Treatise on the Hundred Verses Commentary (百論疏)

Chapter 10: Breaking Through Emptiness

This chapter is not merely the central theme of the entire treatise—it is also the very heart of the Mahāyāna scriptures. Its words are concise, yet its meaning is clear; its phrasing is elegant, and its depth profound. When used to illuminate what is right, nothing right remains unilluminated; when employed to dismantle what is wrong, nothing wrong remains undefeated. It can subdue demons, restrain heretics, humble the Lesser Vehicle, and deflate arrogant views. Relying on it to cut through delusion, no obstacle remains unleveled; practicing the path with it, no object of contemplation goes unseen. It awakens wisdom in the dull and gives eloquence to the tongue-tied. Truly, it is an essential method for taming the mind and a clear technique for repentance and purification.

In my youth, I delighted in these subtle teachings; approaching the age of sixty, I have held them as a mirror for the mind. But my notes and records have scattered, so I now preserve only their general outline. As for the various ways of approaching this chapter, I will briefly explain ten points:

First: If we divide the treatise into three sections, the chapter “Refuting the Self” illuminates the emptiness of sentient beings; from “Refuting Oneness” through “Refuting Permanence,” it discerns the emptiness of all phenomena; and this present chapter shows that the very emptiness that cures such views is itself also empty. The *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* uses these three approaches as techniques for taming the mind, and so it briefly explains them at the outset; Āryadeva, likewise, uses these three as methods for refining the spirit, elaborating on them at length later on.

Second: If we divide the treatise into two sections, then “abandoning fault and merit” has two aspects: first, abandoning fault, and second, abandoning merit. “Refuting error” also has two aspects: first, refuting attachment to existence, and second, refuting attachment to emptiness. From “Refuting the Self” through “Refuting Permanence,” attachment to existence is refuted. Now this present chapter refutes attachment to emptiness. Existence and non-existence are the root of all views and the obstacle to the Middle Way, so they must be refuted. Once that is done, the roots of all views topple and the true Middle becomes manifest.

Third: If we divide the treatise according to “the refuting subject” and “the object refuted,” from the beginning of the treatise we have been refuting the object. Now this chapter refutes the refuting subject itself, so that both subject and object are leveled, and both refutation and establishment vanish together. Thus, one rests in a state of utter non-attachment, yet nothing loses its truth; one settles in a state of total non-reliance, and principle is mysteriously understood on its own.

Fourth: If we divide the treatise according to “conditions” and “contemplation,” all that precedes this chapter shows conditions exhausted within contemplation. This chapter shows contemplation exhausted within conditions. “Conditions exhausted within contemplation” means that whether fault or merit, whether phenomena or persons, whether saṃsāra or nirvāṇa, whether ordinary or sage, whether delusion or awakening—none can be grasped; all are exhausted within contemplation, hence the phrase. “Contemplation exhausted within conditions” means that once conditions are extinguished, right contemplation itself ceases. When conditions are exhausted within contemplation, there is no more “conditioning”; when contemplation is exhausted within conditions, there is no more “contemplating.” Therefore, it is neither conditioned nor contemplative. Not knowing what to call it, we provisionally name it “right contemplation.” We also provisionally call it *prajñā*, Buddha-nature, or Dharmakāya, assigning names based on function—as it is said: “*Prajñā* is a single truth, but the Buddha proclaims many names; according to the capacities of beings, he establishes different designations.”

Fifth: From the standpoint of host and guest: from “Refuting the Self” through “Refuting Permanence,” the heretics propose doctrines and Āryadeva debates them. In this chapter, Āryadeva sets forth his own thesis while the heretics debate against it. When heretics propose and Āryadeva debates, no difficulty is left unrefuted and no objection is left unanswered. When Āryadeva proposes and heretics debate, no challenge goes unmet and no reply fails to silence them. Why is this so? Because the heretics do not rely on emptiness in their questions and answers, their questions are not real questions and their answers are not real answers. But the treatise-master, relying on emptiness, asks questions that refute everything, and answers in ways that silences every opponent. This teaches sentient beings of later ages that even worldly dialogue must rely on emptiness—how much more so those who seek to transcend suffering and realize the path of tranquil cessation? How could they cling to existence?

Sixth: All that precedes this chapter is called “refuting error.” This chapter is called “refuting what is right.” Now, because the error of the heretics was set against our own correctness, once error no longer stands, correctness has no reason to remain either. Likewise, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, true and false, even the “within principle” and “outside principle,” “with attainment” and “without attainment”—all follow the same pattern. Śākyamuni’s entire teaching career was the same: from the Deer Park onward, he pursued the various heretics until, by the time he reached the twin sāla trees, the erroneous paths of the six teachers had vanished, and Śākyamuni’s own “correct teaching” was also laid to rest. Āryadeva is the same: earlier he eliminated external error; now he quiets internal correctness. Just as when Master Hu’s medicine disappears, Master Hu himself withdraws—such is the case here.

Seventh: Earlier, the refutation targeted individual teachers. This chapter refutes all heretics in general.

Eighth: In terms of persons, earlier we refuted heretics attached to existence; now we refute heretics attached to emptiness. Earlier we refuted the Sarvāstivādins; now we refute the Vaipulya school. Earlier we refuted those with abundant craving; now we refute those with abundant views. As the *Great Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra* says: “Those with abundant craving cling to existence; those with abundant views cling to emptiness.”

Ninth: Earlier sections were genuine refutations. This chapter is called “explanatory refutation.” Explanatory refutation means: when we break a mistaken view, it is like stopping a vision of water—we call it “breaking,” but in fact there is no actual water to break. Hence, it is called “explanatory refutation.”

Tenth: Earlier sections were genuine refutation. This chapter is called “discriminating refutation.” Why so? The ninety-six heretical schools refute one another; the five hundred Lesser Vehicle masters refute one another; even those of the Greater Vehicle with attachments refute one another—and in each case, the more forceful intellect wins while the weaker one loses. Now, Āryadeva also refutes heretics, but he differs from those teachers. Those teachers all have minds that grasp something and words that settle on positions, hence their refutation of others. Āryadeva’s mind relies on nothing and his words settle nowhere—therefore he is beyond both refuting and not refuting. But because misconceptions appear to exist yet yield nothing when searched for, we speak of “refutation”; there is actually nothing refuted. Thus, he differs from those teachers.

In the fourth year of the Daye era (608 CE), facing the three kinds of treatise masters in Chang’an—those of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, the *Daśabhūmika*, and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*—who held the principle of the two selflessnesses and the three natures-without-self-nature as their main doctrine, I established this chapter precisely to refute them. It should rightly be called the chapter “Refuting the Two Selflessnesses” and “Refuting the Three Natures-without-Self-Nature.” How do we know? The chapter “Refuting the Self” clarifies the selflessness of persons; from “Refuting Oneness” onward, the selflessness of phenomena is established. Now, when we say “refuting emptiness,” we are refuting the emptiness of both persons and phenomena—is that not refuting the two selflessnesses? This was Āryadeva’s own intent—do not blame the lecturer. As for the “Refuting the Three Natures-without-Self-Nature” chapter: you hold the defiled realm of saṃsāra, consciousness, and so forth as the “dependent” and “discriminated” natures, and nirvāṇa as the “perfected” nature. All three natures were already refuted above. Now, refuting emptiness—how is this not refuting the three natures-without-self-nature? Again, this is the treatise-master’s own explanation, not something I have fabricated out of thin air.

Question: If both the two selflessnesses and the three natureless natures are refuted, what then is being pointed to?

Answer: How could the Path be something like self or selflessness, nature or naturelessness? The fivefold negation and its meaning should be understood from this alone.

Now, let me explain the purpose of this chapter. It not only clarifies the significance of Venerable Deva's (Āryadeva's) appearance in the world but also reinforces our understanding of Venerable Nāgārjuna's emergence. People often studied Nāgārjuna's four treatises without grasping their true intent. Therefore, after Deva refuted the non-Buddhist teachers, he composed this treatise to illuminate the true purpose behind Nāgārjuna's teachings. Having covered the reasons for Deva's and Nāgārjuna's appearances, we also touch upon the overarching intentions of Śākyamuni Buddha's entire teaching career, as well as those of all Buddhas throughout the ten directions and three times.

Furthermore, this chapter addresses the fundamental issue of correct understanding versus delusion. People following various Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna schools claim that one uses wisdom to eliminate delusions—delusion being the object to overcome, wisdom the agent that overcomes. Thus, unobstructed wisdom directly cuts through delusion in its path, and liberation confirms this victory. They speak of unobstructed wisdom destroying delusion directly and liberation blocking it from another angle, even claiming that Buddha's wisdom extinguishes all obstacles. This chapter establishes that there is neither establishment nor refutation, revealing that there is no delusion to be eliminated—so what wisdom could there be to refute it? This is why this chapter was written.

Additionally, the chapter explains the meaning of repentance found in various Mahāyāna scriptures. People often say, "I have committed countless wrongdoings since beginningless time, and now I wish to repent." They see wrongdoing as something to be destroyed and repentance as the power that destroys it. But this kind of repentance is actually a transgression itself! How do we know? The very concept of something being destroyed and something else doing the destroying is a non-Buddhist view. To claim that repentance is the destroyer and wrongdoing is the destructible—isn't that the same non-Buddhist fallacy? This teaching is truly only appropriate for those ready to grasp deeper truth. The great master of the mountains once said, "When leaving the lecture hall, do not speak to anyone." The reason is precisely this—fearing that listeners might develop doubts or slander upon hearing such profound teaching.

Finally, this chapter aims to explain the essential purity and non-arising nature taught in Mahāyāna scriptures. What does "non-arising" mean? Originally, no person arises, no phenomenon arises—so what is there to establish? And ultimately, nothing ceases—so what is there to refute? Thus, without establishment and without refutation, we arrive at the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing. This also explains why these scriptures say we neither cut off afflictions nor dwell with them—because without establishment, there is no "dwelling with," and without anything to destroy, there is no "cutting off." All such similar meanings can be understood in this light. When Jizang (Master of the Three Treatises) previously lectured on this chapter in the Jiangnan region, he offered seventeen points for consideration. But memory fades with age, so here I merely mention one or two among them.

The chapter on "Breaking Emptiness" has two main meanings. First, various non-Buddhist teachers hold that all things truly exist, yet when they seek an ultimate reality above, they find nothing—thus both self and phenomena become empty, and they fall into a mistaken view of emptiness. Now we break this mistaken notion of emptiness that outsiders cling to, hence it is called "Breaking Emptiness." As the Nirvana Sutra says, "Sentient beings give rise to views in two kinds: one is nihilism, the other is eternalism." It also says, "It is because of eternalism that nihilism arises, and because of nihilism that eternalism arises." The reasoning is that clinging to permanence gives rise to a view of annihilation, and clinging to annihilation gives rise to a view of permanence.

Second, in the earlier chapters of this treatise, the author first showed how relying on merit abandons wrongdoing, and relying on emptiness abandons merit. From the chapter "Breaking the Self" through "Breaking Permanence," he sought to show that neither self nor phenomena have any true foundation, thereby establishing the meaning of emptiness. Once emptiness is established, abandoning merit becomes clear. For those of sharp faculties among the non-Buddhists, this gate of emptiness leads directly to the correct path. But those of duller faculties become attached to emptiness itself, and then emptiness ceases to be a gate. This present chapter breaks that attachment to emptiness, allowing them to awaken and enter, hence it is called "Breaking Emptiness."

Question: Emptiness is a non-existent thing—what is there to break? As the non-Buddhists mock Deva: "Like a fool trying to break open space, it is only futile effort." So why say we break emptiness?

Answer: We break the disease of clinging to emptiness; that is what is meant by "breaking emptiness." There is no actual emptiness to break.

Question: If so, it should be called the "Chapter on Breaking the Disease," not the "Chapter on Breaking Emptiness."

Answer: The disease is the subjective clinging; emptiness is the object clung to. If we called it "Breaking the Disease," then all ten chapters would be about breaking disease. Here we use the object—emptiness—to reveal the subjective disease of clinging, hence the name "Breaking Emptiness."

Question: Earlier, the author broke the non-Buddhists' view of existence, and they conceded. Now in this chapter, when they challenge Deva on emptiness, why is he able to respond?

Answer: The outsiders had existence to be broken, so they were defeated. The author has no non-existence to be faulted, so he remains untroubled.

Question: Does this chapter only break emptiness, or does it also break the four propositions?

Answer: All four propositions regarding emptiness are broken. But since the previous eight chapters broke views of existence, this chapter now clarifies the breaking of emptiness. Furthermore, "empty and existent," "neither empty nor existent," or "both empty and existent" — all of these are forms of existence. Only when none of the four propositions apply is it called emptiness. The breaking of emptiness in this treatise covers all propositions, both within and outside these four.

Question: If all four propositions, inside and out, are broken, then there should be nothing to uphold.

Answer: Breaking these various views, inside and out, leads one to awaken to the true nature of all things—that itself is the upholding.

Question: If so, we should only uphold the true nature, and not uphold the teaching gateways.

Answer: Teachings are meant to convey principle. Once one sees the moon, what need is there for the pointing finger?

Question: If so, then later there should be no need to explain the two truths.

Answer: For those who fully understand, there is no need for the two truths either. Moreover, having thoroughly broken the non-Buddhists' four propositions without remainder, the obstructions are removed, and only then can the two truths be clearly explained.

The text is divided into two parts: first, refuting the nihilistic emptiness held by non-Buddhists; second, presenting the middle way of the two truths as the final conclusion. The reason for these two parts is that from the beginning of the treatise up to this point, we have refuted the view that things exist. Now this chapter goes on to refute the view that things are empty.

However, this attachment to emptiness is also an obstacle to the two truths of the Buddha. It is necessary to first clear away these obstructions before the two truths can be explained. Moreover, in the previous refutation of existence and emptiness, we clarified that things are neither existent nor empty, which is the true meaning of the middle way. Only after establishing that things are neither existent nor empty can we provisionally speak of emptiness and existence. This provisional designation of emptiness and existence is meant to reveal the non-dual path that is neither empty nor existent—thus the explanation of the middle way through the two truths.

Furthermore, after the refutation of existence and emptiness, outsiders fell into a nihilistic view. So the two truths are taught to rescue them from that nihilistic mindset. Also, the earlier refutation showed that the four propositions—existence, emptiness, both, and neither—are ultimately without any reality, which is the ultimate truth. Next, we clarify that what is ultimately without existence is nevertheless conventionally spoken of as existing—this is the worldly truth. Thus, the Buddha taught according to the two truths, and the author of this treatise, following the Buddha, also relies on the two truths. If one speaks apart from the two truths, it is delusion. Therefore, first the ultimate truth is explained, then the worldly truth.

But one should carefully observe the text itself, not trust what others say.

To sum up this entire treatise, there are five levels of meaning: The first section, from the beginning of the treatise, refutes what outsiders have established—this is the first level. At the start of this chapter, there is a refutation of that refutation—this is the second level. Next, from "then there should be things existing, existing in dependence on each other," onward—this refutes the outsiders' claim that the author of the treatise ends up with something that remains—this is the fourth level. Next, from "if emptiness, there should be no speaking," onward—this deals with outsiders who fall into nihilism and fail to recognize the two truths—this is the fifth level.

These five levels are not only used in this treatise. One should observe all Buddhist teachings—the six sense objects, the four postures, all activity and stillness—in terms of these five levels. The reason for having these five levels is that one must grasp them with precision. They can help one escape the subtle obstructions of a bodhisattva. The moment any view of self, of dharmas, of birth and death, or of nirvana arises, one's mind is already straying from the path—that is called being an "outsider" (literally, one outside the Way). That is "establishment." From the beginning of the treatise, we have refuted this kind of establishment, which is why it is called "refuting attachment." This is the meaning of the first level.

Next, someone might think: "There is a correct contemplation of no-birth that refutes what was established above. What was established above is the object of refutation, and the correct contemplation of no-birth is the agent of refutation." Having this thought, one falls into the duality of agent and object, and the mind of refuting and establishing arises. Therefore, the second level clarifies that birth-and-death and nirvana were never actually objects of refutation, nor was there ever a correct contemplation of no-birth that served as an agent of refutation. Both agent and object are products of conceptual attachment. This is the meaning of the second level.

Outsiders then say: "If there is no birth-and-death or nirvana as objects of refutation, and no correct contemplation of no-birth as the agent of refutation, then there is no right or wrong, no inner or outer, and everything is destroyed—this is a view of great nihilism!" Thus we clarify that dharmas never actually came into being, so what is there to refute? If you arbitrarily say they "exist" and arbitrarily say they are "refuted," attributing error to us, then you are the one who is destroying the Dharma. Hence the third level: nothing was ever established, nothing is ever refuted.

Outsiders then say: "If there is no establishment or refutation at all, how is it that you never fail to answer a challenge, and never have a challenge you cannot overcome? Since you can handle all objections, there must be some wonderful method you possess—so you do end up with something that remains." Thus the author clarifies: if there were even one thing that did not exist, then one could speak of "remaining." But since there is not a single thing that does not exist, how could there be any single thing that remains? This is the meaning of the fourth level.

Outsiders then say: "If we may not preserve even a hair's breadth of existence, and may not negate even a hair's breadth of non-existence, then how do the Buddhas of the three times teach the twelve divisions of the scriptures and the eighty-four thousand Dharma stores to guide people?" Therefore, next we explain that although things are ultimately neither existent nor non-existent, the Buddha nevertheless speaks provisionally for the sake of sentient beings, following worldly conventions. This is the fifth level, which explains the two truths.

Among these five levels, the first belongs to the previous nine chapters, the fifth belongs to the second section of this chapter, and the remaining three are contained in the first section of this chapter, forming three sub-points.

This treatise was originally based on the old interpretation of Chang'an. In earlier days in Jiangzuo, it was often said: "The tradition of Guanhe (the old Central Asian transmission) was later perfected. Those who do not study this treatise often hold onto one-sided views." To address this ailment, I too will present these four levels. The first level refutes the two kinds of selflessness and the threefold absence of nature.

The second level: outsiders then say: "The 'Emptiness Chapter' refutes the three natures, and the 'Emptiness Chapter' refutes the three absences of nature. If the three natures and three absences of nature, the two selves and two selflessnesses—all are refuted—then you are one who destroys the Dharma and extinguishes the Buddha's teaching." Thus the answer is: "You see something established and something refuted, something born and something ceased—so you are the one who destroys the Dharma. I have never established anything, nor refuted anything, never brought anything into being, nor ceased anything—so I am not one who destroys the Dharma."

The third level: "If you say that because I have establishment and refutation, birth and cessation, my position is wrong, and because you have no establishment or refutation, no birth or cessation, your position is right—then you have something you grasp and rely upon. How can you say you are without support and without attainment?" The answer: "You suppose that I have support and attainment, but I have never had even a hair's breadth of a dharma to support or attain."

The fourth level: "If there is no support or attainment, then why do the scriptures say that from the Dharma-body flowed the twelve divisions of scriptures and the eighty-four thousand Dharma stores, guiding sentient beings to cultivate causes and attain buddhahood?" The answer: "This is merely the Buddha's conventional speech. The ultimate path has never uttered a single word—how much less eighty-four thousand Dharma stores! The *Sutra of the Doubtful Image of the Dharma* says: 'From the first attainment of enlightenment to final nirvana, he never spoke a single sentence, nor did he liberate a single person. It is sentient beings themselves who see him speak and liberate.'" This is using the old Chang'an interpretation to answer the later Yogācāra scholars, and others.

Within the first two questions and answers, which refute the refutation itself, there are two parts: The first refutes the outsiders' claim that the author of the treatise uses "emptiness" to refute "existence," thus refuting the outsiders' empty refutation. The second question-answer refutes the outsiders' claim that the author uses "existence" to refute all dharmas, showing that there is no such refutation.

Again, the first question-answer refutes the outsiders' claim that the author uses a conventional refutation relying on conditions; the second question-answer refutes the outsiders' claim that the author uses a contrastive refutation based on opposing conditions. Again, the first question-answer refutes the outsiders' claim that the author uses "correct" to refute "incorrect"; the second question-answer refutes the outsiders' claim that the author borrows "incorrect" to refute "incorrect."

All possible agents of refutation and objects of refutation fall within these three pairs. Now we clarify that there has never actually been such an object of refutation, nor has there ever been such an agent of refutation.

In the first exchange, the question comes first and then the answer. The question has two meanings: "Outsider says: 'There must be things, for they refute existence'—this is refuting the agent of refutation from the standpoint of existence. There are five points: (1) If there is an agent of refutation, then there is an object of refutation. Therefore, since all things exist, one should not say they are empty. (2) You have an agent of refutation, and I have an object of refutation. Both exist. But since my object is refuted by your agent, your agent is also refuted. If so, then Āryadeva is no different from ordinary people. How can you say that the outsider is the object and the insider is the agent? (3) Both agent and object exist. If the agent refutes the object, then the object should also refute the agent. Then the insider becomes the object, and the outsider the agent. (4) Both agent and object exist, and both being objects of refutation, there is no agent. If there is no agent, there is no object. If so, there is neither agent nor object—so where is the victory or defeat? (5) If both agent and object exist, then the three emptinesses are set up in vain, and the meaning of giving up merit is destroyed. If giving up merit is destroyed, nothing can be accomplished."

"Or, 'if there is no refutation, then things exist'—this is refuting the agent of refutation from the standpoint of non-existence. Also five points: (1) If there is no agent of refutation, what refutes me? Since there is no agent, my position stands again. (2) If there is no agent of refutation, existence and non-existence are relative. In the absence of an agent, there is then an object. (3) If there is no agent of refutation, but I have an object my object means I hold a view of existence; your lack of an agent means you hold a view of emptiness. Then I am a Sarvāstivādin, and you are a Vaiśeṣika—both are at fault. (4) I have an object of refutation, so I do not lose cause and effect. You have no agent of refutation, so you have no merit or demerit. Therefore, better to hold a view of self than to grasp at emptiness wrongly. "It is not because of this view that one falls into the evil paths"—so holding a view has the lighter fault, while clinging to nothingness is the most serious. (5) If there is no agent of refutation, then there is no establishment of the correct path. How can you set up the Three Treatises and establish the true teaching?"

"Insider says: 'Refutation is like what is refutable'—this answers the difficulties of existence and non-existence above. Now we do not answer with existence, nor with non-existence. If we answered with existence, we would fall into the difficulty of existence; if with non-existence, we would fall into the difficulty of non-existence. Nor do we answer with neither existence nor non-existence, for that would fall into foolish speech and be blunt and dull. Nor do we remain silent, for the outsider would take silence as having no answer.

The answer here throws the question back at the outsider. You saw me establish above, and now you see me refute. So this refutation and establishment are thrown back to you. The word 'like' has two meanings: (1) The 'like' of conceptualization—you conceptualized an object of refutation above, and now you conceptualize an agent of refutation. (2) The 'like' of refutation—above, when we searched for an object of refutation in your position, we found none. Now, when we search for an agent of refutation in your position, we also find none.

Moreover, this difficulty is stronger than the previous one. Above, you supposed there was an object of refutation, and we searched your position and found none. Now you suppose there is an agent of refutation. But you yourself refute that agent of refutation using existence and non-existence. Therefore, this agent of refutation is self-refuted; we do not need to refute it.

Also, you use existence and non-existence to refute the one who establishes an agent of refutation—that does not concern me. If I had established an agent of refutation, I could accept your question. But since I do not establish any agent of refutation, I do not accept your question. This is like the discussion in the *Twelve Gates Treatise*.

Also, you ask whether there is an agent of refutation or not. We now turn this question of existence and non-existence back at you: Do you have an object of refutation, or do you not? If you have an object, why was none found above? If you have no object, then you yourself are the object. Since there is no object, who is asking about the agent? Also, if the agent of refutation exists, it is still one of your existents. If it does not exist, it is still one of your non-existents. You have an object, and that object is refuted. But the agent, being existent, is also an object. Then you have no agent and no object—so what are you asking about?

Also, since nothing was ever established above, what is there to refute now? You were never established—what have I ever refuted? Now, suddenly asking about the existence or non-existence of the agent of refutation is like someone saying: "Cut off my horse's horn with your rabbit-horn knife." Having lost the rabbit horn, now they are looking for the horse horn.

"Refutation is like what is refutable" also means: if the agent of refutation exists, it exists in the same way that the object of refutation exists. If the agent does not exist, it does not exist in the same way. Thus, in all five cases, the agent is like the object.

"Refutation is like what is refutable" also means: both the refutation and the object of refutation that you conceptualize are your own concepts, and thus both are refutable. Hence, "refutation is like what is refutable."

Also: first there must be a thing, and then we can speak of refuting it and being able to refute it. If there was never any thing, what can we speak of refuting? Like flowers in the sky—what is there to refute?

Question: If indeed there is no dharma to refute, but you refute the disease of attachments—then there is a disease to refute. Even if there is no water to refute, stopping the thought of water—shouldn't there still be a refutation?

Answer: You say "the thought of water is non-existent" and "the thought itself is existent," hence you make this question. But just as your thought of water is like the water you think of, what is there to refute?

The commentary has two parts: first, describing the outsider's position; second, answering the outsider's difficulty.

"You are attached to refutation" (the text says): this means that the outsider, though there was truly nothing to refute, became attached to a refutable object. And though there was truly no agent of refutation, he now becomes attached to an agent. This is the heavy offense of a dull-rooted person.

Another explanation: there are four kinds of delusion in the outsider. First, what does not exist, he asserts exists—that is the first delusion. Second, in this chapter, though there is no refutation, he thinks there is—the second delusion. Third, he then uses the two refutations of existence and non-existence to refute this refutation—the third delusion. Fourth, all three of these are merely projections of the outsider himself, yet he attributes them to the author of the treatise—the fourth delusion. All four delusions are thrown back at him in response.

Next, Vasubandhu uses the outsider's two difficulties as the author's double answer. This is like not moving a single soldier or drawing a single sword, yet making the enemy army collapse. This is now in the commentary.

"With the dharmas of existence and non-existence, he wants to refute this refutation"—this shows that the outsider, self-supposing that there is a refutation, then uses existence and non-existence to refute his own refutation. This is a loss within a loss, a delusion within a delusion. It has nothing to do with us.

"Don't you know..."—this is the second answer to the outsider's difficulty. There are six turns of meaning:

First, granting a hypothetical agent of refutation: if the meaning of refutation were established, then everything would be empty. Why? Because once something is called "refuted," both the agent and the object are refuted—so everything is empty. "Refutation" is thus another name for emptiness.

"If this refutation exists" (second line)—the outsider says: if refutation is established, then this refutation exists, and you fall into my difficulty of existence. So now we clarify: if this refutation exists, it already falls into being refutable itself. So why ask whether it exists?

"If this refutation does not exist" (third point)—the outsider says: if the agent of refutation falls into being an object, then there is no agent, and you fall into my difficulty of non-existence. So now we clarify: since the agent does not exist, the object also does not exist. There is no outside and no inside—who is there to challenge?

"Like saying there is no second head" (fourth point)—the outsider says: if both agent and object of refutation are non-existent, why did you above refute my self (puruṣa) and even refute my dharmas? Since you refuted my person and dharmas, we know there were persons and dharmas to refute—so there is an agent of refutation. How then can you say that refutation and object are together non-existent? So now we clarify: it is like saying "there is no second head." We do not, because of refutation, say there was a head. The second head was originally non-existent. Your self and dharmas are the same: not because we refuted them do they come into existence. They were originally non-existent. Since the object was originally non-existent, how could there be an agent?

"Like a person saying 'none'" (fifth point)—the outsider says: if the second head was originally non-existent, then the agent of refutation is also originally non-existent. If so, one should not speak of "non-existence." But since you now speak of "non-existence," that is a "non-existence" that negates something. With such a negation, there is something to be negated. So there are dharmas to be negated, and there is the negating act—hence an agent and an object of refutation. So now we clarify: it is like a person saying "none." This "none" is an actual absence—there is nothing that negates and nothing that is negated, so it is called "none." It is not that there is one "none" that negates something else.

"Refutation and the refutable are also thus" (sixth)—this is the final, comprehensive answer, combining all the preceding points.

"You claim that dharmas must exist because we grasp at this and that."

The previous section refuted the opponent’s claim that the author used emptiness to refute existence. Now we address the opponent’s second claim: that the author used existence to refute existence.

First comes the question, then the answer. The question has two parts: 1. "Dharmas must exist"—this establishes what is to be refuted. 2. "Because we grasp at this and that"—this establishes the means of refutation.

The opponent says: "You used emptiness to refute existence, but then you said there is no emptiness. This means you used existence to refute existence. Also, you said you would use your own reasoning to refute me, but then you said you have no reasoning of your own to use against me. If so, you should use my reasoning to refute my reasoning."

This same pattern applies to concepts like having attainment versus no attainment, internal versus external, and so on.

There are two types of refutation: 1. Refutation through reliance on objects—seeking the object externally and finding it has no basis. This is the first question and answer. 2. Refutation through reliance on opposing views—this is what we see in the current passage.

**Question:** Why not say "grasping at oneness refutes difference" or "grasping at difference refutes oneness," instead of saying "grasping at this and that"?

**Answer:** The terms "oneness" and "difference" are narrow in scope, while "this" and "that" are broader. "This" refers to permanence, "that" to impermanence; "this" refers to samsara, "that" to nirvana. This pattern applies to all such pairs.

The commentary mentions only the conceptual grasping of oneness and difference because these are the main doctrines of those schools.

The inner text says: "Oneness is not what is grasped, and difference is likewise so."

Above, we clarified that emptiness is not used to refute existence—that was the opponent's own assumption. Now we clarify that existence is not used to refute existence—this also arises from the opponent's own assumptions.

Above, we did not use correctness to refute error. Now we do not use error to refute error.

Furthermore, when we search within your own framework for oneness or difference, we cannot find them. So what is there to grasp?

If I grasped at oneness, I would be like the Sāṃkhya school. If I grasped at difference, I would be like the Vaiśeṣika school. If I grasped at both oneness and difference, I would be like the Lohāyana school. If I grasped at neither oneness nor difference, I would be like the Ājīvika school. Not being any of these four teachers, I have nothing to grasp.

Also, Āryadeva is not identical to the four schools, so he says "not one." He is not different from them either, so he says "not different." If you could actually find the four schools, you could discuss whether he is same or different. But when you search for them and find nothing, how can you speak of sameness or difference?

Moreover, originally there is no oneness or difference—these are deluded perceptions. In the previous discussion, I wanted to stop deluded thinking, so I used delusion to break delusion. But in reality, there is no delusion to borrow and no delusion to break.

**Question:** If you say "using delusion to break delusion," then who borrows the delusion? If there is a borrower, there must be something borrowed.

**Answer:** If you ask this question, you should know that the borrowing is like what is borrowed. Because of you, you call your position "what is borrowed" and call me "the borrower." This all comes from your own assumptions—I have never been a borrower.

**Question:** If so, then why did you speak of "borrowing" in the previous discussion?

**Answer:** The mind arises from the idea of mind; an image arises from the idea of an image. The notion of borrowing arises from the idea of borrowing.

The commentary explains this in two parts: 1. The first part explains the inner text's universal application. 2. The "Furthermore" section teaches how to make a rebuttal.

"If someone says you have nothing to grasp"—this is a hypothetical scenario, clarifying that the other person has nothing to grasp. "I grasp at oneness and difference"—this is the other person establishing their own position of oneness and difference. "If there is such a question, it should be refuted thus"—meaning you should use oneness and difference to refute someone who grasps at existence.

The point here is to show that the author does not grasp at oneness or difference, so you cannot use oneness or difference to challenge the author. However, if another person grasps at oneness or difference, you may use oneness or difference to refute them.

Another explanation: "If someone says you have nothing to grasp, I grasp at oneness and difference"—this is a hypothetical external question to the inner self: "Do you have nothing to grasp?"

The inner self answers: "I have nothing to grasp."

The external says: "I was afraid you might use a doctrine to refute me. Since you have nothing to grasp, I myself grasp at oneness and difference. Why should I fear you refuting me?"

"If there is such a question, it should be refuted thus"—this teaches the inner self how to answer the external.

Even though I have nothing to grasp, that does not mean I cannot borrow oneness and difference to refute you. How could you possibly be without fear?

Outer: "Since you refute the doctrines of others, you are a refuter." From the very beginning of the treatise, the first refutation addressed the opponent who claimed there was something to refute. Now, in this second part, the opponent claims that the treatise master himself is a refuter. The intention behind this question is: From the start of the treatise, we have refuted what is to be refuted. At the beginning of this chapter, in two rounds, we further refute the refuter. Thus, we refute both the refuter and the refuted. When all dharmas are touched and found nonexistent, and when there is no path through refutation, the master becomes a "refuter." Moreover, earlier, refuting what is to be refuted revealed that there is no external, erroneous doctrine. Since the chapter's beginning, refuting the refuter refutes even the internal, correct doctrine. Whether it is incorrect or correct, whether it involves attainment or non-attainment—everything is refuted. Hence, the master is called a "refuter and a guilty party."

Inner: "You are the refuter." In my understanding, there is no refutation to be refuted within me, so I am not a refuter. You cling to doctrines and cling to refutation, so you are the refuter. Moreover, you, by clinging to this view, refute true reality. If you refute true reality, the Three Jewels, the Four Noble Truths, and everything else are all refuted. Thus, you are the refuter. I have no clinging and am in accord with true reality, so I do not refute true reality and refute nothing at all. Hence, I am not a refuter. Furthermore, you wish to establish yourself by refuting others, so you are a refuter. I neither establish myself nor refute you, so I am not a refuter. If your doctrine had been established from the start, you could say I refute it and call me a refuter. But your doctrine was never established—its non-establishment is itself a matter of your own failure, so you are the refuter. Moreover, all dharmas are neither refuted nor unrefuted. You see refutation and non-refutation, so you are the refuter. I do not see refutation or non-refutation, nor do I see or not see. Therefore, I am not a refuter.

Outer: "Because you refute others' doctrines, your own doctrine becomes established." The treatise master said above that establishing oneself and refuting others makes one a refuter. But I have nothing to establish, so I am not a refuter. The opponent now asks: In any contest, victory must face defeat, and submission must face vindication. Since I have fallen into defeat, you should be the victor. Since my doctrine has been refuted, your doctrine is established. Thus, since you refute others and establish yourself, you are a refuter. I am merely refuted and establish nothing, so I am not a refuter. Even if you do not say your doctrine is established when you refute others, when others' doctrines are destroyed, your doctrine naturally comes to stand. Moreover, with your mouth you refute others' doctrines while in your mind you establish your own. If your mind does not establish your doctrine, why would you refute others with your mouth? The previous three rounds of questions and answers showed that the treatise master was refuting. The master in every case said he refuted nothing. Now the opponent says: If there is no refutation, then there is establishment. This is using "being" to contrast "non-being."

Question: Above it was said that if the inner has no refutation then the outer has establishment. How is this different? Answer: Above it meant that the inner lacks refutation and the outer gains establishment. Here it means that if the inner lacks refutation, the inner itself gains establishment. Hence, this differs. The opponent further presses: If the refuted person breaks down and does not become established, then darkness would break down, but light would not arise. If light does not arise, how can darkness still be broken? If understanding is not born, how can delusion be eliminated? The opponent then turns the fault back on the treatise master. The master said, "You are the refuter." Since you label me a refuter, I become wrong and you become right by your very reasoning. Thus, you assert yourself and deny others, giving rise to judgments of right and wrong. Therefore, you are the refuter. I see you refuting others, so I merely repeat your words. How am I the refuter? Furthermore, you have always explained dependent arising by saying that "non-being" summons "being," and "being" summons "non-being." Since you claim that non-establishment summons establishment, and non-refutation summons refutation, if you say non-establishment does not summon establishment and non-refutation does not summon refutation, you again fall into the error of intrinsic nature. Also, does your refutation aim at something or at nothing? If it aims at nothing, you should not revere anything. Why do you revere the Three Jewels? If it aims at something, then there is something being established.

Inner: "Establishment and refutation are not one." Throughout this entire passage, there are three kinds of responses; this is the first. If you say that once my doctrine is refuted yours is established, then establishment and refutation would be identical. Victory and defeat, submission and vindication, would also have to be identical. But establishment and refutation are not one—how can you say that once my doctrine is refuted, yours is established? Hence, the opponent gets stuck on the difficulty of the unity of establishment and refutation. The treatise master also avoids the fault of self-clinging. If establishment and refutation were one, there would be four faults: (1) Both would be refutation. (2) Both would be establishment. (3) If establishment and refutation were the same, and establishment is establishment only when refutation is not, then likewise refutation would only be refutation when establishment is not. This would make refutation refutation and establishment non-refutation, or vice versa, which results in differences—contradicting unity. (4) Since there is establishment and refutation, they are not one.

Now respond to the earlier difficulties in sequence. You first said that if others' doctrines are broken, your own is established by reasoning. Then establishment and refutation would be one. If you hold that establishment and refutation are one, when you refute me, you also refute yourself—so how can you say your refutation of me establishes you? And when I am established, you too are established—so how can you say my establishment is your refutation? Moreover, in direct perception, when one thing is being established, there is no refutation; when it is being refuted, there is no establishment. How can you say that refutation is establishment? If you say that the destruction of delusion is itself the arising of understanding, then you are still stuck in this difficulty of making establishment and refutation identical. If you say delusion destroys itself and understanding arises by itself, as when darkness perishes and a lamp appears, then destruction and establishment are different. How can you say that when your doctrine is destroyed, mine is established? Furthermore, we observe that when darkness is destroyed, a lamp appears—but such a thing has never occurred here. When your doctrine is destroyed, when could it be that my doctrine is established? Moreover, the earlier reasoning already refuted the idea that darkness can be destroyed and a lamp can appear. Why bring it up again? As for your earlier difficulty: "If I have no refutation, I should still have establishment"—if refutation does not exist, how could establishment exist? If refutation does not exist, then it does not lead to non-existence; if establishment does not exist, then it does not arise from being. What is there to depend on?

To your earlier objection: "If there is something to be saved, then there is something that is established. If there is nothing to be saved, then there should be nothing to revere"—precisely because there is nothing established, there is nothing being saved or asserted. Again, we can respond by analogy: It is only because of wrong views that we speak of asserting the right view. But since there was never any wrong view to refute, how could there ever be a right view to assert? All other difficulties are already resolved by the previous responses.

"Furthermore, establishment brings fear." This second point reasserts that establishment and refutation are not one. Establishment brings fear; refutation brings fearlessness. Since fear and fearlessness differ, establishment and refutation are not the same.

Question: What does this mean? Answer: It is a criticism of the non-Buddhists. You have been trying to establish a doctrine, and since you cannot establish it, you are afraid and dare not assert it. But toward my Dharma you are fearless and want to refute it. Thus you know that establishment and refutation are not one. This statement is made to mock the heretics, not to claim that the treatise master's establishment carries fear while his refutation is fearless.

"If one refutes others' dharmas..." The next passage is a third point, from Vasubandhu's commentary, arising from the opponent's continued insistence through wordplay.

Outer: "By pointing out the faults in others' positions, you establish your own refutation." Question: How is this different from the earlier statement, "Because you refute others' doctrines, your own doctrine is established"? Answer: The former refers to establishing a positive doctrine. Here, "establishment" means establishing the act of refutation itself. Therefore, it differs. You claim that establishment and refutation are not one, so you do not establish any positive doctrine but only refute others. If so, in the end, you still should establish this very act of refutation. And if you establish this refutation, that itself becomes establishing a doctrine. There is also another point: You say establishment and refutation are not one, but you do not deny that there is establishment and refutation. If so, there is still establishment and refutation in the end. If you do not establish any doctrine, you would not refute others. But since you do refute others, your refutation in the end counts as establishment.

Inner: "Because you refute others' dharmas, your own doctrine is established—and with that, nothing whatsoever is established." The opponent thinks the Inner aims to establish refutation. The Inner provisionally concedes: If refuting others' dharmas is the case, then the act of refutation is established. But if this refutation is established, then everything else fails to be established. Why? Whatever is called "refutation" refutes self and others alike. If this refutation is established, then self, others, internal, external—all fail to be established. Since everything is said to lack establishment, my own doctrine falls within "everything," so how can it alone be established? This kind of refutation is another name for ultimate emptiness; hence all things lack establishment. Similarly, if I use my non-levelness to break your non-levelness, and cause you to be level, that is my levelness—so all things are level. Another reading: When you refute others and show they are not established, this is also to show that you yourself are not established. From my perspective, you are "other"; from your perspective, I am "other." Thus all positions are "other." Since it is said that what is "other" is not established, nothing at all is established. This is a forceful refutation, not the main textual intent. Yet there is something correct to this approach in a relative sense: "Because you refute others' doctrines, the act of refutation is established"—that is, when the opponent's thesis is refuted, the act of refutation itself is established. The reason the act of refutation needs to be established is precisely to remedy the attachment of heretics and those with views of attainment, whether lesser or greater vehicle. "Nothing whatsoever is established": originally, because there was an established view, refutation existed. Since establishment is not actually established, there is no established object to depend on, and hence no refutation either. Therefore, it is said: nothing at all is established. This is the meaning of the text.

Outer: "Not so—because it contradicts the world." If you say that both establishment and refutation are empty, and everything is unestablished, then you contradict the world. Who would believe such a teaching? For both inside and outside there are only two options: one is establishment, the other is refutation. Building means establishing one's own view. Refuting means destroying the other's view. For example, Sāṅkhya establishes the oneness of the self and refutes other views. The Satyasiddhi establishes emptiness and refutes the Sarvāstivāda's existence. The Mahāyāna establishes the greater vehicle and refutes the lesser. Or again, one establishes correct views and refutes heretical views. If you have neither establishment nor refutation, this contradicts everyone. Who could believe it?

Inner: "This Dharma is credible to the world." There are several ways to answer this question. Sometimes it is said that the Path is contrary to the ordinary world—so why should it follow mundane conventions? Those who trust the mundane do not trust the Path, and those who trust the Path do not trust the mundane. For example, if one trusts prajñā, one does not trust any dharma as inherently real; if one trusts dharmas as inherently real, one does not trust prajñā. Another response: The reason I seem to contradict the world is this: The ordinary intellect is shallow. It sees existence and nonexistence, refutation and establishment. Because of such seeing, it does not see what the noble ones see and sees what the noble ones do not see. It does not practice what the noble ones practice, and it practices what the noble ones do not practice. Another response: I do not coincide with the world, yet there is nothing to be separate from. Who is the "worldly person"? Who is "I" such that we can be compared as same or different? The opponent might retort: "This very statement that there is neither difference nor sameness is itself a contradiction of the world's assumptions." Then the answer would be: "What thing is used to contradict? Who contradicts? What is contradicted?"

But here the treatise master does not give those answers; instead, he states that the Dharma is credible to the world. This is a matter of resolving the opponent's incredulity by demonstrating what is worthy of faith. The opponent considers the master's statement to be groundless and unbelievable, so the master now clarifies that dharmas arising from causes and conditions are vivid and yet ultimately empty; although ultimately empty, they are fully real as conditioned appearances, and so they can be clearly trusted. Hence, the Middle Treatise says: "Because the world directly sees it, because the world's eye perceives it." Therefore, it is said that this Dharma is credible to the world. The commentary divides into four points: (1) clarifying what is credible, (2) clarifying what is not credible, (3) concluding what is not credible, and (4) concluding what is credible. The first is as in the text.

"You claim..." is the second point, showing what is not credible—the five schools' views are all untrustworthy. The first is the Sāṅkhya school. "Moreover, apart from beams and rafters..." is the second, the Vaiśeṣika school. "Some say the effect is present in the cause..." is the third, the Sāṃmitīya–Lokāyata kind of school. Question: How is this known to be the third teacher's view? Answer: Above, the statement that milk contains curd and the effect is present in the cause was already refuted. Now the text says "some say," so we know this represents a third school. "Some say that dharmas arise apart from causes and conditions" is the fourth, the school of non-causation. "That which is truly empty should not be spoken of in worldly terms" is the fifth, the school of wrong views, which denies dharmas entirely. "Whose claims could anyone trust?" is the third point, concluding what is not trustworthy. "My Dharma is not like this" is the fourth point, concluding what is trustworthy.

Outer: "Since you cling to nothing, your Dharma is established." In all the previous rounds, the opponent sought to catch the treatise master holding even a single thread of a view, without success. Now, however, the Inner claims: "My Dharma of dependent arising is the same as the world." If that is the case, then you no longer cling to intrinsic nature, but you do cling to dependent arising. Thus, there is a doctrine of dependent arising to be caught. Second: If you say you do not cling to intrinsic nature nor to dependent arising and are utterly without grasping, then you are afraid of grasping, and so you cling to non-grasping. This is not clinging to objects, but in that case you cling to non-clinging itself—so you do possess an attachment. Third: If you say there is no clinging and you are neither the same as the world nor different from it, yet in the end you are not different from the world and therefore the same as it—since the world grasps, you must also grasp.

Inner: "Non-clinging is not called clinging—just as 'nonexistent' is not a thing." The response is twofold: first as a teaching in principle, second as a simile. "Non-clinging is not called clinging" is the principle. When I say "non-clinging," I mean the absence of grasping. When I say one is without grasping, there is no grasping at all; it is not that "non-grasping" is something I possess. Thus, neither is there clinging to an object nor clinging to non-clinging. "Just as 'nonexistent'" is the simile. For example, when one says "no thing," there really is no thing. In the same way, when I say "no clinging," clinging really does not exist. Just as saying "no thing" does not bring a thing into being, saying "no clinging" does not produce clinging. Moreover, since clinging is absent, non-clinging is also absent. Just as the concept of "non-attainment" arises relative to the idea of attainment—once attainment is gone, non-attainment is also gone.

As for the question about dependent arising, there are several modes of response: First, one can simply use dependent arising itself: a dharma born of causes and conditions is from the start tranquil and still—hence there is no trace or location to be found. If there is grasping, it is not genuine dependent arising. Second, sometimes the response is: It is only because there was a notion of intrinsic nature that we speak of dependent arising. Once intrinsic nature is absent, dependent arising is also absent. The same applies to the various combinations of "intrinsic nature" and "dependent arising," to all five possible assertions. Thus all alternatives are dismantled.

Outer: "Since you speak of a signless Dharma, you are one who destroys the Dharma." You say that you do not cling to grasping nor to non-grasping, and even the position of "no grasping" is itself annihilated. Then you destroy everything—thus you are a Dharma-destroying person.

Question: How is this different from the earlier "refuter" criticism? Answer: Earlier, the point was that both refutation and establishment are destroyed—such a one is called a "refuter." Now the charge is that the master does not see refutation or establishment, has nothing to grasp, and further destroys even "non-grasping." This goes one step deeper and is thus different.

Inner: "One who destroys the destroyer is the true destroyer of the Dharma." Within my understanding, there is neither destruction nor non-destruction, so I am not a destroyer of the Dharma. I truly neither destroy nor preserve, and grasp at nothing. You suppose I am destroying something and wish to refute me—then you are the destroyer. That is the explicit meaning here. Also, I teach dependent arising. Dependent arising is the Middle Way and also conventional expression. You now want to destroy dependent arising—this destroys the Middle Way and the conventional, and along with it the Three Jewels, the Four Noble Truths, causality, guilt, and merit. Therefore, you are the Dharma-destroyer. Alternatively, it is also said: Yes, I am a Dharma-destroyer. Why? I destroy all conceptual elaborations and every dharma—hence I am a Dharma-destroyer. Also, I am one who holds the "annihilationist" view—but only in the sense that I annihilate all views. I am also an icchantika, because I exercise no wrongful credulity whatsoever. I am also called mindless, because I put an end to all conceptualization. I am also called mute, because all speech is stilled. Thus, I may be called a Dharma-destroyer. But these are all rhetorical strategies of refutation, not the fundamental meaning of the text.

"Objection: Things must exist because they depend on each other."

In this third section, the opponent argues against the claim that the author of the treatise holds onto any particular thing. This argument has both far-reaching and immediate roots.

From a broader perspective, everything the author discusses involves specific factors—if all things are said to have no foundation, there must be a counterpart that provides that foundation. If the author claims silence, words stand in opposition. If he is neither silent nor speaking, then both speech and silence stand as opposites. If speech and silence exist, then non-speech and non-silence exist as opposites. If he says there is no such thing at all, then even "no such thing" is itself a counterpart. This question is genuinely difficult to answer!

More narrowly, the author previously stated that "others are people who have ceased suffering (are extinguished), while we are not people who have ceased suffering." If this is the case, then "ceased suffering" depends on "not ceased suffering." If there is such dependence, things do exist. How can you claim to hold no position at all? If you truly hold nothing, then who are you arguing with about the cessation of suffering? Without an opposing party, there is no "you who has ceased suffering" and no "we who have not"—your earlier distinction between "us" and "them" falls apart.

**Response: How could there be anything to depend on, since a single unit was already refuted.**

Some might say that "existence" is one side, and since this was already refuted above, what basis is there for dependence? Now, let's be clear: this is not to deny the point entirely—if even a hair's breadth of a thing truly existed from which to establish dependence, then how could we speak of dependence at all? If there were even one minute particle with which to argue for dependence, then that particle, if located within unity, was already refuted in the discussion of unity; if located within difference, was already refuted in the discussion of difference. Furthermore, unity is a number, and its existence has already been denied—since there is no unity, how can there be myriad things to discuss in terms of mutual dependence? Again, when all things are reduced to one: two and one make two, three and one make three—so all are ultimately one, with no multiplicity. Without multiplicity, there is no unity either—so what is this "one" anyway?

This response demonstrates the author stepping forward to meet the challenge, while the opponent, by contrast, retreats to seek answers elsewhere. You argue: "if there is dependence, there must be a thing first, and then dependence can be discussed." Yet we don't even know what single entity you are referring to before raising the question of dependence—thus the mistake is yours.

**Objection: "Your non-establishment is itself an establishment."**

First, according to your earlier reply, existence has been refuted—so you may not be establishing existence, but you must be establishing non-existence. Thus "non-establishment is establishment."

Second, when you claim that even a hair's breadth of a thing has been refuted, you are refraining from asserting any phenomena whatsoever—and in so doing, you are asserting ultimate emptiness. Thus "non-establishment is establishment."

Third, your view that all things are un-established itself ends up being an establishment—just as stating "all dharmas are unborn" means that *prajñā* (wisdom) is not attached to any dharma, and therefore *prajñā* can be an object of attachment. How can you claim total non-attachment?

Fourth, if there is no ground whatsoever for you to stand on, how could you launch all these arguments that force me into endless difficulties? How could you skillfully navigate my challenges so that they fail to land? Since you have this capacity to attack and defend, you must possess some subtle art. If you possess it, that is indeed an establishment.

Fifth, since you have this deep insight, there must be a single point of understanding you have reached. With such a principle available for study, you are able to do what you do.

Furthermore, "non-establishment is establishment" may also suggest that which cannot be called either established or un-established—that is the highest establishment. As the scriptures say: "Not established and not un-established—this is truly good establishment. Neither suffering nor pleasure—this is great bliss." Only through this neither-nor can one truly understand both establishment and non-establishment.

Additionally, "non-establishment is establishment" means you may not have mutual dependence, but you should still have the non-dependent establishment.

The commentary cites: "As when we say there are no horses in a house." The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra* explains: if there are no horses in a shrine, then there exists the fact of "no horses." Likewise, although you claim no establishment, you nevertheless possess this "establishment of non-establishment." Thus, those who delight in emptiness rejoice upon hearing of it, while those who hate emptiness are distressed upon hearing it. From this we see: this very emptiness acts on people's minds.

Moreover, if this principle of emptiness did not exist, then believing in it would bring no merit, and denigrating it would incur no fault. But since it gives rise to both merit and fault, this reality of emptiness surely exists.

**Response: Not so — both existence and non-existence are completely nonexistent.**

If you use this argument to support emptiness, we reply: existence and non-existence are both wholly absent. We are not establishing existence—how then could we be establishing non-existence?

If you say we are producing activity in the mind—since both existence and non-existence are gone, what basis is there for generating thought? As *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way* states: "Since existence and non-existence no longer exist, who is it that perceives them?" Thus both existence and non-existence vanish—objects and the mind that perceives them are both silenced.

If you claim we end up establishing something—if there is no "not-established," how can there be "established," or "established and not-established," or "neither established nor not-established"? If no dharmas are un-attached to, how can wisdom be attached to anything?

If you argue for the non-dependent—when there is mutual dependence, there can be its negation; but since no dependence exists at all, how can there be absence of dependence?

If you insist we possess a subtle art—we do not even see your lack of skill, so how could there be ours? Therefore: existence and non-existence are altogether absent.

**Objection: "Your refutation itself is impossible, because things are already inherently empty."**

This objection has both far-reaching and immediate sources. Far-reaching: it challenges the three kinds of emptiness claimed by the author. If both the self and phenomena are inherently empty, they should not require refutation—if refutation is deemed necessary, then they were not inherently empty to begin with. Alternatively, if things are not empty yet you refute them, you violate the nature of reality. If they are empty yet you refute them, you act like a fool. If they are not empty and you attempt to refute them, they will remain non-empty no matter how much you refute them—it takes two to make a contradiction. If truly empty, then they should never be refuted in the first place—there would be nothing to negate.

Immediate origin: this arises from your proposition that "existence and non-existence are all nonexistent." If existence and non-existence are inherently empty, why treat them as something to be refuted? If they were not inherently empty, how could you say that both exist and do not exist are empty? If they are not empty and need to be refuted, you are logically at fault. If they are already empty and still get refuted, that seems entirely futile.

**Response: Although things are inherently empty, beings are bound because they cling to false perceptions.**

This answers the dilemma from both sides. Although things are inherently self-empty, this resolves one part of the dual objection. Indeed, phenomena have always been empty from the start—there is truly nothing to refute. However, because you outsiders cling to imagined signs, we must refute those delusions. Yet in destroying false views, we destroy nothing real. There can be refutation and emptiness together without contradiction.

The commentary proceeds in three parts: the doctrinal statement, the metaphor, and the application. The doctrinal statement is given above. The metaphor concerns "a foolish person": the opponent criticizes the author for being deluded if he refutes what is already empty. Conversely, we clarify: a fool sees a mirage and thinks there is water—just as the confused outsider, projecting inverted views, sees a self where there is none, sees things where there is nothing, and even sees emptiness where no emptiness exists. We seek to stop his illusion of water; there is actually no water for us to refute. This is "removing the disease but not the object—because the disease deludes, sign and reality are conflated; to characterize this as 'no objects of attachment to remove' is 'not removing things.'"

This same dialogue conveys three major principles:

First, it concerns the very essence of the Path: all phenomena are inherently calm and empty. This inherent emptiness is itself another name for the true Middle Way and is intended as the essential point in all scriptures. Echoing what the elder Master Sengrui said of Dao'an: "Cut a road through the wilderness; mark the profound meaning as inherent emptiness—none but the doctrine of emptiness comes closest to the truth." Our current exchange is precisely about this inherent emptiness. But the outsiders, assuming that if things are inherently empty they need no refutation—that refutation itself disproves inherent emptiness—fail to grasp the meaning. The answer shows: even so, they require refutation for those who cling; but because they are intrinsically empty, the refutation is not a real destruction. This clarifies what it truly means that they are empty in their own nature.

Second, it explains how mistaken perception arises among beings in the six realms of rebirth and the three vehicles. The truth is that emptiness never gives rise to six realms or three vehicles. Beings imagine six realms when there are none and invent three vehicles when none exist—hence appearing differences such as the nine paths. This is why confusion arises.

Third, it clarifies why buddhas and bodhisattvas throughout the ten directions and three times appear to help sentient beings by "removing diseases." They once refuted the six realms; now they refute clinging to the three vehicles. In truth, there are no six realms nor three vehicles to eliminate. They merely calm those false thoughts. This is what it means by "refuting the disease."

But someone may ask: even if what we label "six realms and three vehicles" doesn't exist, is there any real entity that does this perceiving? If "perceiver" truly existed, we could not call it deluded or inverted. Since it is called delusion, it has not a trace of substance—it is on equal footing with its object.

Another objection: Could that which is perceived and perceiver at least have nonexistence? To that we answer: if these two were never real in the first place, how can one even talk of their "existence" or "nonexistence"? Therefore all five modes of speculative categories (existence, nonexistence, both, neither, etc.) are likewise at peace.