---
title: "中論略義 · 觀緣品略義"
description: "《中論略義》是潭影對龍樹菩薩所著《中論》的簡明釋論。龍樹為公元2-3世紀印度中觀派祖師，該論以緣起性空為核心，破除一切自性見，闡釋中道實相。潭影的略義精要提煉《中論》二十七品綱領，以現代語言解析八不中道、二諦等深義，幫助學人契入般若空性。此釋論承襲漢傳佛教傳統，兼具學術嚴謹與實修指導，是研究中觀哲學的重要入門典籍，在當代佛教義理研究與實踐中具有承先啟後的價值。"
url: "https://rushiwowen.co/en/r/cmcxq39dr011tle044yx8xqmh"
---

### 觀緣品略義

> Summary of the Chapter on Observing Conditions

此品略義有三，即說明對於所破的是如何執法和以正理破除之後結論如何，以及如何建立因緣及果。茲約言之：

> This section has three main points: first, it explains how to correctly understand what is to be refuted; second, it shows the conclusion reached after refuting it with proper reasoning; and third, it demonstrates how cause, condition, and effect are established. In brief:

由種生芽及從薪起火等作用，當眼見耳聞之時，若認為因果二法，不僅是唯名安立，而且執為彼名言所安立境之能生、所生，是有自性者，即是對於所破起執之行相。

> When we see a seed sprouting into a shoot, or fire arising from fuel, and we think that the cause and effect are not merely labeled by name, but believe that what is labeled by those names—the producer and the produced—exists inherently, that is the very form of grasping at what is to be refuted.

彼所執境，若許為有，則應觀察：果之生起與因緣法，是自性一？還是自性異？如是觀已，即從果的方面，破所生有自性。又應觀察：因中有果？還是無果？此是從因的方面破能生有自性。總的說明：若有自性，則因緣及果，都不能建立，即以說明破有自性為主。要之，其所以說明破有自性為主者，由於對因果等法，執有自性，是從無始時來，串習所致，欲破除之，非常困難。又彼自性，若已破除，則於無自性上，建立因果，極為容易。因此自宗不以說明於名言中建立因果作用為主。

> Regarding the object that they cling to, if it is claimed to exist, then one should examine: Is the arising of the effect and the law of causes and conditions inherently one? Or are they inherently separate? After contemplating in this way, one refutes the inherent existence of the produced from the perspective of the effect. Furthermore, one should examine: Does the cause contain the effect? Or does it lack the effect? This refutes the inherent existence of the producer from the perspective of the cause. In summary, if inherent existence is asserted, then neither causes and conditions nor effects can be established. Thus, the primary focus is on refuting inherent existence. The reason for emphasizing the refutation of inherent existence is that clinging to inherent existence in phenomena such as causes and effects arises from habitual tendencies accumulated since beginningless time. To eliminate this clinging is extremely difficult. Moreover, once inherent existence is refuted, establishing causes and effects on the basis of emptiness becomes very straightforward. Therefore, our own tradition does not primarily focus on explaining how causes and effects function within conventional reality.

此中破時，純用自生、他生等方式，觀察名言所安立的境是如何有已而破。此亦只是破彼「非唯名言所安立的生」有自性的生，不破「生」者，義甚明顯。因此在各品中於所破上，大半未加簡別語即「非唯名言所安立的」或「有自性的」等，而加簡別語者亦有多處。一處已加，則易了知，其餘未曾明加之處，亦須例加，其理同故。「明句」月稱論師所著的中論釋中說明「無滅亦無生」等與經中所說有滅等義不相違者，此中是說生滅等法，非無漏智所緣境體，只破「勝義生」，不破「世俗生」又對經中所說從四緣生之密意，亦如是釋。破所緣緣，亦是破「勝義中有」，不破「世俗中有」等等。於所破上，加簡別語，最為明顯。加的處所亦多。因此在釋文義時，對於未加簡別之處，不可誤解。「又百論釋」月稱論師著中亦說：「有人認為此種觀察方式，是破一切生，即是說明有為無生者，那末，彼生等法，不成如幻，而成如石女兒，如此推度一切，即成沒有緣生之過。為免此種謬解，不說如石女兒，而說如幻。」此中所說，極為明顯。又「明句」中引「楞伽經」云：「我依無自性生，密意說一切法無生。」

> In refuting here, the method of self-production, other-production, and so forth is used to examine how the objects established by conventional language are said to exist, and then refute them. This refutes only that kind of "production" which is \*not merely established by conventional language\*<note>i.e., production with inherent existence</note>; it does not refute "production" itself. The meaning is quite clear. Therefore, in the various chapters, most of the objects being refuted are not explicitly qualified<note>by phrases like "not merely established by conventional language" or "with inherent existence"</note>, though there are also many places where such qualifications are added. Once it has been added in one place, it is easy to understand that the same qualification must be applied by analogy to other places where it is not explicitly stated, as the reasoning is the same. In the \*Clear Words\*<note>Chandrakīrti's commentary on the \*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā\*</note>, when explaining that there is no contradiction between statements like "there is no cessation and no production" and the scriptural teachings that speak of cessation and so forth, it is clarified that phenomena like production and cessation are not the objects of non-conceptual wisdom. It refutes only \*ultimate production\*, not \*conventional production\*. Similarly, regarding the scriptural teaching that things arise from the four conditions, the same explanation is given. Refuting the object-condition is refuting its \*ultimate existence\*, not its \*conventional existence\*, and so on. The addition of such qualifications to the objects being refuted is most evident here and occurs in many places. Therefore, when interpreting the meaning of the text, one must not misunderstand the passages where such qualifications are not explicitly stated. Furthermore, the \*Hundred Stanzas Commentary\*<note>also by Chandrakīrti</note> states: "Some think that this mode of analysis refutes all production, thereby explaining that conditioned phenomena are unproduced. If that were so, then those phenomena of production and so forth would not be like illusions, but would be like the son of a barren woman. Reasoning in this way about everything would lead to the fault of denying dependent arising. To avoid this misunderstanding, it is said to be like an illusion, not like the son of a barren woman." This explanation is extremely clear. Moreover, the \*Clear Words\* quotes the \*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra\*: "With the intention that things lack inherent existence, I teach that all phenomena are unproduced."

若能破除有自性之因果，即成唯名安立，及唯由名言所安立之因果。如「佛護釋」佛護論師所著的中論釋中第一品初說：「所云生者，唯就『名言中』說。」又於品末亦說：「所云生者，唯是『名言中有』。」由見若許有自性，則因果不能成立；而有損益苦樂作用之因果，誰亦不能否認其有。既不能立為有自性，故許為唯由名言之所安立，方為合理。

> If one can refute the notion of inherently existing cause and effect, then it becomes merely nominal, established only by conventional designation. As stated in the \*Buddhapālita Commentary\* at the beginning of the first chapter: "The term 'arising' is spoken of only in the context of conventional designation." And at the end of the chapter, it also says: "The term 'arising' exists only in the realm of conventional designation." Upon seeing that if inherent existence is asserted, cause and effect cannot be established, yet no one can deny the existence of cause and effect, which has the function of producing benefit and harm. Since it cannot be established as inherently existent, it is reasonable to assert that it is established merely by conventional designation.

由於對所生、能生執有自性之積習極為深厚，故於破此執後，唯於名言所安立中，安立因果，心中固覺不慣；但應思維，安立之法只有二種：前者有自性的若不應理，就應依據後者唯名言安立的安立，故須令心趨向這一方面。有人認為既有所生、能生，就有因果義，若說是唯名安立者即不應理云云。此種想法，不應道理。因為「唯」字，既不遮遣有非名之義，亦不遮遣量所成立之義。又「唯名安立中有」一語，雖說明絕對沒有非由名言所安立的有，然亦非說凡是名言所安立的一切皆有。

> Because the habit of clinging to inherent existence in both the producer and the produced is deeply ingrained, after refuting this clinging, it feels unnatural to establish cause and effect solely within the framework of nominal designation. However, one should reflect that there are only two ways to establish phenomena: if the former<note>inherent existence</note> is unreasonable, one must rely on the latter<note>mere nominal designation</note>. Therefore, the mind should be directed toward this understanding. Some may think that since there are producers and produced, there must be a real causal relationship, and if it is said to be merely nominally established, that would be unreasonable. This line of thinking is not valid. The word "merely" does not negate the existence of meaning beyond names, nor does it negate what is established by valid cognition. Furthermore, the phrase "exists in mere nominal designation" clarifies that there is absolutely no existence not established by names, but it does not assert that everything established by names exists.

由此觀之，從內外因緣而生諸法，如由種子而生芽等，及依根、境而起識等，隨取一個比較明顯的例子，觀察己心是如何執取。次從果品及因品中隨拈一法，用破「有自性」之正理，破除其餘一切自性。若有少許未破，即被此執所縛，不得解脫。再於因果等法見為是唯名安立，而起損益苦樂作用之因果不能說為沒有。故從唯假安立之因而生果是有的，今執此等為有自性，實是顛倒。如此思已而生定解。然而對於因果緣起的定解不應破壞。若謂自宗不立因果，只是就迷亂識前有，立為「世俗中有」者，則是極大錯誤的損減之見。