破常品第九
Chapter 9: On Impermanence
破法七品二章，前六品破無常法竟，今第二次破常法。生起如前。二者依總別門，〈一〉、〈異〉兩品總破常無常，〈情〉、〈塵〉、〈有果〉、〈無果〉別破四種無常，今品別破五種常法。若總若別求常無常皆不可得即畢竟空，令眾生捨斷常見悟入中道，因中發觀得於解脫。三者從〈有果〉、〈無果〉品生，上二品破從因生果。外云：從因生果是無常之法，可得云無；常法不從因生，應當有也。四者接次相生。上〈破因無果〉品末四句求因生果無從，今接此興論：果從因有可得云無，不從因法應當有也。次通生起者，諸方等經破無為法明無為法空，今欲釋之，故說此品。又如《涅槃經》正簡邪常正常，明外道所計是於邪常，如來涅槃名為正常。所以稱邪者，求外道常義無從，無而謂有，是故名邪。今欲破外道邪常、申佛無所得正常，故說此品。又根性不同、受悟各異，自有聞上諸品而不得悟，聞於破常即便領解，故說此品。此論始末破外道七種常義：初破神常，次破大有常，今此品破五種常，謂時、方、虛空、微塵、涅槃。但前雖破二種常，為成破神義及總別一異義，非正破常；今此品中正破五常。問：四種外道執常云何同異？答：此事難詳。論十品受名有四：一品同而計異，如〈破神品〉。同是一品名為品同，而立神不同故名計異。二品異計異，如〈一〉〈異〉兩品，既有兩品名為品異，而所執又殊名為計異。〈因中有果〉、〈無果〉亦爾。三品異計同，如〈情〉、〈塵〉兩品，既有二品名為品異，而立情塵又同故名計同。四品同計同，即〈常品〉是也，同共一品，執常又同，故名品同計同。問：外道辨常與佛法何異？答：佛法有大小乘，總有五常：小乘有三無為即是三常，大乘長有真諦及以佛果，故名五常。此品論者二同三異，謂虛空、涅槃內外大小同明是常；時、方、微塵但是外道所計之常，內說此三並是無常。問：此品破何等常？答：正破外道五種常法、傍破內人五種常義。此則收破二句不同：外道五常但破不收，內道五常有收有破，破能迷之情、收所惑之教。就外道五常，復有亦收亦破，望《涅槃經》盜牛之譬，外道偷得常名、不達常義，破其常義、收取常名。就破收中更二句：虛空、涅槃亦破亦收；時、方、微塵、唯破不收也。問：若破涅槃常，佛經何故說涅槃耶？答：佛為對治生死，故說是常。又非常無常，歎美為常，為欲引物。又涅槃有體有用，體非常無常、用具常無常，稟教人不識此義，故執於常，墮在常見也。問：舊十地師云：體非常無常、用具常無常。與今何異？答：今明兩非二是，皆是方便用。如〈法品〉明實不實四句並是實相家門，常無常四句亦是涅槃門。而上以二非為體、兩是為用，此對偏病作此語耳。
**Chapter on Refuting Permanence (Part 2)**
The previous six chapters refuted impermanence. Now, in this second phase, we refute the concept of permanence. The structure follows earlier patterns.
**Outline of this chapter:**
First, there are the general and specific refutations. The chapters on "Oneness" and "Distinction" broadly refute both permanence and impermanence. The chapters on "Emotion," "Objects," "Effects Present," and "Effects Absent" specifically refute four types of impermanence. This chapter specifically refutes five types of permanence. Whether approaching from the general or specific angle, seeking permanence or impermanence yields nothing—this is ultimate emptiness. This leads sentient beings to abandon the extreme view of permanence and awaken to the Middle Way, achieving liberation through contemplation.
Second, this chapter arises from the chapters on "Effects Present" and "Effects Absent." Those two chapters refuted effects arising from causes. An opponent says: "Effects arising from causes are impermanent, so they can be negated. But permanent things do not arise from causes—they must exist."
Third, this chapter connects sequentially. The final four lines of the chapter "Refuting Effects Without Causes" showed that seeking effects from causes yields nothing. Now we extend this discussion: If effects exist only through causes, then they can be negated. But things not dependent on causes should exist.
Fourth, in the broader context, the various Mahāyāna scriptures refute unconditioned phenomena, showing they are empty. We now explain this and thereby present this chapter.
Also, as in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, which distinguishes false permanence from true permanence, what non-Buddhists hold is false permanence, while the Nirvāṇa of the Tathāgata is called true permanence. It is called false because when we examine the non-Buddhist concept of permanence, it has no basis—claiming existence where there is none. Thus this chapter refutes the false permanence of non-Buddhists and proclaims the Buddha's true permanence, which is attainment without grasping.
Moreover, beings have different capacities and awaken in different ways. Some may not awaken from the previous chapters but immediately understand upon hearing the refutation of permanence. For them, this chapter is taught.
Throughout this treatise, seven types of non-Buddhist permanence are refuted: first, the permanence of the self; second, the permanence of ultimate existence; and now in this chapter, five types: time, space, emptiness, atoms, and Nirvāṇa. The earlier refutations of two types were to support the refutation of the self and the general/specific oneness/distinction framework, not primarily to refute permanence. This chapter directly refutes five types.
**Question:** How do the four types of non-Buddhists who hold permanence differ or agree?
**Answer:** This is difficult to fully explain. The ten chapters of this treatise can be categorized by four patterns of naming and doctrine:
1. **Same chapter name, different doctrines** — like the chapter on "Refuting the Self." It is one chapter, but the various schools posit different selves.
2. **Different chapters, different doctrines** — like the chapters on "Oneness" and "Distinction." They are two different chapters, and the positions held are also different. The chapters on "Effects Present" and "Effects Absent" follow the same pattern.
3. **Different chapters, same doctrine** — like the chapters on "Emotion" and "Objects." These are two chapters, but the ideas about emotion and objects are similar.
4. **Same chapter, same doctrine** — like this chapter on permanence. It is one chapter, and the concept of permanence is shared.
**Question:** How does the non-Buddhist view of permanence differ from the Buddhist one?
**Answer:** Buddhism has both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, and together there are five types of permanence. The Hīnayāna has three unconditioned phenomena, which are three types of permanence. The Mahāyāna additionally has ultimate truth and the Buddha fruit, making five. This chapter shares two and differs on three: emptiness and Nirvāṇa are considered permanent by both inside and outside, large and small vehicles. But time, space, and atoms are considered permanent only by non-Buddhists—Buddhism teaches these three are impermanent.
**Question:** What permanence does this chapter refute?
**Answer:** It directly refutes the five types of permanence held by non-Buddhists, and indirectly refutes the five types of permanence held by Buddhists. This involves two approaches—rejection and acceptance:
- The five non-Buddhist permanences are rejected but not accepted. - The Buddhist five permanences are both accepted and rejected—rejecting the confusion in the minds of practitioners, while accepting the teachings themselves (which are valid when properly understood).
Among the non-Buddhist five, there is also a nuance: some are both rejected and accepted. Using the "stolen cow" metaphor from the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*: non-Buddhists stole the name "permanence" without understanding its true meaning. We reject their misunderstanding but accept the name itself.
Within this rejection–acceptance framework: - Emptiness and Nirvāṇa: both rejected (as non-Buddhists misunderstand them) and accepted (as valid concepts). - Time, space, and atoms: rejected outright, with no acceptance.
**Question:** If Nirvāṇa's permanence is refuted, why do the Buddhist scriptures speak of Nirvāṇa as permanent?
**Answer:** The Buddha taught permanence as an antidote to the extremes of birth and death. Also, Nirvāṇa is described as neither permanent nor impermanent, and praised as permanent as a skillful means to attract beings. Furthermore, Nirvāṇa has both essence and function: its essence is neither permanent nor impermanent, while its function can be described as permanent or impermanent. Those who cling to the teachings without understanding this fall into the extreme view of permanence.
**Question:** The old teachers of the ten grounds say: "Essence is neither permanent nor impermanent; function can be permanent or impermanent." How is that different from what you say?
**Answer:** We teach that both "neither" and "both" are merely skillful means. As in the chapter on "Dharma," the four statements—real and unreal—are all gateways within the realm of ultimate reality. Likewise, permanence and impermanence as four statements are gateways into Nirvāṇa. The view that "two negations are essence, two affirmations are function" is a response to the one-sidedness of certain views, not an absolute truth.
此品為二：一總破常、二別破常。「外曰應有諸法無因法不破故」，上就有因救有因，今舉無因法證有因。舉無因釋成常義也。有因法可破，無因法常、不可破；既有於常，必有無常。又滅無常而得於常，內外大小義並同。然無常若無則知有常，此有無相待也。「內曰若強以為常無常同」，凡三義：一者本有無常可得說常；既無無常亦無有常，而汝謂有常故名強說，若強說常則是無常。二者汝本立無常，上求既無從，今立有常亦同不可得。而汝謂有名強說常，故與無常同。三者為有所以故說常，為無所以漫噵常耶？此二俱破於常。若有所以則是有因，汝言無因法常，今既有因則無常也。若無所以漫說常者，既是漫說則是無常。問：外人品初已明無因法不破故，今云何更問因無因耶？答：上直明無因耳，今問其有所以因、無所以因，故異上也。「外曰了因故無過」，救上無常同之難也。因有二種：一者生因、二者了因。常法無有生因，是故為常；以有了因，非強說常。但了因有二：一別、二總。虛空以滅色為因，時以華實為因，方以日合為因，微塵以麁果為因，涅槃無累為因。因此五法知有五常，故以五法為五常因，此是別了因也。總了因有二：一以言說顯示前法令人得知，故以言說為常了因；二因無常法相對故知有常，故以無常法為常了因。「內曰是因不然」者，凡有四義：夫論有常不出人法，人即是神、法謂大有是常。上以言說立此二常，求既無從；今以言說證有五常，類同前破，故云是因不然。二者無此言說，以何證常？夫論言說不出人法，言說若從人有，求人無從；若因法有，撿法不得，故無可證常。三者撿汝現事尚皆無從、空有言說，云何有法？四者求所說常法實不可得，後當具明，汝以言說何所證耶？「外曰應有常法作法無常故」者，上以言證法，內既不受不許言，今默然不須語。外今直指破壞之瓶，顯不破者是常，以見有為起作之法是於無常，則知非起作法名之為常。此即是對有為說無為，生死涅槃真妄等法悉相對而立。「內曰無亦共有」者，有百論師謂此文是於一難。今明不然，凡有二難：所言無者，此一難也。汝以無常證有於常者，此事無也。以上六品求無常法，竟自無從，以何證常？故云無也。二依文難者，外既相對而立，內還相對而破。「汝言作法無常故不作法常」者，亦應有無相對，作法既有，無作應無，故云無也。言共有者，上就二門破：作無作異，則有無亦異；作法既有，無作應無。今就同門破。汝言常法無色香味觸既是常者，心法亦同無色香味觸，此則不作法與作法同。汝本謂與作法異故名無為常，今既與作法同，則同皆無常。前是借異破異，今是借同破異。文正爾也，不容異釋。今勢破者，前就異門破之，今作法既有，無作應無。外必不受此難，作無作乃異而同，是有自有，作法有、無作法亦有。如一切有部有三有為、有三無為，不可聞為無為異便謂有無亦異。故今破云：若為無為同皆是有，則同應無常。故《中論》云「涅槃若是有，有則老死相。涅槃若是有，則應是有為。」又作不作同有，同皆是常。又同皆是有，而作法無常、不作是常，亦應作法是常、不作無常。注為二：初釋偈本；二從「如是」下，結前發後。釋偈本同異破即二：前釋異破；「復次」下，釋同破。「如是遍常不遍常悉已總破」者，遍不遍乃異、常義是同，既已破常則破遍不遍也。
## Breaking Down Permanence
This chapter has two parts: first, a general refutation of permanence; second, a specific refutation of permanence.
**The Opponent says:** There must be things that exist. Things that have no cause are not refuted.
Earlier, you used the idea of things having causes to argue against things having causes. Now I will use the idea of things without causes as proof that things with causes exist. I bring up things without causes to establish the meaning of permanence.
Things with causes can be refuted, but things without causes are permanent and cannot be refuted. Since permanence exists, impermanence must also exist. Furthermore, after impermanence is eliminated, permanence is attained—this view is shared by both inner and outer schools, and by both great and small traditions. If there were no impermanence, we would know there is permanence. This is how existence and non-existence depend on each other.
**Our response:** If you forcibly claim permanence, it becomes the same as impermanence.
There are three points here:
First, permanence can only be spoken of if impermanence originally exists. Since there is no impermanence, there is also no permanence. Yet you claim permanence exists—this is forced assertion. If you must force the claim of permanence, then that itself becomes impermanence.
Second, you originally established impermanence, but when we sought it above, it could not be found. Now you establish permanence, and this too cannot be found. But you say it exists and force the claim of permanence—so this too is the same as impermanence.
Third, do you call it permanence because there is a reason for it, or are you just randomly calling it permanence without any reason? Both of these destroy permanence. If there is a reason, then it has a cause. You said things without causes are permanent, but since it now has a cause, it is impermanent. If there is no reason and you are just randomly calling it permanent, then since it is random, it is impermanent.
**Question:** The opponent already stated at the beginning of this chapter that things without causes are not refuted. Why ask again about cause and no cause?
**Answer:** Earlier, we simply addressed the idea of no cause. Now we are asking whether there is a reason for it or not—this is different from before.
**The Opponent says:** Because it is known through evidence, there is no fault.
This rescues the earlier difficulty that permanence would be the same as impermanence. There are two kinds of causes: First, causes that produce something. Second, causes that reveal something.
Permanent things have no producing cause, and that is why they are permanent. But they do have revealing causes—so they are not forcibly called permanent.
There are two types of revealing causes: specific and general.
- Space (all-pervasiveness) is revealed by the absence of physical obstruction. - Time is revealed by flowers and fruits. - Direction is revealed by the sun meeting a place. - Atoms are revealed by coarse objects made of them. - Liberation (Nirvana) is revealed by being free of burdens.
Through these five things, we know there are five permanent realities. Thus these five serve as the revealing causes for the five permanents. This is the specific revealing cause.
There are two types of general revealing causes:
First, through words and explanations, the previous things are shown so that people can know them. Therefore, words serve as the general revealing cause of permanence.
Second, because impermanent things exist in contrast, we know permanence exists. Therefore, impermanent things serve as the general revealing cause of permanence.
**Our response:** This cause is not valid.
There are four points:
First, when we discuss permanence, it comes down to two categories: persons and things. Person means the self. Thing means the Great Existence that is permanent. Earlier, you tried to establish these two permanents through words, but when we sought them, nothing could be found. Now you use words to prove five permanent things—this is refuted the same way as before. So your cause is not valid.
Second, if there were no such words, how could you prove permanence? Words themselves come down to persons and things. If words arise from a person, when we seek the person, none is found. If they arise from things, when we examine things, none are found. So there is nothing that can prove permanence.
Third, when we examine the very things you point to in the present, none of them can be found. You have mere words and nothing more—how can there be any real thing?
Fourth, when we seek the permanent thing that you claim exists, it truly cannot be found. This will be explained in detail later. What are you using words to prove?
**The Opponent says:** There must be permanent things, because things that are made are impermanent.
Earlier, you did not accept words as proof, so now I will not speak. I will simply point directly to a broken pot. What is unbroken is permanent. Since we see that active, created things are impermanent, we know that what is not created is called permanent.
This is comparing the conditioned to the unconditioned. Birth and death, liberation and bondage, truth and falsity—all these things are established in contrast to one another.
**Our response:** "Non-existence" is also shared.
Some commentators on the Hundred Treatise say this passage is a single refutation. We say this is not the case. There are two refutations here:
First, when we speak of "non-existence"—this is one refutation. You use impermanence to prove permanence, but this cannot be done. In the six preceding chapters, we sought impermanence and ultimately could not find it. What is there to prove permanence with? Hence we say "non-existence."
Second, according to the text itself: The opponent establishes things in contrast. We also refute in contrast. You say, "Because made things are impermanent, therefore unmade things are permanent." Then existence and non-existence should also be in contrast. Since made things exist, unmade things should not exist. Hence we say "non-existence."
As for "shared"—just now we refuted from the angle of difference: If made and unmade are different, then existence and non-existence are also different. Since made things exist, unmade things should not exist. Now we refute from the angle of sameness. You say permanent things have no color, smell, taste, or touch, and therefore they are permanent. But mental phenomena also have no color, smell, taste, or touch. So unmade things are the same as made things. You originally claimed that because they differ from made things, the unconditioned is permanent. But now, since they are the same as made things, they are all impermanent together.
The first refutation uses difference to break difference. This one uses sameness to break difference. This is exactly what the text means—there is no room for other interpretations. In the current rhetorical move: Earlier, from the angle of difference, since made things exist, unmade things should not exist. The opponent would not accept this. He would say: "Made and unmade are different yet both exist. Existence belongs to both—made things exist and unmade things also exist. For example, the Sarvastivada school holds three conditioned and three unconditioned things. You cannot hear that conditioned and unconditioned are different and conclude that existence and non-existence are also different."
So we now refute: If conditioned and unconditioned are both existence, then both should be impermanent. As the Middle Treatise says: "If Nirvana is existence, then existence has the marks of aging and death. If Nirvana is existence, then it should be conditioned."
Furthermore, since made and unmade both exist, both could be said to be permanent. But also, since both exist, and made things are impermanent while unmade things are permanent—then it should also follow that made things are permanent and unmade things are impermanent.
**Commentary note:** This is divided into two parts. First, it explains the verse. Second, from "Thus" onward, it summarizes what came before and introduces what follows.
The explanation of the verse has two parts: First, it explains the refutation from difference. Then, under "Furthermore," it explains the refutation from sameness.
"Thus universal permanence and non-universal permanence have all been generally refuted"—universal and non-universal differ, but their permanence is the same. Since permanence has already been refuted, the universal and non-universal are also refuted.
「外曰定有虛空」，第二別破五常。前總後別，觀門次第，亦是立義之方。又是前總破內外一切諸常，今別略破五常。即五：一破空常、二破時常、三破方常、四破微塵常、五破涅槃常。前破虛空者，世間外道小乘大乘共知虛空是常，其義最顯，故初立之。《涅槃經》云「如諸常中虛空第一，如來亦爾，故最初立空常。」就破虛空為三：一破空體、二破空住處、三破空相，此三破空略盡。今前立空體。但釋空體不同：一毘曇人云有有為虛空、無為虛空，成外世界及成內身。有為虛空，即是色法；二無為虛空，如天漢等空。問：數人何故立虛空是有為？答：《婆沙》云「有去來故、能容有故，當知是有。」問：有為空與無為空何異？答：有為空是色，故二十一色中空是一色；無為空非色。有為空可見，無為空不可見。有異部云：虛空非色非非色，但隨世俗故說名虛空。次成論人明虛空一向是無法。三外道立空，即如今文所說。就偈本為二：第一標章門、二釋章門。標章門為三：一明虛空是有，簡異〈成實〉，又簡異計無虛空家。「常」者，第二標常章門，簡異《毘曇》有為虛空。所言「遍」者，第三標遍章門，簡異餘不遍常，又簡異計虛空是不遍者。無分明空體是一，不可分為多分，簡異計有多虛空者也。「一切處」下，第二解釋三門：「一切處」，逐近釋遍及無分義。「一切時」，釋前常義。「信有故」，釋初定有虛空法。又有者通釋常遍可信。「內曰分中分合故分不異」，破上虛空是常遍也。問：何故破空？答：一破病，大小內外有所得人謂瓶等為有、虛空是無，因此有無生煩惱業苦，故今破之，明無此有無。二者欲通經，諸方等經借空為喻，若如外道空者則法亦同外道，今破除外道邪空申空義，故破空也。分中者，瓶中空也。分合故者，此瓶中之空是有分空家一分與瓶合也。分不異者，上二句是牒外義，今是破也。瓶中之空是有分，空一分來與瓶合，空則可分，便與諸分不異。若爾，不應言無分，亦不應言是於遍常，此三義便壞也。注中為四：一雙牒、二雙定、三雙難、四雙結。「若瓶中向中虛空」，此雙牒瓶向二處空也，即釋偈本「分中」兩字。「是中虛空」下，第二雙定。雙定者，且據瓶中空以定外也。定意云：瓶中之空為都有十方空、為有一分空？「若都有者」下，第三雙破，有二義：一者若瓶中都有十方空，則十方空並在瓶內，瓶外應無有空，空則不遍不常。「若是為遍」下，第二義，若瓶內之空遂遍，瓶亦應遍；空既常，瓶亦應常。前句得瓶不遍而空墮不遍，今得空遍而瓶失不遍也。「若分有者」下，第二破分合，正牒偈本中「分合」兩字。「虛空但是分」下，釋偈本分不異。「是故虛空」下，第四雙結非遍非常。帖文正爾，今更義破。問：瓶內空與瓶外空為一為異？若一者，一切空皆在一瓶中，空則不遍；空若遍，瓶亦遍。若瓶內空與瓶外空異者，便有二空，則墮有分，有分故無常。又問：空與瓶為一為異？若空與瓶一，空常瓶即常，瓶無常空即無常。若瓶與空異，空常瓶無常，亦應瓶常空無常。遍不遍亦爾，空與瓶一，俱遍俱不遍；若空遍瓶不遍，亦應瓶遍空不遍。若瓶與空異，則瓶處無空，空則不遍，不遍則不常。破真俗一體二體皆作此責之。《成論》云「虛空是無法，而終有此空。是於法塵、異於兔角，若撥無虛空則成邪見。」今問：空若是無法，應非法塵；既是法塵，便是有法。又舊云：虛空無丈尺；丈尺約虛空，虛空名丈尺。若爾，虛空非無常用，無常約虛空，詺虛空作無常。覆結可知。又問：柱內空與柱外空為是一空為是二空？若是一空，柱外空既容柱，柱內空何不容柱？彼釋云：柱自礙柱，非空為礙。今問：我不安柱置柱內，理但安柱置柱空內。柱空內何故不容柱耶？若言為柱礙故不容，即礙處應無空；若礙處有空，即應容柱。又礙處有礙復有空，無礙亦礙亦無礙，應亦容亦不容。若柱內無空，空則不遍。「外曰定有虛空遍相亦常有作故」，上一番破虛空體竟，今第二破虛空用。立中為二：初三句牒體，一虛空是有、二遍、三常也。「有作故」下，第二舉用證體。空有容納之用，故得有舉下去來施為造作。若無容納之用，使不得有所造作。「內曰不然虛空處虛空」，內有二破，並責虛空住處。所以責住處者，外既云有法住虛空中得有造作，則空是有物住處，故今次問虛空。虛空既是一法，亦應有住處。若虛空無住處者，則有法亦不在空中住。又有二種法：一者礙法、二無礙法。礙法既在無礙法中住，無礙法亦應有其處，是故今文責住處也。就責住處，開為二別：前責空還在空中住便有二空，一空是能住、一空是所住。既有二空則有分，有分故無常不遍也。問：何故前責空在空中住？答：外人謂空無礙能容於有，則知空亦無礙還能容空，故前就空處責空也。「亦不實中住」下，第二破其在實中住。實則滿塞不容於空，故空不在實中住。前明空得容空而墮二空，今免於二空墮無住處，故進退失也。又實中無空空則不遍，實中有空則應容空，實若容空則不名實。「復次」下，天親義破上舉住處證空。空中得有造作可得有空，實中無作應無空。汝以作有故有空，作無故應無空。「復次無相故」下，第三破虛空相。就文為三：一破、二救、三破救。破云：有為無為並皆有相，是故有法。空若無相，即應無法。又五種是有有法有相，虛空若無，無應無相即無空。「外曰」，第二救。空有二相：一者標相、二者體相。因五種之有，知空種為無。因有為是有，知無為是無，名為標相。二滅有得無為空家體相，空具二相，而汝不知謂為無相。「內曰」下，第三破救。但破體相，即為三別：初作無體破。無色乃辨色無，非更有法自立為空，故無有此物，以何為空體相耶？「復次」下，第二明無有相。本以滅色為空相，若色未生則無可滅，是故無相。「復次色無常」下，第三就常破。色是無常則始生，空是常法本來已有，已有則知本來無相。問：第三破與第二何異？答：前明相未有故無相，今明可相本來有故本來無相，反覆互相成也。問：破空有三，初二何故有偈本，後破相無偈本耶？答：後都是天親義生故無耳。問：提婆何故不破相耶？答：二論主制作更相開避。《中論．六種品》已廣破相，故提婆不更破之。但天親欲破虛空三義：一體、二用、三相，對前破二，故義生破相耳。
[External Text:] "It is certainly true that space exists." This is the second major section, which specifically refutes the five eternal substances. The previous section was a general refutation; this is a detailed one. This follows the proper order of contemplation and is also the correct method for establishing an argument. The previous section broadly refuted all notions of permanence—both inner and outer—while this section now focuses on refuting five specific claims of eternity. These five are: (1) space as eternal, (2) time as eternal, (3) direction as eternal, (4) atoms as eternal, and (5) nirvana as eternal.
The first to be refuted is the eternity of space. Among worldly beings, non-Buddhists, followers of the Lesser Vehicle, and followers of the Greater Vehicle alike, it is widely known that space is considered eternal. Since this claim is the most prominent and widely accepted, it is addressed first. The *Nirvana Sutra* states: "Among all eternal things, space is foremost; the Thus-Come One is likewise." Therefore, the eternity of space is addressed first.
The refutation of space as eternal is divided into three parts: (1) refuting the substance of space, (2) refuting the location of space, and (3) refuting the characteristics of space. These three refutations nearly exhaust the topic.
Now, the first: refuting the substance of space. There are different explanations of space's substance:
1. The Vaibhashika school holds that there are two kinds of space: conditioned space and unconditioned space. Conditioned space forms the external world and the internal body. Conditioned space is a material phenomenon. Unconditioned space is like the sky or vast empty regions.
Question: Why do the Vaibhashikas maintain that space is conditioned? Answer: The *Abhidharma-mahavibhasha-shastra* says: "Because it has coming and going, and because it can contain things, it should be known as conditioned."
Question: What is the difference between conditioned space and unconditioned space? Answer: Conditioned space is material; among the twenty-one material elements, space is one of them. Unconditioned space is not material. Conditioned space is visible; unconditioned space is invisible.
Another school says: Space is neither material nor non-material; it is merely called "space" following worldly convention.
Next, the Satyasiddhi school maintains that space is entirely non-existent.
Third, the non-Buddhists establish space as eternal, which is what the present text addresses.
Regarding the verse itself, it has two parts: first, stating the proposition; second, explaining it.
Stating the proposition has three parts:
- "Space certainly exists" — this first statement distinguishes this view from the Satyasiddhi school and from those who deny the existence of space. - "Is eternal" — this second statement distinguishes it from the Vaibhashika view of conditioned space. - "Is omnipresent" — this third statement distinguishes it from other eternal things that are not omnipresent, and also distinguishes it from those who claim space is not all-pervasive.
"Without distinction" clarifies that space's substance is one and cannot be divided into many parts, distinguishing it from those who claim there are multiple spaces.
"Everywhere" begins the second part, explaining the three propositions. "Everywhere" explains the meaning of omnipresence and indivisibility. "At all times" explains the meaning of eternity. "Because it is believed to exist" explains the initial claim that space certainly exists as a real entity. "Exists" also broadly explains that eternity and omnipresence are credible.
[External Text:] "In the part, because of combination with the part, the part is not different." This refutes the above claim that space is eternal and omnipresent.
Question: Why refute space? Answer: First, to cure a disease: those attached to views—whether greater or lesser, inner or outer—claim that pots and other things exist while space does not. From this duality of existence and non-existence, afflictions, karma, and suffering arise. Now we refute this, showing that such existence and non-existence do not truly exist. Second, to explain the scriptures: the various Vaipulya sutras use space as a metaphor. If space were as the non-Buddhists claim, then the Dharma would be like the non-Buddhists. Now we refute the non-Buddhists' false view of space to reveal the true meaning of space. Hence the refutation.
"Within the part" refers to the space inside a pot. "Because of combination with the part" means this space inside the pot is one part of space that combines with the pot. "The part is not different" — the first two phrases restate the opponent's position; now it is refuted.
The space inside the pot is a part. If one part of space comes to combine with the pot, then space is divisible, and it would not be different from other parts. If so, one should not say it is indivisible, nor should one say it is omnipresent and eternal. These three claims are thus destroyed.
The commentary is divided into four parts: (1) dual restatement, (2) dual determination, (3) dual refutation, and (4) dual conclusion.
"If the space inside the pot and toward the opening" — this restates the two locations of space (inside the pot and at its opening), explaining the verse's phrase "within the part."
"This space" begins the second part, the dual determination. It provisionally takes the space inside the pot to determine the external claim. The determination asks: Does the space inside the pot contain all the space of the ten directions, or only one part of it?
"If it contains all" begins the third part, the dual refutation, with two points:
First: If the space inside the pot contains all the space of the ten directions, then all space would be inside the pot, and there would be no space outside the pot. Space would then not be omnipresent or eternal.
"If it is omnipresent" begins the second point: If the space inside the pot is nonetheless omnipresent, then the pot should also be omnipresent. Since space is eternal, the pot should also be eternal. The first clause establishes that the pot is not omnipresent, so space would fail to be omnipresent. The present clause establishes that space is omnipresent, so the pot would lose its non-omnipresence.
"If it has parts" begins the second refutation, concerning combination with parts, directly addressing the verse's phrase "combination with the part."
"Space is but a part" explains the verse's "the part is not different."
"Therefore space" begins the fourth part, the dual conclusion: space is neither omnipresent nor eternal.
This follows the text directly. Now let us refute further through reasoning.
Question: Are the space inside the pot and the space outside the pot the same or different? If the same: then all space would be within a single pot, and space would not be omnipresent. If space is omnipresent, then the pot should also be omnipresent. If the space inside the pot and the space outside are different: then there would be two spaces, which entails division into parts. Having parts means being impermanent.
Another question: Are space and the pot the same or different? If space and the pot are the same: space is eternal, so the pot should be eternal; the pot is impermanent, so space should be impermanent. If the pot and space are different: space is eternal and the pot is impermanent, but then it should also follow that the pot is eternal and space is impermanent.
The same applies to omnipresence and non-omnipresence: If space and the pot are the same, both should be omnipresent or both non-omnipresent. If space is omnipresent while the pot is not, then the pot should be omnipresent while space is not. If the pot and space are different, then where the pot is, there is no space; space would not be omnipresent, and not being omnipresent, it would not be eternal.
The refutation of the ultimate and conventional truths—whether considered one entity or two—follows the same pattern of criticism.
The *Satyasiddhi Shastra* says: "Space is a non-existent thing, yet this space still exists. It pertains to the mental object and differs from a rabbit's horn. If one denies space entirely, one falls into wrong views."
Now we ask: If space is non-existent, it should not be a mental object. Since it is a mental object, it must exist as a thing.
Another old view says: Space has no measurements; measurements are applied to space, and space is named by measurements. If so, space is not impermanent by nature; impermanence is applied to space, and space is called impermanent. The conclusion follows as above.
Another question: Is the space inside a pillar and the space outside a pillar one space or two spaces? If it is one space: The space outside the pillar can contain the pillar, so why can't the space inside the pillar contain the pillar? Their explanation says: The pillar itself obstructs the pillar; it is not space that obstructs. Now we ask: I would not place a pillar inside a pillar; I would simply place a pillar within space. Why then can the space where the pillar is located not contain it? If one says the pillar is obstructed and therefore cannot be contained, then where there is obstruction there should be no space. If there is space where obstruction is, then it should contain the pillar. Moreover, if where there is obstruction there is both obstruction and space, then in a non-obstructed place there should also be both non-obstruction and obstruction, and it should both contain and not contain. If there is no space within the pillar, then space is not omnipresent.
[External Text:] "It is certainly true that space exists, is omnipresent, is eternal, and because of activity..." The previous section refuted the substance of space. Now the second section refutes the function of space.
The opponent's argument has two parts: The first three phrases restate the substance: (1) space exists, (2) is omnipresent, and (3) is eternal. "Because of activity" begins the second part, using function to prove substance. Space has the function of containing, so there can be coming, going, and various activities. Without the function of containing, there could be no activity.
[External Text:] "It is not so. Space abides in space." Here there are two refutations, both questioning where space itself resides. Why question its location? Because the opponent says that things abide in space and thereby have activity, making space the location of existing things. Thus we now ask about space itself. Since space is one thing, it too should have a location. If space has no location, then existing things should not abide in space either.
There are two kinds of things: obstructive and non-obstructive. Since obstructive things abide in non-obstructive space, non-obstructive space itself should also have its location. Hence the present text questions its location.
This questioning of location is divided into two parts:
First, we question whether space resides in space. This would entail two spaces: one that is the resident and one that is the location. With two spaces, there is division into parts; having parts means being impermanent and not omnipresent.
Question: Why first question whether space resides in space? Answer: Because the opponent claims space is unobstructed and can contain things. Therefore, space itself, being unobstructed, should also be able to contain space. Hence the first line questions space regarding its location in space.
"It does not truly abide in a material thing" begins the second refutation: that space abides in a material thing. A material thing is solid and filled, and cannot contain space; therefore, space does not abide in a material thing. The first point showed that space can contain space, but this leads to two spaces. The present point avoids two spaces but leads to having no location at all. Thus the opponent is trapped either way.
Moreover, if there is no space in a material thing, then space is not omnipresent. If there is space in a material thing, then it should be able to contain space. If a material thing can contain space, then it is not truly solid.
"Furthermore" — this is Vasubandhu's additional refutation of the above argument that location proves space exists. If space allows activity and thus exists, then material things, in which there is no activity, should have no space. You claim that where there is activity, there is space; where there is no activity, there should be no space.
"Furthermore, because it has no characteristics" begins the third section, refuting the characteristics of space. This section has three parts: (1) refutation, (2) defense, and (3) refutation of the defense.
Refutation: Both conditioned and unconditioned things have characteristics; therefore they exist. If space has no characteristics, it should not exist. Moreover, the five elements are existing things with characteristics. If space were non-existent, then non-existence would have no characteristics, and there would be no space.
[External Text:] — Second, the defense. Space has two characteristics: (1) indicative characteristics and (2) substantive characteristics. First, because of the existence of the five elements, one knows that the space element is non-existent. Because conditioned things exist, one knows the unconditioned is non-existent. This is called the indicative characteristic. Second, the cessation of existence leads to the attainment of the unconditioned, which is the substantive characteristic of space. Space has both characteristics, but you, not knowing this, claim it has none.
[External Text:] — Third, the refutation of the defense. We only need to refute the substantive characteristic, which is done in three points:
First, refuting by showing there is no substance: The absence of materiality merely indicates that materiality is absent; it is not another self-existing entity called "space." There is no such thing, so what would be the substantive characteristic of space?
"Furthermore" begins the second point, showing there is no characteristic: Originally, the cessation of materiality is taken as the characteristic of space. But if materiality has not yet arisen, there is nothing to cease. Therefore, there is no characteristic.
"Furthermore, materiality is impermanent" begins the third point, refuting through eternity: Materiality is impermanent and arises at the beginning. Space is eternal and already existed from the beginning. Since it already existed, it should be known that it has had no characteristic from the beginning.
Question: What is the difference between the third refutation and the second? Answer: The second showed that because the characteristic does not yet exist, there is no characteristic. The third shows that because the characterized thing has existed from the beginning, it has had no characteristic from the beginning. They complement each other.
Question: Among the three refutations of space, why do the first two have verse lines while the last refutation of characteristics has no verse? Answer: The last one is entirely Vasubandhu's own addition, hence no verse.
Question: Why did Aryadeva not refute the characteristics? Answer: The two treatise masters took turns addressing different aspects. The *Madhyamaka-shastra*'s chapter on the six elements has already extensively refuted characteristics, so Aryadeva did not repeat it. But Vasubandhu wished to refute all three claims about space — substance, function, and characteristics — and since the first two were already refuted, he added the refutation of characteristics.
「外曰有時法常相有故」，第二次破時常。次虛空破時者，外道情近與世人同，既見恒有四時則謂時常。此亦麁顯，故次空破之。釋時有二：一內、二外，內外各二。外中二者，一計時常是萬物了因。故《智度論》云「時是不變因」，時體是常故名不變，了出萬物故稱為因。又名不變者，物自去來而時無改易，故名不變。衛世師九法中，時是主諦之一法。二者計時是生因，能生萬物；亦名生殺因，謂由時故萬物滅也。內法二者，一數論明因法假名時，離法無別時。二譬喻部別有時體是非色非心，如三相之類。依《智度論》有假實二時：一迦羅時，謂實法時，多是小乘律中所用，以制時食時衣必須明實有時，則結戒義成，佛法久住。二三摩耶，是假名時，是經中所用。經既通化道俗，若明實有時，外道聞之則生邪見，故說假名時。此義難明。若為結戒故明實時者，為結殺戒應明實有眾生，為結處戒應實有方也。外偈本立有三：初明實有時者，異數論時無別體家也。「常」者，異計時是無常也。「相有故」者，時微細不可見，假相故知，即是防於他難。又上立時體，今立時相。釋中前逐近解相有故，從「無不有時」，次釋常。初又二：前就時標相證有時。「有法雖不可現見以共相比知故證有」者，明人日共有去相，見人從東至西既有去法，雖不見日去，將人比日，日亦有去也。如是時雖細不可見，合日去，以節氣等合人去也。「復次一時不一時」，舉體相證有時也。一剎那為一時，第二剎那以去至無量劫非一時也。一日為近，一劫為久。「內曰過去未來中無是故無未來」，此偈本破三世時是常，而正捉外過去是常，破無未來也。過去時既常，則過去定住過去不轉作未來，故未來中無過去，故云過去未來中無。以過去住過去不轉作未來，是故無未來。此猶少二句，亦應言過去現在中無，是故無現在。二者應云現在未來中無，是故無未來。但論主偏明過去未來中無是故無未來者，此是舉極始極終為言端耳。注釋為二：一者捉過去破未來、二者例破現在。破未來中為二：一者就果中無因破未來、二者就因中無果破於未來。就果中無因破又二：一就不作門破、二就作門破。初又二：一明過去不作未來、二明過去不作現在。初又二：一者正破、二徵經破。初文前牒三世時相。「此則時相常故」者，外明時體是常，但體不離相，相為體所制，故體常相亦常。又相是常家相，以體常故相亦常，故云時相常故。「過去時不作未來時」者，正破也。過去時體既常不轉作未來者，相是時相，相亦不轉作未來。「汝經言時是一法」者，第二徵經破。所以須徵經者，欲明二義：一者依經則有不作之失、二若言作則有違經之過。是一法者，是一常法也，雖四時三世相殊而時體但是一常法。又過去但過去，不雜當現，故名一法。「亦不作現在時」者，上捉過去常不作未來，今明過去常不作現在也。若過去時作未來者，上依彼義宗則有不作之失。今縱關就作破，若過去作當現二時則有雜亂之咎。前得宗失二時，今得二時則失宗也。又上得宗三世不亂而失當現二時，今得當現二時則三世便亂也。又過去中無未來時，上就未來中無過去，是果中無因故無未來；今就過去中無未來，因中無果亦無未來。「現在亦如是破」者，憑師云：「此文煩長。上已明不作現在，今復破現在，是故為煩。」今謂不爾。《智度論》亦有此文，故不應煩也。今明自上已來捉過去為端，破未來有二雙：一當中無過、過中無當，例今亦應當中無現、現中無當。二者上明過不作當及過作當，今亦明現作於當、現不作當。故云現在亦如是破，非是煩也。「外曰受過去故有時」，上內明過住於過，過不作當，故當中無過，故無有當。外今捉破為立，汝但不許有當受有過去；既有過去，必有未來。「內曰非未來相過去」，有人言：非者無也，既無未來，云何有過去，故云非未來相過去。有人言：我前明非未來相耳，非是受汝過去，故云非未來相過去。今明此是二破，諸百論師合作一破釋之，致令於文乖錯。所言二破者，非未來相，此是一破，謂過去土住過去，不作未來，是故無未來也。過去者，此是第二破，縱汝過去作於未來，則失過去。所以作此二破者，前明過不作當則無當；今明過若作當即便無過，前得過失當，今得當失過去，故三世並破。又前是住宗破，今縱關破。住宗明不相作則失於未來，縱其相作則失於過去。問：何以知此文是二破耶？答：今不敢自推，專觀《智度》及天親此文，知有二破。天親釋二破即二：「汝不聞我前說過去土不作未來瓶」，此釋偈本非未來相，以過去土相自住過去，不作未來瓶相故也。「若墮未來相中」者，釋偈本中過去字。前明過去不作未來瓶，故非未來相；今明過去作未來則是未來相，故無過去。「外曰應有時自相別故」，自上已來兩番問答：初問答破未來、次問答破過去，則三世盡矣。而外人無辭可救，直明現見有三世相別。又初問答就不作門破三世、次問答就作門破三世，此二既窮則主三世並壞。今不知何救，但問論主應有時。所以知有者，現見三世相別，若無三世則無因果。又若無三世則無三達智。又上來別破外道時是常義，此下通破內外。明三世有義四種：薩婆多，事異相異等並云三世有相，略同外道。成論師云：若太虛無不說去來，是曾當義以說去來。是曾當有，故異太虛，則知三世並有其相。「內曰若爾一切現在」，上明三世作與不作有互失之咎，若不作得過失當、若作得當失過，故有互失。汝今若立三世皆有自相，則三世皆在現在，便失去來，既失去來亦失現在。此正破數論義。數人三世皆有，若三世皆有則三世皆現，有現不現、有有不有，得有宗則墮三世皆現，得三世不現則失有宗。成論師，若三世皆有則應皆現，若去來是無則與太虛不異，便失去來，亦進退失也。「外曰過去未來行自相故無咎」，救上一切現在難也。我前言自相有者，不言過去未來同有現在相，但過去自行過去、未來自行未來，以兩世不同行現在。如數論云：現在行於事有之相，去來行性有之相。如成論云：去來行曾當之相，現在行現起之相。故不得三世皆現在也。「內曰過去非過去」，上捉有相明三世皆現，今捉行相明過去非過去。若法在過去猶不捨自相，自相不捨應名現在，不名過去，故云過去非過去。若過現而去捨於自相，則無其自體，既是無法不名過去，此亦是過去非過去。前文正也。又此是二難：過去者一難也。汝遂言過現而去，如土謝滅則無復過去也。非過去者第二難，若土不去，則是現在不名過去。現注文百論師多作一難，故不中詣也。注釋為二：一別解偈本；「是故時法」下，總結無時。初又二：前開二關破過去、次例未來。二門破過去即二。初門有四：一牒、二難、三釋、四舉譬顯。「若過去過去者」，牒也。土為過去，是一過去也；此土復謝滅無復土相，復是一過去，故云過去過去也。「不名為過去」，第二難也。土既滅後無復有土，故不名過去。「何以故離自相故」者，第三釋也。土既謝滅則離土自相，故無復過去。「如火捨熱」下，第四舉譬顯，易知。「若過去不過去者」，第二關正釋偈本。又二：初牒、次破。牒云過去不過去者，明過去土住過去，土不謝滅，故云過去不過去。「今不應說過去時行過去相」者，第二破也。若過去土不謝滅則猶是現在，汝不應言過去行謝滅之相。「未來亦如是破」者，第二例破未來，亦應開兩關問之。一云：若未來未來則無瓶相，以瓶是未來名一未來，復未有此瓶復名未來。若爾，便無未來。若未來不未來已有瓶相，便是現在，汝不應言未來行未有之相。
[Foreign opponent's argument:] "Time exists because its characteristics are always present." This is the second refutation of the constancy of time. Next, the refutation of time through emptiness: since ordinary people's views are similar to those of the world, seeing the four seasons constantly revolving leads them to assert that time is eternal. This view is relatively crude and obvious, hence it is refuted through emptiness.
There are two types of time: internal and external, each with two subdivisions. Among the external two: first, some philosophies posit that time is the eternal, efficient cause of all things. As the *Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise* says, "Time is the unchanging cause." Time's essence is eternal, hence "unchanging"; it brings forth all things, hence "cause." It is also called "unchanging" because things come and go while time itself never changes. In the Vaiśeṣika system's nine categories, time is one of the principal existents. Second, some assert time is the generating cause that produces all things; it is also called the cause of arising and destruction, for through time all things cease.
Among the internal two: first, the Sāṃkhya school states that time is merely a conventional name based on conditional factors—apart from those factors, there is no separate time. Second, the譬喻部 (Analogy School) posits a distinct time entity that is neither material nor mental, like the three characteristics [of arising, abiding, and ceasing].
According to the *Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise*, there are two kinds of time—real and conventional. First, *kāla* (real time) is used mainly in the Small Vehicle monastic codes, where for regulating meals and robes, real time must be acknowledged; then the precepts can be established, and the Dharma will endure long. Second, *samaya* (conventional time) is nominal time, used in the scriptures. Since the scriptures guide both monastics and laypeople, if real time were taught, outsiders hearing it would develop wrong views; hence nominal time is taught. This distinction is subtle. If real time is taught for establishing monastic precepts, then for the precept against killing, one should also teach real living beings; for the precept on dwelling places, one should also teach real physical locations.
The opponent's verse establishes three points: first, explaining real time—this differs from the Sāṃkhya view that time has no separate essence. "Eternal" differs from those who say time is impermanent. "Because characteristics are present"—time is subtle and invisible, but known through inferred characteristics, which guards against other objections. Moreover, the previous statement established time's essence; now it establishes time's characteristics.
In the commentary, the explanation first addresses "characteristics are present" in a simplified manner, then from "there is no time when..." it explains "eternal." This first section has two parts: first, using characteristics of time to establish its existence. "Though a thing cannot be directly seen, its existence is proven by comparing common characteristics"—just as people and the sun both have motion, and seeing a person move from east to west, even without seeing the sun move, one infers by comparison that the sun also moves. Similarly, time, though subtle and invisible, is inferred from the sun's movement, seasonal changes, and human activities.
"Furthermore, one time and not one time"—citing the features of different time units to prove time exists. A single moment is one time; from the second moment onward through countless eons is not one time. A day is near; a kalpa is distant.
[Internal response:] "In the past and future there is no [past], therefore there is no future." This verse refutes the view that the three times are eternal, specifically attacking the opponent's claim that the past is eternal, thereby disproving the future. If the past were eternal, it would remain fixed in the past and never transition into the future; hence the future contains no past, which is why the text says "in the past and future there is no." Since the past stays in the past and does not become the future, there is no future. Two more clauses should be added: "in the past and present there is none, therefore there is no present" and "in the present and future there is none, therefore there is no future." But the author only emphasizes "in the past and future there is none, therefore there is no future," using the extreme beginning and end as the starting point of discussion.
The commentary has two sections: first, seizing the past to refute the future; second, analogically refuting the present. In refuting the future, there are two approaches: first, from the effect lacking the cause, refuting the future; second, from the cause lacking the effect, refuting the future.
In the first approach (effect lacking cause), two further points: first, refuting through the non-production gate; second, refuting through the production gate. The first has two parts: first, showing the past does not produce the future; second, showing the past does not produce the present. The first part begins by citing the characteristics of the three times. "Thus, the characteristics of time are eternal"—the opponent says time's essence is eternal, and since essence and characteristics are inseparable, the characteristics are also eternal. Furthermore, characteristics belong to what is eternal, so with eternal essence, characteristics are also eternal—hence "time's characteristics are eternal." "The past time does not produce the future time"—this is the actual refutation. Since the past time's essence is eternal and does not transform into the future, its characteristics, being time's characteristics, also do not transform into the future.
"Your scripture says time is a single entity"—this is the second point, citing scripture to refute. Why cite scripture? To clarify two matters: first, according to scripture, there is the fault of non-production; second, if one insists on production, there is the fault of contradicting scripture. "A single entity" means a single eternal entity—though the four seasons and three times differ in characteristics, time's essence is but one eternal thing. Also, the past remains only the past, not mixed with present or future, hence "a single entity."
"Nor does it produce the present time"—above it was shown that the eternal past does not produce the future; now it is shown that the eternal past does not produce the present. If the past time produced the future, then according to the opponent's own principle, there would be the fault of non-production. Now, granting the opponent's standpoint for refutation through production: if the past produced both future and present, there would be the fault of confusion. Previously, keeping the principle meant losing the two times; now gaining the two times means losing the principle. Also, above, with the principle intact, the three times remained distinct but the future and present were lost; now, with future and present gained, the three times become confused.
"Furthermore, in the past there is no future time"—above it was said that in the future there is no past, meaning the effect lacks the cause, hence no future; now it is said that in the past there is no future, meaning the cause lacks the effect, hence also no future.
"'The present is also refuted in the same way'—Master Ping comments: 'This passage is redundant. The non-production of the present was already refuted above; now refuting the present again is superfluous.' But I say this is not so. The *Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise* contains this same passage, so it should not be considered redundant. From the beginning, the past was used as the starting point; refuting the future involved two pairs: first, the future lacking the past and the past lacking the future; similarly, the present should lack the past and the past should lack the present. Second, above it was shown that the past does not produce the future and that the past produces the future; similarly now it is shown that the present produces the future and the present does not produce the future. Hence the text says 'the present is also refuted in the same way'—it is not redundant."
[Foreign opponent:] "Because the past is accepted, time exists." Above, the internal school showed that the past remains in the past and does not produce the future, so the future lacks the past and there is no future. The opponent now seizes this refutation to establish his position: "You simply do not accept the future, but you do accept the past. Since the past exists, the future must also exist."
[Internal response:] "The past is not the future's characteristic." Some say: "Non" means non-existence—since there is no future, how can there be a past? Hence "the past is not the future's characteristic." Others say: "I meant that the past is not the future's characteristic; I did not accept your past." Hence "the past is not the future's characteristic."
I now clarify that these are two refutations. Earlier commentators combined them into one, causing confusion in the text. The two refutations are: "not the future's characteristic"—this is one refutation, meaning the past remains in the past, does not produce the future, hence no future exists. "The past"—this is the second refutation: even if you grant that the past produces the future, then the past is lost. Why make these two refutations? Earlier it was shown that the past not producing the future means no future; now it is shown that if the past produces the future, then there is no past. Earlier, keeping the past meant losing the future; now, gaining the future means losing the past—thus both the past and future are refuted. Also, the earlier refutation operates within the opponent's own position; the later one grants his position and then refutes. Within his position, non-production loses the future; granting production loses the past.
Question: How do we know this passage contains two refutations? Answer: I do not presume to infer on my own; I rely on the *Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise* and Vasubandhu's commentary here, which clearly show two refutations. Vasubandhu explains the two refutations as two: "You have not heard my earlier statement that the past earth does not produce the future jar"—this explains "not the future's characteristic," because the past earth's characteristic remains in the past and does not become the future jar's characteristic. "If it falls into the future's characteristic"—this explains the word "past" in the verse. Earlier it was shown that the past does not produce the future jar, so it is not the future's characteristic; now it is shown that if the past produces the future, then it becomes the future's characteristic, so there is no past.
[Foreign opponent:] "Time should exist because its own characteristics are distinct." Up to this point, there have been two rounds of question and answer: the first refuted the future, the second refuted the past—thus the three times were exhausted. The opponent, having no other recourse, directly declares that we can see the three times have distinct characteristics. Also, the first round refuted the three times through the non-production gate; the second through the production gate. Once both are exhausted, the opponent's three times collapse entirely. Now, not knowing what else to salvage, he simply asks the author whether time should exist. His reason for asserting it exists: we directly see the three times differ in characteristics. Without three times, there would be no cause and effect. Also, without three times, there would be no threefold knowledge of past, present, and future lives.
Furthermore, above, only the opponent's view of time as eternal was refuted; below, both internal and external views are refuted together. There are four types of the theory that the three times exist: the Sarvāstivāda, with different entities and characteristics, all proclaim the three times have characteristics—roughly similar to the opponent's view. The *Satyasiddhi* masters say: if ultimate emptiness, we do not speak of past and future; it is based on the meaning of "having been" and "about to be" that we speak of past and future. Since "having been" and "about to be" exist, this differs from ultimate emptiness—therefore we know the three times each have their characteristics.
[Internal response:] "If so, then everything is present." Above, it was shown that the three times, whether producing or not producing, each have the fault of mutual loss—if not producing, gaining the past loses the future; if producing, gaining the future loses the past—hence mutual loss. If you now establish that the three times each have their own characteristics, then all three times would be in the present, losing both past and future. Losing past and future, you also lose the present. This directly refutes the Sāṃkhya and Abhidharma theories. The Abhidharma school asserts all three times exist; if all three exist, then all three are present—there would be no distinction between present and non-present, being and non-being. Holding to their principle, they fall into "all three are present"; holding to the three times being distinct, they lose their principle of existence. The *Satyasiddhi* masters: if all three times exist, all should be present; if past and future are non-existent, they are no different from ultimate emptiness—thus losing past and future, losing both ways.
[Foreign opponent:] "Past and future operate according to their own characteristics, so there is no fault." This answers the above objection about all being present. "My earlier statement that characteristics exist did not mean past and future share the present's characteristic. Rather, the past operates as past, the future operates as future—the two times do not operate as the present does. As the Sāṃkhya says: the present operates with the characteristic of existing phenomena; past and future operate with the characteristic of existing in nature. As the *Satyasiddhi* says: past and future operate with the characteristics of 'having been' and 'about to be'; the present operates with the characteristic of arising now. Therefore, the three times cannot all be the present."
[Internal response:] "The past is not past." Above, using "having characteristics," the three times were shown to be all present. Now, using "operating with characteristics," it is shown that the past is not past. If a thing in the past still does not abandon its own characteristic, it should be called present, not past—hence "the past is not past." If it passes from present to past and thereby abandons its own characteristic, then it has no self-nature; being a non-thing, it cannot be called past—this too is "the past is not past." The earlier statement is the primary refutation.
Moreover, this is a double difficulty: "the past" is one difficulty—you say it passes from present to past, like earth disintegrating, then there is no longer any past. "Not past" is the second difficulty—if the earth does not disintegrate, it is still present and cannot be called past. The present commentary's authors mostly treat this as a single difficulty, and so they do not hit the mark.
The commentary has two sections: first, explaining the verse specifically; "Therefore, the category of time" below—summarizing that there is no time. The first section has two parts: first, opening two gates to refute the past; second, applying the same to the future. The two gates refuting the past have four points in the first gate: first, citing the proposition; second, the difficulty; third, the explanation; fourth, an analogy.
"If past is past"—this is the proposition. Earth as past is one "past"; this earth further disintegrates and no longer has earth's characteristics, which is another "past"—hence "past is past." "It cannot be called past"—this is the second, the difficulty. Once the earth has perished, there is no more earth, so it cannot be called past. "Why? Because it has departed from its own characteristics"—this is the third, the explanation. Once earth disintegrates, it departs from earth's own characteristics, so there is no longer any past. "Like fire abandoning heat"—the fourth, the analogy, easy to understand.
"If past is not past"—the second gate, which directly explains the verse. It has two parts: first, citing the proposition; second, refuting. The proposition "past is not past" means the past earth remains in the past; the earth does not disintegrate, hence "past is not past." "Now you should not say that past time operates with the characteristic of passing away"—this is the second, the refutation. If the past earth does not disintegrate, it is still present; you should not say the past operates with the characteristic of passing away.
"'The future is likewise refuted'"—the second application, refuting the future by analogy, also opening two gates of questioning. First: if the future is future, then there is no jar's characteristic, for the jar being future is one "future," and before its existence, it is another "future"—if so, there is no future. If the future is not future, then since the jar already has its characteristic, it is present—then you should not say the future operates with the characteristic of not yet existing.
「外曰實有方常相有故」，次時破方者，方相麁顯，道俗共知，故次時破之。《智度論》云「汝四法藏中無方，我六法藏中有。」四法藏無則四諦不攝，彼六諦九法中方為其一，故云六法藏有。今言實有方者，明簡四諦中無，即六諦中有也。常者，內法大乘中說有假名十方，是無常法；今簡異之，故云常。此二句出方體。相有故，方體是常而不可見，假日為相故知有方。「內曰東方無初故」，此破方也。《智度論》云「世間法中大謂方，出世法中大謂涅槃。破世間法大故十八空名為大空。」今言東方無初者，破其日初出是東方也。四天下皆有初出，則四天下皆是東方。若爾，此東方豈是定初？亦四天下皆有日沒，則無定有西。四天下皆有背日，無定有背；皆有向日，無定有向。今略舉一邊，故名無初。又弗于逮日中、閻浮提日出，是則南方之初是東方之中，定從何方而判初耶？故云無初。注為三：一釋偈本。「復次日不合處」下，第二外人以相有故方有，今明相無故方無。如鐵圍間恒不見日，應無方也。「復次不定故」，下第三就不定破。上就四天下論無定有初，今隨就一處顯方無定。猶如一柱，此觀為東、彼觀為西，在柱上為下、在柱下為上。故柱無定方。又上直明東方非定初，今明無定東西。又前明無初後，故初後不定；今明無東西，東西不定。又前破其相，今破方體。「外曰是方相一天下說故」，救上三難。若四天下說，可得東方無初；今就一天下說，故日初出定是東方，故東方非無初過。救第二云：若四天下說，或可有無日之處；今就一天下說方相，一天下皆有日合，故常有方相，則知有方。救第三云：一天下說方相，故一天下方定，無有不定過。「內曰若爾有邊」，乃免三難而墮有邊，有邊則無常，無常故無方。
"Objection: Direction (space) truly exists because its characteristics are perceived." Next, the refutation of direction: the marks of direction are gross and evident, known to both monastics and laypeople alike, and so it is refuted next. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* says: "Your storehouse of four dharmas has no direction; my storehouse of six dharmas has it." Since it is absent from the four-dharma storehouse, it is not included in the Four Noble Truths. In their six truths and nine dharmas, direction is one of them, and so it is said the six-dharma storehouse contains it. Now when they say direction truly exists, this makes clear that it is excluded from the Four Noble Truths and is instead found among the six truths. As for "permanent": within the inner teachings of the Great Vehicle it is said that there are ten directions as provisional designations, and these are impermanent dharmas. Here it is being distinguished from that, and so it is called permanent. These two statements establish the substance of direction. "Because its characteristics are perceived": the substance of direction is permanent yet cannot be seen; it takes the sun as its characteristic, and from this one knows direction exists. "Inner position: the east has no beginning" — this refutes direction. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* says: "In worldly dharmas, the great is called direction; in supramundane dharmas, the great is called Nirvana. Because it refutes the great of worldly dharmas, the eighteen kinds of emptiness are called the emptiness of the great." Now when it says the east has no beginning, this refutes the idea that the sun's first rising is the east. All four continents have a first rising, and so all four continents would be the east. If so, how could this east be a fixed beginning? Likewise all four continents have a sunset, and so there is no fixed west. All four continents have a side away from the sun, and so there is no fixed away; all have a side facing the sun, and so there is no fixed facing. Here only one side is mentioned in brief, and so it is called "no beginning." Further, when it is noon in Pūrvavideha, it is sunrise in Jambudvīpa — so is the beginning of the south the middle of the east? From which direction, then, can a beginning be determined? Therefore it is said there is no beginning. The commentary has three parts: first, explaining the verse itself. "Further, where the sun does not reach" and below: second, the opponent holds that because characteristics are perceived, direction exists; now it is shown that because characteristics do not exist, direction does not exist. For example, between the iron mountain ranges the sun is never seen, and so there should be no direction there. "Further, because it is undetermined" and below: third, refuting on the ground of indeterminacy. Above, the discussion of the four continents showed there is no fixed beginning; now, taking any single place, it is shown that direction is undetermined. Just as with a pillar: viewed from here it is east, viewed from there it is west; above the pillar it is below, below the pillar it is above. Thus the pillar has no fixed direction. Further, above it was stated directly that the east is not a fixed beginning; now it is shown that east and west are not fixed. Further, the preceding showed that because there is no beginning, beginning and end are undetermined; now it is shown that because there is no east, east and west are undetermined. Further, the preceding refuted its characteristics; now it refutes the substance of direction. "Objection: the characteristic of direction is spoken of with respect to one continent" — this rescues the above three difficulties. If it were spoken of with respect to the four continents, one could grant that the east has no beginning; but now it is spoken of with respect to one continent, and so the sun's first rising is definitively the east, and the east is not guilty of having no beginning. Rescuing the second: if it were spoken of with respect to the four continents, there might perhaps be places without the sun; but now the characteristic of direction is spoken of with respect to one continent, and in one continent the sun always meets it, and so the characteristic of direction is always present, and from this one knows direction exists. Rescuing the third: because the characteristic of direction is spoken of with respect to one continent, direction is fixed within one continent, and there is no fault of indeterminacy. "Inner position: if so, there is an extreme" — this escapes the three difficulties but falls into the extreme, and what has an extreme is impermanent, and being impermanent, there is no direction.
「外曰雖無遍常」下，第四破微塵常。微塵至細，世間不知，唯外道所執，故次三常後破於微塵。又前破三種遍常，今次破不遍。以遍義明常明顯，故前破；不遍明常義昧，故後破。釋微塵不同，今略明八種：一衛世師云微塵至細，無十方分、四相不遷，故名為常。二毘曇人云：明亦有十方亦無十方，以其極細不可分為十方，在塵東則塵為西故亦有十方。問：隣虛塵為礙不礙？答：亦礙不礙，不礙於麁而礙於細。若細細不相礙，則多亦不礙，則終無礙也。又若不礙，重則不高、並則不大。而實不爾，故知礙也。數論師答《釋論》難云：以無十方分故名微塵，以體是礙故名為色。三經部人明有十方分，明窮此一十方分。四是達摩欝梨，明無十方分，而具八微共相合著。此塵極細，亦動則俱、空而具有，三相所遷。五是大迦旃延造《昆勒論》，此云假名論，明隣虛塵亦有八微而不相著，若相著則成一。雖有八微而不相礙。六開善云：析析無窮故有十方分。引《釋論》云：若有極微色，則有十方分。若無十方分，則不名為色。《釋論》實是破微塵義，而謬引證釋微塵。七莊嚴明無十方分，與前數義大同。八建初明有隣虛方，只有一方無有十方。次《唯識論》明無此微塵，如魚人見水水具四微，餓鬼見火唯有色觸，故知無有一微塵質。羅什答匡山遠師云：「佛不說有至細微塵，但說一切色若麁若細皆是苦空無常無我不淨，令人得道。以諸論義師自推斥言有隣虛塵。」外立中有二：「雖無遍常」，如前三也。「有不遍常」，立後義也。又上就遍救遍，今舉不遍救遍。「微塵是」者，出不遍常體也。果相有故，舉相證有。所以舉果證因者，如〈塵品〉云「外道明微塵不可見，今但見其麁果，故舉果證因。」注釋為二：前逐近釋「果相有故」，初列二章門。「如見牙等」，釋見果知因章門；「世界法」下，釋見因知果章門。「可知二微塵」下，於二義中取見果知因。問：極細果起自兩塵，云何是極麁果？答：外極麁如世界，內極麁如大自在天身一萬六千由旬也。「是故有微塵圜而常」，釋偈本有不遍常。微塵是無十方分故稱圜，以其至細故不從因生。圜論其體，無因釋其常。「內曰二微塵非一切身合果不圜故」者，此有五破。所以破塵者，毘曇等知人空，亦知餘法空，唯不知塵空，故名小智。今令知塵空，即一切法空，迴小入大，名為大智。《大品．三慧品》云「破壞一切法乃至微塵，名為摩訶波若。」今第一以果徵因破。眼見二塵果不圜，當知非一切身合。非一切身合則不圜。若一分合，一分合則無常。又有分則可分，不名極細。若一切身合，果則應圜。復次若一切身合，二亦同壞。前是舉果不圜驗因不合，今縱其因合則二亦同壞。二同壞者，要須壞二微塵和成一體然後乃圜；若爾，則微塵無常。前門破其圜義，此文破其常義。此文是修妬路。從「若塵重合」下，天親釋也。「復次微塵無常與虛空別故」，虛空是常、無十方分，若微塵無十方分則與空為一。今既與虛空異，虛空無十方則塵有十方。「復次以色等別故」，前明與虛空別，今明與有法別。微塵既與香味等異，若五塵各別是則有分，若其無分則與五塵不異便是一塵，若是一塵則失五塵。多無故，亦無一。「復次有形法有相故」，此亦是偈本。前明微塵與五塵別，今明微塵是色則有方圜長短，有方圜長短則是有分，若無長短則非是色。此與《智度論》同。若有極微色則有十方分，若有十方分則不名極微，若無十方分則不名為色。
Regarding the phrase "Although there is no omnipresent eternal [entity]," this section addresses the fourth refutation: the eternity of subtle particles (atoms). Subtle particles are extremely fine; the world at large does not perceive them, and only non-Buddhist schools posit their existence. Therefore, they are refuted after the three types of omnipresent eternals. Furthermore, since the meaning of "omnipresent" makes the concept of "eternal" more obvious, those were refuted first; the "non-omnipresent" makes the concept of "eternal" more obscure, so it is addressed subsequently.
There are differing interpretations of these subtle particles; we can summarize eight major views: 1. The Vaiśeṣika school claims that since subtle particles are infinitesimal—lacking ten directional divisions and unaffected by the four characteristics (birth, abiding, change, and cessation)—they are called eternal. 2. The Abhidharma school claims that they both have and do not have ten directional divisions. They are so fine that they cannot be divided into ten directions; yet, if one is positioned to the east of another, the particle itself has a western side, thus they possess ten directions. (Question: Do these "neighbor-to-void" particles possess obstruction or not? Answer: They are both obstructive and non-obstructive—they do not obstruct gross matter but do obstruct the subtle. If the subtle did not obstruct the subtle, then even many would not obstruct, and there would ultimately be no obstruction. Moreover, if they were not obstructive, heavy things would not be high and clustered things would not be large. Since this is not the case, we know they are obstructive.) The Sāṅkhya school responds to the critique in the *Treatise* by saying: "They are called subtle particles because they lack ten directional divisions, and they are called 'form' because their substance is obstructive." 3. The Sautrāntika school holds that they possess ten directional divisions, and that one can exhaust the analysis of these ten directions. 4. The school of Dharmatrāta and Ghosaka holds that they lack ten directional divisions, yet eight subtle particles aggregate together. These particles are extremely fine, and when they move, they move together; they are present in space and are moved by the three characteristics. 5. Mahākātyāyana, in the *Kuṇāla-śāstra* (Treatise on Nominal Concepts), holds that these "neighbor-to-void" particles contain eight subtle particles that do not touch; if they touched, they would become one. Thus, they contain eight subtle particles but do not obstruct one another. 6. Kai-shan holds that because they can be analyzed infinitely, they must have ten directional divisions, citing the *Treatise*: "If there is a subtle 'form,' it must have ten directional divisions; if it lacks ten directional divisions, it cannot be called 'form'." (The *Treatise* is actually refuting the theory of particles, but this interpretation mistakenly cites it as proof for them.) 7. Zhuang-yan holds that they lack ten directional divisions, which is largely similar to the previous theories. 8. Jian-chu holds that there are "neighbor-to-void" directions, but only one direction exists, not ten.
Subsequently, the *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* (Treatise on Consciousness-Only) states that these subtle particles do not exist. Just as a fish perceives water as possessing four subtle elements, while a hungry ghost perceives the same as fire containing only color and touch, we know there is no such thing as a "subtle particle" substance. Kumārajīva once replied to Master Huiyuan of Mount Lu: "The Buddha did not teach that there are infinitesimal particles. He only taught that all forms, whether gross or subtle, are Suffering, Emptiness, Non-self, and impure, to lead people to the Path. It is the masters of the various treatises who have extrapolated and asserted the existence of 'neighbor-to-void' particles."
The external side's position contains two points: "Although there is no omnipresent eternal," which refers to the previous three types; and "There is a non-omnipresent eternal," which asserts the latter theory. Furthermore, just as they previously used the "omnipresent" to defend the "omnipresent," they now use the "non-omnipresent" to defend the "omnipresent."
"The subtle particle is..." introduces the essence of the non-omnipresent eternal. They argue that because there are effects (phenomena), one can prove the existence of the cause (the particle). The reason they use the effect to prove the cause is described in the "Dust Chapter": "Non-Buddhists clarify that subtle particles cannot be seen; we only see their gross effects, so we infer the cause from the effects."
The commentary is divided into two: first, following the explanation of "because there are effects," it lists the two categories. "Like seeing sprouts, etc." explains the category of knowing the cause by seeing the effect; "from 'world-phenomena' downward" explains the category of knowing the effect by seeing the cause. From "one can know the two subtle particles" downward, it focuses on knowing the cause through the effect. (Question: Since the infinitesimal effect arises from two particles, how can it be a gross effect? Answer: The external "most gross" refers to the world, and the internal "most gross" refers to the body of Great Maheśvara, which is 16,000 *yojanas*.)
"Therefore, there are subtle particles, round and eternal," explains the verse's original premise of the non-omnipresent eternal. They are called "round" because they lack ten directional divisions, and they are called "eternal" because they are so subtle that they are not produced by causes. "Round" discusses their essence, while "without cause" explains their eternity.
"Internal side says: 'Two subtle particles are not the combined effect of all bodies, thus they are not round,'" involves five refutations. The reason for refuting particles is that while the Abhidharmikas and others know the self is empty, they also know other phenomena are empty, but they do not know that *particles* are empty; thus, they are called "small wisdom." By making them know that particles are empty, they realize that *all* phenomena are empty, turning from the small to the great, which is called "great wisdom." The *Great Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra* says: "To destroy all phenomena even down to the subtle particles is called Great Prajñā."
First, we refute by inferring the cause from the effect: the eye sees that the effect of two particles is not round, so we should know they are not the combination of all bodies. If they are not the combination of all bodies, then they are not round. If only one part combines, then it is impermanent. Furthermore, if they have parts, they can be divided and cannot be called "infinitesimal." If all bodies combined, the effect should be round. Furthermore, if all bodies combined, the two would also perish together. The former point used the lack of roundness in the effect to verify that the cause does not combine; this point concedes that if the cause *did* combine, the two would perish together. "Perishing together" means that one must destroy the two subtle particles to form a single entity, and if that is so, then the subtle particles are impermanent. The former passage refutes their "roundness," and this text refutes their "eternity." This text is a *sūtra*. From "If particles combined" downward, it is Vasubandhu’s commentary.
"Furthermore, subtle particles are impermanent because they are distinct from space." Space is eternal and lacks ten directional divisions; if subtle particles also lacked ten directional divisions, then they would be identical to space. Since they are different from space, and space lacks ten directions, then particles must have ten directions.
"Furthermore, because color, etc., are distinct." The previous point explained their distinction from space; this explains their distinction from other phenomena. Since subtle particles are distinct from scent, taste, etc., if the five types of particles are each distinct, then they have parts. If they have no parts, then they are not different from the five particles and would be just one particle; if it is one particle, the five are lost. If there are many, there is no one.
"Furthermore, because shaped phenomena possess characteristics." This is also part of the original verse. The previous point explained the distinction between subtle particles and the five types of particles; this explains that if subtle particles are "form," they must have direction, roundness, length, or shortness. If they have direction, roundness, length, or shortness, then they have parts. If they lack length or shortness, they are not "form." This is the same as the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*: "If there is an infinitesimal form, it must have ten directional divisions; if it has ten directional divisions, it is not called 'infinitesimal'; if it lacks ten directional divisions, it is not called 'form'."
「外曰有涅槃法常無煩惱涅槃不異故」，第五最後破涅槃者，上四種明世間常，今是出世常。以世間人不知，唯出世人知，義最隱昧，故後破之。又涅槃是究竟法，凡聖終歸，故最後破。亦如《中論》大乘觀行最後破於涅槃。又外道云：內外雖異，同明涅槃；若無涅槃，則是邪見。故最後論之。釋涅槃不同，《中論疏》已具出。問：《中》、《百》二論何故最後論涅槃？答：釋迦及三世佛應化等身，常皆最後明涅槃。二論欲通經，故亦最後論之。問：二論同最後論有何異？答：大意同，轉勞異。《中論》一品廣論，今一章略論。《中論》竪破四句涅槃，今橫破四計。而大意並破邪涅槃、申正涅槃，此處無異。問：二論申正涅槃無異，應無二論異。答：非但二論無異，一切經皆為明涅槃，一切經無異論亦無異。良由所論之道既一，能論之教無二也。《中論疏》未盡者，今略述之。《楞伽經》出外道義，明有四種涅槃：一者自體相涅槃，明本相而有。此似大乘本有涅槃。二種種相有無涅槃，明涅槃實有，無諸苦事。此似內義涅槃體有空與不空，空無生死，不空者謂常樂我淨。三自覺體有無涅槃，明此涅槃有靈智之性故名為有，無諸闇惑故稱為無。此似《成論》大乘圜智涅槃。四諸陰自相同相斷相續涅槃，明得涅槃不更受生死，故云斷相續。此亦大小乘義。問：外道計生死為涅槃，是五見中何見？答：是獨頭見取，無樂淨計樂淨故。問：計生死為涅槃，為迷生死、為迷涅槃？答：迷於生死，如謂杌為人，是迷杌也。問：外道計無想非想為涅槃，是五陰中何陰攝耶，答：彼修得無想非想定，無復出入息，即是捨受，故計捨受為涅槃。數人別有無為法，是善是常，在生死外、為煩惱覆，修解斷惑起得得於無為，屬彼行人。與地論師本有涅槃義大同也。問：數人何故立涅槃是有耶？答一是第三諦故有、二者為滅智知故有、三者為無為名有相故有、四無為是常故有也。《成論》文破之：汝經泥洹名無相，若是有者當有相。又衣壞名無衣，應別有無衣之法是有。《成論》小乘涅槃是惑無處，無別有法，不當三性，從善因得故名為善。數人破云：若泥洹是無，應無泥洹。答云：非無泥洹，但泥洹是無法。《地論》有四種涅槃：一性淨、二方便淨、三圓淨、四如如淨。《攝大乘》亦有四種：一本性淨、二有餘、三無餘、四無住處，如彼文說之。就破涅槃為二：初破所得涅槃、二破能得之人。破所得涅槃又開四別：初破涅槃與無煩惱不異、二破涅槃是無煩惱因、三破涅槃是無煩惱果、四破斷無以為涅槃。四計之中，初三破彼有餘、第四破外無餘。初又二：前一明涅槃與無煩惱不異、後二明涅槃與無煩惱異。與無煩惱不異，此是《成論》小乘義；與無煩惱異，是毘曇及大乘人義。故此中破四涅槃，內外大小乘一切皆盡。《中論》破邪涅槃、申正涅槃，故亦破亦取。若外道計生死以為涅槃，但破不收。若就偷得涅槃之名而不識涅槃之義，則收名不收其義，故亦破亦收也。就立中三句：初明「有涅槃」者，涅槃是出世常法。上舉世救世，今舉出世救世，故言有也。又簡異撥無涅槃之人，是故言有。又斥於提婆執一切空，是故言有。「常」，明涅槃體。「無煩惱涅槃不異故」者，釋常義也。有煩惱則有生死，是故無常；若無煩惱則無生死，是故名常。正是《成實》義也。「內曰涅槃作法故」，破外涅槃與無煩惱不異之言也。有煩惱時未有無煩惱，由修道故斷煩惱始得無煩惱，此無煩惱本無今有，是起作之法。既本無今有，則已有還無，體是起作之法，故非常法也。又言作法者，為道諦所造作，故名作法。釋中有二：初明涅槃是作法、次明無有涅槃。前是縱破，後名奪破，文處易知。次論毘曇、成實義。毘曇人云：本有善常涅槃，生死煩惱外，為煩惱所障，故眾生不得涅槃。則不著今文破。今問成實師：既以無煩惱為涅槃者，為本有此無、為本無此無？若本有此無，則與數同；若本無此無，因修治道斷惑得之，則同外道起作之法也。「外曰作因故」，此第二計，明涅槃與無煩惱異。前觀涅槃然後生解斷惑得於無累，如因中發觀，觀生惑滅，故名作因。亦如會真生解，及數人因境發智，境為無煩惱因。此是《成論》本有，及《地論》性淨、數人無為，皆是有法，在生死外，故修解斷惑然後得之也。「內曰能破非破」，破上涅槃是無煩惱因也。能破者，牒外義也。外謂涅槃是無煩惱因，由涅槃故能無煩惱、由涅槃故能得解脫、由涅槃故能得於破。破、解脫、無煩惱此三皆是異名，今欲存略，故作破名也。非破者，論主難也。涅槃是於破因，即是解脫因，便應非是解脫。然涅槃是解脫異名，豈得言非解脫耶？又涅槃是果名，解脫亦是果名，今若言是解脫因則失果義，以果為因則名顛倒。又涅槃若是因者，道諦便應是果，是亦顛倒。又反並，若涅槃能解脫非解脫，亦生死能繫縛非繫縛。注釋亦二：初縱因破；「復次」下，奪因破。「外曰無煩惱果」，此第三計。亦立涅槃與無煩惱異名，由斷惑而得，故是無煩惱果。此是《成實》始有義。故成實師斷五住惑盡，二生死滅，然後得大涅槃。即《地論》方便淨義，由息妄故然後顯真，名無煩惱果。注中三句：初非初立；二「亦非無煩惱因」下，非第二立也；第三句正釋偈本。「內曰縛可縛方便異此無用」，破上是無煩惱果也。破中二：初牒、次破。牒中又二：縛可縛，牒繫縛也；方便者，牒斷縛之方便也。異此無用者，內破也。破意云：有煩惱是繫縛、無煩惱得解脫，故此解脫便是有用；涅槃若是無煩惱果，即無用也。又涅槃非煩惱，故不能繫縛用；非眾生，故不能修道用；非八正，故不能斷滅用。異此三法，故名無用。正意云：異縛可縛，即涅槃非是生死縛；異正觀故，涅槃非是解脫用。此何為邪？注中有二：前縱是果，明無用過；次奪，明無煩惱。既無因故，涅槃不名無煩惱果。「外曰有涅槃是若無」，第四立斷無為涅槃，即是立無餘也。外云：有於身智故名為患，若灰身滅智此即無患。肇師立小乘涅槃義云「大患莫若於有身，故滅身以歸無。勞懃莫前於有智，故絕智以淪虛。」若爾便是大用，上何得云離三法是無用耶？又深取此立意者似三論義。外人云：我涅槃異上二種，即是大用。異縛可縛，非縛義；異方便，非脫義。故非縛非脫、非妄非真、非眾生非佛，名為深妙涅槃，是大用。所以然者，但能除縛不能除解，但能除妄不能息真，此是非用；今能兩忘，故是大用。「內曰畏處何染」，無身無心是永死之坑大怖畏處，汝等外道何故貪染？正呵數論灰身滅智涅槃義也，答後兩忘義。汝無妄無真、無縛無脫是大邪見，現世斷善、來世入地獄，甚可怖畏。云何染著無耶？注釋為二：初破外道斷無涅槃；從「涅槃名離一切著」下，略申正涅槃破邪涅槃。前是就緣假破，今是對緣假破。離一切著者，外無所著。滅一切憶想者，內無有心。即肇公云：「於外無數、於內無心，彼已寂滅乃名涅槃。」「非有非無」者，非上三家之有、非第四家之無。又非小乘涅槃斷無、非大乘涅槃妙有。又於外無數、於內無心，名為涅槃。即有此涅槃，是故云非有。非有即著無，復云非無。「非物非非物」者，既聞非有非無，終言有於一切，是故云非物；既聞非物，便謂非物，故明亦非非物。以非物不物則心行處滅。「譬如燈滅」，明語言道斷。「外曰誰得涅槃」，自上已來破所得之法，今破能得之人。問有兩意：一舉能得之人證有上所得四種之法；二問論主正涅槃，若言涅槃言斷心忘，誰得之耶？「內曰無得涅槃」，亦有兩意：一者前破無所得之法，今破無能得之人。若以神得，求神無從。又設令有神，神是常遍，不應有得。若五陰得，求五陰無從。設有五陰，無常失滅亦不應得。若答外人問論主誰得正涅槃，上明所得之法絕於四句，今辨能得之人，義亦如是，是則無能得所得。如《中論》明涅槃絕四句竟，後明如來亦絕四句；今亦爾。問：若爾，應無得涅槃。答，若能不見能得所得，便是得涅槃也。故肇師云：「大像隱於無形，故不見以見之；玄道存乎絕域，故不得以得之。」如《大品》云「無所得即是得，以是得無所得。」問：文中何故破神及五陰？答凡論得，不出人法，故人法並破。又破人，破外道得；破法，破內人得。又破人，明常無得；破陰，明無常亦不得。今云聞熏習故得報佛證法身者，不出常無常等，故並著今文破。問：若爾，不應從佛聞法，應得成佛耶？答：今明從佛聞法熏習得者，息常無常見、息能得所得報法等見，方得佛耳。
百論疏卷下之中
百論疏卷下之餘
釋吉藏撰