他義比量品第三
Chapter 3: Inference for Others
他義比量者， 善顯自見義。
其顯所比者， 許為因義境。
唯說自體性， 自所樂不遣。
現義及比量， 信許於自依。
諸正理派說， 謂顯示所立，
義顯不成者； 其不成因喻，
亦應成所立。 若法是所立，
則無有同法； 有法是所立，
則因全無義。 前定詞無義，
後則非所樂。 對論軌者說：
如是說所立， 宗性故非有，
此觀察所樂， 唯返所不樂。
對正理派說： 由宗與因違，
謂宗過非理。 諸未善學者，
說彼異法喻。 此非以其因，
量度其所立， 非相違相應。
所有因似因， 多屬於宗法，
故於因等義， 先廣顯宗法。
宗法於同品， 謂有非有俱；
於異品各三， 有非有及二。
總是所立故， 法有法單獨，
雖非真所立， 是彼一分故，
假說名所立， 由彼俱成法，
而得名言故。 若俱或隨一，
相反或猶豫， 法成非所許。
不許皆能破。 若俱極成者，
能破或能立。 餘者許重成。
有法非能成， 有法及於法，
法亦非有法， 法成法成故。
有法亦如是。 由宗因之語，
應成非所樂， 當知是答彼，
由彼門合故。 說因宗所隨，
宗無因不有， 依第五顯喻，
由合故知因。 若說反破者，
應成為無因， 由二喻成故，
故非別解因。 應非宗法故，
由先有所立。 如是因宗門，
當知說過破。 無異言即此，
於別法宣說。 言同品於品，
不許此有異。 彼餘彼相違，
於二種異品， 無因及相違，
唯由於簡別。 唯同品非有，
雖是同一相， 多義轉應理。
總隨轉非愚。 所量作無常，
作性聞勇發， 無常勇無觸，
依常性等九。 於同有及二，
在異無是因。 翻此名相違，
所餘皆不定。 樂說唯一數，
於相違疑故。 如是疑及因，
見決定為一。 諸具二相者，
許二二非一， 眾多若不違，
尤其於一轉， 若法是不共，
共決定相違， 遍一切於彼，
皆是疑因性。 觀宗法審察，
若所樂違害， 成躊躇顛倒，
異此無似因。 邪證法有法，
自性或差別， 由違害於彼，
此成相違因。 共與差別法，
及所立二種， 初二是猶豫，
餘觀待分三。 由隨行不行，
返隨不成故。 非於一隨行，
及返應成因， 成二者非有，
有亦無俱非。 隨遮其所無，
即成所成義， 彼一餘二轉。
若如轉成者， 由白色德依，
應逆其次第， 了知三二一。
顯示一言故， 反所立於違。
若隨所轉者， 於差別愚蒙。
對論軌者說， 若顯異品無，
便說為因者： 若異品唯無，
不共應成因。 指定唯異無，
唯等遍為因， 非許唯同有，
於一見多義。 若示彼體者，
述因則無能。 如實義未說，
由何相於何， 如超越能知，
不見義能立？ 眼所取等聲，
應成無常因。 若謂未說者，
於何何未說， 俱行於所立？
非爾由二喻， 即見無常等，
豈許餘所立。
諸正理派者說：從同法說喻，彼即成立所立之因。對彼曰：
The Nyāya philosophers say: "From a similar example, that which establishes the proposition is the cause." To this, we reply:
若同法能立， 非分非第五。
謂語應簡別， 於能立非理。
俱應得他性， 彼非同法因。
非彼二過故， 應時亦無他，
各相違害故， 假立亦非有。
故第六於彼， 差別亦無義。
非許一切語， 何許應簡別？
無許為不許， 超越主要聲。
唯異門于總， 非有其特殊，
彼似空異法， 於同應是因。
If the same property can establish, It is not a partial case nor a fifth. The statement should be qualified— But in the basis of establishment, that is unreasonable.
Both would obtain otherness— That is not a cause through the same property. Since neither has those two faults, At that time, otherness also does not occur.
Each mutually contradicts and harms, So even a nominal designation does not exist. Therefore, for the sixth, Even distinctions hold no meaning.
Not all statements are accepted— So why should qualification be imposed? What is not accepted is deemed unaccepted, Surpassing the primary expression.
Only as a different expression for the universal, There is no particularity in it— That resembles emptiness as a separate thing, And should be a cause for the same.
諸勝論者說：彼相應之法是因。對彼曰：
The exponents of the Vaishveshika school claim that the dharmas associated with it are the cause. To them, it is said:
總性應成法， 法有法非宗，
不共亦得成， 宗相應之法。
復次諸不定， 成立有空等，
量式不應立。
The general consequence method, The teaching and its subject are not the thesis. Even the uncommon can be established, As the thesis and its related qualities. Moreover, various uncertainties, Such as establishing emptiness and the like, Should not be set up as logical formulas.
諸數論者說：由彼量式所立差別，比量有二種，謂相應與反破。對彼曰：
The proponents of logic describe two types of inference based on the distinctions established by their methods: correlation and refutation. In response to that:
不知量境故， 所立法能立，
是廣語未說， 不具勝隨行。
語亦度非理， 與宗義相違，
無淨故非有， 異如樹皮等。
隨行皆成者， 有一類隨行，
餘亦唯一果， 親因亦成彼。
非外俱過故。 雖許亦相違，
亦應成不定。 喻由缺所立，
故彼亦非有。 非成由差別，
障礙因非二。 二式亦非理，
最後者相反， 遣一彼非理，
非如具有五。 由破一一敵，
許為後邊者， 敵答無邊際，
應皆成反破。 是為中間頌。
由於論軌中， 未說不成別，
亦未說錯亂， 彼亦有不共，
亦相違決定。 一相違總同，
一不成不共， 未說相反由，
及違害所樂。
Because their measure is unknown, The property to be established and its reasons Are not stated in the extensive texts, And lack the proper accompanying conditions. The words themselves are also unreasonable, Contradicting the tenets of the school. Without purity, they do not exist, Unlike, for example, the bark of a tree. If all accompaniments were complete, Then one kind of accompaniment would suffice; The rest would also have a single result, And the direct cause would also become that. Because it is not faulty with respect to external objects, Even if accepted, it would be contradictory. It would also become indefinite. The example, lacking the established property, Is therefore also nonexistent. It is not established through distinctions, And the obstacle is not a cause for the two. The two forms are also unreasonable; The last one is the opposite, And to refute one is not reasonable, For it is not like possessing the five [conditions]. By refuting each opponent one by one, They are considered to be the later ones. The opponent's replies are without limit, And all should become counter-refutations. This is the middle verse. Because in the treatise on reasoning, The specific case of non-establishment is not taught, Nor is error taught. There is also the uncommon kind, And contradictory determination. One contradiction is generally the same; One non-establishment is uncommon. The reason for opposition is not taught, Nor the contradiction with what is desired.
諸正理派者說：有錯亂者，即是不定。非有差別。說：違宗所許是為相違。餘相違非他。說：為抉擇應時義故，所列舉者，名時相同。此應成不定。說能立與所立無差別故，名同所立。此非不成。說延時而說，名過時者，此是不完全成立所立故。
The Nyaya school says: "When there is confusion, it is uncertainty, not a distinct fault." They say: "Contradicting one's own thesis is a contradiction. Other contradictions are not real contradictions." They say: "What is cited to decide the meaning of the moment is called 'same time.' This should be considered uncertainty." They say: "Because the proof and the proposition are not distinct, it is called 'same as the proposition.' This is not a failure." They say: "Speaking after a delay is called 'too late.' This is because the proposition is not fully established."
若如勝論者， 無有或相違，
相反說不全。
If, as the Vaisheshika school claims, There is no contradiction, Their opposing view is incomplete.