulties: first, if there is, then many; second, if not many, then nonexistent. But the outsider has no further means of rescue, and so grasps refutation as establishment. Question: The treatise master has the two difficulties of many and nonexistent; why does the outsider say the inner [position] has many pots, and not say the treatise master holds nonexistence? Answer: The outsider says the treatise master accepts his many pots, and so the meaning of pot is established. The outsider does not establish no-pot, and so does not say the treatise master accepts his no-pot. Further, it is answering the reason: since you establish many, one must know there is one—this is called the why. "Inner: Because the one is nonexistent"—also nonexistent. This has two refutations: first, clarifying that because the substance-one is nonexistent, there is no many; second, clarifying that because the number-one is nonexistent, there is no many. Now, clarifying that because the substance-one is nonexistent there is no many: the outsider establishes the three dharmas as different substances yet combining together, and so many pots are made. Therefore originally there is no one pot; since one pot is nonexistent, there is no many. Above it was clarified that because one is nonexistent the treatise master does not accept his one, and also because many is nonexistent does not accept his many. If there were one and many, then afterward one would accept; since in the end there is no one or many, what is there to accept? "Further, because the initial number is nonexistent"—second, clarifying that because the number-one is nonexistent there is no many. This refutation differs from the previous: above it was clarified that because the substance of the one pot is not established there is no one, and no one means no many; now it is clarified that pot and the number-one are originally different, and so on the substance of pot there is no number-one, and because the number-one is nonexistent there is also no many. Thus the previous was the nonexistence of the pot's substance; now even granting that there is the pot's substance, still on the pot's substance there is originally no number-one—this is the difference. "Outer: The pot exists because of combination with existence." From above down to here, the reversals have three stages: first, using establishment as establishment, the meaning was not established; second, grasping refutation as establishment, the meaning was also not established; now he again grasps establishment, and so this passage comes. Further, first he established one pot, and the treatise master refuted that the one is not established; second he rescued many pots, and the treatise master did not accept his many; now he again establishes one. Question: Now he establishes one pot—how does this differ from before? Answer: Though above there were many reversals, broadly there are two positions: first, if one establishes that there is a pot, one falls into many; if one avoids many pots, one falls into no pot. Now the outsider further arranges the meaning of his position to doubly penetrate both difficulties, clarifying that with three different natures he harmonizes them into one substance; though combined yet different, though different yet combined. Because though different yet combined, it is not nonexistent; because though combined yet different, it is not many. The reason: pot is the name of the self-substance; the one existent receives its designation from another. Because it receives its designation from another, the pot is named the one existent; yet the nature of the one existent is always not pot, and so there is no many pots. And pot is the name of the immediate substance; it does not lose its own nature, and so there is no no-pot. You cannot hear that the pot is named the one existent and then say the one existent is pot and so there are many pots; nor can you hear that the one existent is not pot and then say the pot also has no substance. Though the broad position rescues the pot, this is the establishment of all three. The commentary above brings up pot combining with existence to doubly penetrate the two difficulties: because pot combines with existence, pot is named existent—this clarifies that though different yet combined, and so the pot receives the name existent, avoiding the difficulty of no pot; "not entirely having this" clarifies that though combined yet different, the pot is not entirely existent in substance, avoiding the difficulty of many pots. Question: Why does it first avoid the difficulty of no pot? Answer: The treatise master above refuted with two gates: first he said because one is nonexistent many is also nonexistent; second he said because the initial number is nonexistent. These two both clarify that the outsider falls into the fault of no pot; therefore now it first penetrates no-pot. "Because pot combines with existence, pot is named existent"—this is not no-pot. This is the primary intent of the verse. Therefore Vasubandhu first explains penetrating the difficulty of no pot; fearing that having avoided no-pot one still falls into many pots, he therefore also says "not entirely having," avoiding many pots. "Thus pot combining with the one is named one"—here with respect to pot combining with the one he also penetrates the two difficulties. Question: The verse itself only uses the gate of existence to penetrate the two difficulties; why does Vasubandhu further do it with respect to the one? Answer: This has deep intent. The treatise master above had a double refutation: first he said because one is nonexistent many is also nonexistent—this is the proper difficulty of no pot; therefore now he clarifies that because pot combines with existence pot is named existent to penetrate it. Above the second "further" said the initial number is nonexistent; therefore now he clarifies that pot combining with the one is named one, and uses this to penetrate it. Though pot is different from the number-one, pot combines with the number-one, and so pot is named the number-one—not that the initial number is nonexistent. The various masters who themselves lecture on the Hundred Treatise mostly do not see this intent, and say the text is verbose. "Inner" below also has two parts: first, pointing to the above; second, proper refutation. Pointing to the above: though you are different yet combined, you still fall into many; though combined yet different, you do not escape the fault of nonexistence. Therefore you have already leaked into the previous trap, and should not re-establish. "But there is this statement"—though there are words of not-many and not-nonexistent, there is no meaning of not-many and not-nonexistent; therefore he says "but." "If there is non-pot, then no pot"—above there were fully the two gates of many and nonexistent; now he briefly points to the gate of nonexistence. The reason he specially points to the gate of nonexistence is that the outsider says pot exists because of combination with existence, which precisely rescues nonexistence; therefore now he specially points to nonexistence. "Now we should further say the pot should be non-pot"—second, proper refutation. Pot combining with existence then from existence is named existent; the substance of existence is not pot. "Pot combining with non-pot," from non is named non, and it should be named non-pot. If it is not named non from non, then it is also not named existent from existence. Question: Why does he make this refutation? Answer: There are three meanings. First, the two gates of granting and seizing. Just now, pointing to the above refutation, he said if there is non-pot then no pot—this is the seizing refutation. Now granting that there is pot, pot combining with existence is named existent from existence, and should be named non from non. Second, the two passages refute his two meanings. The outsider says: though combined yet different, though different yet combined. Just now, pointing to the above refutation, he refutes his "though combined yet different"; now he refutes his "though different yet combined." "Though combined yet different" incurs the difficulty of no pot; "though different yet combined" is flawed by the parallel of non-pot. Third, he wishes to show that both meanings alike fall into no pot. "Though combined yet different" already falls into no pot; "though different yet combined," being named non from non, also falls into no pot. The commentary has three parts: first, citing the outsider's meaning; "This is non-pot" is the second sentence, which will set up a parallel and designate the outsider's meaning as definitively the great existent—existence has itself and no other, and so he says "this is non-pot." "If pot combines with non-pot" below is the third, properly setting up the parallel. Some say: this brings up a parallel of a different kind. Your pot is different from existence and also different from space; being different from existence it is named existent from existence; being different from space it is named space from space. Now I say this can be a forced refutation, but is not the primary intent of the text. "Outer: Because there is no combination with the nonexistent, it is not non-pot." The outsider says: existence has two meanings: first, the meaning of having existence; second, the meaning of no pot. The meaning of having existence is existent, and so pot combining with existence is named existent from existence. On the side of the meaning of non-pot it is nonexistent; the nonexistent has no combination, and so pot does not combine with the nonexistent, and is not named non from non. But merely by turning one word, there is the inner refutation and outer penetration. The commentary has two parts: first, penetrating the latter parallel; second, explaining the former difficulty. It clarifies that on the side of existence being non-pot there is no combination, and one cannot be named non from non, and thereby penetrates the above parallel. "Now because there is existence" below clarifies that on the side of non-pot there is existence; because there is existence there is combination, and it is named existent from existence, penetrating the above pointing to the difficulty of no pot. If one penetrates the above parallel with space: the great existent is existent, and so pot can combine with existence; space is nonexistent, and because nonexistent there is nothing to combine with. One may also further follow the words and parallel the text: if so, the great existent can be different from pot, and space should not be different. If both are different, both should combine. The outsider answers: when a thing is different, there can be combination, like two hands; when there is no thing that is different, like one hand—there being one hand, the nonexistent cannot combine. "Inner: Now because there is combination with pot"—also two difficulties: first, the refutation by granting combination; second, the refutation by seizing combination. The refutation by granting combination: if you say the substance of existence is existent, and so pot combining with existence is named existent, then existence combining with pot—existence should produce pot, and then existence would be a producing cause, and existence should be impermanent, which refutes your meaning. Second, the refutation by seizing combination: since you say now because there is combination with pot, therefore pot exists, one knows that originally when it had not yet combined with existence there was no pot; if there was no pot, who combined with existence? This is still the nonexistent having no combination. The commentary has two parts: first, explaining the refutation by granting combination. "Now because there is combination with pot," existence should produce pot; from "if you say" below is the second, taking the intent to seize combination and refute. You say that before pot combined with existence there was no pot; at that time, since there was no pot, what would combine with existence? "Outer: Because of making-known pot and so on, like a lamp"—this penetrates the above two difficulties. Existence is like a lamp, pot is like a thing. The lamp merely makes the thing known and brings it forth; it does not produce the thing. Existence merely makes the pot known and brings it forth; it does not produce the pot, and so there is no first fault. Second, when not yet illuminated by the lamp it is not that there is no thing; when the pot has not yet combined with existence it is also not that there is no pot. Therefore the pot can combine with existence, penetrating the above difficulty of the nonexistent having no combination. The commentary says "existence is not merely the cause of pot and all things"—here the word "merely" means "is." Therefore in the chapter refuting oneness there are frequently the word "merely," also clarifying that existence is not the producing cause of pot and all things. "Also able to make pot and all things known"—here the word "also" should be called "merely," meaning the great existent merely can make pot and all things known. "Inner: If a dharma can make known, like a lamp, the pot first exists"—with respect to the text from beginning to end there are altogether three refutations, separately forming six gates: first, with respect to pot having pot and no pot, to refute existence, forming two difficulties; second, with respect to pot and the markable, refuting, again forming two gates; third, with respect to the lamp, granting and seizing, again forming two difficulties. Together six gates. It is said there are three pairs: the first two refute the dharma, the last one refutes the simile. With respect to the first, two parts: "If a dharma can make known, like a lamp" cites the outsider's meaning. "The pot first exists" sets up two difficulties. First, the difficulty of existence: before the lamp illuminates the pot, in darkness the pot exists beforehand; when existence has not yet combined with pot, the pot also exists beforehand. Since the pot already exists beforehand, what use is existence? Therefore one obtains the meaning of combination but falls into the fault of no use. Question: In darkness there is a pot, and the lamp has the use of making known and bringing forth. Also the pot exists beforehand, and existence has the use of making known and bringing forth—why is there no use? Answer: Existence is slightly different from the lamp. Your existence originally makes things exist; now the thing, before combining with existence, already exists—what use is existence? If you say there is the nature of pot, this nature is different from the nonexistent, and in the end is itself existent. Further, the nature-existence is originally self-existent, and does not depend on existence to exist. Also the thing-existence is originally self-existent, and also does not depend on existence to exist. Further, the great existent can produce the nature-existence into existence; the potter can also do so. Since the potter is a producing cause, the great existent is also a producing cause. The second, the difficulty of nonexistence: if before combining with existence there is no pot, and only when combined with existence is there a pot, then existence is a producing cause. The former incurs the fault of falling into no use; the latter incurs the fault of use falling into a producing cause. Question: Now the verse refutes the lamp—how does this differ from the refutation of the lamp in the chapter refuting the Self? Answer: Above, the pot in darkness originally existed, while the substance of awareness originally did not exist; existence and nonexistence being different, it is not a simile. Now the verse grants that the pot-dharma first exists and yet existence—this falls into the fault of no use. Question: Why above did he refute with respect to nonexistence, and now with respect to existence? Answer: In principle, when conditions have not yet combined, within the five realms there is truly no substance of awareness, and so he refutes with respect to nonexistence. In principle, when the pot has not yet combined with the great existent, it is not that there is no pot, and so he refutes with respect to existence. The verse has two parts: first, refuting with respect to the pot already existing; second, refuting with respect to the pot not yet existing. Refuting with respect to the pot already existing: dharma and simile are alike, but there is the fault of falling into no use. "If when not yet combined" below refutes with respect to the meaning of not yet existing: dharma and simile are not alike; one obtains the use of existence but falls into the fault of a producing cause. "Further, if by mark and markable it is established, why is it one and not two"—this refutes with respect to mark and markable. "If by mark and markable it is established" cites the outsider's meaning. The great existent is the mark, the pot is the markable; it is required that with the great existent as mark the pot be the markable, and only then is the pot established. Therefore he says "if by mark and markable it is established." "Why is it one and not two" is the second, proper refutation. Since the pot has both the mark and the markable, two meanings, and only then is established, why is the great existent only the one of the capable mark, and does not possess both the capable mark and the marked? The cited text is precisely this. If one refutes lengthwise and crosswise: if existence is the same as pot, then both should have two; if both have two, then existence further requires existence, and so on without end. Next, if pot is the same as existence, if existence is self-existent and does not further require existence, then pot is also self-existent and does not require existence to be pot. Second, the difficulty of inversion: if your existence does not require existence while pot requires existence, then pot should also not require existence while existence requires existence. The reason one must make the inversion difficulty is that all dharmas necessarily require the meaning of mark and markable and only then are established; yet your pot requires mark and markable while existence does not require mark and markable. Since this meaning is one-sided, it incurs the fault of inversion. "The lamp simile was already refuted above"—third, refuting the lamp. Above he refuted the dharma statement; now next he refutes the simile. Also two parts: first, the seizing refutation, clarifying that the lamp was already refuted above—what do you cite it for? "Further" below is the second, granting refutation. The outsider has a lamp parallel, and he refutes it. The outsider uses the lamp to simile existence; the inner turns the lamp to simile pot. The lamp illuminates itself without depending on an external illumination; the pot also self-exists without waiting for external existence. This grasps the pot as the same as the lamp. If the pot cannot self-exist and requires existence to be pot, then the lamp also cannot self-illuminate and requires an illumination to illuminate the lamp. Next, the difficulty of inversion: if the pot is not self and the lamp is self, then the lamp should also not be self and the pot should be self.

"Outsiders say: the body's characteristics are like this." From the above onward, the outsiders' general and particular views have been refuted. Now the second part refutes the inner general and particular views, clarifying the meaning of inner and outer emptiness. Above there were three refutations and six objections; now all are addressed. It is essential that the foot be taken as the body's characteristic, for the foot is useful, and without the foot there is no use. Having a foot enables the body to be produced, but it is not produced from the body, so there is no difficulty regarding a producing cause. Just as the foot is the body's characteristic, the body is what is characterized, so the body possesses both the characterizing and the characterized — two but not one. Yet the foot does not further seek a characteristic; the foot separately is only one and not two. The same holds for the pot, so there is no second difficulty. And the lamp can illuminate itself without relying on an external light, whereas the body cannot exist on its own but requires the foot as its characteristic; just as the pot cannot exist on its own but requires something that makes it a pot, so there is no third difficulty.

Under "Insiders say," this passage only refutes the analogy, and so the doctrinal statement collapses on its own. Moreover, by refuting only the analogy, it means that when one searches for this body, it is ultimately unfindable; contemplating the true nature of the body is the same as contemplating the Buddha, enabling outsiders to attain the Buddha's path.

The inner refutation has two parts: first, refuting the divisible body; second, refuting the various parts. The reason for refuting these two is that outsiders claim the body possesses both the characterizing and the characterized as two, while the various parts are merely the characterizing with no characterized as two. Now by refuting the body and the various parts, the outsiders' meaning of characterizing and characterized is completely refuted.

The refutation of the overall body has two parts: first, refuting the coarse whole; second, refuting the subtle whole. The first again has two: first, refuting co-presence; second, refuting distributed presence. First, quoting co-presence; "Why is there no foot in the head?" is the actual refutation. Since the one body is co-present in the head, therefore the head should contain the foot. Question: Why was co-presence refuted first? Answer: Outsiders take parts such as the foot as the characteristics of the overall body; having seen the parts, they know there is a body possessing the parts. If so, the body possessing parts should be co-present within the various parts. But since outsiders earlier cited the foot as the body's characteristic, we should now say the head is in the foot. That we say instead the foot is in the head is just a matter of choosing one location to discuss it. The commentary has two parts: first, setting up two alternatives to pin it down. "If there is a body-dharma" — this quotes the outsiders' position. Outsiders say the various parts come together and there is separately an overall body-dharma distinct from the various parts, just as the faction holding that a composite has its own substance says there is separately a composite substance distinct from the real substances, and just as the Vātsīputrīyas say the four great elements come together and there is separately an eye-dharma, and the five aggregates come together and there is separately a person-dharma — hence co-presence and distributed presence are used to refute the view of a composite body having its own substance and the Vātsīputrīya view. "In the foot and other parts, is it co-present or distributed?" The reason for pinning it specifically on the foot and other parts is that outsiders cited the foot as the characteristic of the body, so the foot is chosen to pin it down.

Under "If co-present," the actual objection is made. "Because the body-dharma is one" — for the Vātsīputrīyas, the four great elements come together and there is an eye-dharma, the five aggregates come together and there is a person-dharma; for the faction holding a composite has its own substance, the five aggregates come together and there is separately an overall composite dharma — the same as the outsiders here. If there is one overall body-dharma and it is in the foot, then the foot contains the head; if it is in the head, then the head contains the foot. Under "If distributed," the second refutation of distributed presence. First quoting; then under "It is not so. Why?" the actual refutation. If it is only distributed, as when a head possessing parts is in the part that is the head, and a foot possessing parts is in the part that is the foot, then the head has a head and the foot has a foot, which avoids the fault of the head containing the foot, but incurs the fault that the possessor of parts is the same as the parts — hence "the possessor of parts is like the parts." The commentary has three parts: first quoting, second refuting, third concluding. "If the foot contains a part equal to the foot-part, and likewise in the other parts" — this clarifies that the possessor-of-parts foot is in the part-foot, and likewise for the other parts; all of this quotes the outsiders' position. "Then the possessor of parts and the parts become one" is the actual refutation. This "one" has two meanings: first, there is a head-possessing-parts and again a part-head, so the possessor of parts and the parts are equal, hence called one — which incurs the fault of two heads and eight feet. Second, the possessor of parts just is the various parts, hence called one — in which case, even to two heads and eight feet, the possessor of parts is lost and only the various parts remain. Under "Therefore," the conclusion.

"Thus, feet, and so on." From the above onward, the coarse general and specific have been refuted. Now, the second refutation of the fine general and specific. Feet are called parts because they are possessed of parts; this should also be applied to the refutation of the whole and the parts. "Since the possessed of parts does not exist, the parts also do not exist." From the above onward, the refutation of the coarse and fine, the two generals, is precisely the refutation of the possessed of parts. Now, the second refutation of the parts according to the two schools of no-coarse and no-fine.

The outsider says: "Because atoms exist." From the above onward, the two sections refuting the internal and external general and specific effects are complete. Now, the second refutation of the internal and external general and specific causes. The intention of this text has both a proximate and a distant meaning. The distant meaning is to adduce the general and specific of atoms to rescue the general and specific effects above. The Vaiśeṣika says: When the three disasters arise, the coarse things of the world, being conditioned, are all destroyed. Only the neighboring subtle atoms remain permanent and undestroyed, as the cause of internal and external dharmas. If these atoms did not exist, then when the later world arises, there would be no cause but there would be an effect. Now, since these atoms exist, later producing all things, there is cause and there is effect.

The proximate meaning is: Above, the refutation of parts and the possessed of parts has shown that both are nonexistent. The outsider says: Atoms are round and permanent, without parts of the ten directions, and therefore do not fall within the previous refutation of parts and the possessed of parts. Although they are not parts or the possessed of parts, they can serve as the cause of parts and the possessed of parts. Therefore, parts and the possessed of parts are not nonexistent. The Sāṃmitīya school holds that from these atoms all things are aggregated, and when all things disperse, they return to these atoms. The difference from the outsiders is twofold: First, their essence possesses the three characteristics and is a shared cause, and therefore is impermanent. Second, they arise from a produced cause. Therefore, the *Saṃyukta-hṛdaya* says: "If it arises from a single cause, know that it does not exist." Zhuangyan says: Neighboring subtle atoms have no directional parts, and a moment has no beginning, middle, or end. Kaishan says: Neighboring subtle atoms have directional parts, and a moment has beginning, middle, and end. But they agree that from the fine, the coarse is formed, and from the coarse, the world is formed.

The insider says: "If gathered, it becomes a pot; all pots..." The insider's refutation has two parts: "If gathered, it becomes a pot" cites the outsider's position. The reason for citing their gathering is that they claim atoms are permanent and also without parts. According to their essential nature, each one is not a pot; only by gathering can it become a pot. Therefore, their gathering is cited. "All pots" is the second refutation, which has two meanings: First, great gathering; second, small gathering. Great gathering means: If atoms have the nature of a pot, then all atoms in the world should become pots, and should not become other things. If atoms sometimes produce pots and sometimes produce other things, then atoms do not have the nature of a pot. If they lack the nature of a pot, then all atoms, even when gathered, cannot become pots. Next, the objection based on fine gathering: This is the small-gathering all, meaning all within a pot. If atoms contain the nature of a pot, each atom should individually become a pot. If each atom cannot individually produce a pot, then many gathered together also cannot produce one.

Past and present commentators only offered the first two objections. I have always been dissatisfied with this text when listening and lecturing. Now, examining Vasubandhu's intention, it does not correspond to these two interpretations. These two interpretations can only be forceful refutations. What I now clarify is: The outsider directly claims that atoms can produce a pot. Now, I set up two alternatives to determine it: Do you gather all atoms in the world to make a pot, or do you not gather all atoms in the world to make a pot? If you gather all atoms in the world to make a pot, then all atoms in the world should become pots. If you do not gather all atoms in the world to make a pot, then all atoms in the world are not pots. Since there is gathering all and not gathering all, you incur the faults of all becoming and none becoming. This is precisely the meaning of the text.

The commentary has two parts: First, it points to the latter, refuting the essence of atoms; second, it directly refutes, refuting the function of atoms. Again, pointing to the latter is a confiscatory refutation, clarifying that these atoms do not exist; next, even granting their existence, it interrogates with two alternatives. Comparing this commentary with the previous two interpretations, they do not correspond.

The outsider says: The outsider adduces the example of threads and drops of water gathering their force to counter both the previous objections of gathering all and not gathering all. Threads and drops individually cannot, but many gathered can. Because individually they cannot, it avoids the objection of not gathering all; because many gathered can, it avoids the objection of gathering all. Most masters of the *Hundred Verses* have not seen this meaning.

The insider says: "Because it is indefinite." The outsider claims that individually they definitely cannot, which counters the objection of not gathering all; and that many gathered definitely can, which counters the objection of gathering all. Now, these two definites are denied, and therefore it is said to be indefinite. Since the two definites are destroyed, the previous two objections still hold, like blind men and sand: individually they cannot, and many also cannot. How can you say that individually they definitely cannot and many definitely can?

The outsider says: "Because each part has force, it is not indefinite." This clarifies that atoms definitely cannot individually and definitely can in multitude. Because each atom has force, blind men and sand definitely cannot individually and definitely cannot in multitude, because each lacks force. Therefore, there are two kinds of definiteness, not indefiniteness. Once the definiteness is established, the two objections are destroyed.

The insider says: "Because of the fault of sameness or difference between parts and the possessed of parts." This refutes their definiteness that individually they cannot and in multitude they definitely can. You say parts cannot and the possessed of parts can. If parts and the possessed of parts are the same, then since parts cannot, the possessed of parts also cannot; and since the possessed of parts can, parts also should be able. If the possessed of parts can while parts cannot, this is the meaning of difference, and it should also incur the five objections, as in the case of the self being separate from consciousness and so on. Again, if the possessed of parts and parts are the same, as when many threads form a rope, the rope is one and the many threads are one, like the body being one and head and feet being one. If the rope and the many threads are one, then since the threads are many, in the rope they are also many, which also incurs the five objections, as stated in the "Refutation of Oneness." If parts and the possessed of parts are different, then apart from the many threads there should separately be a rope, and when the threads are destroyed the rope should remain. If the threads are destroyed then the rope is destroyed, one cannot say they are different. Again, even granting that apart from the many threads there is separately a rope, is the rope wholly in one thread or partially in one thread? If it is wholly in one thread, then within one thread there are all the threads. If it is partially in one thread, then in the other threads there should be no rope. If all the other threads have the rope, then there are many ropes. If one rope is partially in the many threads, then there is a possessed of parts like parts.

The commentary has two parts: First, it explains the verse's fault of sameness or difference; under "Furthermore," it generates the refutation of existence and nonexistence. First, it refutes from the gate of nonexistence. When there are the many threads, the rope does not yet exist. What is waited for that it is called a part? If when there are the many threads the rope already exists, what need is there for the force of parts?

“Outsider: You are a destroyer of the Dharma.” From the above onward, three rounds have refuted the outsider’s general and particular notions of distinct entities. Now the fourth refutes the outsider’s unwarranted faultfinding. The treatise master previously refuted the outsider’s fault of being the same as a destroyer of the Dharma; here there is an immediate and a distant sense. Taken in the distant sense, from the “Chapter on the Spirit” through to this passage, whether dharmas or persons, unity or difference, all alike are refuted—hence “destroyer of the Dharma.” This is a general censure by all the masters, not merely the Vaiśeṣika’s angry reproach. In the immediate sense, from the above onward the text has three parts and the meaning has four. The three textual parts: first, refuting the outsider’s general and particular; second, refuting the inner [Buddhist] general and particular; third, refuting the atom—refuting the cause of general and particular. The four meanings: cause and effect, inner and outer. These four comprehensively encompass all dharmas; you refute them all, so you are called a destroyer of the Dharma.

The inner [Buddhist] reply has two: first, Vasubandhu’s meaning arising to escape fault; second, Āryadeva’s meaning of shifting the fault. The escape-of-fault reply: you claim general and particular are distinct entities, but when we seek the meaning of difference in your view, it cannot be established—this is not my fault. Again, this is precisely the shifting-the-fault reply: since the outsider asserts that “existence” is different from the pot, and that difference cannot be established, the fault of non-establishment falls back on you. Moreover, you have above recklessly set up your own thesis, and now you recklessly fault others—thus you heap up offenses again.

“Again, the one with the view of nonexistence has the view of existence, and the one with the view of existence has the view of nonexistence, and so on”—the second, the shifting-the-fault reply. Here first a general explanation of this meaning. The outsider with the view of existence is called “nonexistence-viewing existence”; the outsider with the view of nonexistence is called “existence-viewing nonexistence.” Within the inner Dharma, the Sarvāstivādins and others are “nonexistence-viewing existence”; the Vaipulya faction are “existence-viewing nonexistence.” Explaining according to the text: it clarifies that the Vaiśeṣika’s assertion of difference has two faults. First, in the Buddhadharma, a body is named from the causes and conditions of head and feet, but the outsider says it is not a body—this is “existence-viewing nonexistence.” Apart from head and feet there is in reality no separate general body, yet they claim there is a separate general body—this is “nonexistence-viewing existence.” Again, the faction holding that the conventional has a substantive entity: apart from the four atoms there is a separate substantive pillar, apart from the five aggregates there is a separate substantive person—this is “nonexistence-viewing existence.” The faction holding that the conventional has no substantive entity says there are only the five aggregates, only the four atoms—this is the meaning of “existence-viewing nonexistence.” No substance yet having function possesses two meanings: a separate function is named “nonexistence-viewing existence”; having no substance is “existence-viewing nonexistence.”

The commentary has two: first, it sets up the two gates; second, it explains the two gates. Setting up the two gates: “You are the same as a destroyer of the Dharma”—this sets up the gate of destroying the Dharma. “Indeed you go even further”—this sets up the gate of going further. Being the same as a destroyer of the Dharma is “existence-viewing nonexistence”; going even further is “nonexistence-viewing existence.” Under “Why is this?” it explains the two gates. Again two: first according to the inner Dharma, second according to the outer Dharma. Explaining the two according to the inner Dharma: first, explaining the gate of being the same as a destroyer of the Dharma, clarifying that a body is the harmony of causes and conditions; you say it is not a body—this is destroying the Dharma of causes and conditions. If you destroy causes and conditions, you also destroy the meaning of Emptiness and destroy the middle and the conventional, and so destroy everything alike. As stated in the “Chapter on the Four Noble Truths” of the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way. “Apart from this there is a separate body”—explaining the second gate of going further. It clarifies that a destroyer of the Dharma merely negates the existent and makes it nonexistent, and does not posit the nonexistent as existent; you then negate the existent and make it nonexistent, and further posit the nonexistent as existent—is this not going even further? Next, explaining according to the outer Dharma, as in the text.