破因中無果品第八
Chapter 8: Refuting No Effect in Cause
內外二家根本有無兩執，僧佉執有、衛世計無，內上座計有、大眾部執無。前正破外有、傍破內有，今正破外無、傍破內無。良以有無是眾見根、障中道本，所以洗之。又上破僧佉之有，今改宗捉無，是故破無。又上借無破有，則有是所破、無是能破，上破所破，今破能破。又破無為成除有，以有無是相待法，若不破無還生有見，是以破無令有心都息。又此品正破於生、不正破無，但為對僧佉之有故破無耳。問：何故破生耶？答提婆撰論破有為法凡有四門：一者破一畢竟，因有果品破有為體門，此品破有為相門，體相既除則有為法盡，是故破生。二者論主凡破二法：從一異竟因有果破於別法，謂眾家所計不同，亦法體差別為異；今次破其通法。三相通相有為故名為通，又眾師通立故名為通，是故破生。三者欲示諸法本自無生、今亦無滅，令外道悟無生忍，是故無生。四者論主上品末借果生因滅破其斷常，斷常之見雖除，生滅之病便起。如他云實滅不常、假續不斷，雖無斷常而有生滅。是故今明既無斷常即不生滅，故次破生滅。上破斷常，破外道義；今破假實生滅，破內道義，故生此品。
品有五段：第一破外人能生證有可生因果義、第二破外可生證有能生義、第三破外人雙舉生可生證有諸法義、第四破舉滅證有生義、第五破引因果證有生可生義。「外曰生有故一當成」者，生有故者，捉論主上明續故不斷之言也。以因滅故不常、果生故不斷，汝乃不立斷常而立有生滅，若立有生滅則與我同。此正是數論及有所得大乘人，明有為之法無有斷常而有生滅故言生有故也。一當成者，上立生相，今立法體。既有生相，於因中有果無果、亦有亦無、非有非無四句之中必當有一。「內曰生無生不生」，前借生滅破斷常。若玄悟者，既不執斷常亦不執生滅；但中下鈍根雖不執斷常更執生滅，今次破生滅也。此偈本可有二義：所言生者，謂因中前有果也。無生者，因中前無果也。此二牒彼一當成也。不生者，明生相不能生有果無果，故有果無果並皆不生，即破彼生有故之言也。此釋是勢破之耳，非正文意。又望下釋，生者已有法體也，無生者未有法體也，不生者生相不生。此二種法體已有，不須生相；未有則生相不能生也。次云生者，明已有生相也，無生者未有生相也，不生者已有生相及未有生相並不能生法體也，汝何得云生有故一當成也？此釋為正。以外人正舉生相證有法體，是故正破生相，明不能生法體。又生者，離法體外別有生相，如毘曇之流。無生者，離法體外無別生相，如即法沙門之例。又生者，計生相是有為也，如數論之流。無生者，計生相是無為，如毘婆闍婆提之流。此即法離法、有為無為並不能生法體，文具含此破意。注釋為二：初就生相有無不能生法體、次明法體有無生相不能生。以天親有此二意，故前作兩義釋之。「若有生」者，此牒偈本中「生」字。「因中前有因中前無」下，此釋偈本中「不生」字。縱汝有生相，因中前有果，不須生相生；因中先無果，生相不能生，故無生相也。「何況無生」下，釋偈本中「無生」字，以有生相於有果無果尚不能生法體，況無生相能生法體也。
The passage is divided into five sections: First, refuting the opponent’s claim that a cause can produce an effect. Second, refuting the opponent’s claim that an effect can exist, thereby proving a cause. Third, refuting the opponent’s dual claim that there is both a cause and an effect, thereby proving all phenomena exist. Fourth, refuting the claim that cessation proves existence. Fifth, refuting the argument that cause and effect prove the existence of a producer and a produced.
The opponent says: “Since production exists, one is established.” “Since production exists” refers to the proponent’s earlier statement that continuity prevents cessation. Because a cause ceases, it is not permanent; because an effect arises, it does not end. You do not accept permanence or cessation but accept arising and ceasing. If you accept arising and ceasing, you agree with me. This is precisely the view of the Sāṃkhya and Mahāyāna practitioners who see conditioned phenomena as free from permanence and cessation but subject to arising and ceasing, hence “since production exists.” “One is established” means that the earlier section established the characteristic of production, and now it establishes the essence of phenomena. Since there is the characteristic of production, there must be one of the four possibilities regarding an effect in the cause: present, absent, both, or neither.
The proponent says: “Production cannot produce what is unborn.” Earlier, we used arising and ceasing to refute permanence and cessation. Those of deep insight neither cling to permanence and cessation nor to arising and ceasing. But those of middle and inferior capacities, though not clinging to permanence and cessation, still cling to arising and ceasing, so now we refute arising and ceasing. This verse can have two interpretations: “Production” means that the effect pre-exists in the cause. “Unborn” means that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. These two statements address the opponent’s claim that “one is established.” “Does not produce” means that the characteristic of production cannot produce an effect that either exists or does not exist in the cause; thus, neither type of effect arises. This refutes the opponent’s claim that “since production exists.” This interpretation is an aggressive refutation, not the literal meaning. Looking at the later explanation, “production” means that the essence of phenomena already exists; “unborn” means that the essence does not yet exist; “does not produce” means that the characteristic of production does not produce. If the essence already exists, it does not need production; if it does not exist, production cannot produce it. Next: “Production” means that the characteristic of production already exists; “unborn” means that the characteristic does not yet exist; “does not produce” means that whether the characteristic exists or not, it cannot produce the essence of phenomena. So how can you claim that “since production exists, one is established”? This interpretation is correct. Since the opponent uses the characteristic of production to prove the existence of essence, we directly refute the characteristic of production, showing it cannot produce essence. Also, “production” refers to a characteristic separate from essence, as in the Abhidharma school. “Unborn” means no separate characteristic, as in the school that identifies phenomena with their characteristics. Also, “production” means the characteristic is conditioned, like the Sāṃkhya school. “Unborn” means the characteristic is unconditioned, like the Vibhajyavāda school. Thus, whether phenomena and characteristics are separate or identical, conditioned or unconditioned, the characteristic cannot produce essence. The text includes all these refutations. The commentary is divided into two parts: First, regarding whether the characteristic of production exists or not, it cannot produce essence. Second, regarding whether essence has the characteristic of production or not, the characteristic cannot produce. Because Vasubandhu had these two intentions, two interpretations are given earlier. “If production exists” refers to the word “production” in the verse. “Whether the effect pre-exists in the cause or not” below explains the word “does not produce” in the verse. Even if you claim that the characteristic exists, if the effect pre-exists, it does not need the characteristic to produce it; if it does not pre-exist, the characteristic cannot produce it, so the characteristic does not produce. “How much less so without production” below explains the word “unborn” in the verse. Since the characteristic, whether applied to an existing or non-existing effect, cannot produce essence, how much less can it produce essence without the characteristic?
「汝若有瓶生」下，第二就法體已有未有生相不能生。就此中有兩復次。就瓶有二初、泥有二後，顯法體有無明生相不能生。瓶有二初者：一瓶初成竟名為瓶初，此是已有，不須生相生。二始造瓶初名之為初，此是未有，生相不能生。泥有二後者：一是用泥盡竟名為泥後，此是已有，不須生相生。二是作泥始竟名為泥後，此是未有，生相不能生。而文初復次明一初一後，謂瓶初成及造泥始竟，就此二門撿無生瓶之生。第二復次就用泥盡後及始作瓶初，此是一已一未，驗無生瓶之生。就初又三：一牒、二定、三破。「汝若有瓶生」者，縱生，牒外人有生瓶之生也。「瓶初瓶時」下，開二關定也。瓶初者，作瓶成初也。瓶時者，既是瓶成，即是瓶時也。「為泥團後」者，造泥始竟名為泥後。「非瓶時」者，既是泥團，未有於瓶，故云非瓶時也。
"Now concerning the text 'If you say there is a production of a vase' - this is the second section, discussing how the dharma entity, whether it already exists or not yet exists, cannot have a production mark to produce it. Within this, there are two iterations. The section on the vase has two aspects at the beginning, and the section on the clay has two aspects at the end - demonstrating that the dharma entity, whether existing or not, has no production mark to produce it.
The two aspects at the beginning of the vase section are: First, when a vase has just been completely formed, this is called 'the vase's beginning.' Since it already exists, it does not need a production mark to produce it. Second, when one just begins to make a vase, this is called 'the beginning.' Since it does not yet exist, the production mark cannot produce it.
The two aspects at the end of the clay section are: First, when the clay is completely used up, this is called 'the clay's end.' Since it already exists, it does not need a production mark to produce it. Second, when the clay working has just finished, this is called 'the clay's end.' Since it does not yet exist, the production mark cannot produce it.
The first iteration in the text clarifies one beginning and one end - namely, the completion of the vase and the completion of working the clay. Through these two approaches, we examine that there is no production that produces the vase. The second iteration uses the end of clay usage and the beginning of vase-making - one already existing and one not yet existing - to verify that there is no production that produces the vase.
Within the first approach, there are three parts: first, quoting; second, defining; third, refuting. 'If you say there is a production of a vase' - this concedes production, quoting the opponent's claim that there is a production that produces the vase. 'At the time of the vase's beginning' and following text - opens two alternatives for definition. 'The vase's beginning' refers to when the vase-making is completed. 'The vase's time' means since the vase is completed, this is the time of the vase. 'As the clay's end' - when the clay working has just finished is called 'the clay's end.' 'Not the vase's time' - since it is still the clay lump and does not yet have the vase, it is called 'not the vase's time.'"
「若瓶初」下，第三雙難，即為兩別。初又四：一牒。「是事不然」下，總非。「何以故」下，正作難。既是瓶竟則已有，不須生相生也。「是初中後共相因待」者，釋成難也。此用瓶口成為初造、瓶腹成為中、瓶底成為後。「若無中後則無初」者，無有底腹即無口也。「若有瓶初必有中後」者，既有瓶口必有底腹。「是故瓶已先有」者，第四結難。「若泥團後」，釋第二，亦四：一牒；「是亦不然」，第二總非；「何以故」下，第三正難，「若瓶無初中後」者，釋成難意，泥既始成，未有瓶口底腹也。「若無瓶」下，第四結難。「復次」下，第二就泥後瓶初責無瓶生。又三：一牒能生；「若泥團後」，第二定。泥團後者，用泥盡後也。瓶時者，用泥既盡，後瓶則已成，故云瓶時。「若瓶初泥團時」者，始欲造底，故名瓶初；猶是泥團，名泥團時。「泥團後」下，第三作難破二，即二文，易見也。「外曰生時生故無咎」，上就二門已未破之。一就生相已未不能生法體，次就法體明於已未生相不能生。外今避二種已未，立生時有生。正量部人多用此義。「內曰生時亦如是」者，點於生時還同已未。生時始起未全，始起謂半有，未全則半空，故還同已未。「外生曰成一義故」，自上已來二問答：初一問答破已未生、次問答破生時生，都破三時生竟。夫論有生，不出三世，三世既無，生義盡矣。外理屈辭窮無以能救，但就眼見而立見瓶現成即是生也。「內曰若爾生後」，破生成一義也。初中後三分滿足方名為成，若成是生者，成既在後則生亦在後。初中既無成則初中無生，若初中無生則無初中，初中無故亦無成。若初中有生則初中有成，此則未成說成，名為顛倒。若未成是成，應成是未成，亦是倒也。又初中有成則違前言，前明現成為生故也。又汝本謂瓶不能自生，須生生瓶，即生應在前、瓶應在後。而今瓶成方名生者，此乃瓶在於前而生居後，此乃是瓶生生，何關生生瓶也。又若瓶現成而說生者，瓶成是已，汝前避於已未，何故更立已耶？「外曰初中後次第生故無咎」，此是外道密悔前言以通上生後之難也。外云：生通三分，但據最後成分故說生耳，故無生在後過。又初分亦生亦成，後分亦爾，如瓶底生即瓶底成，乃至口生即是口成，故生通三分，成亦如之，故無生在後過。注為二：一立三分有生。「非泥團」下，舉三種非顯成生義。初非未有法體而有於生。「亦非瓶時」下，非已有法體方有生相。「亦非無瓶生」下，非都無法體而有生瓶之生。「內曰初中後非次第生」，十地三十心及一切初中後次第，亦用今文責之。二偈本破初中後是次第義，初就前後破、次一時破。前後破者，如《中論》破相待前定有何法也。若前定有初，初不因後，云何有初？若初不因後，後亦不因初。若後因初而後名後者，初因於後，初亦名後。既互相因則互為初後，唯是次第；既無次第，云何言次第生耶？注為三：初為外作相待義。「若離云何有」下，第二正破彼。有初時未有中後，即是相離也。「是故」下，第三結。次破一時者，一時則皆初皆中皆後。又一時並有，無初中後名。「外曰如生住壞」，救上二難也。三相既前後次第，初中後亦然，無初過也。既立前後不立一時，故無一時過也。亦得體同時、用前後，體同時故離於初過，用前後故離第二過。亦得用前後離初過、體同時免後失。譬喻部三相次第、薩婆多即法沙門，體同時、用前後，以用前後故有次第。「內曰生住壞亦如是」，所以破三相者，六品破有為法體，故今破三相，則體相俱忘，有為盡矣。內有二偈本，并天親義破，合以為三：初例同破、二無窮破、三取意破。例同破者，同上二種：一三相不得前後、二亦非一時。非前後破譬喻，非一時破毘曇。又非一時破體同時，非前後破用前後，文易知。
"If a vase exists initially" — the third section presents a double difficulty, which in turn consists of two parts.
The first part has four points: 1) Establishing the premise. "This is not so" — a general negation. "Why?" — the actual challenge. Since the vase would already exist once completed, there is no need for it to be brought into being through the process of arising. "The beginning, middle, and end are mutually dependent" — this explains the challenge. Here, the rim of the vase being formed is considered the beginning, the body of the vase the middle, and the base the end. "Without the middle and end, there is no beginning" — without the base and body, there is no rim. "If there is a vase-beginning, there must be a middle and end" — if there is a rim, there must be a body and base. "Therefore, the vase already exists beforehand" — this concludes the challenge in the fourth point.
"After the clay is formed" — explains the second part, also with four points: 1) Establishing the premise. "This is also not so" — the second general negation. "Why?" — the third point, the actual challenge. "If the vase has no beginning, middle, or end" — this explains the meaning of the challenge, as the clay has just been formed and the rim, body, and base of the vase do not yet exist. "If there is no vase" — the fourth point, concluding the challenge.
"Furthermore" — the second section critiques the notion of arising from nothing, by examining the clay after formation and the vase before arising. This has three parts: 1) Establishing the cause of arising. "After the clay is formed" — the second part establishes the sequence. "After the clay is formed" means after the clay has been used up. "At the time of the vase" means that once the clay is exhausted, the vase has already been completed, hence it is called the time of the vase. "If it is the beginning of the vase at the time of the clay" — when one first begins to make the base, that is called the beginning of the vase; at that moment, it is still clay, so it is called the time of the clay. "After the clay is formed" — the third part presents the challenge, which breaks the argument into two parts; the text is easy to understand.
"The Externalist says: 'Because arising occurs at the moment of birth, there is no fault.'" Above, the argument has been examined from two perspectives: first, regarding the already and not-yet aspects of the characteristic of arising—[it was shown that] it cannot give rise to the substance of a dharma. Second, regarding the substance of a dharma—[it was shown that] the characteristic of arising cannot arise from what is already or not yet existent. Now, to avoid the two extremes of "already" and "not yet," the Externalist posits a moment of arising when birth occurs. The Sammatiya school largely uses this argument.
"The Internalist says: 'The moment of birth is also like this.'" This points out that the moment of birth is the same as the states of "already" and "not yet." The moment of birth has just begun but is not yet complete. "Just begun" means half-existent, while "not yet complete" means half-empty—so it remains the same as "already" and "not yet."
"The Externalist says: 'Because of the principle of oneness in completion.'" From the beginning, there have been two rounds of questions and answers: the first round refutes existence in the "already" and "not yet" states; the second round refutes arising at the moment of birth—thus thoroughly refuting arising across the three times. If we speak of arising, it cannot go beyond the three time periods. Since the three times do not exist, the concept of arising is exhausted. The Externalist, having no arguments left, can only rely on what is seen with the eyes—the vase appears to be complete right now, and that is called arising.
"The Internalist says: 'If that is the case, arising comes after completion.'" This refutes the idea that arising and completion are one principle. Only when the beginning, middle, and end are all fully satisfied can something be called "complete." If completion is the same as arising, then since completion comes afterward, arising would also come afterward. Since the beginning and middle are not complete, they would not involve arising. If the beginning and middle have no arising, then there would be no beginning or middle. Without beginning or middle, there is also no completion. If the beginning and middle involved arising, then they would have completion—this means that something incomplete is called complete, which is an inversion. If incompleteness is considered completeness, then completeness should be incompleteness—this is also an inversion. Furthermore, if the beginning and middle included completion, that would contradict the previous statement, which identified manifest completeness as arising. Moreover, you originally argued that the vase cannot arise by itself—it requires a cause of arising to bring forth the vase. That would mean that the cause of arising should come first, and the vase should come later. But now you say that the vase becomes complete and then call it arising—this means the vase comes first, and arising comes later. This is the vase producing arising—how is it related to arising producing the vase? Further, if you say that arising occurs when the vase is manifestly complete, then the vase's completion is "already." Previously, you avoided the "already" state—why do you now re-establish it?
"The Externalist says: 'Because the beginning, middle, and end arise sequentially, there is no fault.'" Here, the Externalist secretly recants the previous statement in order to address the difficulty of arising coming after completion. The Externalist says: Arising pervades all three stages, but only the final completion stage is designated as arising—therefore, there is no fault of arising coming afterward. Also, the initial stage involves both arising and completion—the same applies to the later stage. For example, when the base of the vase arises, that is also the base's completion; similarly, when the rim arises, that is the rim's completion. Therefore, arising pervades all three stages, and completion does as well—so there is no fault of arising coming afterward. The commentary is in two parts: first, establishing that the three stages involve arising. "It is not like clay" — three types of negation are raised to clarify the meaning of arising and completion. First, it is not that there is no dharma-substance yet but arising exists. "Nor is it the time of the vase" — it is not that the dharma-substance already exists and then a characteristic of arising appears. "Nor is it without a vase" — it is not that there is no dharma-substance at all yet there is an arising that produces a vase.
"The Internalist says: 'The beginning, middle, and end do not arise sequentially.'" This critique also applies to the ten grounds, the thirty minds, and all sequential stages of beginning, middle, and end. The two verses refute the idea that the beginning, middle, and end are sequential. The refutation proceeds first through a sequence-based critique, then through a simultaneous critique. In the sequence-based critique, as in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the refutation of mutual dependence asks: "What dharma is determined beforehand?" If the beginning is predetermined and does not depend on the end, how can there be a beginning? If the beginning does not depend on the end, then the end does not depend on the beginning. If the end depends on the beginning and is thus called "end," then the beginning depends on the end, so the beginning would also be called "end." Since they depend on each other, they would mutually be beginning and end—if they are only sequential, then there is no fixed sequence—how can they be said to arise sequentially? The commentary has three parts: first, it presents the concept of mutual dependence for the Externalist. "If they are separate, how can they exist?" — the second part directly refutes. When there is a beginning time, the middle and end do not yet exist—that means they are separate. "Therefore" — the third part concludes.
Next, the simultaneous critique states: if all are simultaneous, then everything would be beginning, middle, and end all at once. Also, if they exist simultaneously, there would be no distinct names of beginning, middle, and end.
"The Externalist says: 'Like arising, abiding, and ceasing.'" This rescues the two previous objections. Since the three characteristics (arising, abiding, ceasing) occur sequentially, the beginning, middle, and end similarly occur sequentially—so there is no fault regarding the beginning. Since a sequence is established but not simultaneity, there is no fault of simultaneity. It is also possible that their substance is simultaneous while their functions are sequential. Because the substance is simultaneous, the first fault is avoided; because their functions are sequential, the second fault is avoided. Likewise, functional sequentiality avoids the first fault, and simultaneous substance avoids the later fault. The Parable School holds that the three characteristics occur sequentially, while the Sarvāstivāda (the Dharmaguptaka or "Dharma-ascetic" school) holds that the substance is simultaneous but the functions are sequential. Because the functions are sequential, there is an order.
"The Internalist says: 'Arising, abiding, and ceasing are also like this.'" The reason for refuting the three characteristics is that the six chapters [of the text] refute the substance of conditioned dharmas. Therefore, refuting the three characteristics allows both substance and characteristics to be forgotten, exhausting the category of conditioned phenomena. There are two verses from the Internalist, along with Vasubandhu's commentary on the meaning, combined into three parts: first, refutation by analogy; second, infinite regress; third, refutation by implication. The refutation by analogy is the same as the two earlier types: first, the three characteristics cannot be sequential; second, they also cannot be simultaneous. The non-sequential refutation targets the Parable School, while the non-simultaneous refutation targets the Abhidharma schools. Also, the non-simultaneous refutation refutes the idea of simultaneous substance, and the non-sequential refutation refutes sequential functions. The text is easy to understand.
「復次一切處有一切」，第二無窮破。一切處者，牒外義也。三相遍有為法體，故云一切處也。有一切者，此一切中復有一切，即捉法體破相也。法體要須備三相方是有為，若不備三即非有為。相亦如是，生中若不備三則非有為，若生備三便有二過：一相害、二無窮。「若汝謂」下，第三天親義。取意破為三：初取意、二總非、三正破。生生共生者，生謂大生、次生是小生，大小更互相生，故云共生。以小生大，通無為難；以大生小，免無窮失。「如父子」下，譬說也。「是事不然」，第二總非。「如是生生」下，第三正破，初破法、次破譬。如是生生者，諸百論師云偏牒小生也。今謂不爾，雙牒大小二生，故云生生。此大小二生二俱有也，不須相生。如其俱無，無可相生。半有同有，半無同無。又俱有但能非所，俱無但所非能，兩半還同前二。而文云「因中前有相待」者，大小互為因果、互相待也。相待即是相生，故破相待即是破生。「復次如子前有」，第二破譬。有二論本，「如子前有」，宋代馮師用之，此文應是舊本。馮師云：「子是眾生，無始已有。小生不爾，是故非喻。」今明此破有二義：一者如馮師，子是眾生，先來已有，故云前有。二者子生子，必先有子，然後更生子。如世間兒生兒，必前有兒，然後取婦更生兒。汝小生不更生小生，故非喻。「是父更有父」者，前破子喻於小，今破父喻於大。父更從父，大不從大，故亦非喻。若有論本「如父前有」，此文亦是也。何以知然？彼以子喻小生、父喻大生，只此子能生子，即是父義，故云如父先有。
「外曰定有生可生法有故」，自上已來破能生證有所生竟，今第二破外可生證有能生。外立二義：一舉可生而證有生；二見內借所破能便謂有所，故舉所證能。「內曰若有生無可生」者，內有二破：一有無破、二三門破。有無破者，外舉所相證有能相，內還捉能相有無以破可相。若有生相，生不孤立，必生瓶竟然後名生。今既有生，瓶則已成，不名可生，故云若有生無可生。所以然者，夫未生名為可生，今有生相，瓶則已生，不名可生也。無門破者，已有生相尚無有可生，況無生相而有可生也。「復次自他共亦如是」第二三門破。此三門通破體相。生相自生，破不展轉。若從他生，破於展轉。共生合，破二家。法體自生破，即法有相義。如離法體外無別有相，即以法起為生名為自生；法從他生，破異法體外別有生相能生法體；共生者，合破二義。「外曰定有生可生共成故」第三俱立生可生也。若有能生則有可生，若有可生則有能生，一時相待而有。所以一時者，內外同明體相必俱，如法在未來則相在未來，二世亦爾，是故一時。「內曰生可生不能生」，內有二破：一縱待破、二奪待破。縱待破者，縱能所互待則能所無定，無定則無能所。同《中論》「若法有待成」偈。今文云生可生不能生者，由可生有能生，則能生成可生，故能生非能生，故云生可生不能生。既能成所則非復能，所則成能便非復所，故無能無所，以何相待？「復次有無相待不然」者，第二奪待破。能所是有無義，不得論待。如長短俱有，可得待長說短、待短說長。今能生是有、可生是無，一有一無，云何待耶？問：能生云何有耶？答：如母生子，必前有能生，故能生是有，則所生未有，故有無不得待。問：今待有說無、待無說有，何故有無非相待耶？答：諸百論師言此文是破有無相待。是事不然，此乃是捉有無破能所相待。外云有能則有所、有所則有能，故能所一時相待。今明能有所無，云何得待？如長有短無、大有小無，云何待耶？問：云何破有無待耶？答：三門破。一者有無二體各成，不須相待。若二體不成則無有無，用何物待？二者有無為待成、為成待？若有無成竟而更待，則有重有重無之過。若待成者，則知未待時未成，用何物待？三者如前〈破一品〉中三門責之，有非有中、亦非無中、亦不在二處，云何待耶？「外曰生可生相待故諸法成」，救前二破也。由生可生相待，故萬法得成；今現見萬法成，故知生可生相待。何故前云生可生不得互待？復何得云有無相待不然？「內曰若二生何以無三」，上立有二句：一者生可生相待、二者諸法成。若爾者，離生可生外，應有第三法成；而離生可生外無第三法，如生相是能生、瓶是可生，故知生可生外無第三法成，汝何得言生可生故諸法成耶？若言生可生相待，還生可生二法成者，則漏前二破，不應更立。問：父母生子有第三，今何故無？答：父母同是能生則屬生相，子屬所相，故唯有二也。「外曰應有生因壞故」，自上已來三番就生門破生，今就滅義破生，以無滅故所以無生。又上是無生門，今明無滅門，明不生不滅義也。救意云：若無果生，寧有因滅？既有因滅，即有果生。問：破何生滅？答：六道。三乘本不生、今不滅，即顯不生死、不涅槃等義。「內曰因壞故生亦滅」，內有三破：此初縱外有壞而奪彼生。以外舉壞證生，故內就壞撿生。對上生門求生不得，今就滅中求生不得。瓶無別體用泥為瓶，泥因既壞，瓶果即壞。又已未二時，如注二時破之。「復次因中果定故」，第二就因果定義破生。四家俱定俱不生。僧佉定有，有定不須生。世師定無，無定不可生。亦有同定有，亦無同定無。非有同定無，非無同定有。注釋但明二句不生，開為三門：初雙牒；「二俱」下，總標無生；「何以故」下，雙釋無生。釋無易知。釋有中云「是因中是果生是事不然」者，彼因果既一，不得分別云此是因、此是果，因生於果；但得云因生因、果生果耳。「復次因果多故」第三因果多破。四家俱多。因中有多果者，乳中有酪，此酪中即有蘇，一時之中頓具五味。乃至五味之中即應有糞，糞中亦具五味，故果中多因。如《涅槃》云「女有兒性，兒有孫性。又如買馬之人應責駒直。」因中無果多者，如乳中無五味應頓生五味，醍醐中無五味亦應頓生。又乳中無一物而生一物，無一切物應生一切。「外曰因果不破故生可生成」，第五舉因果證生可生。此文來有遠近。遠來者，從破因中有果品竟於此文，外云汝雖種種破生可生，而因果道理終不可無，若無因果則成邪見。次近生者，從上三破生，汝雖作一多等破，但不許定有定無及合，一因多果、多因一果，而終不破因果。若有因果，必有生可生。「內曰」下，論主既破因果將竟，廣開四門攝一切執。若有因果必墮此四，此四若無則因果無寄。文開為二：初總標四句無生、次偏釋初句無生。初為二：一標四句、二辨不生。標四句者，「物物」，明有有不相生。「非物非物」，明無無不相生。互之一字含於二句，有不生無、無不生有也。「不生」者，第二總明四句不生。此本定，餘本悉非。問：外舉因果不破救有諸法，內明四句因果並成不生，便是破一切因果，豈非邪見？答：一切經論明無因果，有三種義：一者外人作因果不成，無彼所計因果，故言無因果也。此是二諦外無也。二者申佛法因緣，因果宛然即畢竟空。此是二諦內明無因果。三者外人立有，今正破其有病，論主不言無。外若執無，復須破無。如是四句也。注釋為三：一總明四句無生。「是則不然」下，第二總非。「何以故」下，第三釋非。破四句即四破。初句中寄三事：一就母子、二約老壯、三就鏡像。此三事並就內法明無因果。品初已來多就外法明無生竟，故今就內法也。內法中事三義二：初就母子明破內法之始、老少內法之終。此二明無真，鏡像一門明無偽法。無偽法亦二：初明外緣中無果生；次「與面相似」下，明內因中無果。此攝內法真偽事盡故有四，則例外法亦應有四也。母子中二破：初破云：汝言母是有、子亦有言相生者，子是眾生，先來已有，寄母胎出，非母生子。又子有因緣，業行為因、父母為緣，不得偏從緣也。「若謂從母血分」，第二取意破。以攬血分為母，此乃從母生母，非從母生子。又外人亦謂本無有子，從血分變作子，亦是不識子因、但知現緣。又文正意，外謂從母血分生子，言血分與母異，故今明只血是母，云何言從母血生子耶？問：答爾，應無君臣母子，與闡提六師何異？答：如前釋之，生子具有因緣，今偏執緣、不達其因，故壞母子義，乃外成闡提內非邪見。又從因緣生即寂滅性，外不達此義，故其生義不成，非提婆破母子也。餘並如文。復次若「物生物」者，第二重破初句，凡有二義：一破初類後、二惑情多計故偏破之。就文為三：一牒；「是應二種」下，第二定；「若因中有果」下，第三正破。破二即二。破無中為三：初牒；「是則不然」下，總非；「何以故」下，正破也。「因邊異果不可得」者，二義：一泥能生瓶是因生同果、泥生布等是因生異果，今泥中無同果而能生同果，亦無異果應生異果。而因邊遂無異果可生，故知非因無果。二者執因中無果家謂因異果，今就彼泥因邊求異泥之瓶果不可得，故知非因中無果。二義中此為正意。何以知然？下破因中有果既破其一，則知今破無果破其異也。破有果亦三：「若因中前有果」，牒也。「云何生滅」，破也。「不異故」，釋也。果與因不異，果生時因不滅；因與果不異，因不應生瓶。以不異故，無果生因滅也。
百論疏卷下之上
百論疏卷下之餘
釋吉藏撰