破情品第五
Chapter 5: Dispelling Attachment
破法有三雙：前破一異次破情塵者，一為歷法觀行，雖知一異已空，未語情塵非有，今欲歷法明空，令觀心觸境斯淨，故次破情塵。二者顛倒虛妄起無根本、聊亂而生，有病便治、隨救即破，故前破一異之病，今洗情塵之執。三者菩薩作論本為通經，而方等眾經皆明六情本性空寂，但經中散說，利根能悟、鈍者未了，今廣釋之，故有此品。四者一切眾生有此情故起諸煩惱，在家之者因情塵而起愛、出家外道由情塵而見生，佛法有所得大小乘人義亦如是；今觀此情塵究竟無從，故大小內外愛見便息，故有此品。又諸方等經皆明六根懺悔悟六本空即六根罪滅，四依欲為末世懺悔故觀六根空，又《法華》等明六根清淨，今悟六本空，故六根淨耳。今欲釋如此等經，故破六情。皆是通來意也。次別來意者，前破一異總破諸法，以萬法與於大有一體異體義皆不成；從此已後別破諸法，謂萬像之中有情塵因果，前總後別，觀門次第亦是立義前後，故有此品。二者前破一異通破常與無常法，今次別破無常法，亦是前總後別以為次第。三者一異理隱、情塵義顯，故捨彼一異更立情塵，故有此品。四者一異偏是外道所計、情塵內外同執，故別計不成故引通來救，故有此品。五者上〈破異品〉末論主呵外人云無見有有見無，今接此故舉實有情塵而有見有，非無見有亦非有見無。論主若破情塵，則有見於無而別立佛法謂無見有，故有此品。前破情次破塵者，情內塵外親疎不同，故破前後。問：今破一異，與破情塵義齊以不？答：通義則齊。外道橫計一異故，謂於大有與萬法一體異體。亦外道橫計偏造，遍造之情及瓶等可見之塵實無此法，故破義是齊。而小異者，大有一體異體唯外道所執，故餘處云外道大有經說此則破而不取。若是情塵，通於內外，故亦取亦破。若橫謂有者，則破而不取。因緣假名情塵，取而不破。問：此品破情與《中論．破情品》何異？答：《中論》但破於情、不破知生義，今則具足。《中論》通破見義、不別開到不到，此論別破到不到義。所以然者，《中論》破內學，內學大小乘人但明不到能見，故《中論》直破其見。外道具執到不到見，故此論具破二迷。所言情者，《智度論》云「九十六術不說意識，意識難解故，但明五情及以於意。神御於意，行眼等中，故能見色。」問：既稱外道不說意識，云何言意行眼門？答：外道不明從意根生意識，但言有心平等根名之為意，神御此意行眼等門耳。今言破情者，有二義：一者正破外道無六計六，傍破內人橫謂之六；二者若內若外有此六情名，皆起佛法。《成論》云「劫初物未有名字，聖人為受用故假為立名，如瓶衣等。」問：聖人何故說六？答：道門未曾六不六，但為顛倒故受此六根，聖人欲令其悟六無，是故說六。如經云「為令悟第一義，故說世諦。」所以令悟六無。六者三世諸佛出世皆為一大事，謂開示悟入諸佛知見。諸佛知見即是四智，觀此六情本來寂滅，名如來智；雖復寂滅於顛倒眾生宛然而六，即是佛智；悟六無六，了無六六任運現前，名自然智；此之三智不從師得，名無師智。此之四智是佛知見，三世諸佛為欲開示悟入此智見故出現於世。此四智觸處皆得明之，但約眾生心為正意，故就〈情品〉說之。
There are three pairs of reasons for refuting the dharma:
First, after refuting the notions of "one" and "different," we now refute the senses and their objects. This is because, although one has already understood through contemplative practice that "one" and "different" are empty, one has not yet spoken of the non-existence of the senses and their objects. Now, in order to clarify emptiness through the examination of dharmas, we cause the observing mind to encounter objects and thereby become purified. Hence, we next refute the senses and their objects.
Second, inverted and false views arise without any fundamental basis, emerging chaotically. Where there is sickness, there is treatment; as soon as a remedy is applied, the fault is refuted. Therefore, having previously refuted the sickness of "one" and "different," we now cleanse the attachment to the senses and their objects.
Third, Bodhisattvas compose treatises fundamentally to elucidate the sutras. The various Mahayana sutras all clarify that the six senses are inherently empty and tranquil. However, the sutras speak of this in scattered passages; those of sharp faculties can awaken to it, while those of dull faculties do not yet understand. Now, we explain it extensively. Hence, this chapter exists.
Fourth, all sentient beings, because they possess these senses, give rise to various afflictions. Householders, due to the senses and their objects, give rise to craving; renunciants and non-Buddhists, due to the senses and their objects, perceive birth. The same is true for those in the Buddha's teaching who hold to views of attainment, whether in the Mahayana or Hinayana. Now, contemplating that these senses and objects ultimately have no source, the attachments of craving and views, whether within the great or small vehicles, or inside or outside the teaching, cease. Hence, this chapter exists.
Furthermore, various Mahayana sutras all speak of repentance through the six sense faculties, awakening to the emptiness of their basis, whereby the offenses of the six faculties are extinguished. The Four Reliances, wishing to provide repentance for the degenerate age, therefore contemplate the emptiness of the six faculties. Also, sutras like the *Lotus Sutra* speak of the purification of the six faculties. Now, awakening to the emptiness of their basis, the six faculties are purified. Wishing to explain such sutras, we refute the six senses. All these are general reasons for its coming.
Next, the specific reasons: Previously, refuting "one" and "different" was a general refutation of all dharmas, because the ten thousand phenomena, in relation to the great being, cannot be established as having either an identical or a different essence. From this point onward, we specifically refute various dharmas, meaning that among the myriad appearances, there are the senses, their objects, causes, and effects. First general, then specific; this is also the sequence of the contemplative approach and the order of establishing principles. Hence, this chapter exists.
Second, previously refuting "one" and "different" was a general refutation of both eternal and non-eternal dharmas. Now, we next specifically refute non-eternal dharmas. This is also a sequence of first general, then specific.
Third, the principles of "one" and "different" are subtle, while the meaning of the senses and objects is evident. Therefore, abandoning those notions of "one" and "different," we further establish the refutation of the senses and objects. Hence, this chapter exists.
Fourth, "one" and "different" are particularly held by non-Buddhists, while the senses and objects are clung to both inside and outside the teaching. Therefore, when specific views cannot be established, we draw upon general reasons to address them. Hence, this chapter exists.
Fifth, at the end of the previous chapter "Refuting Difference," the author of the treatise admonished outsiders, saying they see existence in non-existence and non-existence in existence. Now, following this, we present the actual senses and objects as having existence seen as existence, not as non-existence seen as existence, nor as existence seen as non-existence. If the treatise author were to refute the senses and objects, then one would see non-existence in existence and separately establish the Buddha's teaching as seeing existence in non-existence. Hence, this chapter exists.
First refuting the senses, then refuting the objects, is because the senses are internal, the objects external—there is a difference in intimacy and remoteness. Therefore, the refutation has a sequence.
Question: Does refuting "one" and "different" now equate in meaning to refuting the senses and objects?
Answer: In a general sense, they are equivalent. Non-Buddhists arbitrarily posit "one" and "different," saying the great being has an identical or different essence with the ten thousand phenomena. Also, non-Buddhists arbitrarily posit universally creating senses and visible objects like pots, which in reality have no such dharma. Therefore, the refutation is equivalent. However, there is a slight difference: The notions of the great being having an identical or different essence are held only by non-Buddhists. Hence, elsewhere it is said that the non-Buddhist *Great Being Sutra* speaks of this; thus, it is refuted and not adopted. As for the senses and objects, they are common to both inside and outside the teaching; therefore, they are both adopted and refuted. If arbitrarily considered to exist, they are refuted and not adopted. The conventionally designated senses and objects arising from causes and conditions are adopted and not refuted.
Question: How does refuting the senses in this chapter differ from the "Refuting the Senses" chapter in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*?
Answer: The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* only refutes the senses and does not refute the meaning of perception arising. Here, it is complete. The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* generally refutes the meaning of seeing, without separately distinguishing between reaching and not reaching. This treatise specifically refutes the meaning of reaching and not reaching. The reason is this: The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* refutes those within the Buddhist teaching. Those within the teaching, whether Mahayana or Hinayana, only speak of not reaching being able to see. Therefore, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* directly refutes that seeing. Non-Buddhists firmly hold to views of reaching and not reaching. Therefore, this treatise fully refutes both delusions.
What is meant by "senses"? The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* says: "Among the ninety-six schools, they do not speak of mental consciousness because it is difficult to comprehend. They only clarify the five senses and the mind. The spirit governs the mind, which operates through the eye, etc., therefore it can see forms."
Question: Since it is said that non-Buddhists do not speak of mental consciousness, how can it be said that the mind operates through the eye faculty?
Answer: Non-Buddhists do not clarify that mental consciousness arises from the mental faculty. They only say there is a mind, an impartial faculty called the mind, and the spirit governs this mind, causing it to operate through the eye and other faculties.
Now, speaking of refuting the senses has two meanings: First, directly refuting non-Buddhists who, having no six, posit six; indirectly refuting those within who arbitrarily posit six. Second, whether inside or outside, having these six sense names all gives rise to the Buddha's teaching. The *Satyasiddhiśāstra* says: "In the beginning of the kalpa, before things had names, sages, for the sake of utility, provisionally established names, such as for pots, robes, etc."
Question: Why did the sages speak of six?
Answer: The path has never been six or not six. But because of inversion, one experiences these six faculties. The sages wish to cause sentient beings to awaken to the non-existence of the six, therefore they speak of six. As the sutra says: "In order to cause awakening to the ultimate truth, they speak the conventional truth." Therefore, they cause awakening to the non-existence of the six.
Sixth, all Buddhas of the three times appear in the world for one great purpose: to open, show, awaken, and lead sentient beings into the Buddha's knowledge and vision. The Buddha's knowledge and vision are the four wisdoms. Contemplating that these six senses are originally tranquil and extinguished is called the Tathāgata's wisdom. Although tranquil and extinguished, for deluded sentient beings they appear as six—this is the Buddha's wisdom. Awakening to the non-six within the six, comprehending that there is no six, and the six spontaneously manifesting before one—this is called natural wisdom. These three wisdoms are not obtained from a teacher—this is called untaught wisdom. These four wisdoms are the Buddha's knowledge and vision. All Buddhas of the three times appear in the world in order to open, show, awaken, and lead sentient beings into this wisdom and vision. These four wisdoms can be understood wherever one encounters them. However, taking the minds of sentient beings as the primary intent, they are explained in relation to the "Senses" chapter.
品開為二：一破眼情、二例餘五。初又二：初破情令生知、二正破情。初是破果、次名破因，因果既破，情事盡矣。「外曰定有我我所有法現前有故」，〈破一品〉初以法證人，今此品初以法證法。定有我所者，謂有一瓶也。有法現前有故者，舉五情生知，證有一瓶等我所法也。現前者，五識知現在法也。又現事可信也，誰不知青黃者哉？所言知者，六根皆四合，四合中皆生知，眼與塵合知青黃，乃至意與法合能知法。今但取五知、不論意知者，有二種義：一者外道不說意識，如上所明；二者意通知三世，非顯現法故不舉之，五情對五塵生於五知是顯現法，故偏舉也。問：觀此文既言生知，即似偏破衛世師義。答：正破衛世，以接上〈破異品〉，故世師立四合生知通前無見有、有見無難；而僧佉明緣合故有覺知用，約義用邊亦得論生，但體不生耳。問：此中何故但明三合？答：外人舉法證法不復存神，若重存神則便墮負，故但立於法。法義若成，人義自立，是故文云定有我所。「內曰見色已知生何用」，內破知生有三門，謂前、後、一時也。今是前見後知破。本為未見青黃之色，可須青黃之知；今眼見青黃已分明，則知生無用？此正破數義。眼根既能見色，何用識耶？若必須識方了青黃，何名眼見？若眼識和合方能見者，則違義宗立眼能見。「若前知生」下，第二破前知後見。然前知後見，知則有用，但以見無，故知不得生。二者復有違宗之過。汝云四合生知，今四未合而知遂生，故違前宗。前得宗、知墮無用，今知得用、墮違宗。「外曰若一時生」者，救云：見色時即知生，知生時即見色，故無上二過。問：何故無修妬路耶？答：有二義。一者外人前立現前一知，提婆頻搆三難，謂前、後、一時。但天親欲發一時之破，故義生外立，故無修妬路也。亦可易解故不釋，所以無也。「內曰」下，偈本為四：一牒、二非、三難、四釋。「若一時生」，牒也。「是事不然」下，非也。「生無生共不一時生」，第三難也。問：此就何難？答：正就無生門難，以外人立一時生故；今但破其生，則一時自壞。又生通前後一時，今破於生則備破三義。又若但破見知一時，則不得兼破餘法；今若破生，得兼顯萬法無生。「有故無故前破故」，第四釋破。有故，釋上生。無故，釋無生。前破故，釋上共。但前破有二：一者有無望共則為在前，故破有無名為破共。二者依天親以初二偈本名之為共，初偈破前見後知，此是有見無知；次偈破前知後見，是有知無見。前二既破有無則名破共，故云前破。又偈本中明云有故無故，此二即是二修妬路。還指此二，故云二修妬路也。注中為二：前釋偈本、次義破一時。所以明此二者，外立一時生，偈本破其生，天親義破一時有，則二義盡矣。初又三：一牒；「於三中」下，次總非；「何故」下，三正破。復次「若一時」者，第二義破一時。見則是因、知名為果，若知見一時，便為並失相待也。「復次眼為到色見耶」，自上已來破知生義，今第二次破其見。亦開三門：一到不到門破、二破眼性自見、三重破到不到見。內法大小乘義乃不同，並云眼是遙矚不到能見。僧佉亦云眼可懸矚，所以眼見惡事即須避之、逢見好事須就之，耳聞聲亦爾，此與佛法全同。鼻舌身三根為成身故到根方知，與內義亦同。提婆今總破眾家，故開二關責也。初破到色見易解。「復次」下，天親欲難上破到見義，生破不到見。應有四難：一者近遠俱不到，應俱不見。二近遠俱不到，則應俱見。三若見近不見遠，應到近不到遠。四若見近不見遠應見遠不見近。「復次」下，開二門重責到色見義。初云若見色已方去，墮無用過；若不見而去，得有見用而違意所取。「復次無眼處亦不取」下，重開二門破到不到。初明若眼去到色，得取色義而面上失眼；「不去」下明面不失眼而失取義。「復次」下，重破眼不到色，亦有四難：一等是不到，則障內外俱見；二俱不見；三見障內不見外，亦應見外不見內；四有見不見、有到不到。以內外兩家皆云不到，宜委曲破之。《涅槃經》云「若到見者，今眼見火，火應燒眼；眼見水，水應濕眼。」《智度論》二十八卷解知眾生心趣向，外人問云：「知眾生心趣向，為去不去？若去則同死人，不去則不與境合。又若不去，經那云因眼緣色生於眼識？」論主答云：「不去不住而能知，此猶難解。若言心法非去不去，亦應非知不知。若云心是慮智故知者，今問慮智為云不去，終不免責。」
This chapter is divided into two parts: first, refuting the eye as a perceiving subject; second, applying the same reasoning to the other five senses. The first part is further divided into two: initially refuting perception to establish knowledge, and then directly refuting perception. The initial refutation targets the effect (perception), while the subsequent one targets the cause (the sense faculty). By refuting both cause and effect, the notion of perception as a real entity is thoroughly dismantled.
**The opponent argues:** "There must be a self and things belonging to the self, because they are directly perceived."
In the first chapter, "Refuting Difference," the argument used things to prove the existence of a person. Here, at the beginning of this chapter, the argument uses things to prove the existence of things. "Things belonging to the self" refers to objects like a vase. "Because they are directly perceived" means citing the five senses giving rise to knowledge as proof for the existence of objects like vases, which are "things belonging to the self." "Directly perceived" means the five consciousnesses apprehend present objects. Furthermore, direct experience is trustworthy—who does not know colors like blue and yellow? What is called "knowing" involves the coming together of all six sense faculties with their objects. In each of these six conjunctions, knowledge arises. The eye coming together with form knows blue and yellow, and so on up to the mind coming together with mental objects knowing dharmas. Here, only the five sense-knowledges are considered, not mental knowledge, for two reasons: First, as explained before, non-Buddhist schools do not posit a mental consciousness. Second, the mind knows all three times (past, present, future) and is not a "manifestly apparent" phenomenon, so it is not cited here. The five senses confronting their five objects give rise to the five sense-knowledges, which *are* manifestly apparent phenomena, hence they are specifically cited.
**Question:** Looking at this text, since it speaks of "knowledge arising," it seems specifically aimed at refuting the Vaiśeṣika school. **Answer:** It is indeed primarily refuting Vaiśeṣika, connecting to the previous "Refuting Difference" chapter. Therefore, the Vaiśeṣika position that knowledge arises from the fourfold conjunction is subjected to the previous difficulties of "the unseen being seen" and "the seen being unseen." The Sāṃkhya school, however, explains that awareness functions due to conditions coming together; from the perspective of its functional aspect, one can speak of "arising," but its essence does not arise. **Question:** Why does this passage only discuss a threefold conjunction? **Answer:** The opponent is using dharmas to prove dharmas, not positing a soul again. If they redundantly posited a soul, they would immediately incur a defeat. Therefore, they only establish dharmas. If the meaning of dharmas is established, the meaning of a person (self) is automatically established. Hence the text says, "There must be things belonging to the self."
**The proponent (Nāgārjuna) says:** "If the eye has already seen the form, what is the use of knowledge arising?"
The proponent refutes the arising of knowledge through three approaches: prior, subsequent, and simultaneous. This is the refutation of "seeing first, knowledge later." Originally, if one had not seen the blue or yellow form, one might need knowledge of blue or yellow. But now the eye has already clearly seen the blue and yellow form, so what use is the arising of knowledge? This directly refutes the Sāṃkhya position. If the eye faculty itself can see form, what need is there for consciousness? If consciousness is necessary to apprehend blue and yellow, how can it be called "eye-seeing"? If the conjunction of eye and consciousness is required for seeing, it contradicts your own school's doctrine that the eye can see.
**"If knowledge arises first..."** This is the second refutation: "knowledge first, seeing later." Here, knowledge would have a use, but because seeing does not occur, knowledge cannot arise. Furthermore, there is the fault of contradicting your own doctrine. You claim knowledge arises from a fourfold conjunction, but now knowledge arises before the four have conjoined, thus contradicting your previous position. In the first case, your thesis stands but knowledge is useless; in this case, knowledge is useful but your thesis is contradicted.
**The opponent says:** "If they arise simultaneously..."
This is a defense: When the form is seen, knowledge simultaneously arises; when knowledge arises, the form is simultaneously seen. Thus, the two faults above are avoided. **Question:** Why is there no *kārikā* (verse) here? **Answer:** There are two reasons. First, the opponent previously posited a single, directly perceived knowledge. Āryadeva repeatedly constructs three difficulties: prior, subsequent, simultaneous. But Vasubandhu, wishing to develop the refutation of simultaneity, has the opponent's position arise from the meaning, hence there is no *kārikā*. Alternatively, it might be easily understood and thus not explained, which is why it's absent.
**The proponent says:** ... The root verse has four parts: citation, negation, objection, and explanation. 1. **"If they arise simultaneously"** – Citation. 2. **"This is not so..."** – Negation. 3. **"Arising and non-arising do not coexist simultaneously"** – The third part, the objection. **Question:** What is this objection based on? **Answer:** It is based precisely on the "non-arising" approach to refute, because the opponent posits simultaneous arising. By refuting arising itself, simultaneity collapses automatically. Furthermore, "arising" encompasses prior, subsequent, and simultaneous; refuting arising thus refutes all three meanings comprehensively. Also, if one only refuted the simultaneity of seeing and knowing, one could not refute other dharmas by extension. By refuting arising, one can also reveal that all dharmas are unarisen. 4. **"Because of existence, because of non-existence, and because of the previous refutations"** – The fourth part, explaining the refutation. "Because of existence" explains "arising." "Because of non-existence" explains "non-arising." "Because of the previous refutations" explains "coexistence." The "previous refutations" refer to two points: First, existence and non-existence, in relation to coexistence, are prior; thus refuting existence and non-existence is called refuting coexistence. Second, according to Vasubandhu, the first two root verses are called "coexistence." The first verse refutes "seeing first, knowledge later" (existence of seeing, non-existence of knowledge). The second verse refutes "knowledge first, seeing later" (existence of knowledge, non-existence of seeing). Since the first two refute existence and non-existence, it is called refuting coexistence, hence "previous refutations." Also, the root verse clearly states "because of existence, because of non-existence," which are the two *kārikās*. It refers back to these two, hence "the two *kārikās*."
The commentary is in two parts: first explaining the root verse, then refuting simultaneity through reasoning. The reason for explaining these two is: the opponent posits simultaneous arising; the root verse refutes arising; Vasubandhu's reasoning refutes the existence of simultaneity. Thus both meanings are exhausted. The first part has three steps: 1) Citation; 2) General negation following "Among the three..."; 3) Actual refutation following "Why?..."
**"Furthermore, if simultaneous..."** This is the second part, refuting simultaneity through reasoning. Seeing is the cause, knowing is the effect. If knowing and seeing are simultaneous, they lose their relationship of dependence.
**"Furthermore, does the eye go to the form to see it?"**
Up to this point, the arising of knowledge has been refuted. Now, for the second time, seeing itself is refuted. This also opens three approaches: 1) The approach of going/not going to refute; 2) Refuting that the eye's nature sees by itself; 3) Re-refuting the going/not going to see. The meaning within Buddhist schools, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, differs, but they generally agree the eye sees from a distance, without going. Sāṃkhya also says the eye can gaze from afar. Therefore, if the eye sees something dangerous, one must avoid it; if it sees something good, one must approach it. Hearing sounds with the ear is similar. This is entirely the same as the Buddhist teaching. The three senses of nose, tongue, and body, because they constitute the body, know only when the object reaches the faculty, which is also the same as the internal (Buddhist) meaning. Āryadeva now refutes all schools collectively, hence he sets up two alternatives for interrogation. The initial refutation of "going to the form to see" is easy to understand.
**"Furthermore..."** Here, Vasubandhu, wishing to challenge the above refutation of "going to see," generates a refutation of "not going to see." There should be four difficulties: 1) If both near and far are "not gone to," both should be unseen. 2) If both near and far are "not gone to," both should be seen. 3) If the near is seen and the far is not, then it should have gone to the near and not to the far. 4) If the near is seen and the far is not, then it should see the far and not see the near.
**"Furthermore..."** This opens two approaches to re-interrogate the meaning of "going to the form to see." The first says: If one goes after having seen the form, it falls into the fault of uselessness. If one goes without having seen, the act of seeing has a use but contradicts the intended object of apprehension.
**"Furthermore, if the eye does not go, it does not apprehend..."** This re-opens two approaches to refute going/not going. The first explains: If the eye goes to the form, it gains the meaning of apprehending the form but loses the eye on the face. The second, following "If it does not go..." explains that the face does not lose the eye but loses the meaning of apprehension.
**"Furthermore..."** This re-refutes the eye not going to the form, also having four difficulties: 1) Since it's equally "not gone to," it should see both the obstructed (inside) and the unobstructed (outside). 2) It should see neither. 3) If it sees the inside of an obstruction but not the outside, it should also see the outside but not the inside. 4) There is seeing and not-seeing, going and not-going. Since both internal (Buddhist) and external (non-Buddhist) schools say "not going," it is appropriate to refute it thoroughly and meticulously. The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says: "If seeing involves going, then when the eye now sees fire, the fire should burn the eye; when the eye sees water, the water should wet the eye." *The Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom*, Volume 28, explains knowing the inclinations of beings' minds. An opponent asks: "Knowing the inclinations of beings' minds—does [the mind] go or not go? If it goes, it is like a dead person's [mind going elsewhere]; if it does not go, it does not conjoin with the object. Also, if it does not go, how does the scripture say 'dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises'?" The treatise master answers: "It is able to know without going or abiding. This is still difficult to understand. If one says mental dharmas are neither going nor not-going, they should also be neither knowing nor not-knowing. If one says the mind is reflective awareness and therefore knows, we now ask: Is this reflective awareness said to be 'not going'? In the end, it does not escape the objection."
「外曰眼相見故」，自上已來破到不到見，今第二破眼自見。上以到不到二門責之，辭理俱屈，外無以救，但云眼是見相，不有眼而已，有即體性能見，何論到與不到？「內曰若眼見應自見眼」，熱是火體相而自他俱熱，見是眼體相應自他俱見，開眼則覩外青黃、合眼應見內黑白。又問：眼為是見為非見耶？眼若是見，既自是眼應當自見，若自不見自應非眼。又見若是眼，若常有眼則應常見，若有時見不見則有時眼不眼。若見異眼，則見自見應非眼見。又若見異眼，熱應異火。「外曰如指」，論主舉火為難，外用指為通。當時未必發言，亦可直舉於指。「內曰觸指業故」，眼以見為相，指不以觸為相，故非喻也。又若觸即是指，不觸之時應當無指。若常有於指，亦常有於觸。又觸即是指，既自是指則應自觸，若不自觸應不自指。又若見即是眼，自既不見，自應非眼；自若是眼，自應能見。又自不見而是眼，則見他應非眼。又三節是指相，何異見是眼相？今無見遂有眼，無三節應有指。若取指動搖為指相，亦應取眼開閉為眼相。
“You say the eye sees because seeing is its nature.” So far, we have refuted the ideas of seeing through contact and non-contact. Now, in this second stage, we refute the idea that the eye sees itself. Above, we challenged with the two perspectives of contact and non-contact, and both arguments were defeated. The opponent has no other recourse but to insist: “The eye is simply that which sees. It’s not that there is no eye at all—if there is an eye, its very substance includes the ability to see. Why bring up contact or non-contact?”
Our response: “If the eye sees, it should see itself.” Heat is the nature of fire, and fire heats both itself and other things. Similarly, seeing is the nature of the eye, so it should see both itself and others. When you open your eyes, you see external forms like blue and yellow; when you close your eyes, you should see internal colors like black and white.
Furthermore, we ask: Is the eye itself seeing, or not? If the eye is seeing, then since it is the eye, it should see itself. If it cannot see itself, then it should not be called an eye. Also, if seeing is the eye, then if the eye always exists, it should always see. If it sometimes sees and sometimes does not, then it is sometimes the eye and sometimes not. If seeing is separate from the eye, then seeing itself would see, and it would not be the eye’s seeing. Moreover, if seeing is different from the eye, then heat should be different from fire.
The opponent says: “It’s like a finger.” The teacher used fire as a challenge, and the opponent used a finger to explain. At that time, they may not have spoken aloud; they could have simply pointed with a finger.
Our response: “Because touching is the finger’s function.” The eye has seeing as its nature; the finger does not have touching as its nature. So the analogy does not hold. Furthermore, if touching is the finger, then when not touching, there should be no finger. If the finger always exists, then touching should always exist. Also, if touching is the finger, then the finger should touch itself. If it does not touch itself, it should not be called a finger. Similarly, if seeing is the eye, then since the eye does not see itself, it should not be an eye. If it is an eye, it should see itself. And if not seeing itself yet still being an eye, then seeing others should not be the eye’s seeing. Also, having three segments is the finger’s nature—how is that different from seeing being the eye’s nature? Yet now, without seeing, there is still an eye, so without three segments, there should still be a finger. If you take the finger’s movement as its nature, then you should also take the eye’s opening and closing as its nature.
「外曰光意去故見色」，第三重破到不到。所以重破到不到者，外人聞內初作到不到破，當時辭理俱屈無以取通，但云眼體性能見，論主乘言仍責見相不成。今外智思更生重通前到不到義，云我義具有到不到，眼光與意去到於色，而眼體不到於色。所以須意去者，一者意欲見前色故往就之、二者眼光無知須意導御，是故意與眼光共去。成論師云：眼光不去而意非去不去。「內曰若意去到色此則無覺」，縱去奪覺也。若意遂去，身則無意，由如死人。以此譏於外道。外看內面是死，外道何能言論。又亦應云：眼光若去，眼體無光，是盲外道。注為二：前釋偈本。「然意實不去」不，有兩義釋意不去：一者近遠一時，知非是去法。二者過去已謝，意若遂去，意亦應謝；未來未起，意緣未來亦應未起。而實不爾，故知不去。「外曰如意在身」，通上無覺之難也。意在身非是無覺，意力能遠知諸塵，則二義成也。「內曰若爾不合」，意本去得合，既其不去是則不合，乃免無覺之過，復墮不合之咎。「外曰意光色合故見」，諸立之中此救最巧。眼意在身，離無覺無眼之咎；意力能運眼光到於前色，則與色合，故免無合之過。「內曰若合故見生無見者」，縱合奪見也。此者乃者於人乃者於主。明五種和合：一眼、二光、三意、四意力、五色。五法之中見定屬誰？誰為見者？五合方見，則不應言見定屬眼。「外曰受合故」者，捉破為立也。內以和合用破於見，外即執合以之為立，但令有合則有於見。「內曰」，明三法體異終不得合。又三法體異各無見理，雖復共合終不能見，如三盲共聚終無見性耳。上明不合不得見，今明合不得見，故畢竟無見。如呵迦葉見色與盲等，呵善吉不見佛乃是識佛耳。《大品》等明諸法無所見無所知，並是此品意也。「耳鼻」下，第二例破餘情。
"**The opponent says: 'Because the light of the mind goes forth, we see forms.'** This is the third refutation regarding whether [the faculties] reach [their objects] or not. The reason for repeatedly refuting the issue of reaching or not reaching is that when the opponent first heard our internal refutation based on reaching or not reaching, their arguments and logic were both defeated, leaving them no way to respond. They could only say that the eye's nature inherently sees. The master of the debate then pressed further, pointing out that the act of seeing cannot be established. Now, the opponent, with renewed intellectual effort, attempts to clarify the earlier point about reaching or not reaching, saying: 'My position includes both reaching and not reaching. The eye's light and the mind go to the form, but the eye itself does not reach the form. The reason the mind must go is twofold: first, because the mind desires to see the form in front, it goes toward it; second, since the eye's light lacks awareness, it requires the mind to guide and direct it. Therefore, the mind and the eye's light go together.' The masters of the *Abhidharma* say: 'The eye's light does not go, and the mind neither goes nor does not go.'
**'Internally, we say: If the mind goes to the form, then there is no perception.'** This grants the going but takes away the perception. If the mind indeed goes, the body would be without mind, like a dead person. This is used to ridicule the non-Buddhist. From the outside looking in, the face is dead—how can a non-Buddhist engage in discourse? One could also say: If the eye's light goes, the eye itself would be without light, making it a blind non-Buddhist. The commentary is divided into two parts: first, explaining the verse itself. **'However, the mind truly does not go.'** There are two meanings explaining why the mind does not go: first, knowing near and far simultaneously shows it is not something that goes. Second, the past has already ceased; if the mind indeed went, it too should have ceased. The future has not yet arisen; if the mind apprehends the future, it too should not have arisen. But in reality, it is not so; therefore, we know it does not go.
**'The opponent says: As the mind is in the body,'** this addresses the difficulty of having no perception. With the mind in the body, it is not without perception. The mind's power can know distant sense-objects, thus both meanings are established. **'Internally, we say: If so, then there is no contact.'** The mind originally goes and achieves contact; since it does not go, there is no contact. Thus, while avoiding the fault of having no perception, it falls into the fault of having no contact.
**'The opponent says: Because the mind's light and the form make contact, we see.'** Among all the positions, this defense is the most clever. The eye and mind are in the body, avoiding the faults of having no perception and no eye. The mind's power can transport the eye's light to the form in front, making contact with the form, thus avoiding the fault of having no contact. **'Internally, we say: If contact produces seeing, then there is no seer.'** This grants contact but takes away seeing. This refers to the person, the subject. It clarifies five kinds of conjunction: first, the eye; second, light; third, mind; fourth, the mind's power; fifth, the form. Among these five dharmas, to whom does seeing definitively belong? Who is the seer? If seeing arises from the conjunction of the five, then one should not say that seeing definitively belongs to the eye.
**'The opponent says: Because there is reception through contact,'** this is seizing the refutation to make an assertion. We internally use conjunction to refute seeing; the opponent then grasps conjunction to assert it, merely stating that if there is contact, there is seeing. **'Internally, we say:'** It clarifies that the three dharmas have different natures and ultimately cannot make contact. Moreover, since the three dharmas have different natures, each lacks the principle of seeing. Even if they come together, they ultimately cannot see, just as three blind people gathered together ultimately have no capacity for sight. Above, it was explained that without contact, there is no seeing; now it is explained that even with contact, there is no seeing. Therefore, ultimately, there is no seeing. It is like admonishing Kāśyapa that seeing forms is equal to being blind, or admonishing Subhūti that not seeing the Buddha is truly knowing the Buddha. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* and other texts explain that all dharmas are unseen and unknown—this is precisely the meaning of this section.
**'Ear, nose...'** Next, the second part analogically refutes the other sense faculties.